Today's Daf Yomi
February 24, 2016 | ט״ו באדר א׳ תשע״ו
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This month's learning is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.
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Masechet Gittin is sponsored by Elaine and Saul Schreiber in honor of their daughter-in-law Daniela Schreiber on receiving her Master of Science in Marriage and Family Therapy.
Gittin 73
There is a disagreement in a case where a man gives his wife a get conditional upon dying from a sickness and he is cured, is the get cancelled or not? Rav Huna thinks the get is cancelled just like a gift of someone on his sick bed. Rabba and Rava disagree because they are concerned others with think the get is only good after death and therefore will think there is a way to give a get after one dies. The gemara asks how can they override the basic Torah law that will say this is a get. In answer, they give the famous response that the rabbis have the power to annul marriages. To what extent this answer can be applied in other cases is a subject of debate among the Rishonim and in modern times as well regarding resolving aguna cases.
What is the status of a woman whose husband says this is your get from now if I die? She cannot be alone with her husband for fear that they may sleep together for the purposes of betrothal and he will be required to give her a new get. If she sleeps with another man in this period (before he dies), there is a disagreement about whether she is considered 100% a married woman or is she a case where there is doubt whether or not she is married. This would affect the punishment.
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והא קא משמע לן דהלך על משענתו הוא דבעינן אומדנא אידך אומדנא נמי לא בעינן
And this teaches us that we require assessment only in a case where he walked with his staff. But in another case, where he did not arise from his illness and walk but immediately became ill again, we do not even require assessment, as it is clear that his death from the second illness was a result of the first illness.
שמעת מינה שכיב מרע שניתק מחולי לחולי מתנתו מתנה אין דאמר רבי אלעזר משמיה דרב שכיב מרע שניתק מחולי לחולי מתנתו מתנה
The Gemara asks: Can you conclude from it that in the case of a person on his deathbed who proceeded from one illness immediately to another illness, his gift is a valid gift, as he ultimately died as a result of the first illness? The Gemara answers: Yes, as Rabbi Elazar says in the name of Rav: In the case of a person on his deathbed who proceeded from one illness immediately to another illness, his gift is a valid gift.
רבה ורבא לא סבירא להו הא דרב הונא גזירה שמא יאמרו יש גט לאחר מיתה
The Gemara notes: Rabba and Rava do not hold in accordance with this halakha stated by Rav Huna, that if the husband was healed of his illness then the bill of divorce is nullified even if did not specify such a condition. They hold that there is a rabbinic decree in place lest people say that there can be a valid bill of divorce given after death. Since people will see that in this case the bill of divorce took effect only once the husband died, in the future they may mistakenly consider a bill of divorce to be valid even though the husband explicitly made a condition that it would take effect only after his death.
ומי איכא מידי דמדאורייתא לא הוי גיטא ומשום גזירה שרינן אשת איש לעלמא
The Gemara asks: And is there anything that by Torah law is not a valid bill of divorce, but due to a rabbinic decree we permit a married woman to marry anyone, even though by Torah law she remains married to her husband? Both Rabba and Rava agree that by Torah law the bill of divorce is nullified once the husband is healed from his illness, yet they treat the bill of divorce as valid. How can this be?
אין כל דמקדש אדעתא דרבנן מקדש ואפקעינהו רבנן לקדושין מיניה
The Gemara answers: Yes, the Sages have the ability to nullify even a marriage that took effect by Torah law, because anyone who betroths a woman betroths her contingent upon the will of the Sages, and when one fails to conform to their will in matters of marriage and divorce the Sages expropriated his betrothal from him retroactively. Consequently, it is permitted for the woman to remarry.
אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי תינח דקדיש בכספא קדיש בביאה מאי איכא למימר אמר ליה שויוה רבנן לבעילתו בעילת זנות
Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This works out well in a case where he betrothed his wife with money, as it is possible to say that the Sages expropriated the money used for the betrothal from the possession of its owner, resulting in a retroactive cancellation of the betrothal. But if he betrothed her by means of sexual intercourse then what is there to say? Rav Ashi said to him: The Sages declared his sexual intercourse to be licentious sexual intercourse, which does not create a bond of betrothal.
תנו רבנן זה גיטיך מהיום אם מתי מחולי זה ונפל הבית עליו או הכישו נחש אינו גט אם לא אעמוד מחולי זה ונפל עליו בית או הכישו נחש הרי זה גט
§ The Sages taught (Tosefta 7:2): If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him, then it is not a valid bill of divorce. But if he said: This is your bill of divorce if I will not arise healthy from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him, then this is a valid bill of divorce.
