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Today's Daf Yomi

June 4, 2017 | 讬壮 讘住讬讜谉 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Bava Batra 132b

Study Guide Bava Batra 132. A mishna in Peah is quoted: If a husband writes all of his possessions to his son and gives his wife a small portion of land, she loses her rights to her ketuba. 聽Several explanations are given for this opinion among the amoraim. 聽A second opinion is brought in the mishna by Rabbi Yossi that if the woman accepts it even if the husband doesn’t write it, she gives up her rights. 聽Various cases are brought relating to issues of women in situations similar to this and it was decided聽in each case whether or not she has given up all her rights to receive her ketuba or not. 聽Rav Huna says that if one on one’s deathbed says “all my possessions will go to so and so” – if the person is one of his inheritors, it is passed on as inheritance and if not, it is passed down as a gift. 聽In what situation he meant this and what is the relevance of whether it is inheritance or a gift is discussed.

讘注讬 专讘讗 讘讘专讬讗 讛讬讗讱 讘砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讛讜讗 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬砖转诪注讜谉 诪诇讛 讗讘诇 讘讘专讬讗 讛讗 拽讗讬 讗讬讛讜 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讘专讬讗 谞诪讬 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬砖转诪注讜谉 诪诇讛 诪讛砖转讗

With regard to the halakha that a person on his deathbed who wrote a document granting all his property to his wife has appointed her as a steward, Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a healthy person, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that specifically in the case of a person on his deathbed it is assumed that he intended to appoint his wife as a steward, as it is preferable for him that her word be heard and she is honored after his death, but in the case of a healthy person, he is still standing and can ensure that his wife is honored, so he apparently intended to actually give her all of his property? Or perhaps should it be reasoned that in the case of a healthy person as well, it is preferable that his wife鈥檚 word be heard and she be given honor from now?

转讗 砖诪注 讛讻讜转讘 驻讬专讜转 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗砖转讜 讙讜讘讛 讻转讜讘转讛 诪谉 讛拽专拽注 诇诪讞爪讛 诇砖诇讬砖 讜诇专讘讬注 讙讜讘讛 讻转讜讘转讛 诪谉 讛砖讗专

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from a baraita: If one writes a document that the profits of his property should go to his wife in the event that he dies or divorces her, she collects payment of her marriage contract, which he wrote her at the time of their marriage, from the land itself. The profits are hers as a result of his gift. Similarly, if he wrote a document granting her one-half, one-third, or one-quarter of his property, she collects payment of her marriage contract from the rest of his property, which he did not give her as a separate gift.

讻转讘 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗砖转讜 讜讬爪讗 注诇讬讜 砖讟专 讞讜讘 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 转拽专注 诪转谞转讛 讜转注诪讜讚 注诇 讻转讜讘转讛 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 转拽专注 讻转讜讘转讛 讜转注诪讜讚 注诇 诪转谞转讛 讜谞诪爪讗转 拽专讞转 诪讻讗谉 讜诪讻讗谉

The baraita continues: If one wrote a document granting all his property to his wife, and subsequently a promissory note emerged against him for a loan he took while they were married but before he gave her this gift, Rabbi Eliezer says that she should tear up her deed of gift and remain with her marriage contract, so that the creditor will not be able to collect the property she received, as her marriage contract preceded the promissory note. And the Rabbis say: She must tear up her marriage contract and remain with her deed of gift, as by accepting the gift of all her husband鈥檚 property she waived her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. Since the promissory note preceded the deed of gift, the creditor receives the property, and the wife is found to be bald from here and from there, i.e., she receives neither her gift nor her marriage contract.

讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛谞讞转讜诐 诪注砖讛 讜讗讬专注 讛讚讘专 讘讘转 讗讞讜转讬 讻诇讛 讜讘讗 诪注砖讛 诇驻谞讬 讞讻诪讬诐 讜讗诪专讜 转拽专注 讻转讜讘转讛 讜转注诪讜讚 注诇 诪转谞转讛 讜谞诪爪讗转 拽专讞转 诪讻讗谉 讜诪讻讗谉

And Rabbi Yehuda the baker said: There was an incident where this matter occurred to my sister鈥檚 daughter who is my daughter-in-law [kalla], that my son wrote such a document to her, and the incident came before the Sages. And they said that she must tear up her marriage contract and remain with her deed of gift, and she is found to be bald from here and from there.

