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Today's Daf Yomi

March 17, 2015 | 讻状讜 讘讗讚专 转砖注状讛

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

Ketubot 43

Study Guide Ketubot 43


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讜诪讜讚讛 讘拽谞住 驻讟讜专 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讻讬 拽讗 转讘注 讘讜砖转 讜驻讙诐 拽讗 转讘注

And the principle is that one who admits that he is liable to pay a fine is exempt. Since the man would not have been liable to pay even if he had admitted his guilt, his denial of guilt is not considered a denial of monetary liability, and even if he swears falsely that he is not liable, he still does not become liable to bring an offering. And the Rabbis hold that when the father claims payment in court, it is the compensation for the humiliation and degradation that he claims. His main focus is not on the fine, and therefore the denial refers to a regular monetary claim.

讘诪讗讬 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 住讘专 诇讗 砖讘讬拽 讗讬谞讬砖 诪讬讚讬 讚拽讬抓 讜转讘注 诪讬讚讬 讚诇讗 拽讬抓 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 砖讘讬拽 讗讬谞讬砖 诪讬讚讬 讚讻讬 诪讜讚讬 讘讬讛 诇讗 诪讬驻讟专 讜转讘注 诪讬讚讬 讚讻讬 诪讜讚讛 讘讬讛 诪讬驻讟专

The Gemara asks: If this explanation is correct, with regard to what do the tanna鈥檌m disagree? Rav Pappa said: Rabbi Shimon holds that a person does not leave aside something that is fixed, e.g., a fine, and claim something that is not fixed, e.g., the compensation for humiliation and degradation, which need to be assessed by the court. Consequently, a claim of rape is essentially a demand for the fine. And conversely, the Rabbis hold that a person does not leave aside something that, if the defendant admits to it, he is not exempt from payment, e.g., humiliation and degradation, and claim something that, if the defendant admits to it, he is exempt from payment. Consequently, they contend that the lawsuit is mainly focused on the compensation for the humiliation and degradation.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讬谞讗 诪专讘 砖砖转 讘转 讛谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 诇诪讬

Rabbi Avina raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: With regard to a daughter who is sustained by her brothers, i.e., an orphan whose brothers provide her with her sustenance from their father鈥檚 estate, in accordance with the stipulation in the marriage contract between their parents that requires the father to pay for his daughter鈥檚 sustenance from his property, to whom do her earnings belong?

讘诪拽讜诐 讗讘 拽讬讬诪讬 诪讛 讛转诐 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 诇讗讘 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 诇讗讞讬谉 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讚诪讬 诇讗讘 讛转诐 诪讚讬讚讬讛 诪讬转讝谞讗 讛讻讗 诇讗讜 诪讚讬讚讛讜 诪讬转讝谞讗

Rabbi Avina explains the sides of the dilemma. One might say that the brothers stand in place of the father: Just as there, if their father is alive, her earnings go to the father, here too her earnings go to the brothers. Or perhaps this is not similar to the case of a living father. Why not? Because there, she is sustained from his own property, and therefore he is entitled to receive her earnings, whereas here, she is not sustained from their possessions but from the estate of their father, and consequently they should not receive her earnings.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 讗诇诪谞讛 谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谞讻住讬 讬转讜诪讬诐 讜诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 砖诇讛谉

Rav Sheshet said to him: You already learned the answer to this dilemma from a mishna (Ketubot 81a): A widow is sustained from the property of the orphans, and her earnings are theirs. This indicates that although a widow receives her sustenance from the estate of her deceased husband, in accordance with the stipulations of the marriage contract, the orphans are nevertheless entitled to her earnings. The same reasoning should apply to an orphan sustained by her brothers.

诪讬 讚诪讬 讗诇诪谞转讜 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讘讛专讜讜讞讛 讘转讜 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讘讛专讜讜讞讛

The Gemara refutes this argument: Are the two situations comparable? In the case of his widow, the deceased is not necessarily amenable to her living in comfort. Consequently, she is entitled only to the minimum guaranteed to her in the marriage contract, while her earnings go to his heirs. Conversely, with regard to his daughter, he is amenable and is interested in her living in comfort, and therefore he allows her to retain her earnings so that she can have the extra money.