מאי שנא רישא ומאי שנא סיפא
The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause such that the bill of divorce is not valid and what is different in the latter clause that the bill of divorce is valid? In neither case did he die from the illness. The Gemara gives no answer to this question.
שלחו מתם אכלו ארי אין לנו
They sent a ruling to Babylonia from there, from Eretz Yisrael: If the husband said: This is your bill of divorce if I am not healed from this illness, and a lion ate him, then we do not need to be concerned about this bill of divorce, for it is certainly not valid.
ההוא גברא דזבין ארעא לחבריה קביל עליה כל אונסא דמתיליד לסוף אפיקו בה נהרא
It is related: There was a certain man who sold land to another, and he accepted upon himself the responsibility for any unavoidable accident that may happen to the land. In such a case he would reimburse the buyer for the damage. In the end they diverted a river into it, meaning the government decided to make a new canal through the land that he sold.
אתא לקמיה דרבינא אמר ליה זיל שפי ליה דהא קבילת עלך כל אונסא דמתיליד אמר ליה רב אחא בר תחליפא לרבינא אונסא דלא שכיח הוא
The buyer came before Ravina to lodge a claim. Ravina said to the seller: Go pacify him, i.e., reimburse him, as you accepted upon yourself responsibility for any unavoidable accident that might happen. Rav Aḥa bar Taḥalifa disagreed and said to Ravina: It is an uncommon, unavoidable accident, and the condition of the sale should not apply in such a case.
איגלגל מילתא ומטא לקמיה דרבא אמר להו אונסא דלא שכיח הוא איתיביה רבינא לרבא אם לא אעמוד מחולי זה ונפל עליו בית או הכישו נחש הרי זה גט
The matter was circulated, as this ruling was never finalized, and it came before Rava. He said to them: It is an uncommon, unavoidable accident, and the seller should not have to pay. Ravina raised an objection to Rava: Isn’t it taught that if the husband said: This is your bill of divorce if I am not healed from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him then it is a valid bill of divorce? These cases are both uncommon, unavoidable accidents, yet the bill of divorce is valid.
אמר ליה רבא ואימא מרישא אינו גט
Rava said to him: But you can say an opposite inference from the first clause: If a husband says: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him, then it is not a valid bill of divorce. Apparently, an uncommon, unavoidable accident is not included within his condition. If so, the inference from first clause of the baraita contradicts the inference from latter clause and it cannot be used to prove either opinion.
אמר ליה רב אחא מדפתי לרבינא ומשום דקשיא רישא אסיפא לא מותבינן תיובתא מינה
Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: And because there is a difficulty presented by the contradiction between the first clause of the baraita and the latter clause, can we no longer raise an objection from it? Seemingly, the challenge raised by Ravina from the latter clause of the baraita is still valid.
אמר ליה אין כיון דקשיא רישא אסיפא לא איתמר בי מדרשא ומשבשתא היא זיל בתר סברא
Ravina said to him: Yes, Rava was correct. Since there is a difficulty presented by the contradiction between the first clause of the baraita and the latter clause, this baraita was never stated in the study hall and it is corrupted. As it is not possible to rely on this baraita one must follow reason, and the most reasonable interpretation is that his condition would not include an uncommon and unavoidable accident.
רב פפא ורב הונא בריה דרב יהושע זבן שומשמי אגידא דנהר מלכא אגור מלחי לעבורינהו קבילו עלייהו כל אונסא דמתיליד לסוף איסתכר נהר מלכא
It is related that Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, purchased sesame on the bank of the Malka River. They hired sailors to cross them to the other side of the river, and the sailors accepted upon themselves responsibility for any unavoidable accident that might occur. In the end the Malka River was dammed so that the merchandise could not be transported by river.
אמרו להו אגורו חמרי אפקעינהו ניהלן דהא קבילתו עלייכו כל אונסא דמיתליד
The two Sages said to them: Hire donkeys and release them to us in order to transport the sesame, as you accepted upon yourself responsibility for any unavoidable accident that might arise.
אתו לקמיה דרבא אמר להו קאקי חיורי משלחי גלימי דאינשי אונסא דלא שכיח הוא
The two Sages came to court before Rava and he said to them: You white geese [kakei ḥivarei], referring to their long, white beards, who strip men of their cloaks. You are acting unfairly with the sailors. It is an uncommon, unavoidable accident for the Malka River to be dammed, and the sailors did not accept responsibility for this case.