讟注诪讗 讚讬爪讗 注诇讬讜 砖讟专 讞讜讘 讛讗 诇讗 讬爪讗 注诇讬讜 砖讟专 讞讜讘 拽谞讬讗 讜讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讜讛讗 讗诪专转 诇讗 注砖讗讛 讗诇讗 讗驻讜讟专讜驻讜住 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讘讘专讬讗

The Gemara infers: The reason she loses her gift is that a promissory note emerged against him, but if a promissory note did not emerge against him, she acquires the gift of his property. And with regard to what case is this stated? If we say it is with regard to a person on his deathbed, but didn鈥檛 you say previously that in such a case he merely rendered her a steward? Rather, is it not with regard to a healthy person? Accordingly, Rava鈥檚 dilemma is resolved: If a healthy person writes a document granting all his property to his wife, it is hers.

诇注讜诇诐 讘砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讜专讘 注讜讬专讗 诪讜拽讬 诇讛 讘讻讜诇讛讜 专讘讬谞讗 诪讜拽讬 诇讛 讘讗砖转讜 讗专讜住讛 讜讗砖转讜 讙专讜砖讛

The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, the halakha of the baraita is stated with regard to a person on his deathbed; and Rav Avira would interpret the baraita as referring to all of the cases mentioned above in which, in his opinion, the wife acquires the property and is not appointed as a steward. And Ravina would interpret it specifically in reference to a case where one wrote a document granting all his property to his betrothed wife or his former wife, whom he divorced, where he concedes that she acquires the property.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛诇讻讛 转拽专注 讻转讜讘转讛 讜转注诪讜讚 注诇 诪转谞转讛 讜谞诪爪讗转 拽专讞转 诪讻讗谉 讜诪讻讗谉

Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Na岣an says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. She must tear up her marriage contract and remain with her deed of gift, and she is found to be bald from here and from there.

诇诪讬诪专讗 讚诇讗 讗讝讬诇 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘转专 讗讜诪讚谞讗

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rav Na岣an does not follow the principle of assessing intention, meaning that even if one did not state something explicitly, the court assesses what his intention was and decides the halakha based on that assessment? Clearly, upon accepting the gift the wife did not intend to waive payment of her marriage contract and thereby be left with nothing in the event that her husband鈥檚 creditor produces a promissory note that predates her gift.

讜讛转谞讬讗 讛专讬 砖讛诇讱 讘谞讜 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜砖诪注 砖诪转 讘谞讜 讜注诪讚 讜讻转讘 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗讞专讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗 讘谞讜 诪转谞转讜 诪转谞讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诪谞住讬讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诪转谞转讜 诪转谞讛 砖讗讬诇讜 讛讬讛 讬讜讚注 砖讘谞讜 拽讬讬诐 诇讗 讻转讘谉 讜讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诪谞住讬讗

But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ketubot 5:9): In a case where one鈥檚 son went overseas and he heard that his son died, and then he arose and wrote a document granting all his property to others, and then his son came back, his gift to the other people is a valid gift. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: His gift is not a valid gift, as had he known that his son was alive he would not have written a document granting them his property. And Rav Na岣an says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya. Apparently, Rav Na岣an follows the principle of assessing intention.

砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讛 讚转讬驻讜拽 注诇讛 拽诇讗 讚讻转讘讬谞讛讜 谞讬讛诇讛 诇讛谞讛讜 谞讻住讬诐

The Gemara answers: There, in the case of one who writes a document granting all his property to his wife, it is different, as it is beneficial to her that it be publicized that he wrote a document granting her all of that property, and she was willing to risk not receiving payment of her marriage contract to gain this benefit.

转谞谉 讛转诐 讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讬讜 讜讻转讘 诇讗砖转讜 拽专拽注 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讗讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讻转讘 诇讛 拽专拽注 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讗讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛

We learned in a mishna there (Pe鈥檃 3:7): If a man writes a document granting his property to his sons, and he wrote a document granting any amount of land to his wife, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara questions this: Because he wrote a document granting her any amount of land, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract? Why should this be?

