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Today's Daf Yomi

May 14, 2015 | 讻状讛 讘讗讬讬专 转砖注状讛

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

Ketubot 101

讬讜爪讗讛 讘讙讟 爪专讬讻讛 诇讛诪转讬谉 砖诇砖讛 讞讚砖讬诐

One who leaves the marriage union through a bill of divorce is required to wait three months before remarrying.

诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 转谞讬谞讗 讻讜诇讛讜 讛诪诪讗谞转 讘讗讬砖 讛讜讗 诪讜转专 讘拽专讜讘讜转讬讛 讜讛讬讗 诪讜转专转 讘拽专讜讘讬讜 讜诇讗 驻住诇讛 诪谉 讛讻讛讜谞讛 谞转谉 诇讛 讙讟 讛讜讗 讗住讜专 讘拽专讜讘讜转讬讛 讜讛讬讗 讗住讜专讛 讘拽专讜讘讬讜 讜驻住诇讛 诪谉 讛讻讛讜谞讛

The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us by telling us all of this? We already learned it all in Yevamot (108a): In the case of one who refuses to continue living with a certain man, he is permitted to her relatives and she is permitted to his relatives, and she is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, then he is forbidden to her relatives and she is forbidden to his relatives, but she is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.

爪专讬讻讛 诇讛诪转讬谉 砖诇砖讛 讞讚砖讬诐 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讗 转谞谉

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to mention that if she receives a bill of divorce, she is required to wait three months before remarrying, as we did not learn that halakha in the mishna. Once Shmuel mentioned the difference between one who refuses to continue living with her husband and one who is divorced, he mentioned the other differences between the two cases.

诇讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诪注砖讛 拽讟谞讛 讻诇讜诐 讜讗讬谉 讘注诇讛 讝讻讗讬 讘诪爪讬讗转讛 讜诇讗 讘诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜诇讗 讘讛驻专转 谞讚专讬讛 讜讗讬谞讜 讬讜专砖讛 讜讗讬谞讜 诪讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讻诇诇讜 砖诇 讚讘专 讗讬谞讛 讻讗砖转讜 诇讻诇 讚讘专 讗诇讗 砖爪专讬讻讛 诪讬讗讜谉

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute between Rav and Shmuel is parallel to a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as the baraita teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says: The act of marriage by a minor girl is nothing, i.e., has no legal impact, when she is married off not by her father, and her husband is not entitled to any lost article that she finds, and not to her earnings; and he is not able to annul her vows; and he does not inherit from her; nor does he become impure for her if he is a priest. The principle is that her legal status is not that of his wife in every sense, only that she requires a refusal in order to leave the marriage.

专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗讜诪专 诪注砖讛 拽讟谞讛 讻诇讜诐 讜讘注诇讛 讝讻讗讬 讘诪爪讬讗转讛 讜讘诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜讘讛驻专转 谞讚专讬讛 讜讬讜专砖讛 讜诪讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讻诇诇讜 砖诇 讚讘专 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻讗砖转讜 诇讻诇 讚讘专 讗诇讗 砖讬讜爪讗讛 讘诪讬讗讜谉

Rabbi Yehoshua says: The act of marriage by a minor girl is something, i.e., has legal impact, and her husband is entitled to any lost article that she finds and to her earnings; and he is able to annul her vows; and he inherits from her; and he becomes impure for her, even if he is a priest. The principle is that her legal status is that of his wife in every sense, except for the fact that she leaves this union through refusal and does not need a bill of divorce.

诇讬诪讗 专讘 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注

Shall we say that Rav said that she does not receive payment of her marriage contract in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that her marriage did not take effect, and that Shmuel said that she does receive payment of her marriage contract in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who holds that her marriage did take effect?

讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬

The Gemara rejects this: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, everyone agrees that a minor girl鈥檚 marriage has no legal standing and, as Rav said, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.

讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 砖诪讜讗诇 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讜专讘 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讛转诐 讗诇讗 诪讚讬讚讛 诇讚讬讚讬讛 讗讘诇 诪讚讬讚讬讛 诇讚讬讚讛 诇讗

When they disagree, they disagree in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. Shmuel is in accordance with the literal opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. And Rav says that when Rabbi Yehoshua said there that a minor girl has a legal status of his wife in every sense, it was only with regard to her obligations toward him. But with regard to his obligations toward her, since according to Torah law they are not married, the Sages could not obligate the husband to pay her anything.

讜诇讗 讘诇讗讜转 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专 讞讬讬讗 诇专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专转 诇谉 诪砖诪讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讗讘诇 谞讻住讬 爪讗谉 讘专讝诇 讗讬转 诇讛

搂 The mishna teaches that a girl who refuses to continue living with her husband, a woman who is forbidden by rabbinic law as a secondary relative, and an ailonit are not entitled to payment of a marriage contract and are not entitled to their worn clothes. Rav Huna bar 岣yya said to Rav Kahana: You told us in the name of Shmuel: They taught that she is not entitled to her worn clothes only with regard to the worn-out items of usufruct property [nikhsei melog], but she does have rights to the worn-out items of her guaranteed property [tzon barzel].

讛讜讬 讘讛 专讘 驻驻讗 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗诪诪讗谞转 讗讬 讚讗讬转谞讛讜 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 砖拽诇讗 讜讗讬 讚诇讬转谞讛讜 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 诇讗 砖拽诇讗

Rav Pappa discussed it and wondered: To which part of the mishna is this referring? If we say that it is referring to one who refuses to continue living with her husband, then if the worn-out articles are still in existence, she takes both the usufruct and the guaranteed properties. Since the marriage is annulled, she takes whatever belongs to her. And if they are no longer in existence and were completely worn out over the course of time, then she does not take compensation for either of them, as the husband was within his rights to make use of them.

