Ketubot 42

מעשה ידיה ומציאתה אף על פי שלא גבתה מת האב הרי הן של אחין

By contrast, with regard to her earnings and the lost items that she has found, although she has not collected them, e.g., she had yet to receive her wages, if the father died they belong to her brothers. These payments are considered the property of their father, as he was entitled to them before he passed away.

גמ׳ מאי קא משמע לן תנינא המפתה נותן שלשה דברים והאונס ארבעה המפתה נותן בושת ופגם וקנס מוסיף עליו אונס שנותן את הצער לאביה איצטריך ליה לאביה נמי פשיטא מדקא יהיב מפתה דאי לעצמה אמאי יהיב מפתה מדעתה עבד

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the mishna teaching us? We already learned this in a mishna (Ketubot 39a): The seducer pays three types of indemnity and the rapist pays four. The seducer pays compensation for his victim’s humiliation and degradation and for the fine the Torah imposes on a seducer. A rapist adds an additional payment, as he pays compensation for the pain she suffered. The Gemara answers: It is necessary for the mishna to teach that the money is given to her father. The Gemara asks: It is also obvious that the money goes to her father, from the fact that a seducer pays these types of indemnity, as, if one claims that the money goes to her, why does a seducer pay her at all? After all, he acted with her consent, how can she then claim compensation?

עמדה בדין איצטריכא ליה פלוגתא דרבי שמעון ורבנן

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the mishna to mention these cases in order to address the case where she stood for judgment before her father died, and then he died before collecting payment. In this case, there is a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis as to whether the sons inherit these payments from the father or whether the money belongs to the young woman.

תנן התם אנסת ופיתית את בתי והוא אומר לא אנסתי ולא פיתיתי משביעך אני ואמר אמן ואחר כך הודה חייב

§ We learned in a mishna there (Shevuot 36b) that if someone said to another: You raped my daughter, or: You seduced my daughter, and the other says: I did not rape and I did not seduce, to which the father replied: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen, and afterward he admitted that he had raped or seduced the man’s daughter, he is obligated both in the payments of a rapist or a seducer as well as an additional one-fifth, and he must bring an offering for swearing falsely that he did not owe the money.

רבי שמעון פוטר שאינו משלם קנס על פי עצמו אמרו לו אף על פי שאינו משלם קנס על פי עצמו אבל משלם בושת ופגם על פי עצמו

Rabbi Shimon exempts him, as he does not pay the fine on his own admission. The accused individual is not considered to have taken a false oath in denial of a monetary charge because he would not have been obligated to pay the fine on the basis of his own admission of guilt. The Rabbis said to him: Although he does not pay the fine on his own admission, indeed he does pay compensation for the humiliation and degradation on his own admission. Consequently, he has denied a monetary claim, and therefore his false oath obligates him to add one-fifth and to bring an offering. This concludes the mishna.

בעא מיניה אביי מרבה האומר לחבירו אנסת ופיתית את בתי והעמדתיך בדין ונתחייבת לי ממון והוא אומר לא אנסתי ולא פיתיתי ולא העמדתני בדין ולא נתחייבתי לך ממון ונשבע והודה לרבי שמעון מאי

In light of this mishna, Abaye raised a dilemma before Rabba: With regard to one who says to another: You raped my daughter, or: You seduced my daughter, and I made you stand in judgment for your actions, and you were found obligated to pay me money but you did not do so, and the defendant says: I did not rape, or: I did not seduce, and you did not make me stand in judgment, and I was not found obligated to pay you money, and the defendant took an oath that he was telling the truth and subsequently admitted his guilt, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, what is the halakha?

כיון דעמד בדין ממונא הואי ומיחייב עליה קרבן שבועה או דלמא אף על גב דעמד בדין קנס הוי אמר ליה ממונא הוי ומיחייב עליה קרבן שבועה

Abaye explains the two sides of the dilemma: Since he stood trial and was found liable, is this considered a regular monetary obligation, and therefore he is liable to bring the offering for taking a false oath to deny a monetary claim? Or perhaps one can argue that although he stood trial and the court ordered him to pay, the payment is in essence a fine. Rabba said to him: Since he has already stood trial, it is considered a regular monetary payment, and he is liable to bring the offering of an oath.