讗诪专 专讘 讘诪讝讻讛 诇讛谉 注诇 讬讚讛 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讘诪讞诇拽 诇驻谞讬讛 讜讛讬讗 砖讜转拽转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讗诪专 讘讗讜诪专 诇讛 讟诇讬 拽专拽注 讝讜 讘讻转讜讘转讱

Rav says: This mishna is referring to a case where the husband transfers ownership of his property to his sons through his wife鈥檚 participation in a formal act of acquisition. Not only did she not protest the transfer of property to the sons, but she facilitated the transaction. Clearly, she agreed to waive payment of her marriage contract. And Shmuel says: It is referring not only to a case where she actually participates in the act of acquisition, but also to a case where he distributes the property to his sons in her presence, and she is silent and does not ask about her marriage contract. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, says: It is referring to a case where he says to her: Take only this parcel of land for your marriage contract.

讜诪拽讜诇讬 讻转讜讘讛 砖谞讜 讻讗谉

And the Sages taught here one of the leniencies that apply to a marriage contract. This manner in which the wife loses her right to receive payment of her marriage contract is a leniency for the husband, as an ordinary creditor does not lose money he is owed in this fashion.

转谞谉 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讗诐 拽讘诇讛 注诇讬讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讗讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛 诪讻诇诇 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 讻转讬讘讛 讜拽讘诇讛 讘注讬

The Gemara questions this statement: We learned in the same mishna that Rabbi Yosei says that if she accepted the distribution upon herself, even if he did not write a document granting her any amount of land, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. By inference, it can be stated that the first tanna holds that both his writing a document granting her a piece of land and her acceptance of the distribution are necessary for her to lose her right, contrary to the interpretation of all three amora鈥檌m, i.e., Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, all of whom assumed that she need not affirmatively accept the distribution and that her silence is sufficient.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗 讜讛讗 转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讬诪转讬 砖讛讬转讛 砖诐 讜拽讘诇讛 注诇讬讛 讗讘诇 讛讬转讛 砖诐 讜诇讗 拽讘诇讛 注诇讬讛 拽讘诇讛 注诇讬讛 讜诇讗 讛讬转讛 砖诐 诇讗 讗讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛 转讬讜讘转讗 讚讻讜诇讛讜 转讬讜讘转讗

And if you would say that the entire mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that either the husband鈥檚 writing a deed of gift or the wife鈥檚 acceptance of the distribution is sufficient, but isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: According to the first tanna, when does she lose her right to receive payment of her marriage contract? In a case where she was there at the time of the distribution and accepted it; but if she was there but did not accept it, or accepted it but was not there, she has not lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract, as she can claim that her acquiescence was only to please her husband and was not sincere. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinions of all the interpretations of the amora鈥檌m is indeed a conclusive refutation.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讗 专讘 讛讗 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 诪专 诪讗讬 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 讻讬讜谉 砖注砖讗讛 砖讜转祝 讘讬谉 讛讘谞讬诐 讗讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛

Rava said to Rav Na岣an: This is the opinion of Rav; this is the opinion of Shmuel; and this is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina. What does the Master hold in this matter? Rav Na岣an said to him: As I say, that once he rendered her a partner in the property among the sons, she lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.

讗讬转诪专 谞诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻讬讜谉 砖注砖讗讛 砖讜转祝 讘讬谉 讛讘谞讬诐 讗讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛

Rav Na岣an鈥檚 opinion was also stated as a halakhic ruling: Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Na岣an says that once he rendered her a partner in the property among the sons, she lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.

讘注讬 专讘讗 讘讘专讬讗 讛讬讗讱 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讘砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讛讜讗 讚讬讚注讛 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 讜拽诪讞诇讛 讗讘诇 讘讘专讬讗 住讘专讛 讛讚专 拽谞讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛转 诇讬转 诇讬讛 转讬拽讜

Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a healthy person, what is the halakha? Do we say that the wife loses her right to receive payment of her marriage contract only in the case of a person on his deathbed, as she knew that he had no other property and nevertheless waived payment of the marriage contract, but in the case of a healthy person, she might have reasoned that he will then acquire other property from which she will be able to collect payment of her marriage contract, and that is why she accepted the distribution of the property? If so, she did not waive her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. Or perhaps, should it be reasoned that since in any event, now he has no other property, her acceptance should be interpreted as waiving her right? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