讗诇讗 讗讗讬讬诇讜谞讬转 讗讬 讚讗讬转谞讛讜 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 砖拽诇讗 讗讬 讚诇讬转谞讛讜 讗讬驻讻讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讚讘专砖讜转讛 拽讬讬诪讬 讗讬转 诇讛 谞讻住讬 爪讗谉 讘专讝诇 讚诇讗讜 讘专砖讜转讛 拽讬讬诪讬 诇讬转 诇讛

Rather, it must be that Shmuel鈥檚 statement is in reference to an ailonit. This too is difficult as, in that case, if the articles are still in existence she takes both the usufruct and the guaranteed properties. If they are no longer in existence, then Shmuel should have stated the opposite and said: With regard to the usufruct property, which remains in her possession during the marriage, she does receive compensation for it in the event that the marriage is annulled. However, she does not receive compensation for the guaranteed property, which does not remain in her possession during the marriage but in the possession of her husband.

讗诇讗 讗砖谞讬讛 讜拽谞住讜 专讘谞谉 诇讚讬讚讛 讘讚讬讚讬讛 讜诇讚讬讚讬讛 讘讚讬讚讛

Rather, it must be that Shmuel鈥檚 statement is in reference to a secondary forbidden relative, and the rationale for this halakha is that the Sages penalized both the husband and the wife for violating a rabbinic prohibition. The Sages assigned a penalty to her with regard to his obligations to her, and she is not reimbursed for the worn-out usufruct property. And they assigned a penalty to him with regard to her obligations to him so that he is responsible for reimbursing her for the worn-out guaranteed property.

讗诪专 专讘 砖讬诪讬 讘专 讗砖讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诪讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 注讬讬诇讗 诇讬讛 讙诇讬诪讗 拽专谞讗 讛讜讬 讜诇讗 诪讻住讬 诇讛 讜讗讝讬诇 注讚 讚讘诇讬

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Conclude from the statement of Rav Kahana that if a wife brought home to her husband a cloak after they were already married, it is viewed as capital, and he may not go and cover himself with it until it wears out. With regard to land that the wife obtains during the marriage, the husband has the right to benefit from it by consuming its produce. From the fact that Rav Kahana stated that it is only in this particular case that the woman is not reimbursed for clothing that became worn out through her husband鈥檚 use, one can infer that generally, the husband does not have the right to use a garment she obtains, to the degree that it becomes worn out.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 驻讬专讗 讛讜讬 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 驻诇讬讙讗

The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 Rav Na岣an say that use of the cloak is considered the produce of her property, to which the husband is entitled? The Gemara answers: The statement of Rav Na岣an is in disagreement with that opinion.

讗讬谉 诇讛谉 讻转讜讘讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 诪谞讛 诪讗转讬诐 讗讘诇 转讜住驻转 讬砖 诇讛谉

搂 The mishna teaches that these specific women are not entitled to payment of a marriage contract. Shmuel said: They taught this only with regard to the principal of the marriage contract, which the Sages instituted for all women, amounting to one hundred dinars for a widow and two hundred dinars for a virgin. However, the additional sum listed in the marriage contract, which their husband specified for them of his own accord, is considered a gift and they are entitled to it.

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 谞砖讬诐 砖讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讛谉 讻转讜讘讛 讻讙讜谉 讛诪诪讗谞转 讜讞讘专讜转讬讛 讗讬谉 诇讛谉 诪谞讛 诪讗转讬诐 讗讘诇 转讜住驻转 讬砖 诇讛谉

The Gemara notes: That is also taught in a baraita: Women with regard to whom the Sages said: They are not entitled to payment of a marriage contract, for example, one who refused to remain married to her husband, and her companions, they are not entitled to the principal of one hundred dinars or two hundred dinars. But as for the additional sum stipulated in the marriage contract that the husband added of his own accord, they are entitled to it.

谞砖讬诐 砖讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 讬讜爪讗讜转 砖诇讗 讘讻转讜讘讛 讻讙讜谉 注讜讘专转 注诇 讚转 讜讞讘专讜转讬讛 讗讬谉 诇讛谉 转讜住驻转 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 诪谞讛 诪讗转讬诐 讜讛讬讜爪讗转 诪砖讜诐 砖诐 专注 谞讜讟诇转 诪讛 砖诇驻谞讬讛 讜讬讜爪讗讛

However, women with regard to whom the Sages said: They are divorced without receiving payment for their marriage contract, for example, a woman who violates the precepts of halakha or Jewish custom, and her companions, are not entitled to the additional sum stipulated by their husbands in the marriage contract. And since they violated and transgressed the mitzvot, it is all the more so that they are not entitled to receive the principal one hundred dinars or two hundred dinars, as the Sages penalized them and negated all of their husband鈥檚 obligations that are recorded in the marriage contract. And one who is divorced because she received a bad reputation for licentiousness takes what is left of her usufruct property and is divorced.

诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讛讜谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讝讬谞转讛 诇讗 讛驻住讬讚讛

The Gemara notes: This baraita supports the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna said: A woman who was licentious has not lost

讘诇讗讜转讬讛 拽讬讬诪讬谉

her right to her worn clothes that are in existence. She retains possession of her clothes and all of the other items that she brought with her to the marriage that have not been worn out.