מתני׳ לא תתייחד עמו אלא בפני עדים
MISHNA: If a woman’s ill husband gave her a bill of divorce, and made a condition that it should take effect from today if he dies from his illness, then she may be secluded with him only in the presence of two witnesses, lest they end up engaging in sexual intercourse.
אפילו על פי עבד אפילו על פי שפחה חוץ משפחתה מפני שלבה גס בה בשפחתה
This applies to being secluded in the presence of not only valid witnesses; it is permitted for her to be secluded with him even in the presence of a slave or even in the presence of a maidservant, except for the wife’s personal maidservant. And it is prohibited for the wife to be secluded in the presence of the latter because she is accustomed to her maidservant, and there is concern that she will engage in sexual intercourse with her husband even though the maidservant is present.
מה היא באותן הימים רבי יהודה אומר
What is the halakhic status of the wife during these days between when the bill of divorce was given but before the condition has been fulfilled with the death of the husband? Rabbi Yehuda says: She is
כאשת איש לכל דבריה רבי יוסי אומר מגורשת ואינה מגורשת
like a married woman with regard to all of her matters, and she remains forbidden to other men. Rabbi Yosei says: It is uncertain whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced.
גמ׳ תנו רבנן ראוה שנתייחדה עמו באפילה או שישנה עמו תחת מרגלות המטה אין חוששין שמא נתעסקו בדבר אחר וחוששין משום זנות ואין חוששין משום קדושין רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה אומר אף חוששין משום קידושין
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:4): If, after the giving of this bill of divorce witnesses saw that she secluded herself with her husband in the dark, or that she slept with him under the foot of the bed, one is not concerned that perhaps they were engaged in another matter, i.e., sexual intercourse. And one is concerned due to their action of licentiousness but one is not concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One is also concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal.
מאי קאמר אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה הכי קאמר ראוה שנבעלה חוששין משום קידושין נתן לה כספים חוששין משום זנות דאמרינן באתננה נתן לה ואין חוששין משום קידושין רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה אומר אף בזו חוששין משום קידושין
The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: This is what the baraita is saying: If they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with her husband, then there one is concerned that due to their actions there was a betrothal and perhaps through this act he intended to remarry her. If he gave her money immediately following the sexual intercourse one is concerned due to licentiousness, wherein we say: He gave this money as hire for a prostitute, but one is not concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Even in this case one is concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal, i.e., one is concerned that he gave her the money as betrothal.
כמאן אזלא הא דאמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן מחלוקת כשראוה שנבעלה אבל לא ראוה שנבעלה דברי הכל אין צריכה הימנו גט שני כמאן
Based on this explanation of the baraita, in accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, that the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel (81a) is relevant only when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with her husband, but if they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him, everyone agrees that she does not require a second bill of divorce from him? In the case of a divorced woman who was secluded with her husband after the divorce, Beit Shammai are of the opinion that she does not require a second bill of divorce, while Beit Hillel are of the opinion that she does. In accordance with whose opinion mentioned in the baraita is this?
כדברי הכל
The Gemara explains: It is in accordance with everyone. It is in accordance with the opinion of both the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who hold that when they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is not concerned that they are betrothed, and she does not need a second bill of divorce.
מתקיף לה אביי מידי כספים קתני
Abaye objects to this understanding of the baraita, according to which the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, disagree about a case where he gave her money after they engaged in sexual intercourse: Is anything with regard to money taught in the baraita?
אלא אמר אביי הכי קאמר ראוה שנבעלה חוששין משום זנות ואין חוששין משום קידושין רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה אומר אף חוששין משום קידושין
Rather, Abaye said: This is what the baraita is saying: If they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is concerned due to licentiousness, but one is not concerned that due to their actions there was a betrothal. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One is also concerned that due to their actions there was a betrothal.
כמאן אזלא הא דאמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן מחלוקת כשראוה שנבעלה אבל לא ראוה שנבעלה דברי הכל אין צריכה הימנו גט שני כמאן
If so, in accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies only when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him. But if they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him then everyone agrees that she does not require a second bill of divorce from him. In accordance with whose opinion is this statement?