诇诪讬诪专讗 讚讘转讜 注讚讬驻讗 诇讬讛 诪讗诇诪谞转讜 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 注砖讜 讗诇诪谞讛 讗爪诇 讛讘转 讻讘转 讗爪诇 讗讞讬谉 讘谞讻住讬谉 诪讜注讟讬谉

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the welfare of his daughter is more preferable to him than that of his widow? But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Abba say that Rabbi Yosei said: The Sages established the halakha of a widow with regard to the daughter, who is also entitled to sustenance from the estate, like the halakha of a daughter with regard to the brothers in a case of a small estate that is insufficient for the livelihoods of both the girl and her brothers?

诪讛 讛讘转 讗爪诇 讗讞讬谉 讛讘转 谞讬讝讜谞转 讜讛讗讞讬谉 讬砖讗诇讜 注诇 讛驻转讞讬诐 讗祝 讗诇诪谞讛 讗爪诇 讛讘转 讗诇诪谞讛 谞讬讝讜谞转 讜讛讘转 转砖讗诇 注诇 讛驻转讞讬诐 诇注谞讬谉 讝讬诇讜转讗 讗诇诪谞转讜 注讚讬驻讗 诇讬讛 诇注谞讬谉 讛专讜讜讞讛 讘转讜 注讚讬驻讗 诇讬讛

Rabbi Abba explains: Just as in the case of a daughter with regard to the brothers, the halakha is that the daughter is sustained from the father鈥檚 estate, and if the brothers have nothing to eat they must go and beg for charity at people鈥檚 doors, so too, in the case of a widow with regard to the daughter, the widow is sustained and the daughters beg for charity at people鈥檚 doors. This indicates that a man is more concerned for his widow than his daughter. The Gemara explains: The two cases are not comparable. With regard to degradation, one鈥檚 widow is preferable to him, i.e., if one of them must be forced to go around requesting handouts, a man would rather it be his daughter than his widow. By contrast, with regard to comfort, the comfort of his daughter is more preferable to him than that of his widow.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜诪爪讬讗转讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讙讘转讛 诪转 讛讗讘 讛专讬 讛谉 砖诇 讗讞讬谉 讟注诪讗 讚讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讛讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讛讗讘 诇注爪诪讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘谞讬讝讜谞转 诇讗 讘砖讗讬谞讛 谞讬讝讜谞转

Rav Yosef raised an objection to Rav Sheshet鈥檚 conclusion that the orphan girl鈥檚 earnings belong to the brothers, from the mishna: With regard to her earnings and the lost items that she has found, although she has not collected them, if the father died, they belong to her brothers. Rav Yosef infers: The reason for this halakha is that she acquired her earnings in her father鈥檚 lifetime, which indicates that the money she earns after the father鈥檚 death belongs to her. What, is it not referring even to a daughter who is sustained from his estate? The Gemara refutes this claim: No, it deals with a daughter who is not sustained from his property but who sustains herself through her own earnings.

讗讬 讘砖讗讬谞讛 谞讬讝讜谞转 诪讗讬 诇诪讬诪专讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讬讻讜诇 讛专讘 诇讜诪专 诇注讘讚 注砖讛 注诪讬 讜讗讬谞讬 讝谞讱 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讘注讘讚 讻谞注谞讬 讚诇讗 讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 注诪讱

The Gemara asks: If the mishna is speaking of one who is not sustained from his estate, what is the purpose of stating this? It is obvious that this is the halakha, as even according to the one who said that a master can say to his slave: Work for me but I will not feed you, i.e., a master is not legally obligated to provide sustenance to his slave, this applies only to a Canaanite slave, with regard to whom it is not written in the Torah: 鈥淲ith you,鈥 and therefore his master is not obligated to feed him.

