Gittin 21

זקן שאני דידע לאקנויי

a knowledgeable old man is different, as he understands the need to transfer the documents, and this may not be true in the case of a woman and the bill of divorce.

אלא אמר רבא מהכא ערב היוצא לאחר חיתום שטרות גובה מנכסים בני חורין

Rather, Rava said: A proof may be brought from here: If there was a guarantor whose commitment emerged after the promissory note was signed, then the creditor may collect only from the guarantor’s unsold property. However, he does not have a lien on the guarantor’s property with which he could collect from property sold after he signed on as a guarantor. Rava’s proof is that it must be that ownership of the promissory note was transferred to the guarantor before he signed it, in order for his commitment to take effect. It may therefore be seen from this baraita that the participants understand the need to transfer ownership of the document.

אמר רב אשי מאי קושיא דלמא גברא שאני דידע לאקנויי אלא אמר רב אשי מהכא אשה כותבת את גיטה והאיש כותב את שוברו שאין קיום הגט אלא בחותמיו

Rav Ashi said: What is the difficulty raised by this baraita? Perhaps a man is different, in that he understands the need to transfer the document, and the question of the Gemara pertains to a woman, who may not be as well versed in the minutiae of monetary law. Rather, Rav Ashi said: There is a proof from what was taught here (22b): A woman may write her bill of divorce on her own or allow a scribe to write it on her behalf, and then give it to her husband, so that he will give it to her. Similarly, a man may write his receipt that he will receive from the woman after paying her marriage contract, as the ratification of a bill of divorce is only through its signatories, i.e., the witnesses who sign it, and the mere writing of the document or its receipt has no legal ramifications and may be done by anyone. In any case, it is clear from here that a woman understands the need to transfer the bill of divorce that will be given to her by her husband in the future.

אמר רבא כתב לה גט ונתנו ביד עבדו וכתב לה שטר מתנה עליו קנאתהו ומתגרשת בו

§ Rava says: If he wrote her a bill of divorce and placed it in the hand of his slave, and he wrote her a deed of gift with regard to the slave, then she acquired the slave due to the document, and she is divorced immediately by the bill of divorce that is in his hand. The slave is considered to be like her property, and it is as though the husband had placed the bill of divorce in her domain at the time that he transferred the slave to her, and she acquires the bill of divorce as though it were in her courtyard.

ואמאי חצר מהלכת היא וחצר מהלכת לא קנה וכי תימא בעומד והאמר רבא כל שאילו מהלך לא קנה עומד ויושב לא קנה והלכתא בכפות

The Gemara asks: And why does she acquire the bill of divorce? The slave is considered a mobile courtyard, and a mobile courtyard does not acquire property. One’s courtyard can acquire items for him only when the courtyard is fixed in its location. Since a slave is considered to be like land with regard to other areas of halakha, he should also be defined as a mobile courtyard, as he can move from place to place. And if you would say that Rava was referring to a slave who happens to be standing, who is not mobile, but didn’t Rava say: Anything that does not acquire when moving also does not acquire when it is standing or sitting. The fact that the slave could move gives him the status of a moving courtyard, regardless if he is currently moving or not. The Gemara answers: And the halakha taught by Rava could apply in a case where the slave was bound and unable to move, as in that case he is not even able to move, and is not considered to be a mobile courtyard.

ואמר רבא כתב לה גט ונתנו בחצרו וכתב לה שטר מתנה עליו קנאתהו ומתגרשת בו

And Rava also says: If he wrote her a bill of divorce and placed it in his courtyard, and he wrote a deed of gift with regard to the courtyard, then she has acquired the courtyard and is divorced immediately by the bill of divorce in the courtyard.

וצריכא דאי אשמעינן עבד הוה אמינא דוקא עבד אבל חצר ליגזר משום חצרה הבאה לאחר מכאן

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for Rava to teach his halakha both with regard to a slave and with regard to a courtyard. One could not have been learned from the other, as had he taught us only about a slave, I would say that the husband may transfer the bill of divorce to his wife specifically through a slave, but in the case of a courtyard the Sages may decide to enact a decree that this should not be a valid bill of divorce, due to the case of her courtyard that comes afterward. People may not differentiate between this case and a similar case, where the husband places the bill of divorce in the courtyard of a third party, and that courtyard is subsequently acquired by her. In that case, the couple is not divorced, as the bill of divorce was not given by the husband to the wife. Therefore, Rava has to teach that the Sages did not make this decree, and in this case, where the husband gave the courtyard together with the bill of divorce, it is valid.