כרבי יוסי ברבי יהודה
It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, as he holds in accordance with Beit Hillel, that if they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is concerned that she may be betrothed to him and she requires a second bill of divorce. By contrast, according to the first tanna, even when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is not concerned that she may be betrothed.
מתקיף לה רבא אם כן מאי אף
Rava objects to this: If so, what is the meaning of the expression used by Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda: There is also concern that due to their actions they performed a betrothal? If there is concern about betrothal there should be no concern with regard to licentiousness.
אלא אמר רבא הכי קאמר רבי יוסי בר רבי יהודה אומר אף לא ראוה שנבעלה חוששין משום קידושין
Rather, Rava said that this is what the baraita is saying: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Even if they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse, one is concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal.
כמאן אזלא הא דאמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן מחלוקת כשראוה שנבעלה אבל לא ראוה שנבעלה דברי הכל אינה צריכה הימנו גט כמאן
And if so, in accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies only where they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him. But if they did not see that she engaged in intercourse with him, then everyone agrees that she does not require a second bill of divorce from him. In accordance with whose opinion is this statement?
דלא כחד
This is not in accordance with any one of the tanna’im, for according to Rava the first tanna is not concerned about betrothal even when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is concerned even when they did not witness that she engaged in sexual intercourse.
מה היא באותן הימים רבי יהודה אומר כאשת איש לכל דבריה רבי יוסי אומר מגורשת ואינה מגורשת
§ The mishna teaches: What is her status during these days? Rabbi Yehuda says: She is like a married woman with regard to all of her matters. Rabbi Yosei says: It is uncertain whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced.
תנא ובלבד שימות ולכי מיית הוי גיטא והא קיימא לן דאין גט לאחר מיתה אמר רבה באומר מעת שאני בעולם
The Sages taught in reference to the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei stated in the baraita: Their dispute with regard to her status in the interim is stated provided that he dies. The Gemara clarifies: And when he dies, is this a valid bill of divorce? Do they hold that the bill of divorce takes effect after the husband’s death? But don’t we maintain that there is no bill of divorce after death? Rabba says that this is referring to a case where the husband says: This should be a valid bill of divorce from the last moment that I am in the world, meaning that it should take effect a moment before he dies.
תנו רבנן ימים שבינתים בעלה זכאי במציאתה ובמעשה ידיה ובהפרת נדריה ויורשה
The Sages taught (Tosefta 7:4): In a case where the husband said: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die from this illness, during the days between, before he dies, her husband is entitled to anything that she finds, i.e., any lost item that cannot be returned to its owner, in accordance with the rabbinic principle that any lost item found by a wife belongs to her husband. And he is entitled to the profits from her earnings, and he is entitled to annul her vows (see Numbers 30:7–9), and he inherits from her if she predeceases him,
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This month's learning is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.
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Masechet Gittin is sponsored by Elaine and Saul Schreiber in honor of their daughter-in-law Daniela Schreiber on receiving her Master of Science in Marriage and Family Therapy.
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Gittin 73
The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria
והא קא משמע לן דהלך על משענתו הוא דבעינן אומדנא אידך אומדנא נמי לא בעינן
And this teaches us that we require assessment only in a case where he walked with his staff. But in another case, where he did not arise from his illness and walk but immediately became ill again, we do not even require assessment, as it is clear that his death from the second illness was a result of the first illness.
שמעת מינה שכיב מרע שניתק מחולי לחולי מתנתו מתנה אין דאמר רבי אלעזר משמיה דרב שכיב מרע שניתק מחולי לחולי מתנתו מתנה
The Gemara asks: Can you conclude from it that in the case of a person on his deathbed who proceeded from one illness immediately to another illness, his gift is a valid gift, as he ultimately died as a result of the first illness? The Gemara answers: Yes, as Rabbi Elazar says in the name of Rav: In the case of a person on his deathbed who proceeded from one illness immediately to another illness, his gift is a valid gift.
רבה ורבא לא סבירא להו הא דרב הונא גזירה שמא יאמרו יש גט לאחר מיתה
The Gemara notes: Rabba and Rava do not hold in accordance with this halakha stated by Rav Huna, that if the husband was healed of his illness then the bill of divorce is nullified even if did not specify such a condition. They hold that there is a rabbinic decree in place lest people say that there can be a valid bill of divorce given after death. Since people will see that in this case the bill of divorce took effect only once the husband died, in the future they may mistakenly consider a bill of divorce to be valid even though the husband explicitly made a condition that it would take effect only after his death.
