Ketubot 23

מאי שנא רישא ומאי שנא סיפא

The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause of the baraita with regard to betrothal, where, if she married another, she need not leave her husband; and what is different in the second clause with regard to divorce, where, if she remarried, she must leave her husband?

אמר אביי תרגמה בעד אחד עד אחד אומר נתקדשה ועד אחד אומר לא נתקדשה תרוייהו בפנויה קמסהדי והאי דקאמר נתקדשה הוה ליה חד ואין דבריו של אחד במקום שנים

Abaye said: Interpret the baraita in a case in which each testimony was given by one witness. If one witness says: She was betrothed, and one witness says: She was not betrothed, they are both testifying that she was unmarried. And that witness who says that she was betrothed is one witness, and the statement of one witness has no validity in a place where there are two witnesses.

סיפא עד אחד אומר נתגרשה ועד אחד אומר לא נתגרשה תרוייהו באשת איש קמסהדי והאי דקאמר נתגרשה הוה ליה חד ואין דבריו של אחד במקום שנים

In the latter clause, if one witness says: She was divorced, and one witness says: She was not divorced, they are both testifying that she was a married woman. And that witness who says that she was divorced is one witness, and the statement of one witness has no validity in a place where there are two witnesses. Therefore, even if she remarried she must leave her husband.

רב אשי אמר לעולם תרי ותרי ואיפוך שנים אומרים ראינוה שנתקדשה ושנים אומרים לא ראינוה שנתקדשה הרי זו לא תנשא ואם נשאת תצא

Rav Ashi said: Actually it is a case where there are two witnesses testifying that she is betrothed and divorced, and two testifying that she is not betrothed and divorced. And in order to explain the difference between the first and latter clauses, reverse the two rulings. In the first clause, if two witnesses say: We saw her that she was betrothed, and two witnesses say: We did not see her that she was betrothed, this woman may not marry, and if she marries she must leave her husband.

פשיטא לא ראינוה אינה ראיה לא צריכא דדיירי בחצר אחד מהו דתימא אם איתא דנתקדשה קלא אית לה למילתא קא משמע לן דעבדי אינשי דמקדשי בצנעא

The Gemara asks: In that case, it is obvious that she must leave her husband, as testimony that we did not see her is not effective proof. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach this halakha in a case where the woman and the witnesses reside in one courtyard. Lest you say: If it is so that she was betrothed, the matter generates publicity, and the fact that the neighbors did not see that she was betrothed indicates that she was not, therefore the baraita teaches us that people are prone to betroth a woman in private, with even their neighbors unaware of the betrothal.

סיפא שנים אומרים ראינוה שנתגרשה ושנים אומרים לא ראינוה שנתגרשה הרי זו לא תנשא ואם נשאת לא תצא מאי קא משמע לן אף על גב דדיירי בחצר אחד היינו הך

In the latter clause of the baraita, if two witnesses say: We saw her that she was divorced, and two witnesses say: We did not see her that she was divorced, this woman may not remarry, and if she remarries, she need not leave her husband. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita teaching us? In this case, too, the fact that the witnesses did not see the divorce proves nothing. The Gemara answers: It teaches that although the witnesses and the woman live in one courtyard and presumably the witnesses would know if she was divorced, their testimony proves nothing. The Gemara asks: This is identical to that novel element taught in the first clause, that neighbors are not necessarily aware of what transpires elsewhere in the courtyard.

מהו דתימא גבי קדושין הוא דעבידי אינשי דמקדשי בצנעא אבל גבי גירושין אם איתא דאיגרשא קלא אית לה למילתא קא משמע לן דעבידי אינשי דמקדשי ודמגרשי בצנעא

The Gemara explains that there is a novel element in this halakha. Lest you say that it is with regard to betrothal that people are prone to betroth a woman in private; however, with regard to divorce, if it is so that she was divorced, it would generate publicity, as divorce is typically the culmination of a period of incompatibility that is often public. Therefore, the latter clause teaches us that people are prone to both betroth and divorce in private. Consequently, the fact that the witnesses did not see that she was betrothed and divorced proves nothing.