איתיביה רבי שמעון אומר יכול האומר לחבירו אנסת ופיתית את בתי והוא אומר לא אנסתי ולא פיתיתי המית שורך את עבדי והוא אומר לא המית או שאמר לו עבדו הפלת את שיני וסימית את עיני והוא אומר לא הפלתי ולא סימיתי ונשבע והודה יכול יהא חייב

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba from the following baraita. Rabbi Shimon says: One might have thought that in the case of one who says to another: You raped my daughter, or: You seduced my daughter, and he says: I did not rape her, or: I did not seduce her, or if he claimed: Your ox killed my slave, and he says: It did not kill him, or if his slave said to him: You knocked out my tooth, or: You blinded my eye and you are therefore obligated to emancipate me, and he says: I did not knock it out, or: I did not blind your eye, and he takes an oath but later admitted to the truth of the accusation, one might have thought that he should be liable to bring an offering for a false oath denying a monetary claim.

תלמוד לומר וכחש בעמיתו בפקדון או בתשומת יד או בגזל או עשק את עמיתו או מצא אבידה וכחש בה ונשבע על שקר מה אלו מיוחדין שהן ממון אף כל שהן ממון יצאו אלו שהן קנס

Therefore, with regard to the offering for a false oath in denial of a monetary claim, the verse states: “If anyone sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord and deal falsely with his neighbor in a matter of a deposit or of a pledge or of a robbery or have oppressed his neighbor, or have found that which was lost and deal falsely with it, and swear to a lie” (Leviticus 5:21–22). Just as all these matters listed in the verse are unique in that they are monetary obligations equal in value to the loss one has caused another individual, so too, this halakha applies to all obligations that are monetary claims, which excludes these payments of a rapist, a seducer, and the like, as they are fines.

מאי לאו בשעמד בדין לא בשלא עמד בדין

What, is it not referring to a case where he has stood trial, and yet Rabbi Shimon does not render him liable for the oath as the payment was originally a fine? Rabba refutes this argument: No, that baraita is referring to a situation where he has not stood trial.

והא מדרישא בשעמד בדין סיפא נמי בשעמד בדין דקתני רישא אין לי אלא דברים שמשלמין עליהם את הקרן תשלומי כפל תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה והאונס והמפתה ומוציא שם רע מנין תלמוד לומר ומעלה מעל ריבה

Abaye persists: But from the fact that the first clause of the baraita deals with one who has stood trial, it follows that the latter clause also deals with one who has stood trial. As the baraita teaches in its first clause: I have derived the halakha only for matters for which one pays the principal. With regard to the payments that are double the principal, and payments that are four and five times the principal, and those of the rapist, and the seducer, and the defamer, from where is it derived that all these are included in the liability to bring an offering for falsely taking an oath on a deposit? The verse states: “If anyone sin and commit a trespass [ma’ala ma’al]” (Leviticus 5:21). The doubled usage of the word trespass serves to amplify and include any false oath taken in denial of monetary liability.

היכי דמי אי דלא עמד בדין כפילא מי איכא אלא פשיטא בשעמד בדין ומדרישא בשעמד בדין סיפא נמי בשעמד בדין

Abaye analyzes this statement: What are the circumstances? If this is referring to a situation when he has not stood trial, is there double payment in that case? Everyone agrees that one who admits his guilt is exempt from the double payment, and yet this obligation is mentioned in the baraita. Rather, it is obvious that the baraita is referring to a case where it is claimed that he has already stood trial and was declared liable to pay the double payment, and the accused individual denies this claim. Abaye summarizes his question: And from the fact that the first clause of this baraita deals with one who has stood trial, the latter clause also deals with one who has stood trial, and even so Rabbi Shimon does not deem him liable to bring an offering for his oath.