ומי איכא מידי דמדאורייתא לא הוי גיטא ומשום גזירה שרינן אשת איש לעלמא
The Gemara asks: And is there anything that by Torah law is not a valid bill of divorce, but due to a rabbinic decree we permit a married woman to marry anyone, even though by Torah law she remains married to her husband? Both Rabba and Rava agree that by Torah law the bill of divorce is nullified once the husband is healed from his illness, yet they treat the bill of divorce as valid. How can this be?
אין כל דמקדש אדעתא דרבנן מקדש ואפקעינהו רבנן לקדושין מיניה
The Gemara answers: Yes, the Sages have the ability to nullify even a marriage that took effect by Torah law, because anyone who betroths a woman betroths her contingent upon the will of the Sages, and when one fails to conform to their will in matters of marriage and divorce the Sages expropriated his betrothal from him retroactively. Consequently, it is permitted for the woman to remarry.
אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי תינח דקדיש בכספא קדיש בביאה מאי איכא למימר אמר ליה שויוה רבנן לבעילתו בעילת זנות
Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This works out well in a case where he betrothed his wife with money, as it is possible to say that the Sages expropriated the money used for the betrothal from the possession of its owner, resulting in a retroactive cancellation of the betrothal. But if he betrothed her by means of sexual intercourse then what is there to say? Rav Ashi said to him: The Sages declared his sexual intercourse to be licentious sexual intercourse, which does not create a bond of betrothal.
תנו רבנן זה גיטיך מהיום אם מתי מחולי זה ונפל הבית עליו או הכישו נחש אינו גט אם לא אעמוד מחולי זה ונפל עליו בית או הכישו נחש הרי זה גט
§ The Sages taught (Tosefta 7:2): If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him, then it is not a valid bill of divorce. But if he said: This is your bill of divorce if I will not arise healthy from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him, then this is a valid bill of divorce.
מאי שנא רישא ומאי שנא סיפא
The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause such that the bill of divorce is not valid and what is different in the latter clause that the bill of divorce is valid? In neither case did he die from the illness. The Gemara gives no answer to this question.
שלחו מתם אכלו ארי אין לנו
They sent a ruling to Babylonia from there, from Eretz Yisrael: If the husband said: This is your bill of divorce if I am not healed from this illness, and a lion ate him, then we do not need to be concerned about this bill of divorce, for it is certainly not valid.
ההוא גברא דזבין ארעא לחבריה קביל עליה כל אונסא דמתיליד לסוף אפיקו בה נהרא
It is related: There was a certain man who sold land to another, and he accepted upon himself the responsibility for any unavoidable accident that may happen to the land. In such a case he would reimburse the buyer for the damage. In the end they diverted a river into it, meaning the government decided to make a new canal through the land that he sold.
אתא לקמיה דרבינא אמר ליה זיל שפי ליה דהא קבילת עלך כל אונסא דמתיליד אמר ליה רב אחא בר תחליפא לרבינא אונסא דלא שכיח הוא
The buyer came before Ravina to lodge a claim. Ravina said to the seller: Go pacify him, i.e., reimburse him, as you accepted upon yourself responsibility for any unavoidable accident that might happen. Rav Aḥa bar Taḥalifa disagreed and said to Ravina: It is an uncommon, unavoidable accident, and the condition of the sale should not apply in such a case.
איגלגל מילתא ומטא לקמיה דרבא אמר להו אונסא דלא שכיח הוא איתיביה רבינא לרבא אם לא אעמוד מחולי זה ונפל עליו בית או הכישו נחש הרי זה גט
The matter was circulated, as this ruling was never finalized, and it came before Rava. He said to them: It is an uncommon, unavoidable accident, and the seller should not have to pay. Ravina raised an objection to Rava: Isn’t it taught that if the husband said: This is your bill of divorce if I am not healed from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him then it is a valid bill of divorce? These cases are both uncommon, unavoidable accidents, yet the bill of divorce is valid.
אמר ליה רבא ואימא מרישא אינו גט
Rava said to him: But you can say an opposite inference from the first clause: If a husband says: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him, then it is not a valid bill of divorce. Apparently, an uncommon, unavoidable accident is not included within his condition. If so, the inference from first clause of the baraita contradicts the inference from latter clause and it cannot be used to prove either opinion.