ואי אשמעינן חצר הוה אמינא דוקא חצר אבל עבד ליגזר כפות אטו שאינו כפות קא משמע לן

And had Rava taught us only about a courtyard, then I would say that a woman is divorced specifically if her husband placed the bill of divorce in a courtyard, but in the case of a slave the Sages may decide to decree with regard to a bound slave that the divorce will not take effect, due to the similarity to an unbound slave, where the divorce would not take effect, as explained above. Therefore, Rava teaches us that it is a valid bill of divorce in both cases.

אמר אביי מכדי חצר מהיכא איתרבי מידה

Abaye said as a challenge to Rava: Now, from where was a courtyard included? What is the source for the halakha that a man can divorce a woman by placing a bill of divorce in her courtyard? This can be derived from the phrase: “And gives it in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and the Sages derived that this is not limited to her actual hand but also includes anything that is an extension of her hand, such as her courtyard.

מה ידה דאיתא בין מדעתה ובין בעל כורחה אף חצרה דאיתא בין מדעתה ובין בעל כורחה והא מתנה מדעתה איתא בעל כורחה ליתא

Consequently, the following reasoning should apply: Just as with regard to her hand, that it acquires property for her whether with her consent or against her will, so too, with regard to her courtyard, it should be that it acquires property for her whether with her consent or against her will. And with regard to a gift, it is so that she acquires it with her consent, but it is not so that she acquires it against her will. Therefore, a courtyard that a husband transfers to his wife as a gift along with a bill of divorce is not the same as a bill of divorce that he gives into her hand. As a courtyard is different from her hand in this sense, it should not be able to be used as a means of transferring a bill of divorce.

מתקיף לה רב שימי בר אשי והא שליחות לקבלה דמדעתה איתא בעל כורחה ליתא וקא הוי שליח לקבלה

Rav Shimi bar Ashi objects to the reasoning of Abaye: But what of agency for receipt of the bill of divorce, where the woman appoints an agent to receive a bill of divorce on her behalf, concerning which the agent can act with her consent, but not against her will. No one other than the wife can appoint an agent to receive the bill of divorce, and despite this he is an agent for receipt. Yet a woman is able to appoint an agent for receipt. Evidently, the comparison of other methods of acquisition to acquisition by placing the bill of divorce in her hand is not absolute.

ואביי אטו שליחות מידה איתרבי מושלח ושלחה איתרבי

And Abaye would respond: Is that to say that the halakha of agency is included from the words “her hand”? It is not learned from there; rather, it is included based on the additional wording of the verse, as the verse does not state: And he sent [veshillaḥ]. Rather, it states: “And sends her out [veshilleḥa]” (Deuteronomy 24:1). The expanded term teaches that a woman can also appoint an agent to receive a bill of divorce on her behalf. Since agency has a different source in the Torah, it is not impacted by the limitations of her hand. The halakha that a bill of divorce can be given to her by placing it in her courtyard is an extension of the halakha that it can be placed in her hand and does carry the limitations of her hand. Therefore, it must be able to work whether with her consent or against her will.

ואיבעית אימא שליחות לקבלה נמי אשכחן בעל כורחה שכן אב מקבל גט לבתו קטנה בעל כורחה

And if you wish, say a different answer: We also have found that agency for receipt can be effective against her will. How so? As the halakha is that a father can receive a bill of divorce for his minor daughter against her will. The halakhot of agency are therefore consistent with the halakhot with regard to her hand, and Abaye’s objection stands.

על העלה של זית וכו׳ בשלמא יד דעבד

§ The mishna taught that a bill of divorce may be written on an olive leaf, on the horn of a cow, or on the hand of a slave, provided that the husband then gives her the slave or the cow. The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to the hand of a slave,

לא אפשר למקצייה אלא קרן של פרה ליקצייה וליתביה לה

it is not possible to cut it off, as it is certainly prohibited to cut off the hand of a slave, and he therefore must give her the slave. But if he wrote the bill of divorce on the horn of a cow, let him cut it off and give it to her. Why does the mishna state that he must give her the cow?

אמר קרא וכתב ונתן לה מי שאינו מחוסר אלא כתיבה ונתינה יצא זה שמחוסר כתיבה קציצה ונתינה

The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And he writes her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1), meaning that something is valid as a bill of divorce when it is lacking only writing and giving, excluding this, a cow’s horn, which is lacking writing, cutting, and giving. Since the additional step of cutting would be required in order for him to give her the horn alone, the horn would not be a valid bill of divorce, so he must give her the cow.

רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר וכו׳ מאי טעמא דרבי יוסי הגלילי דתניא ספר אין לי אלא ספר מנין לרבות כל דבר תלמוד לומר וכתב לה מכל מקום אם כן מה תלמוד לומר ספר מה ספר דבר שאין בו רוח חיים ואינו אוכל אף כל דבר שאין בו רוח חיים ואינו אוכל

§ The mishna taught that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that a bill of divorce may not be written on something living, nor on food. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s opinion? As it is taught in a baraita: It is said in the Torah with regard to a bill of divorce: “And he writes her a scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:1). From the word “scroll,” I have derived only that a scroll is valid; from where do I derive that it is correct to include all objects as valid materials upon which a bill of divorce may be written? The verse states: “And he writes her,” in any case, i.e., a bill of divorce can be written on any type of surface. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states “scroll”? This teaches: Just as a scroll is neither alive nor food, so too, a bill of divorce may be written on any object that is neither alive nor food. This is why Rabbi Yosei HaGelili deems invalid a bill of divorce written on a living being.

ורבנן אי כתיב בספר כדקאמרת השתא דכתיב ספר לספירת דברים הוא דאתא

The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis, who disagree and say that a bill of divorce may be written even on a living creature or on food, interpret the verse? They contend: If the verse were written: And he shall write for her in the scroll [besefer], then it would be as you said, and it would indicate the type of surface on which the bill of divorce may be written. Now that it is written: “Scroll [sefer],” it comes to teach that a mere account of the matters [sefirat devarim] is required. In other words, sefer is referring not to the surface on which a bill of divorce must be written, but rather, to the essence of the bill of divorce. The verse teaches that the bill of divorce must contain particular content.

ורבנן האי וכתב מאי עבדי ליה מיבעי להו בכתיבה מתגרשת ואינה מתגרשת בכסף סלקא דעתך אמינא אקיש יציאה להוייה מה הוייה בכסף אף יציאה נמי בכסף קא משמע לן

The Gemara continues: And the Rabbis, what do they do with this phrase in the verse: “And he writes her”? The Gemara answers: For them, that phrase is required to teach the principle that a woman is divorced only via writing, i.e., a bill of divorce, and she is not divorced via giving money. It might enter your mind to say: I should juxtapose leaving marriage, i.e., divorce, to becoming married, i.e., betrothal, and I will say that just as becoming married is effected with giving money, so too, leaving marriage can also be effected with giving money. Therefore, the Torah teaches us: “And he writes her”; divorce can be effected only with a written bill of divorce.

ואידך נפקא ליה מספר כריתות ספר כורתה ואין דבר אחר כורתה

The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, from where does he derive this reasoning? He derives it from the phrase “scroll of severance,” which teaches that a scroll, i.e., a written document, severs her from her husband and nothing else severs her from him.

ואידך מיבעי ליה דבר הכורת בינו לבינה כדתניא הרי זה גיטיך על מנת שלא תשתי יין על מנת שלא תלכי לבית אביך לעולם אין זה כריתות עד שלשים יום הרי זה כריתות

The Gemara asks: And those who hold the other opinion, the Rabbis, how do they explain this phrase? For them, the phrase “scroll of severance” is required to teach that a bill of divorce must be a matter that severs all connection between him and her, as it is taught in a baraita: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce, on the condition that you will not ever drink wine, or on condition that you will never go to your father’s house, that is not severance, and the bill of divorce is not valid. If a bill of divorce imposes a condition upon the woman that permanently binds her to her husband, her relationship with her husband has not been completely severed, which is a prerequisite for divorce. If, however, he imposes a condition until thirty days have passed, or for any other limited period of time, that is severance. The bill of divorce is valid, as the relationship will be completely terminated at the end of the thirty-day period.

ואידך מכרת כריתות

The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, from where does he derive that a stipulation without a termination point invalidates the divorce? From the fact that instead of using the term karet, the verse uses the more expanded term keritut. Inasmuch as both terms denote severance, using the longer term teaches us two things: Divorce can be effected only via writing and not through money, and divorce requires total severance.

ואידך כרת כריתות לא דרשי

And the other, the Rabbis, what do they derive from this? The Gemara answers: They do not derive anything from the expansion of karet to keritut.