אמר ליה יכילנא לשנויי לך רישא בשעמד בדין וסיפא בשלא עמד בדין וכולה רבי שמעון היא ושינויי דחיקי לא משנינן לך דאם כן אמרת לי ליתני רישא רבי שמעון אומר או ליתני סיפא דברי רבי שמעון

Rabba said to him: I could answer you that the first clause deals with one who is accused of already having stood trial and been deemed liable, and the latter clause deals with one who has not stood trial, and this entire baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. According to this answer, Rabbi Shimon concedes that after one has been deemed liable in court, the double payment attains the status of a regular monetary obligation rather than a fine, and therefore in the first case in the baraita he is liable to bring an offering and a payment for his admission. But I will not answer you a far-fetched answer, for if it is so, that the entire baraita represents the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, you could say to me: Let the tanna of the baraita either teach explicitly in the first clause: Rabbi Shimon says, or let him teach in the latter clause: This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

אלא כולה בשעמד בדין ורישא רבנן וסיפא רבי שמעון

Rabba continued: Rather, I will say that the entire baraita is referring to one who has stood trial, and as for the difference in halakha, the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who deem one liable to bring the offering of an oath in a case where the plaintiff says that the defendant stood trial, was found liable, and swore falsely. And the latter clause represents the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who exempts one who confesses from bringing the offering of an oath.

ומודינא לך לענין קרבן שבועה דרחמנא פטריה מוכחש

And I concede to you, Abaye, with regard to the liability to bring an offering for falsely taking an oath on a deposit, that the Merciful One exempts him from this offering here, based upon the verse “And deal falsely with his neighbor in a matter of a deposit,” (Leviticus 5:21), which indicates that one is liable to bring an offering only if he lied about a claim that was originally a monetary obligation.

וכי קאמינא ממון הוי להורישו לבניו

And when I say that Rabbi Shimon maintains that after one is declared liable in court his obligation to pay is considered a regular monetary payment rather than a fine, that is not to say that he is liable to bring an offering for falsely denying a monetary claim, but rather to say that the recipient of the payment bequeaths it to his sons. Unlike a fine, which does not pass by inheritance to one’s heirs, this is classified as a regular monetary payment. Consequently, if the perpetrator was deemed liable in court and ordered to pay the father of the girl he raped or seduced, and the father died before receiving payment, his sons inherit the right to that payment.

איתיביה רבי שמעון אומר אם לא הספיקה לגבות עד שמת האב הרי הן של עצמה ואי אמרת ממון הוי להורישו לבניו לעצמה אמאי דאחין בעי מיהוי

Abaye raised an objection to this last point from the mishna. Rabbi Shimon says: If the daughter did not manage to collect the payments before the father died, they belong to her. And if you say that this fine is a monetary payment to the extent that one can bequeath it to his sons after the trial, why does the money belongs to her? Since the trial has taken place, it should be the property of the brothers by inheritance from their father, as it is already considered a regular monetary obligation that is owed to the father.

אמר רבא האי מילתא קשאי בה רבה ורב יוסף עשרין ותרתין שנין ולא איפרק עד דיתיב רב יוסף ברישא ופירקה שאני התם דאמר קרא ונתן האיש השוכב עמה לאבי הנערה חמשים כסף לא זיכתה תורה לאב אלא משעת נתינה

Rava said: This matter was difficult for Rabba and Rav Yosef for twenty-two years without resolution, until Rav Yosef sat at the head of the academy and resolved it in the following manner: There, in the case of a rape, it is different, as the verse states: “And the man who laid with her shall give the young woman’s father fifty shekels of silver” (Deuteronomy 22:29), from which it is inferred: The Torah entitled the father to this money only from the time of giving. Consequently, if the father dies before receiving the money, he does not bequeath his right to the money to his sons. Instead, the daughter is considered to take her father’s place as the plaintiff, because she was the victim, and the money is paid to her.