转谞讬 转谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讝讬谞转讛 讛驻住讬讚讛 讘诇讗讜转讬讛 拽讬讬诪讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗诐 讛讬讗 讝讬谞转讛 讻诇讬讛 诪讬 讝谞讗讬 转谞讬 诇讗 讛驻住讬讚讛 讘诇讗讜转讬讛 拽讬讬诪讬谉

The tanna teaches a baraita before Rav Na岣an: A woman who was licentious lost her right to her extant, worn clothes, i.e., when they divorce, she does not keep her clothing. He said to him: If she was unfaithful and engaged in sexual intercourse with another, were her items also licentious? Certainly she is not penalized by losing her right to her property, and therefore teach the opposite: A woman who was licentious has not lost her right to her extant worn clothes.

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讝讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 住转讬诪转讗讛 讗讘诇 讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讝讬谞转讛 诇讗 讛驻住讬讚讛 讘诇讗讜转讬讛 拽讬讬诪讬谉

Similarly, Rabba bar bar 岣na said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: This baraita taught by the tanna is the statement of Rabbi Mena岣m, the unattributed, as his opinion is cited in several places as the unattributed mishna. However, the Rabbis say that if she was licentious, she has not lost her right to her extant worn clothes.

讗诐 诪转讞诇讛 谞砖讗讛 讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗讬诇讜谞讬转 讗砖讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讗砖讛 讗诇诪谞讛 讗砖讛 讙诪讜专讛

搂 The mishna teaches that if, from the start, he married her with the understanding that she is an ailonit, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. Rav Huna said: An ailonit is a wife and she is not a wife, while a widow who is married to a High Priest is entirely a wife.

讗讬诇讜谞讬转 讗砖讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讗砖讛 讛讻讬专 讘讛 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 诇讗 讛讻讬专 讘讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讗诇诪谞讛 讗砖讛 讙诪讜专讛 讘讬谉 讛讻讬专 讘讛 讘讬谉 诇讗 讛讻讬专 讘讛 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara explains: An ailonit is sometimes treated as a wife and she is sometimes not treated as a wife. How so? If he knew about her that she was an ailonit before marrying her, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract like any other wife. But if he did not know about her that she was an ailonit before marrying her, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract. A widow is entirely considered a wife. Whether he knew about her that she was a widow before marrying her whether he did not know this about her, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract.

讜专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗讞转 讝讜 讜讗讞转 讝讜 讗砖讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讗砖讛 讛讻讬专 讘讛 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 诇讗 讛讻讬专 讘讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛

And Rav Yehuda says: Both the ailonit and the widow are sometimes treated as a wife and sometimes not treated as a wife. Even in the case of a widow who marries a High Priest, if he knew about her that she was a widow before marrying her, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. But if he did not know about her that she was a widow, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讻谞住讛 讘讞讝拽转 砖讛讬讗 讻谉 讜谞诪爪讗转 砖讛讬讗 讻谉 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讛讗 住转诪讗 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Huna鈥檚 statement from a baraita: If he married the woman with the presumption that she is so, that she has some deficiency or that she is forbidden to him, and it is found that she is so as he thought from the start, then she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. One can infer from here: If he married her without specification, and it turns out that she has a deficiency or that she is forbidden to him, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.

诇讗 转讬诪讗 讛讗 住转诪讗 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 讻谞住讛 讘讞讝拽转 砖讗讬谞讛 讻谉 讜谞诪爪讗转 砖讛讬讗 讻谉 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara answers: Do not say this implies that if he married her without specification she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract. Rather, say the following inference: If he married her with the presumption that she is not so and it is found that she is so, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.

讗讘诇 住转诪讗 诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇讛 讗讚转谞讬 讘讞讝拽转 砖讛讬讗 讻谉 讜谞诪爪讗转 砖讛讬讗 讻谉 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 诇砖诪注讬谞谉 住转诪讗 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 讛讗

The Gemara asks: But if he married her without specification, what would the halakha be? The halakha would be that she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. If that is the case, instead of teaching the case where he married her with the presumption that she is so and she is found to be so and she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract, let him teach us the case where he marries her without specification. If in a case where he marries her without specification she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract, then all the more so in this case, where he marries her knowingly, she must be entitled to it.

讜注讜讚 转谞讬 讻谞住讛 讘讬讚讜注 讜谞诪爪讗转 讘讬讚讜注 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讻谞住讛 住转诐 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗

And further, it is taught explicitly in another baraita: If he married her knowing that she has a deficiency, and it is found that she does have the deficiency as was known, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. If he married her without specification, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna.