讛讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜 驻诇讙讗 诇讘专转 讜驻诇讙讗 诇讘专转 讜转讬诇转讗 诇讗讬转转 讘驻讬专讬 讗讬拽诇注 专讘 谞讞诪谉 诇住讜专讗 注讜诇 诇讙讘讬 专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗 诪讗讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讛拽谞讛 诇讛 讗诇讗 讚拽诇 讗讞讚 诇驻讬专讜转讬讜 讗讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛

搂 There was a certain man on his deathbed who said to the people surrounding him: Give one-half of my estate to my daughter, and one-half to my other daughter, and one-third of the produce to my wife. Rav Na岣an happened to come to Sura. He entered the study hall to see Rav 岣sda, who said to him: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Rav Na岣an said to him that this is what Shmuel says: Even if he transferred to her ownership only one palm tree for its produce, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬诪讜专 讚讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛转诐 讚讗拽谞讬 诇讛 讘讙讜驻讛 讚讗专注讗 讛讻讗 驻讬专讗 讛讜讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讟诇讟诇讬 拽讗 讗诪专转 诪讟诇讟诇讬 讜讚讗讬 诇讗 拽讗 讗诪讬谞讗

Rav 岣sda said to him: Say that Shmuel said his statement that she loses her right there, in a case where he gave her a palm tree for its produce, because he transferred rights in the land itself to her ownership, as the palm tree is connected to the ground. But here, in this case, it is only produce that he gave her, without any share in the land itself. Perhaps she does not lose payment of her marriage contract. Rav Na岣an said to him: You say that he gave her only movable property? I certainly did not mean to say that she loses her right even if he gave her only movable property such as produce. Rather, she receives payment of her marriage contract.

讛讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜 转诇转讗 诇讘专转 讜转诇转讗 诇讘专转 讜转诇转讗 诇讗讬转转 砖讻讬讘讗 讞讚讗 诪讘谞转讬讛 住讘专 专讘 驻驻讬 诇诪讬诪专 诇讗 砖拽诇讗 讗诇讗 转诇转讗

There was a certain man on his deathbed who said to the people surrounding him: Give one-third of my property to my daughter, and one-third to my other daughter, and one-third to my wife. One of his daughters died before he did, and her portion consequently returned to his possession. Rav Pappi thought to say that the wife takes only one-third. She cannot receive payment of her marriage contract from the two-thirds bequeathed to the daughters, as by entering a partnership with the daughters in ownership of the property, she waived payment of her marriage contract.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Bava Batra 132b

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Batra 132b

讘注讬 专讘讗 讘讘专讬讗 讛讬讗讱 讘砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讛讜讗 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬砖转诪注讜谉 诪诇讛 讗讘诇 讘讘专讬讗 讛讗 拽讗讬 讗讬讛讜 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讘专讬讗 谞诪讬 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬砖转诪注讜谉 诪诇讛 诪讛砖转讗

With regard to the halakha that a person on his deathbed who wrote a document granting all his property to his wife has appointed her as a steward, Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a healthy person, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that specifically in the case of a person on his deathbed it is assumed that he intended to appoint his wife as a steward, as it is preferable for him that her word be heard and she is honored after his death, but in the case of a healthy person, he is still standing and can ensure that his wife is honored, so he apparently intended to actually give her all of his property? Or perhaps should it be reasoned that in the case of a healthy person as well, it is preferable that his wife鈥檚 word be heard and she be given honor from now?

转讗 砖诪注 讛讻讜转讘 驻讬专讜转 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗砖转讜 讙讜讘讛 讻转讜讘转讛 诪谉 讛拽专拽注 诇诪讞爪讛 诇砖诇讬砖 讜诇专讘讬注 讙讜讘讛 讻转讜讘转讛 诪谉 讛砖讗专

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from a baraita: If one writes a document that the profits of his property should go to his wife in the event that he dies or divorces her, she collects payment of her marriage contract, which he wrote her at the time of their marriage, from the land itself. The profits are hers as a result of his gift. Similarly, if he wrote a document granting her one-half, one-third, or one-quarter of his property, she collects payment of her marriage contract from the rest of his property, which he did not give her as a separate gift.