ואם משנשאת באו עדים לא תצא כו׳ רבי אושעיא מתני לה ארישא רבה בר אבין מתני לה אסיפא

§ We learned in the mishna: And if the witnesses came after she married, this woman need not leave her husband. Two cases were cited in the mishna, one with regard to a divorcée and one with regard to a woman taken captive, and to which of these cases this halakha is referring is a matter of dispute. Rabbi Oshaya taught this halakha in reference to the first clause of the mishna, where the woman claims that she was divorced. Rabba bar Avin taught this halakha in reference to the latter clause of the mishna, where the woman claims that she was taken captive and remained pure.

מאן דמתני לה ארישא כל שכן אסיפא דבשבויה הקילו ומאן דמתני לה אסיפא אבל ארישא לא

The Gemara notes: The one who taught this halakha in reference to the first clause of the mishna, all the more so would he teach it in reference to the latter clause of the mishna, as, in general, with regard to the status of a captive woman, the Sages were lenient, because the prohibition is the result of suspicion and uncertainty as far as what transpired during her period of captivity. And with regard to the one who taught this halakha in reference to the latter clause of the mishna, however, in reference to the first clause of the mishna, no, he would not necessarily teach this halakha.

לימא בדרב המנונא קמיפלגי דמאן דמתני לה ארישא אית ליה דרב המנונא ומאן דמתני לה אסיפא לית ליה דרב המנונא

The Gemara explains: Let us say it is with regard to the presumption of Rav Hamnuna that these amora’im disagree. The one who taught this halakha in reference to the first clause of the mishna and maintains that if the witnesses came after she married, this woman need not leave her husband, he holds in accordance with the presumption of Rav Hamnuna, who said that a woman is not insolent in the presence of her husband, and therefore her claim that she was divorced is accepted. And the one who taught this halakha in reference to the latter clause of the mishna and rules that the woman taken captive need not leave her husband the priest, while the woman who claims that she was divorced must leave her husband, he does not hold in accordance with the presumption of Rav Hamnuna.

לא דכולי עלמא אית להו דרב המנונא והכא בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר כי איתמר דרב המנונא בפניו אבל שלא בפניו מעיזה ומר סבר שלא בפניו נמי אינה מעיזה

The Gemara rejects that explanation: No, actually everyone holds in accordance with the presumption of Rav Hamnuna, and here it is with regard to this that they disagree, as one Sage, who holds that the woman who claims that she was divorced must leave her husband, maintains that when the presumption of Rav Hamnuna was stated, it was stated specifically in a case where she was in his presence; however, when she is not in his presence, she is insolent. And one Sage, who holds that the woman who claims that she was divorced need not leave her husband, maintains that when not in his presence she is also not insolent. Therefore, her claim that she was divorced is accepted.

ואם משנשאת באו עדים וכו׳ אמר אבוה דשמואל לא נשאת נשאת ממש אלא כיון שהתירוה לינשא אף על פי שלא נשאת והא לא תצא קתני לא תצא מהתירה הראשון

§ We learned in the mishna: And if the witnesses came after she married, this woman need not leave her husband. The father of Shmuel said: Married does not mean actually married; rather, once the court permitted her to marry, although she has not yet married, she need not leave her husband. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the tanna teach: She need not leave, meaning that she need not leave her husband? The Gemara explains: That phrase in this context means that even if witnesses come, she does not emerge from her initial permitted status.

תנו רבנן אמרה נשביתי וטהורה אני ויש לי עדים שטהורה אני אין אומרים נמתין עד שיבאו עדים אלא מתירין אותה מיד התירוה לינשא ואחר כך באו עדים ואמרו לא ידענו הרי זו לא תצא ואם באו עדי טומאה אפילו יש לה כמה בנים תצא

The Sages taught that if she said: I was taken captive but I am pure, and I have witnesses who were with me throughout captivity who can testify that I am pure, the court does not say: We will wait until those witnesses come. Rather, the court permits her to marry a priest immediately. If the court permitted her to marry a priest, and witnesses came thereafter and said: We do not know whether or not she remained pure, this woman need not leave her husband, as she was already permitted to marry a priest on the basis of her original statement. And if witnesses that she was violated came and testified, even if she has several children, she must leave the priest to whom she is married.