专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讗讟注讬转讬讛 讛讜讗 住讘专 诪讚拽讗 诪驻诇讬讙 讘讗讬诇讜谞讬转 讜诇讗 拽诪驻诇讬讙 讘讗诇诪谞讛 诪讻诇诇 讚讗诇诪谞讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讘住转诪讗 谞诪讬 讗讬转 诇讛 讜诇讗 讛讬讗 讻讬 拽转谞讬 诇讛 诇讗诇诪谞讛 讗驻诇讜讙转讗 讚讗讬诇讜谞讬转 拽讗讬

The Gemara explains: Rav Huna was misled by the language of the mishna and made an inference that caused him to say something that is not in keeping with the halakha. He thought that since the mishna differentiates between a case where the husband was aware of her situation and a case where he was not aware with regard to an ailonit, but the mishna does not differentiate with regard to a widow, by inference one can say that with regard to a widow, even where one merely marries her without knowing that she is a widow, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. In truth, however, that is not so. When the mishna teaches the halakha of the widow, it is based on the differentiation stated with regard to the ailonit. The mishna intended for the distinction between whether the husband was aware of her situation before the marriage, which was stated in the case of an ailonit, to apply in the case of the widow as well.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讗诇诪谞讛 谞讬讝讜谞转

 

诪转谞讬壮 讛谞讜砖讗 讗转 讛讗砖讛 讜驻住拽讛 注诪讜 讻讚讬 砖讬讝讜谉 讗转 讘转讛 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诇讝讜谞讛 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐

MISHNA: One who marries a woman, and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter from another man for five years, is obligated to sustain her daughter for five years.

谞讬住转 诇讗讞专 讜驻住拽讛 注诪讜 讻讚讬 砖讬讝讜谉 讗转 讘转讛 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诇讝讜谞讛 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讗诪专 讛专讗砖讜谉 诇讻砖转讘讗 讗爪诇讬 讗讝讜谞讛 讗诇讗 诪讜诇讬讱 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转讬讛 诇诪拽讜诐 砖讗诪讛

If, in the course of those five years they were divorced and the woman was married to another man, and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter for five years, he too is obligated to sustain her for five years. The first husband may not say: When she comes to me, I will sustain her. Rather, he brings her sustenance to her, to the place where her mother lives.

讜讻谉 诇讗 讬讗诪专讜 砖谞讬讛诐 讛专讬 讗谞讜 讝谞讬谉 讗讜转讛 讻讗讞讚 讗诇讗 讗讞讚 讝谞讛 讜讗讞讚 谞讜转谉 诇讛 讚诪讬 诪讝讜谞讜转

And likewise, both of them may not jointly say: We will sustain the girl as one in a partnership. Rather, one sustains her, providing her with food, while the other gives her the monetary value of the sustenance.

谞讬住转 讛讘注诇 谞讜转谉 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讜讛谉 谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讛 讚诪讬 诪讝讜谞讜转 诪转讜 讘谞讜转讬讛谉 谞讬讝讜谞讜转 诪谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讜讛讬讗 谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讬讗 讻讘注诇转 讞讜讘

If the daughter was married during this period, her husband provides her with the sustenance customarily provided by a husband for his wife, and the two men obligated to sustain her due to agreements with her mother provide her with the monetary value of the sustenance. If the two husbands of the mother died, their daughters are sustained from unsold property, and she, their wife鈥檚 daughter, whom they agreed to sustain, is sustained even from liened property that was sold. This is due to the fact that her legal status is like that of a creditor, given that he is contractually obligated to support her.

讛驻拽讞讬诐 讛讬讜 讻讜转讘讬诐 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讝讜谉 讗转 讘转讱 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐 讻诇 讝诪谉 砖讗转 注诪讬

The perspicacious ones would write an explicit stipulation into the agreement: I agree on the condition that I will sustain your daughter for five years only as long as you are with me. Then they would not be obligated to sustain a girl who is not their daughter when they are no longer married to the girl鈥檚 mother.

讙诪壮 讗转诪专 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 讞讬讬讘 讗谞讬 诇讱 诪谞讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 驻讟讜专

GEMARA: It was stated with regard to one who says to another: I am obligated to pay you one hundred dinars, that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: He is obligated to pay, and Reish Lakish said: He is exempt.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗转诐 注讚讬讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讚拽驻讟专 讗讬 讚诇讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗转诐 注讚讬讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚拽诪讞讬讬讘

The Gemara seeks to clarify: What are the circumstances of this case? If he said to the people present: You are my witnesses, what is the reasoning of Reish Lakish, who exempts him from payment? He confessed before witnesses that he owes the money. If he did not say to them: You are my witnesses, what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who obligates him to pay?

诇注讜诇诐 讚诇讗 拽讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗转诐 注讚讬讬 讜讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讞讬讬讘 讗谞讬 诇讱 诪谞讛 讘砖讟专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讬诪讗 诪讬诇转讗 讚砖讟专讗 讻诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗转诐 注讚讬诐 讚诪讬 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 驻讟讜专 诇讗 讗诇讬诪讗 诪讬诇转讗 讚砖讟专讗

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is a case where he did not say to those present: You are my witnesses. However, here we are dealing with a case where he said to the other: I am obligated to give you one hundred dinars, and he did so in a contract, i.e., he gave him an unsigned contract in which he stated that he is obligated to give him one hundred dinars. Rabbi Yo岣nan said: He is obligated to pay, since his word given through a contract is legally as authoritative as one who said to the bystanders: You are my witnesses. Reish Lakish said: He is exempt from payment, because his word given through a contract is legally not sufficiently authoritative to be considered a bona fide admission.

转谞谉 讛谞讜砖讗 讗转 讛讗砖讛 讜驻住拽讛 注诪讜 诇讝讜谉 讗转 讘转讛 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诇讝讜谞讛 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗

The Gemara presents a challenge to the opinion of Reish Lakish. We learned in the mishna: One who marries a woman, and she stipulated with him that he is obligated to sustain her daughter for five years, is obligated to sustain her for five years. What, is it not that the mishna is discussing a case like this, where he gave her a contract that lacks proper signatures and it is nevertheless legally binding, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan? If you say otherwise, where is the novelty in the teaching of the mishna?