讻转讘 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗砖转讜 讜讬爪讗 注诇讬讜 砖讟专 讞讜讘 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 转拽专注 诪转谞转讛 讜转注诪讜讚 注诇 讻转讜讘转讛 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 转拽专注 讻转讜讘转讛 讜转注诪讜讚 注诇 诪转谞转讛 讜谞诪爪讗转 拽专讞转 诪讻讗谉 讜诪讻讗谉

The baraita continues: If one wrote a document granting all his property to his wife, and subsequently a promissory note emerged against him for a loan he took while they were married but before he gave her this gift, Rabbi Eliezer says that she should tear up her deed of gift and remain with her marriage contract, so that the creditor will not be able to collect the property she received, as her marriage contract preceded the promissory note. And the Rabbis say: She must tear up her marriage contract and remain with her deed of gift, as by accepting the gift of all her husband鈥檚 property she waived her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. Since the promissory note preceded the deed of gift, the creditor receives the property, and the wife is found to be bald from here and from there, i.e., she receives neither her gift nor her marriage contract.

讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛谞讞转讜诐 诪注砖讛 讜讗讬专注 讛讚讘专 讘讘转 讗讞讜转讬 讻诇讛 讜讘讗 诪注砖讛 诇驻谞讬 讞讻诪讬诐 讜讗诪专讜 转拽专注 讻转讜讘转讛 讜转注诪讜讚 注诇 诪转谞转讛 讜谞诪爪讗转 拽专讞转 诪讻讗谉 讜诪讻讗谉

And Rabbi Yehuda the baker said: There was an incident where this matter occurred to my sister鈥檚 daughter who is my daughter-in-law [kalla], that my son wrote such a document to her, and the incident came before the Sages. And they said that she must tear up her marriage contract and remain with her deed of gift, and she is found to be bald from here and from there.

讟注诪讗 讚讬爪讗 注诇讬讜 砖讟专 讞讜讘 讛讗 诇讗 讬爪讗 注诇讬讜 砖讟专 讞讜讘 拽谞讬讗 讜讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讜讛讗 讗诪专转 诇讗 注砖讗讛 讗诇讗 讗驻讜讟专讜驻讜住 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讘讘专讬讗

The Gemara infers: The reason she loses her gift is that a promissory note emerged against him, but if a promissory note did not emerge against him, she acquires the gift of his property. And with regard to what case is this stated? If we say it is with regard to a person on his deathbed, but didn鈥檛 you say previously that in such a case he merely rendered her a steward? Rather, is it not with regard to a healthy person? Accordingly, Rava鈥檚 dilemma is resolved: If a healthy person writes a document granting all his property to his wife, it is hers.

诇注讜诇诐 讘砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讜专讘 注讜讬专讗 诪讜拽讬 诇讛 讘讻讜诇讛讜 专讘讬谞讗 诪讜拽讬 诇讛 讘讗砖转讜 讗专讜住讛 讜讗砖转讜 讙专讜砖讛

The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, the halakha of the baraita is stated with regard to a person on his deathbed; and Rav Avira would interpret the baraita as referring to all of the cases mentioned above in which, in his opinion, the wife acquires the property and is not appointed as a steward. And Ravina would interpret it specifically in reference to a case where one wrote a document granting all his property to his betrothed wife or his former wife, whom he divorced, where he concedes that she acquires the property.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛诇讻讛 转拽专注 讻转讜讘转讛 讜转注诪讜讚 注诇 诪转谞转讛 讜谞诪爪讗转 拽专讞转 诪讻讗谉 讜诪讻讗谉

Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Na岣an says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. She must tear up her marriage contract and remain with her deed of gift, and she is found to be bald from here and from there.

诇诪讬诪专讗 讚诇讗 讗讝讬诇 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘转专 讗讜诪讚谞讗

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rav Na岣an does not follow the principle of assessing intention, meaning that even if one did not state something explicitly, the court assesses what his intention was and decides the halakha based on that assessment? Clearly, upon accepting the gift the wife did not intend to waive payment of her marriage contract and thereby be left with nothing in the event that her husband鈥檚 creditor produces a promissory note that predates her gift.