מתני׳ אין כותבין במחובר לקרקע כתבו במחובר תלשו וחתמו ונתנו לה כשר רבי יהודה פוסל עד שתהא כתיבתו וחתימתו בתלוש

MISHNA: One may not write a bill of divorce on anything that is attached to the ground. If one wrote it on something that was attached to the ground, and afterward he detached it, signed it, and gave it to her, then it is valid. Rabbi Yehuda deems a bill of divorce invalid unless its writing and its signing were performed when it was already detached.

רבי יהודה בן בתירא אומר אין כותבין לא על הנייר המחוק ולא על הדיפתרא מפני שהוא יכול להזדייף וחכמים מכשירין

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: One may not write a bill of divorce on erased paper or on unfinished leather [diftera], because writing on these surfaces can be forged. And the Rabbis deem valid a bill of divorce that was written on either of these items.

גמ׳ כתבו על המחובר והאמרת רישא אין כותבין אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל והוא ששייר מקום התורף

GEMARA: The mishna taught: If one wrote it on something that was attached to the ground, and detached it before he gave it to her, then it is valid. The Gemara challenges: But didn’t you say in the first clause of the mishna that one may not write a bill of divorce on something that is attached to the ground? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The mishna’s statement that if something was detached and signed then it is a valid bill of divorce is applicable only when one left a place for the essential part of the document. He did not write the entire bill of divorce while it was attached to the ground. Rather, he wrote only the standard part of the bill of divorce. However, he left a place for the essential part of the bill of divorce, which includes the names of the man and woman, and wrote that part only after it was detached.

וכן אמר רבי אלעזר אמר רבי אושעיא והוא ששייר מקום התורף וכן אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן והוא ששייר מקום התורף ורבי אלעזר היא דאמר עדי מסירה כרתי

And so Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: And this is a case where he left a place for the essential part of the document. And so Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And this is when he left a place for the essential part of the document. And all these Sages hold that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: Witnesses of the transmission of the bill of divorce effect the divorce. It is not the signatures of the witnesses on a bill of divorce that validate it. Rather, the divorce is effected by the transmission of the document in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, the phrase: “And he writes” (Deuteronomy 24:1), must be referring to the writing of the bill of divorce and not to the signing of the witnesses, and the restrictions derived from this verse will apply to the writing of the bill of divorce, so the essential part may not be written on something that is attached to the ground.

והכי קאמר אין כותבין טופס שמא יכתוב תורף כתבו לטופס ותלשו כתבו לתורף ונתנו לה כשר

And this is what the mishna is saying: One may not write even the standard part on something that is attached to the ground ab initio, lest he write the essential part of the document in this manner as well. However, if he wrote the standard part while it was attached to the ground, and then detached it, wrote the essential part, and gave it to her, it is valid.

וריש לקיש אמר חתמו שנינו ורבי מאיר היא דאמר עדי חתימה כרתי

And Reish Lakish says: The mishna should not be understood in that way, where the phrase: And signed it, is referring to the writing of the essential part, since we learned that they signed it, which is referring to the signatures of the witnesses. And it is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the signatory witnesses on the bill of divorce effect the divorce.

והכי קאמר אין כותבין תורף גזירה שמא יחתום כתבו לתורף תלשו חתמו ונתנו לה כשר

And this is what the mishna is saying: One may not write the essential part on something that is attached to the ground due to a rabbinic decree, lest he also have the witnesses sign while it is attached. However, even if he wrote the essential part while it was attached, then detached it, had it signed, and gave it to her, it is valid. According to Rabbi Meir, when the verse states: “And he writes her,” it is referring to when he has the bill of divorce signed. Therefore, by Torah law, the limitation that it not be attached while he writes applies only to the signing but not to the writing. The Sages decreed that the essential part of the bill of divorce also not be written while it is attached to the ground, but if he violated this decree, it is still valid after the fact.

כתבו על חרס של עציץ נקוב כשר דשקיל ליה ויהיב ליה ניהלה על עלה של עציץ נקוב אביי אמר כשר ורבא אמר פסול אביי אמר כשר

§ In connection with this discussion, the Gemara mentions several halakhot that are affected by items being attached to the ground or detached. If he wrote the bill of divorce on the clay of a perforated pot [atzitz], which is considered to be attached to the ground, then it is valid, as he can take this pot and give it to her. However, if he wrote it on a leaf of a plant growing in a perforated pot, then what is the halakha? Abaye says: It is valid. And Rava says: It is invalid. The Gemara clarifies their dispute in detail: Abaye says that it is valid