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

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Ketubot 101

讬讜爪讗讛 讘讙讟 爪专讬讻讛 诇讛诪转讬谉 砖诇砖讛 讞讚砖讬诐

One who leaves the marriage union through a bill of divorce is required to wait three months before remarrying.

诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 转谞讬谞讗 讻讜诇讛讜 讛诪诪讗谞转 讘讗讬砖 讛讜讗 诪讜转专 讘拽专讜讘讜转讬讛 讜讛讬讗 诪讜转专转 讘拽专讜讘讬讜 讜诇讗 驻住诇讛 诪谉 讛讻讛讜谞讛 谞转谉 诇讛 讙讟 讛讜讗 讗住讜专 讘拽专讜讘讜转讬讛 讜讛讬讗 讗住讜专讛 讘拽专讜讘讬讜 讜驻住诇讛 诪谉 讛讻讛讜谞讛

The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us by telling us all of this? We already learned it all in Yevamot (108a): In the case of one who refuses to continue living with a certain man, he is permitted to her relatives and she is permitted to his relatives, and she is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, then he is forbidden to her relatives and she is forbidden to his relatives, but she is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.

爪专讬讻讛 诇讛诪转讬谉 砖诇砖讛 讞讚砖讬诐 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讗 转谞谉

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to mention that if she receives a bill of divorce, she is required to wait three months before remarrying, as we did not learn that halakha in the mishna. Once Shmuel mentioned the difference between one who refuses to continue living with her husband and one who is divorced, he mentioned the other differences between the two cases.

诇讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诪注砖讛 拽讟谞讛 讻诇讜诐 讜讗讬谉 讘注诇讛 讝讻讗讬 讘诪爪讬讗转讛 讜诇讗 讘诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜诇讗 讘讛驻专转 谞讚专讬讛 讜讗讬谞讜 讬讜专砖讛 讜讗讬谞讜 诪讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讻诇诇讜 砖诇 讚讘专 讗讬谞讛 讻讗砖转讜 诇讻诇 讚讘专 讗诇讗 砖爪专讬讻讛 诪讬讗讜谉

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute between Rav and Shmuel is parallel to a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as the baraita teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says: The act of marriage by a minor girl is nothing, i.e., has no legal impact, when she is married off not by her father, and her husband is not entitled to any lost article that she finds, and not to her earnings; and he is not able to annul her vows; and he does not inherit from her; nor does he become impure for her if he is a priest. The principle is that her legal status is not that of his wife in every sense, only that she requires a refusal in order to leave the marriage.

专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗讜诪专 诪注砖讛 拽讟谞讛 讻诇讜诐 讜讘注诇讛 讝讻讗讬 讘诪爪讬讗转讛 讜讘诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜讘讛驻专转 谞讚专讬讛 讜讬讜专砖讛 讜诪讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讻诇诇讜 砖诇 讚讘专 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻讗砖转讜 诇讻诇 讚讘专 讗诇讗 砖讬讜爪讗讛 讘诪讬讗讜谉

Rabbi Yehoshua says: The act of marriage by a minor girl is something, i.e., has legal impact, and her husband is entitled to any lost article that she finds and to her earnings; and he is able to annul her vows; and he inherits from her; and he becomes impure for her, even if he is a priest. The principle is that her legal status is that of his wife in every sense, except for the fact that she leaves this union through refusal and does not need a bill of divorce.

诇讬诪讗 专讘 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注

Shall we say that Rav said that she does not receive payment of her marriage contract in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that her marriage did not take effect, and that Shmuel said that she does receive payment of her marriage contract in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who holds that her marriage did take effect?

讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬

The Gemara rejects this: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, everyone agrees that a minor girl鈥檚 marriage has no legal standing and, as Rav said, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.

讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 砖诪讜讗诇 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讜专讘 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讛转诐 讗诇讗 诪讚讬讚讛 诇讚讬讚讬讛 讗讘诇 诪讚讬讚讬讛 诇讚讬讚讛 诇讗

When they disagree, they disagree in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. Shmuel is in accordance with the literal opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. And Rav says that when Rabbi Yehoshua said there that a minor girl has a legal status of his wife in every sense, it was only with regard to her obligations toward him. But with regard to his obligations toward her, since according to Torah law they are not married, the Sages could not obligate the husband to pay her anything.

讜诇讗 讘诇讗讜转 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专 讞讬讬讗 诇专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专转 诇谉 诪砖诪讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讗讘诇 谞讻住讬 爪讗谉 讘专讝诇 讗讬转 诇讛

搂 The mishna teaches that a girl who refuses to continue living with her husband, a woman who is forbidden by rabbinic law as a secondary relative, and an ailonit are not entitled to payment of a marriage contract and are not entitled to their worn clothes. Rav Huna bar 岣yya said to Rav Kahana: You told us in the name of Shmuel: They taught that she is not entitled to her worn clothes only with regard to the worn-out items of usufruct property [nikhsei melog], but she does have rights to the worn-out items of her guaranteed property [tzon barzel].

讛讜讬 讘讛 专讘 驻驻讗 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗诪诪讗谞转 讗讬 讚讗讬转谞讛讜 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 砖拽诇讗 讜讗讬 讚诇讬转谞讛讜 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 诇讗 砖拽诇讗

Rav Pappa discussed it and wondered: To which part of the mishna is this referring? If we say that it is referring to one who refuses to continue living with her husband, then if the worn-out articles are still in existence, she takes both the usufruct and the guaranteed properties. Since the marriage is annulled, she takes whatever belongs to her. And if they are no longer in existence and were completely worn out over the course of time, then she does not take compensation for either of them, as the husband was within his rights to make use of them.