讜讛转谞讬讗 讛专讬 砖讛诇讱 讘谞讜 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜砖诪注 砖诪转 讘谞讜 讜注诪讚 讜讻转讘 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗讞专讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗 讘谞讜 诪转谞转讜 诪转谞讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诪谞住讬讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诪转谞转讜 诪转谞讛 砖讗讬诇讜 讛讬讛 讬讜讚注 砖讘谞讜 拽讬讬诐 诇讗 讻转讘谉 讜讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诪谞住讬讗

But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ketubot 5:9): In a case where one鈥檚 son went overseas and he heard that his son died, and then he arose and wrote a document granting all his property to others, and then his son came back, his gift to the other people is a valid gift. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: His gift is not a valid gift, as had he known that his son was alive he would not have written a document granting them his property. And Rav Na岣an says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya. Apparently, Rav Na岣an follows the principle of assessing intention.

砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讛 讚转讬驻讜拽 注诇讛 拽诇讗 讚讻转讘讬谞讛讜 谞讬讛诇讛 诇讛谞讛讜 谞讻住讬诐

The Gemara answers: There, in the case of one who writes a document granting all his property to his wife, it is different, as it is beneficial to her that it be publicized that he wrote a document granting her all of that property, and she was willing to risk not receiving payment of her marriage contract to gain this benefit.

转谞谉 讛转诐 讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讬讜 讜讻转讘 诇讗砖转讜 拽专拽注 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讗讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讻转讘 诇讛 拽专拽注 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讗讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛

We learned in a mishna there (Pe鈥檃 3:7): If a man writes a document granting his property to his sons, and he wrote a document granting any amount of land to his wife, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara questions this: Because he wrote a document granting her any amount of land, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract? Why should this be?

讗诪专 专讘 讘诪讝讻讛 诇讛谉 注诇 讬讚讛 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讘诪讞诇拽 诇驻谞讬讛 讜讛讬讗 砖讜转拽转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讗诪专 讘讗讜诪专 诇讛 讟诇讬 拽专拽注 讝讜 讘讻转讜讘转讱

Rav says: This mishna is referring to a case where the husband transfers ownership of his property to his sons through his wife鈥檚 participation in a formal act of acquisition. Not only did she not protest the transfer of property to the sons, but she facilitated the transaction. Clearly, she agreed to waive payment of her marriage contract. And Shmuel says: It is referring not only to a case where she actually participates in the act of acquisition, but also to a case where he distributes the property to his sons in her presence, and she is silent and does not ask about her marriage contract. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, says: It is referring to a case where he says to her: Take only this parcel of land for your marriage contract.

讜诪拽讜诇讬 讻转讜讘讛 砖谞讜 讻讗谉

And the Sages taught here one of the leniencies that apply to a marriage contract. This manner in which the wife loses her right to receive payment of her marriage contract is a leniency for the husband, as an ordinary creditor does not lose money he is owed in this fashion.

转谞谉 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讗诐 拽讘诇讛 注诇讬讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讗讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛 诪讻诇诇 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 讻转讬讘讛 讜拽讘诇讛 讘注讬

The Gemara questions this statement: We learned in the same mishna that Rabbi Yosei says that if she accepted the distribution upon herself, even if he did not write a document granting her any amount of land, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. By inference, it can be stated that the first tanna holds that both his writing a document granting her a piece of land and her acceptance of the distribution are necessary for her to lose her right, contrary to the interpretation of all three amora鈥檌m, i.e., Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, all of whom assumed that she need not affirmatively accept the distribution and that her silence is sufficient.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗 讜讛讗 转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讬诪转讬 砖讛讬转讛 砖诐 讜拽讘诇讛 注诇讬讛 讗讘诇 讛讬转讛 砖诐 讜诇讗 拽讘诇讛 注诇讬讛 拽讘诇讛 注诇讬讛 讜诇讗 讛讬转讛 砖诐 诇讗 讗讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛 转讬讜讘转讗 讚讻讜诇讛讜 转讬讜讘转讗

And if you would say that the entire mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that either the husband鈥檚 writing a deed of gift or the wife鈥檚 acceptance of the distribution is sufficient, but isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: According to the first tanna, when does she lose her right to receive payment of her marriage contract? In a case where she was there at the time of the distribution and accepted it; but if she was there but did not accept it, or accepted it but was not there, she has not lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract, as she can claim that her acquiescence was only to please her husband and was not sincere. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinions of all the interpretations of the amora鈥檌m is indeed a conclusive refutation.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讗 专讘 讛讗 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 诪专 诪讗讬 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 讻讬讜谉 砖注砖讗讛 砖讜转祝 讘讬谉 讛讘谞讬诐 讗讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛

Rava said to Rav Na岣an: This is the opinion of Rav; this is the opinion of Shmuel; and this is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina. What does the Master hold in this matter? Rav Na岣an said to him: As I say, that once he rendered her a partner in the property among the sons, she lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.