וכי קאמר רבה ממונא הוי להורישו לבניו בשאר קנסות

And when Rabba said that the fine imposed by a court is considered a regular monetary obligation with regard to one’s ability to bequeath it to his sons, he was not referring to this particular case of a rapist or seducer, but only to other fines, which do have the status of regular monetary obligations after the court delivers its verdict.

אלא מעתה גבי עבד דכתיב כסף שלשים שקלים יתן לאדוניו הכי נמי לא זיכתה תורה לאדון אלא משעת נתינה יתן לחוד ונתן לחוד

The Gemara asks: However, if that is so, that the verb “give” is explained in this manner, with regard to an ox that killed a slave, where it is written: “He shall give to their master thirty shekels of silver” (Exodus 21:32), so too will you say that the Torah entitled the master only from the time of giving? The Gemara answers: “Shall give [yiten],” is distinct, and “shall give [venatan],” is distinct. The first expression, which is stated with regard to an ox that killed a slave, does not indicate that the recipient acquires the right to the money only from the moment it is given, whereas the formulation employed in the case of rape does indicate that this is the case.

אי הכי תלמוד לומר וכחש תלמוד לומר ונתן מיבעי ליה

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, that the main source for this halakha is the phrase “shall give [venatan],” when it was taught in the baraita that a man who rapes or seduces a woman is not liable to bring the offering for a false oath in denial of a monetary claim, rather than saying that this is derived from the fact that the verse states “and deal falsely,” he should have said that it is derived from the fact that the verse states “shall give,” as this is the phrase that teaches that the payment is considered a fine even after he has stood trial.

אמר רבא כי איצטריך וכחש כגון שעמדה בדין ובגרה ומתה דהתם כי קא ירית אביה מינה דידה קא ירית

In answer to this question, Rava said: When it was necessary to cite a proof from “and deal falsely,” it was with regard to a situation where the young woman’s case was brought to trial, and the court ruled in her favor, and she reached majority and subsequently died before the money was paid. The reason that “and deal falsely” is necessary in that case is because there, when the father inherits, it is from her that he inherits.

אי הכי יצאו אלו שהן קנס ממון הוא אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק יצאו אלו שעיקרן קנס

The Gemara raises another difficulty: If so, the language of the baraita: Excluding these, as they are a fine, is inaccurate, as it is a regular monetary payment, not a fine. In answer to this question, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that this phrase means: Excluding these, as they are originally a fine, and it is only once the court orders the man to pay that they are viewed as regular monetary payments.

איתיביה רבי שמעון פוטר שאינו משלם קנס על פי עצמו טעמא דלא עמד בדין הא עמד בדין דמשלם על פי עצמו קרבן שבועה נמי מיחייב

Abaye raised an objection to this explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, based upon the mishna in Shevuot cited above (42a), which states: Rabbi Shimon exempts him, as he does not pay a fine on his own admission. The Gemara infers: The reason that he is not liable to bring a guilt-offering is because he has not stood trial. However, if he has stood trial and been found guilty, in which case he pays on his own admission when he later admits that he was already convicted in court, he should also be liable to bring an offering if he denies that he was convicted in court and takes an oath to that effect. This contradicts the claim that, according to Rabbi Shimon, even after one is convicted in court, the payment is still considered a fine.

רבי שמעון לדבריהם דרבנן קאמר להו לדידי אף על גב דעמד בדין רחמנא פטריה מוכחש אלא לדידכו אודו לי מיהת היכא דלא עמד בדין דכי קא תבע קנסא קא תבע

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon stated his opinion to them in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis themselves, as follows: According to my opinion, although he has stood trial, the Merciful One exempts him from the offering, as derived from the verse: “And deal falsely with his neighbor in a matter of a deposit” (Leviticus 5:21), which indicates that he is liable only for a claim that originally concerned regular a monetary payment. However, according to your opinion, you should at least concede to me in a case where he has not stood trial, that when one claims the money, he claims a fine and not a regular monetary payment.