אמר ליה רב אחא מדפתי לרבינא ומשום דקשיא רישא אסיפא לא מותבינן תיובתא מינה
Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: And because there is a difficulty presented by the contradiction between the first clause of the baraita and the latter clause, can we no longer raise an objection from it? Seemingly, the challenge raised by Ravina from the latter clause of the baraita is still valid.
אמר ליה אין כיון דקשיא רישא אסיפא לא איתמר בי מדרשא ומשבשתא היא זיל בתר סברא
Ravina said to him: Yes, Rava was correct. Since there is a difficulty presented by the contradiction between the first clause of the baraita and the latter clause, this baraita was never stated in the study hall and it is corrupted. As it is not possible to rely on this baraita one must follow reason, and the most reasonable interpretation is that his condition would not include an uncommon and unavoidable accident.
רב פפא ורב הונא בריה דרב יהושע זבן שומשמי אגידא דנהר מלכא אגור מלחי לעבורינהו קבילו עלייהו כל אונסא דמתיליד לסוף איסתכר נהר מלכא
It is related that Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, purchased sesame on the bank of the Malka River. They hired sailors to cross them to the other side of the river, and the sailors accepted upon themselves responsibility for any unavoidable accident that might occur. In the end the Malka River was dammed so that the merchandise could not be transported by river.
אמרו להו אגורו חמרי אפקעינהו ניהלן דהא קבילתו עלייכו כל אונסא דמיתליד
The two Sages said to them: Hire donkeys and release them to us in order to transport the sesame, as you accepted upon yourself responsibility for any unavoidable accident that might arise.
אתו לקמיה דרבא אמר להו קאקי חיורי משלחי גלימי דאינשי אונסא דלא שכיח הוא
The two Sages came to court before Rava and he said to them: You white geese [kakei ḥivarei], referring to their long, white beards, who strip men of their cloaks. You are acting unfairly with the sailors. It is an uncommon, unavoidable accident for the Malka River to be dammed, and the sailors did not accept responsibility for this case.
מתני׳ לא תתייחד עמו אלא בפני עדים
MISHNA: If a woman’s ill husband gave her a bill of divorce, and made a condition that it should take effect from today if he dies from his illness, then she may be secluded with him only in the presence of two witnesses, lest they end up engaging in sexual intercourse.
אפילו על פי עבד אפילו על פי שפחה חוץ משפחתה מפני שלבה גס בה בשפחתה
This applies to being secluded in the presence of not only valid witnesses; it is permitted for her to be secluded with him even in the presence of a slave or even in the presence of a maidservant, except for the wife’s personal maidservant. And it is prohibited for the wife to be secluded in the presence of the latter because she is accustomed to her maidservant, and there is concern that she will engage in sexual intercourse with her husband even though the maidservant is present.
מה היא באותן הימים רבי יהודה אומר
What is the halakhic status of the wife during these days between when the bill of divorce was given but before the condition has been fulfilled with the death of the husband? Rabbi Yehuda says: She is
כאשת איש לכל דבריה רבי יוסי אומר מגורשת ואינה מגורשת
like a married woman with regard to all of her matters, and she remains forbidden to other men. Rabbi Yosei says: It is uncertain whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced.
גמ׳ תנו רבנן ראוה שנתייחדה עמו באפילה או שישנה עמו תחת מרגלות המטה אין חוששין שמא נתעסקו בדבר אחר וחוששין משום זנות ואין חוששין משום קדושין רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה אומר אף חוששין משום קידושין
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:4): If, after the giving of this bill of divorce witnesses saw that she secluded herself with her husband in the dark, or that she slept with him under the foot of the bed, one is not concerned that perhaps they were engaged in another matter, i.e., sexual intercourse. And one is concerned due to their action of licentiousness but one is not concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One is also concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal.
מאי קאמר אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה הכי קאמר ראוה שנבעלה חוששין משום קידושין נתן לה כספים חוששין משום זנות דאמרינן באתננה נתן לה ואין חוששין משום קידושין רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה אומר אף בזו חוששין משום קידושין
The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: This is what the baraita is saying: If they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with her husband, then there one is concerned that due to their actions there was a betrothal and perhaps through this act he intended to remarry her. If he gave her money immediately following the sexual intercourse one is concerned due to licentiousness, wherein we say: He gave this money as hire for a prostitute, but one is not concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Even in this case one is concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal, i.e., one is concerned that he gave her the money as betrothal.