讗诇讗 讗讗讬讬诇讜谞讬转 讗讬 讚讗讬转谞讛讜 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 砖拽诇讗 讗讬 讚诇讬转谞讛讜 讗讬驻讻讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讚讘专砖讜转讛 拽讬讬诪讬 讗讬转 诇讛 谞讻住讬 爪讗谉 讘专讝诇 讚诇讗讜 讘专砖讜转讛 拽讬讬诪讬 诇讬转 诇讛

Rather, it must be that Shmuel鈥檚 statement is in reference to an ailonit. This too is difficult as, in that case, if the articles are still in existence she takes both the usufruct and the guaranteed properties. If they are no longer in existence, then Shmuel should have stated the opposite and said: With regard to the usufruct property, which remains in her possession during the marriage, she does receive compensation for it in the event that the marriage is annulled. However, she does not receive compensation for the guaranteed property, which does not remain in her possession during the marriage but in the possession of her husband.

讗诇讗 讗砖谞讬讛 讜拽谞住讜 专讘谞谉 诇讚讬讚讛 讘讚讬讚讬讛 讜诇讚讬讚讬讛 讘讚讬讚讛

Rather, it must be that Shmuel鈥檚 statement is in reference to a secondary forbidden relative, and the rationale for this halakha is that the Sages penalized both the husband and the wife for violating a rabbinic prohibition. The Sages assigned a penalty to her with regard to his obligations to her, and she is not reimbursed for the worn-out usufruct property. And they assigned a penalty to him with regard to her obligations to him so that he is responsible for reimbursing her for the worn-out guaranteed property.

讗诪专 专讘 砖讬诪讬 讘专 讗砖讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诪讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 注讬讬诇讗 诇讬讛 讙诇讬诪讗 拽专谞讗 讛讜讬 讜诇讗 诪讻住讬 诇讛 讜讗讝讬诇 注讚 讚讘诇讬

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Conclude from the statement of Rav Kahana that if a wife brought home to her husband a cloak after they were already married, it is viewed as capital, and he may not go and cover himself with it until it wears out. With regard to land that the wife obtains during the marriage, the husband has the right to benefit from it by consuming its produce. From the fact that Rav Kahana stated that it is only in this particular case that the woman is not reimbursed for clothing that became worn out through her husband鈥檚 use, one can infer that generally, the husband does not have the right to use a garment she obtains, to the degree that it becomes worn out.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 驻讬专讗 讛讜讬 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 驻诇讬讙讗

The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 Rav Na岣an say that use of the cloak is considered the produce of her property, to which the husband is entitled? The Gemara answers: The statement of Rav Na岣an is in disagreement with that opinion.

讗讬谉 诇讛谉 讻转讜讘讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 诪谞讛 诪讗转讬诐 讗讘诇 转讜住驻转 讬砖 诇讛谉

搂 The mishna teaches that these specific women are not entitled to payment of a marriage contract. Shmuel said: They taught this only with regard to the principal of the marriage contract, which the Sages instituted for all women, amounting to one hundred dinars for a widow and two hundred dinars for a virgin. However, the additional sum listed in the marriage contract, which their husband specified for them of his own accord, is considered a gift and they are entitled to it.

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 谞砖讬诐 砖讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讛谉 讻转讜讘讛 讻讙讜谉 讛诪诪讗谞转 讜讞讘专讜转讬讛 讗讬谉 诇讛谉 诪谞讛 诪讗转讬诐 讗讘诇 转讜住驻转 讬砖 诇讛谉

The Gemara notes: That is also taught in a baraita: Women with regard to whom the Sages said: They are not entitled to payment of a marriage contract, for example, one who refused to remain married to her husband, and her companions, they are not entitled to the principal of one hundred dinars or two hundred dinars. But as for the additional sum stipulated in the marriage contract that the husband added of his own accord, they are entitled to it.

谞砖讬诐 砖讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 讬讜爪讗讜转 砖诇讗 讘讻转讜讘讛 讻讙讜谉 注讜讘专转 注诇 讚转 讜讞讘专讜转讬讛 讗讬谉 诇讛谉 转讜住驻转 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 诪谞讛 诪讗转讬诐 讜讛讬讜爪讗转 诪砖讜诐 砖诐 专注 谞讜讟诇转 诪讛 砖诇驻谞讬讛 讜讬讜爪讗讛

However, women with regard to whom the Sages said: They are divorced without receiving payment for their marriage contract, for example, a woman who violates the precepts of halakha or Jewish custom, and her companions, are not entitled to the additional sum stipulated by their husbands in the marriage contract. And since they violated and transgressed the mitzvot, it is all the more so that they are not entitled to receive the principal one hundred dinars or two hundred dinars, as the Sages penalized them and negated all of their husband鈥檚 obligations that are recorded in the marriage contract. And one who is divorced because she received a bad reputation for licentiousness takes what is left of her usufruct property and is divorced.

诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讛讜谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讝讬谞转讛 诇讗 讛驻住讬讚讛

The Gemara notes: This baraita supports the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna said: A woman who was licentious has not lost

讘诇讗讜转讬讛 拽讬讬诪讬谉

her right to her worn clothes that are in existence. She retains possession of her clothes and all of the other items that she brought with her to the marriage that have not been worn out.