讗讬转诪专 谞诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻讬讜谉 砖注砖讗讛 砖讜转祝 讘讬谉 讛讘谞讬诐 讗讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛

Rav Na岣an鈥檚 opinion was also stated as a halakhic ruling: Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Na岣an says that once he rendered her a partner in the property among the sons, she lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.

讘注讬 专讘讗 讘讘专讬讗 讛讬讗讱 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讘砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讛讜讗 讚讬讚注讛 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 讜拽诪讞诇讛 讗讘诇 讘讘专讬讗 住讘专讛 讛讚专 拽谞讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛转 诇讬转 诇讬讛 转讬拽讜

Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a healthy person, what is the halakha? Do we say that the wife loses her right to receive payment of her marriage contract only in the case of a person on his deathbed, as she knew that he had no other property and nevertheless waived payment of the marriage contract, but in the case of a healthy person, she might have reasoned that he will then acquire other property from which she will be able to collect payment of her marriage contract, and that is why she accepted the distribution of the property? If so, she did not waive her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. Or perhaps, should it be reasoned that since in any event, now he has no other property, her acceptance should be interpreted as waiving her right? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

讛讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜 驻诇讙讗 诇讘专转 讜驻诇讙讗 诇讘专转 讜转讬诇转讗 诇讗讬转转 讘驻讬专讬 讗讬拽诇注 专讘 谞讞诪谉 诇住讜专讗 注讜诇 诇讙讘讬 专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗 诪讗讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讛拽谞讛 诇讛 讗诇讗 讚拽诇 讗讞讚 诇驻讬专讜转讬讜 讗讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛

搂 There was a certain man on his deathbed who said to the people surrounding him: Give one-half of my estate to my daughter, and one-half to my other daughter, and one-third of the produce to my wife. Rav Na岣an happened to come to Sura. He entered the study hall to see Rav 岣sda, who said to him: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Rav Na岣an said to him that this is what Shmuel says: Even if he transferred to her ownership only one palm tree for its produce, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬诪讜专 讚讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛转诐 讚讗拽谞讬 诇讛 讘讙讜驻讛 讚讗专注讗 讛讻讗 驻讬专讗 讛讜讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讟诇讟诇讬 拽讗 讗诪专转 诪讟诇讟诇讬 讜讚讗讬 诇讗 拽讗 讗诪讬谞讗

Rav 岣sda said to him: Say that Shmuel said his statement that she loses her right there, in a case where he gave her a palm tree for its produce, because he transferred rights in the land itself to her ownership, as the palm tree is connected to the ground. But here, in this case, it is only produce that he gave her, without any share in the land itself. Perhaps she does not lose payment of her marriage contract. Rav Na岣an said to him: You say that he gave her only movable property? I certainly did not mean to say that she loses her right even if he gave her only movable property such as produce. Rather, she receives payment of her marriage contract.

讛讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜 转诇转讗 诇讘专转 讜转诇转讗 诇讘专转 讜转诇转讗 诇讗讬转转 砖讻讬讘讗 讞讚讗 诪讘谞转讬讛 住讘专 专讘 驻驻讬 诇诪讬诪专 诇讗 砖拽诇讗 讗诇讗 转诇转讗

There was a certain man on his deathbed who said to the people surrounding him: Give one-third of my property to my daughter, and one-third to my other daughter, and one-third to my wife. One of his daughters died before he did, and her portion consequently returned to his possession. Rav Pappi thought to say that the wife takes only one-third. She cannot receive payment of her marriage contract from the two-thirds bequeathed to the daughters, as by entering a partnership with the daughters in ownership of the property, she waived payment of her marriage contract.

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