הני שבוייתא דאתיין לנהרדעא אותיב אבוה דשמואל נטורי בהדייהו אמר ליה שמואל ועד האידנא מאן נטרינהו אמר ליה אילו בנתך הווין מי הוית מזלזל בהו כולי האי

The Gemara relates: There were these captive women who came to Neharde’a with their captors so that the local residents would redeem them. Shmuel’s father posted guards with them to ensure that they would not enter into seclusion with gentiles. Shmuel said to him: Until now who guarded them? If there is concern about their status, it should be with regard to the possibility that they engaged in intercourse while in captivity before they were brought to Neharde’a. He said to Shmuel: If they were your daughters, would you treat them with contempt to that extent? They are no longer captives and deserve to be treated like any Jewish woman of unflawed lineage.

הואי כשגגה שיוצא מלפני השליט ואישתביין בנתיה דמר שמואל ואסקינהו לארעא דישראל אוקמן לשבויינהו מאבראי ועיילי לבי מדרשא דרבי חנינא הא אמרה נשביתי וטהורה אני והא אמרה נשביתי וטהורה אני שרינהו

The statement by the father of Shmuel was “Like an error that emerges from before the ruler” (Ecclesiastes 10:5), and it was realized. The daughters of Master Shmuel were taken captive, and their captors took them up to Eretz Yisrael and sought to sell them or ransom them. Shmuel’s daughters left their captors standing outside, so that they would not come before the court, and the women entered the study hall of Rabbi Ḥanina. This daughter said: I was taken captive, and I am pure, and that daughter said: I was taken captive, and I am pure, and the court permitted them to marry into the priesthood.

סוף עול אתו שבויינהו אמר רבי חנינא בנן דמוריין אינון איגלאי מילתא דבנתיה דמר שמואל הווין

Ultimately, their captors came and entered, and it was clear that they were the captors of Shmuel’s daughters. However, since the daughters made their claim first and the court permitted them to marry into the priesthood, this remained permitted to them. This is based on the halakha that if witnesses subsequently arrive, her initial permitted status need not be revoked. Rabbi Ḥanina said: It is clear from their actions that they are the daughters of great halakhic authorities, as they knew how to conduct themselves in order to retain their presumptive status of purity. The Gemara relates: Ultimately, the matter became clear, that they were the daughters of Master Shmuel.

אמר ליה רבי חנינא לרב שמן בר אבא פוק איטפל בקרובותיך אמר ליה לרבי חנינא והאיכא עדים במדינת הים השתא מיהת ליתנהו קמן עדים בצד אסתן ותאסר טעמא דלא אתו עדים הא אתו עדים מיתסרא

Rabbi Ḥanina said to Rav Shemen bar Abba, who was a priest: Go out and tend to your relatives, the daughters of Shmuel who were taken captive, and marry one of them. Rav Shemen said to Rabbi Ḥanina: But aren’t there witnesses in a country overseas who knew before the daughters appeared in court that they were taken captive? Rabbi Ḥanina said to him: Now, in any event, those witnesses are not before us. He then cited an adage: There are witnesses in the north [astan] side, i.e., in a distant place, and will the woman be forbidden? The Gemara infers from Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement: The reason that their testimony may be ignored is because the witnesses did not come to court. However, were the witnesses to come to court, Shmuel’s daughters would be forbidden to priests.

והאמר אבוה דשמואל כיון שהתירוה לינשא אף על פי שלא נשאת אמר רב אשי עדי טומאה איתמר

The Gemara asks: But didn’t Shmuel’s father say: Once the court permitted a woman to marry, even if she has not yet married, she remains permitted? Rav Ashi said: The discussion between Rabbi Ḥanina and Rav Shemen was stated with regard to witnesses who witnessed their violation. In that case, were the witnesses to come to court and testify, even if she has several children, she must leave the priest to whom she is married.

מתני׳ שתי נשים שנשבו זאת אומרת נשביתי וטהורה אני וזאת אומרת נשביתי וטהורה אני אינן נאמנות ובזמן שהן מעידות זו את זו הרי אלו נאמנות

MISHNA: In a case where witnesses testify that there are two women who were taken captive, and this woman says: I was taken captive but I am pure, and that woman says: I was taken captive but I am pure, they are not deemed credible. And when this woman testifies about that woman that she is pure and vice versa, they are deemed credible.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן אני טמאה וחברתי טהורה נאמנת אני טהורה וחברתי טמאה אינה נאמנת אני וחברתי טמאה נאמנת על עצמה ואינה נאמנת על חברתה אני וחברתי טהורה נאמנת על חברתה ואינה נאמנת על עצמה

GEMARA: The Sages taught in the Tosefta (2:2): If one of the women says: I am tainted and my counterpart is pure, she is deemed credible on both counts. If she says: I am pure and my counterpart is tainted, she is not deemed credible with regard to herself nor with regard to her counterpart. If she says: I and my counterpart are both tainted, she is deemed credible with regard to herself but she is not deemed credible with regard to her counterpart. If she says: I and my counterpart are both pure, she is deemed credible with regard to her counterpart but she is not deemed credible with regard to herself.