כמאן אזלא הא דאמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן מחלוקת כשראוה שנבעלה אבל לא ראוה שנבעלה דברי הכל אין צריכה הימנו גט שני כמאן
Based on this explanation of the baraita, in accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, that the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel (81a) is relevant only when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with her husband, but if they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him, everyone agrees that she does not require a second bill of divorce from him? In the case of a divorced woman who was secluded with her husband after the divorce, Beit Shammai are of the opinion that she does not require a second bill of divorce, while Beit Hillel are of the opinion that she does. In accordance with whose opinion mentioned in the baraita is this?
כדברי הכל
The Gemara explains: It is in accordance with everyone. It is in accordance with the opinion of both the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who hold that when they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is not concerned that they are betrothed, and she does not need a second bill of divorce.
מתקיף לה אביי מידי כספים קתני
Abaye objects to this understanding of the baraita, according to which the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, disagree about a case where he gave her money after they engaged in sexual intercourse: Is anything with regard to money taught in the baraita?
אלא אמר אביי הכי קאמר ראוה שנבעלה חוששין משום זנות ואין חוששין משום קידושין רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה אומר אף חוששין משום קידושין
Rather, Abaye said: This is what the baraita is saying: If they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is concerned due to licentiousness, but one is not concerned that due to their actions there was a betrothal. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One is also concerned that due to their actions there was a betrothal.
כמאן אזלא הא דאמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן מחלוקת כשראוה שנבעלה אבל לא ראוה שנבעלה דברי הכל אין צריכה הימנו גט שני כמאן
If so, in accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies only when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him. But if they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him then everyone agrees that she does not require a second bill of divorce from him. In accordance with whose opinion is this statement?
כרבי יוסי ברבי יהודה
It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, as he holds in accordance with Beit Hillel, that if they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is concerned that she may be betrothed to him and she requires a second bill of divorce. By contrast, according to the first tanna, even when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is not concerned that she may be betrothed.
מתקיף לה רבא אם כן מאי אף
Rava objects to this: If so, what is the meaning of the expression used by Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda: There is also concern that due to their actions they performed a betrothal? If there is concern about betrothal there should be no concern with regard to licentiousness.
אלא אמר רבא הכי קאמר רבי יוסי בר רבי יהודה אומר אף לא ראוה שנבעלה חוששין משום קידושין
Rather, Rava said that this is what the baraita is saying: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Even if they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse, one is concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal.
כמאן אזלא הא דאמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן מחלוקת כשראוה שנבעלה אבל לא ראוה שנבעלה דברי הכל אינה צריכה הימנו גט כמאן
And if so, in accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies only where they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him. But if they did not see that she engaged in intercourse with him, then everyone agrees that she does not require a second bill of divorce from him. In accordance with whose opinion is this statement?
דלא כחד
This is not in accordance with any one of the tanna’im, for according to Rava the first tanna is not concerned about betrothal even when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is concerned even when they did not witness that she engaged in sexual intercourse.
מה היא באותן הימים רבי יהודה אומר כאשת איש לכל דבריה רבי יוסי אומר מגורשת ואינה מגורשת
§ The mishna teaches: What is her status during these days? Rabbi Yehuda says: She is like a married woman with regard to all of her matters. Rabbi Yosei says: It is uncertain whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced.
תנא ובלבד שימות ולכי מיית הוי גיטא והא קיימא לן דאין גט לאחר מיתה אמר רבה באומר מעת שאני בעולם
The Sages taught in reference to the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei stated in the baraita: Their dispute with regard to her status in the interim is stated provided that he dies. The Gemara clarifies: And when he dies, is this a valid bill of divorce? Do they hold that the bill of divorce takes effect after the husband’s death? But don’t we maintain that there is no bill of divorce after death? Rabba says that this is referring to a case where the husband says: This should be a valid bill of divorce from the last moment that I am in the world, meaning that it should take effect a moment before he dies.
תנו רבנן ימים שבינתים בעלה זכאי במציאתה ובמעשה ידיה ובהפרת נדריה ויורשה
The Sages taught (Tosefta 7:4): In a case where the husband said: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die from this illness, during the days between, before he dies, her husband is entitled to anything that she finds, i.e., any lost item that cannot be returned to its owner, in accordance with the rabbinic principle that any lost item found by a wife belongs to her husband. And he is entitled to the profits from her earnings, and he is entitled to annul her vows (see Numbers 30:7–9), and he inherits from her if she predeceases him,