转谞讬 转谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讝讬谞转讛 讛驻住讬讚讛 讘诇讗讜转讬讛 拽讬讬诪讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗诐 讛讬讗 讝讬谞转讛 讻诇讬讛 诪讬 讝谞讗讬 转谞讬 诇讗 讛驻住讬讚讛 讘诇讗讜转讬讛 拽讬讬诪讬谉

The tanna teaches a baraita before Rav Na岣an: A woman who was licentious lost her right to her extant, worn clothes, i.e., when they divorce, she does not keep her clothing. He said to him: If she was unfaithful and engaged in sexual intercourse with another, were her items also licentious? Certainly she is not penalized by losing her right to her property, and therefore teach the opposite: A woman who was licentious has not lost her right to her extant worn clothes.

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讝讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 住转讬诪转讗讛 讗讘诇 讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讝讬谞转讛 诇讗 讛驻住讬讚讛 讘诇讗讜转讬讛 拽讬讬诪讬谉

Similarly, Rabba bar bar 岣na said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: This baraita taught by the tanna is the statement of Rabbi Mena岣m, the unattributed, as his opinion is cited in several places as the unattributed mishna. However, the Rabbis say that if she was licentious, she has not lost her right to her extant worn clothes.

讗诐 诪转讞诇讛 谞砖讗讛 讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗讬诇讜谞讬转 讗砖讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讗砖讛 讗诇诪谞讛 讗砖讛 讙诪讜专讛

搂 The mishna teaches that if, from the start, he married her with the understanding that she is an ailonit, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. Rav Huna said: An ailonit is a wife and she is not a wife, while a widow who is married to a High Priest is entirely a wife.

讗讬诇讜谞讬转 讗砖讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讗砖讛 讛讻讬专 讘讛 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 诇讗 讛讻讬专 讘讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讗诇诪谞讛 讗砖讛 讙诪讜专讛 讘讬谉 讛讻讬专 讘讛 讘讬谉 诇讗 讛讻讬专 讘讛 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara explains: An ailonit is sometimes treated as a wife and she is sometimes not treated as a wife. How so? If he knew about her that she was an ailonit before marrying her, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract like any other wife. But if he did not know about her that she was an ailonit before marrying her, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract. A widow is entirely considered a wife. Whether he knew about her that she was a widow before marrying her whether he did not know this about her, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract.

讜专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗讞转 讝讜 讜讗讞转 讝讜 讗砖讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讗砖讛 讛讻讬专 讘讛 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 诇讗 讛讻讬专 讘讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛

And Rav Yehuda says: Both the ailonit and the widow are sometimes treated as a wife and sometimes not treated as a wife. Even in the case of a widow who marries a High Priest, if he knew about her that she was a widow before marrying her, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. But if he did not know about her that she was a widow, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讻谞住讛 讘讞讝拽转 砖讛讬讗 讻谉 讜谞诪爪讗转 砖讛讬讗 讻谉 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讛讗 住转诪讗 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Huna鈥檚 statement from a baraita: If he married the woman with the presumption that she is so, that she has some deficiency or that she is forbidden to him, and it is found that she is so as he thought from the start, then she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. One can infer from here: If he married her without specification, and it turns out that she has a deficiency or that she is forbidden to him, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.

诇讗 转讬诪讗 讛讗 住转诪讗 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 讻谞住讛 讘讞讝拽转 砖讗讬谞讛 讻谉 讜谞诪爪讗转 砖讛讬讗 讻谉 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara answers: Do not say this implies that if he married her without specification she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract. Rather, say the following inference: If he married her with the presumption that she is not so and it is found that she is so, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.

讗讘诇 住转诪讗 诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇讛 讗讚转谞讬 讘讞讝拽转 砖讛讬讗 讻谉 讜谞诪爪讗转 砖讛讬讗 讻谉 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 诇砖诪注讬谞谉 住转诪讗 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 讛讗

The Gemara asks: But if he married her without specification, what would the halakha be? The halakha would be that she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. If that is the case, instead of teaching the case where he married her with the presumption that she is so and she is found to be so and she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract, let him teach us the case where he marries her without specification. If in a case where he marries her without specification she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract, then all the more so in this case, where he marries her knowingly, she must be entitled to it.

讜注讜讚 转谞讬 讻谞住讛 讘讬讚讜注 讜谞诪爪讗转 讘讬讚讜注 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讻谞住讛 住转诐 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗

And further, it is taught explicitly in another baraita: If he married her knowing that she has a deficiency, and it is found that she does have the deficiency as was known, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. If he married her without specification, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna.