אמר מר אני טהורה וחברתי טמאה אינה נאמנת היכי דמי אי דליכא עדים על עצמה אמאי לא מהימנא נשביתי וטהורה אני קאמרה אלא פשיטא דאיכא עדים

The Master said in the baraita that if she says: I am pure and my counterpart is tainted, she is not deemed credible. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If there are no witnesses that she was taken captive, why is she not deemed credible with regard to herself? If she is saying: I was taken captive and I am pure, she is deemed credible based on the principle that the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted. Rather, it is obvious that there are witnesses that she was taken captive.

אימא מציעתא אני וחברתי טמאה נאמנת על עצמה ואינה נאמנת על חברתה ואי דאיכא עדים אמאי לא מהימנא אלא פשיטא דליכא עדים

The Gemara asks: If so, say the middle clause of the baraita: If she says: I and my counterpart are both tainted, she is deemed credible with regard to herself but she is not deemed credible with regard to her counterpart. And if there are witnesses, why is she not deemed credible with regard to her counterpart? Once there is testimony that she was taken captive, she no longer has the presumptive status of purity. Rather, it is obvious that there are no witnesses that she was taken captive, and therefore her presumptive status of purity is intact.

אימא סיפא אני וחברתי טהורה נאמנת על חברתה ואינה נאמנת על עצמה ואי דליכא עדים אעצמה אמאי לא מהימנא אלא פשיטא דאיכא עדים

The Gemara asks: If so, say the last clause of the baraita: If she says: I and my counterpart are both pure, she is deemed credible with regard to her counterpart but she is not deemed credible with regard to herself. And if there are no witnesses that they were taken captive, why is she not deemed credible with regard to herself? Rather, it is obvious that there are witnesses.

רישא וסיפא דאיכא עדים מציעתא דליכא עדים אמר אביי אין רישא וסיפא דאיכא עדים מציעתא דליכא עדים

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the baraita is formulated in an unusual fashion, with the first clause and the last clause pertaining to cases where there are witnesses, and the middle clause pertaining to a case where there are no witnesses? Abaye said: Yes, the first clause and the last clause pertain to cases where there are witnesses, and the middle clause pertains to a case where there are no witnesses.

רב פפא אמר כולה דאיכא עדים ואיכא עד אחד דקא אפיך אמרה אני טמאה וחברתי טהורה ואמר לה עד אחד את טהורה וחברתך טמאה איהי שויתא לנפשה חתיכה דאיסורא חברתה משתריא אפומא דידה

Rav Pappa said: The baraita in its entirety can be explained in a case where there are witnesses, and there is one witness who is testifying to the reverse of the woman’s claim. If the woman said: I am tainted and my counterpart is pure, and one witness said to her: You are pure and your counterpart is tainted, although the witness testified that she was pure, because she admitted that she was tainted she rendered herself an entity of prohibition. Her counterpart is permitted on the basis of her claim, which is accepted despite being contradicted by the witness.

אני טהורה וחברתי טמאה ואמר לה עד אחד את טמאה וחברתך טהורה איהי כיון דאיכא עדים לאו כל כמינה חברתה משתריא אפומא דעד

If the woman said: I am pure and my counterpart is tainted, and one witness said to her: You are tainted and your counterpart is pure, then with regard to her, since there are witnesses testifying that she was taken captive, it is not in her power to permit herself on the basis of her claim. However, her counterpart is permitted on the basis of the testimony of the witness.

אני וחברתי טמאה ואמר לה עד אחד את וחברתך טהורה איהי שויתא לנפשה חתיכה דאיסורא חברתא משתריא אפומא דעד הא תו למה לי היינו רישא

If the woman said: I and my counterpart are both tainted, and one witness said to her: You and your friend are both pure, she rendered herself an entity of prohibition. However, her counterpart is permitted on the basis of the testimony of the witness. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this additional case? This is identical to that which was taught in the in the first clause. The principles governing the first two cases, i.e., she claims that she is tainted and thereby renders herself as an entity of prohibition, and her counterpart is permitted by the testimony of one witness even if that testimony is contradicted, also apply in this case.

מהו דתימא הני תרוייהו טהורות נינהו והאי דקאמרה הכי תמות נפשי עם פלשתים היא דקא עבדה קא משמע לן

The Gemara answers: Lest you say that in this case, both of them are deemed untainted in accordance with the testimony of the witness, and the fact that she said that they are both tainted was because she was acting with the intention termed: “Let me die with the Philistines” (Judges 16:30), i.e., she was willing to implicate herself in order to bolster her credibility so that her testimony against her counterpart would be accepted, the tanna therefore teaches us that this is not a consideration.

אני וחברתי טהורה ואמר לה עד אחד את וחברתך טמאה איהי כיון דאיכא עדים לאו כל כמינה חברתה משתריא אפומא דידה הא תו למה לי היינו רישא דרישא

If the woman said: I and my counterpart are both pure, and one witness said to her: You and your counterpart are both tainted, with regard to her, since there are witnesses testifying that she was taken captive, it is not in her power to permit herself on the basis of her claim. However, her counterpart is permitted on the basis of her claim. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this additional case? This is identical to that which was taught in the first part of the first clause. The principles governing the first two cases, i.e., her claim that she is pure is not accepted when the fact that she was taken captive was established by witnesses, and her counterpart is permitted on the basis of her claim even if that claim is contradicted, also apply in this case.

מהו דתימא כי מהימנא במקום דפסלה נפשה אבל במקום דמכשרא נפשה אימא לא מהימנא קא משמע לן

The Gemara answers: Lest you say that when is she deemed credible to permit her counterpart, it is only in a case where she rendered herself unfit to marry a priest, but in a case where she rendered herself fit, say that she is not deemed credible with regard to her counterpart; the tanna therefore teaches us that each segment of the testimony is assessed independently, based on the criteria taught in the first clause.

מתני׳ וכן שני אנשים זה אומר כהן אני וזה אומר כהן אני אינן נאמנין ובזמן שהן מעידין זה את זה הרי אלו נאמנין רבי יהודה אומר אין מעלין לכהונה על פי עד אחד אמר רבי אלעזר אימתי במקום שיש עוררין אבל במקום שאין עוררין מעלין לכהונה על פי עד אחד רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר משום רבי שמעון בן הסגן מעלין לכהונה על פי עד אחד

MISHNA: And likewise, with regard to two men whose lineage is unknown, and this man says: I am a priest, and that man says: I am a priest, they are not deemed credible. And when this man testifies about that man that he is a priest and vice versa, they are deemed credible. Rabbi Yehuda says: One does not elevate a man to priesthood on the basis of one witness. Two witnesses are required for that purpose. Rabbi Elazar says: When is that the ruling? In a case where there are challengers to his claim that he is a priest. However, in a case where there are no challengers, one elevates a man to priesthood on the basis of one witness. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon, son of the deputy High Priest: One elevates a man to priesthood on the basis of one witness.

גמ׳ כל הני למה לי צריכי דאי תנא מודה רבי יהושע משום דאיכא דררא דממונא אבל עדים דליכא דררא דממונא אימא לא

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why do I need all these different cases cited in the mishnayot in this chapter? Aren’t they all based on the principle: The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted? The Gemara answers: These cases are all necessary, as, if the tanna had taught only the case where Rabbi Yehoshua concedes, in a case where one says to another: This field, which is currently in my possession, belonged to your father, and I purchased it from him, then one might have thought that his claim is deemed credible due to the fact that there is financial significance [derara] in his contention that it belonged to the other’s father, and he would not have made that claim if it were not true. However, in the case of witnesses authenticating their signatures, where there is no financial significance for them in their testimony, say no, their claim is not accepted.

ואי תנא עדים משום דלעלמא אבל איהו דלנפשיה

And if the tanna taught only the case of witnesses, one might have thought that their claim is deemed credible due to the fact that their testimony is relevant to others. However, with regard to him, whose testimony is relevant to himself, as he claims that he purchased the field from the other’s father,