专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讗讟注讬转讬讛 讛讜讗 住讘专 诪讚拽讗 诪驻诇讬讙 讘讗讬诇讜谞讬转 讜诇讗 拽诪驻诇讬讙 讘讗诇诪谞讛 诪讻诇诇 讚讗诇诪谞讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讘住转诪讗 谞诪讬 讗讬转 诇讛 讜诇讗 讛讬讗 讻讬 拽转谞讬 诇讛 诇讗诇诪谞讛 讗驻诇讜讙转讗 讚讗讬诇讜谞讬转 拽讗讬

The Gemara explains: Rav Huna was misled by the language of the mishna and made an inference that caused him to say something that is not in keeping with the halakha. He thought that since the mishna differentiates between a case where the husband was aware of her situation and a case where he was not aware with regard to an ailonit, but the mishna does not differentiate with regard to a widow, by inference one can say that with regard to a widow, even where one merely marries her without knowing that she is a widow, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. In truth, however, that is not so. When the mishna teaches the halakha of the widow, it is based on the differentiation stated with regard to the ailonit. The mishna intended for the distinction between whether the husband was aware of her situation before the marriage, which was stated in the case of an ailonit, to apply in the case of the widow as well.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讗诇诪谞讛 谞讬讝讜谞转

 

诪转谞讬壮 讛谞讜砖讗 讗转 讛讗砖讛 讜驻住拽讛 注诪讜 讻讚讬 砖讬讝讜谉 讗转 讘转讛 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诇讝讜谞讛 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐

MISHNA: One who marries a woman, and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter from another man for five years, is obligated to sustain her daughter for five years.

谞讬住转 诇讗讞专 讜驻住拽讛 注诪讜 讻讚讬 砖讬讝讜谉 讗转 讘转讛 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诇讝讜谞讛 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讗诪专 讛专讗砖讜谉 诇讻砖转讘讗 讗爪诇讬 讗讝讜谞讛 讗诇讗 诪讜诇讬讱 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转讬讛 诇诪拽讜诐 砖讗诪讛

If, in the course of those five years they were divorced and the woman was married to another man, and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter for five years, he too is obligated to sustain her for five years. The first husband may not say: When she comes to me, I will sustain her. Rather, he brings her sustenance to her, to the place where her mother lives.

讜讻谉 诇讗 讬讗诪专讜 砖谞讬讛诐 讛专讬 讗谞讜 讝谞讬谉 讗讜转讛 讻讗讞讚 讗诇讗 讗讞讚 讝谞讛 讜讗讞讚 谞讜转谉 诇讛 讚诪讬 诪讝讜谞讜转

And likewise, both of them may not jointly say: We will sustain the girl as one in a partnership. Rather, one sustains her, providing her with food, while the other gives her the monetary value of the sustenance.

谞讬住转 讛讘注诇 谞讜转谉 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讜讛谉 谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讛 讚诪讬 诪讝讜谞讜转 诪转讜 讘谞讜转讬讛谉 谞讬讝讜谞讜转 诪谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讜讛讬讗 谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讬讗 讻讘注诇转 讞讜讘

If the daughter was married during this period, her husband provides her with the sustenance customarily provided by a husband for his wife, and the two men obligated to sustain her due to agreements with her mother provide her with the monetary value of the sustenance. If the two husbands of the mother died, their daughters are sustained from unsold property, and she, their wife鈥檚 daughter, whom they agreed to sustain, is sustained even from liened property that was sold. This is due to the fact that her legal status is like that of a creditor, given that he is contractually obligated to support her.

讛驻拽讞讬诐 讛讬讜 讻讜转讘讬诐 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讝讜谉 讗转 讘转讱 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐 讻诇 讝诪谉 砖讗转 注诪讬

The perspicacious ones would write an explicit stipulation into the agreement: I agree on the condition that I will sustain your daughter for five years only as long as you are with me. Then they would not be obligated to sustain a girl who is not their daughter when they are no longer married to the girl鈥檚 mother.

讙诪壮 讗转诪专 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 讞讬讬讘 讗谞讬 诇讱 诪谞讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 驻讟讜专

GEMARA: It was stated with regard to one who says to another: I am obligated to pay you one hundred dinars, that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: He is obligated to pay, and Reish Lakish said: He is exempt.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗转诐 注讚讬讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讚拽驻讟专 讗讬 讚诇讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗转诐 注讚讬讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚拽诪讞讬讬讘

The Gemara seeks to clarify: What are the circumstances of this case? If he said to the people present: You are my witnesses, what is the reasoning of Reish Lakish, who exempts him from payment? He confessed before witnesses that he owes the money. If he did not say to them: You are my witnesses, what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who obligates him to pay?

诇注讜诇诐 讚诇讗 拽讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗转诐 注讚讬讬 讜讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讞讬讬讘 讗谞讬 诇讱 诪谞讛 讘砖讟专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讬诪讗 诪讬诇转讗 讚砖讟专讗 讻诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗转诐 注讚讬诐 讚诪讬 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 驻讟讜专 诇讗 讗诇讬诪讗 诪讬诇转讗 讚砖讟专讗

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is a case where he did not say to those present: You are my witnesses. However, here we are dealing with a case where he said to the other: I am obligated to give you one hundred dinars, and he did so in a contract, i.e., he gave him an unsigned contract in which he stated that he is obligated to give him one hundred dinars. Rabbi Yo岣nan said: He is obligated to pay, since his word given through a contract is legally as authoritative as one who said to the bystanders: You are my witnesses. Reish Lakish said: He is exempt from payment, because his word given through a contract is legally not sufficiently authoritative to be considered a bona fide admission.

转谞谉 讛谞讜砖讗 讗转 讛讗砖讛 讜驻住拽讛 注诪讜 诇讝讜谉 讗转 讘转讛 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诇讝讜谞讛 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗

The Gemara presents a challenge to the opinion of Reish Lakish. We learned in the mishna: One who marries a woman, and she stipulated with him that he is obligated to sustain her daughter for five years, is obligated to sustain her for five years. What, is it not that the mishna is discussing a case like this, where he gave her a contract that lacks proper signatures and it is nevertheless legally binding, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan? If you say otherwise, where is the novelty in the teaching of the mishna?

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