讗讘诇 注讘讚 注讘专讬 讚讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 注诪讱 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讘转讜

However, in the case of a Hebrew slave, as it is written with regard to him: 鈥淲ith you鈥 (Deuteronomy 15:16), which indicates that he is entitled to live with his master as an equal, the master may not compel the slave to serve him unless he feeds him. All the more so concerning his daughter, it cannot be the case that this young woman has to work and give her wages to the brothers if they are not obligated to sustain her at the same time.

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 注讜诇讗 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇讛注讚驻讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 讙讘专讗 专讘讛 讻专讘 讬讜住祝 诇讗 讬讚注 讚讗讬讻讗 讛注讚驻讛 讜拽诪讜转讬讘 转讬讜讘转讗

Rabba bar Ulla said: It is necessary only for the surplus. The mishna is not stating that the brothers take her earnings and do not sustain her, leaving her with nothing. Rather, the question concerns a young woman whose earnings provide her with more than she needs for her sustenance, leaving her with a surplus. It is this surplus that belongs to her brothers. Rava said in response to Rabba bar Ulla鈥檚 explanation: Is it possible that a man as great as Rav Yosef does not know that there is an explanation according to which the mishna is referring to the surplus, and in his ignorance he raises a refutation against Rav Sheshet? This certainly cannot be the case.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讙讜驻讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 讚拽转谞讬 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜诪爪讬讗转讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讙讘转讛 诪爪讬讗转讛 诪诪讗谉 讙讘讬讗

Rather, Rava said: The mishna itself poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Sheshet, and this difficulty led Rav Yosef to his conclusion. This is as the mishna teaches: Her earnings and the lost items that she has found, although she has not collected them. Rava analyzes this statement: With regard to items that she has found, from whom does she collect them? The concept of collecting is inappropriate in this case.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讻诪爪讬讗转讛 诪讛 诪爪讬讗转讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 诇讗讘 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讛讗讘 诇注爪诪讛 讗祝 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 谞诪讬 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 诇讗讘 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讛讗讘 诇注爪诪讛 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

Rather, is it not the case that this is what the mishna said: Her earnings are like items she has found: Just as items she has found in her father鈥檚 lifetime belong to her father, and after the father鈥檚 death they belong to her, so too, the same rule applies to her earnings as well: In the father鈥檚 lifetime, they go to the father, and after the father鈥檚 death they belong to her, even when she is sustained from the inheritance. The Gemara concludes: We can learn from this inference that the mishna deals with her earnings themselves, not their surplus, in contrast to the interpretation of Rav Sheshet.

讗讬转诪专 谞诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讘转 讛谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 诇注爪诪讛 讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讻转讬讘 讜讛转谞讞诇转诐 讗讜转诐 诇讘谞讬讻诐 讗讞专讬讻诐 讗讜转诐 诇讘谞讬讻诐 讜诇讗 讘谞讜转讬讻诐 诇讘谞讬讻诐 诪讙讬讚 砖讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪讜专讬砖 讝讻讜转 讘转讜 诇讘谞讜

This halakha was also stated by amora鈥檌m, as Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: In the case of a daughter who is sustained by the brothers, her earnings nevertheless belong to her. Rav Kahana said: What is the reason for this? As it is written with regard to slaves: 鈥淎nd you may make them an inheritance for your sons after you鈥 (Leviticus 25:46), from which it is inferred: It is them, slaves alone, that you bequeath to your sons, and you do not bequeath your daughters to your sons. This verse teaches that a man does not bequeath a right that he has over his daughter to his son. All the rights a man possesses over his daughter are personal rights, which are not transferable by inheritance.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讛 讜讗讬诪讗 讘驻讬转讜讬 讛讘转 讜拽谞住讜转 讜讞讘诇讜转 讛讻转讜讘 诪讚讘专 讜讻谉 转谞讗 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 讘驻转讜讬 讛讘转 讜拽谞住讜转 讜讞讘诇讜转 讛讻转讜讘 诪讚讘专

Rabba strongly objects to this explanation that the verse is referring to a man鈥檚 rights to his daughter鈥檚 earnings: But one can say that the verse is speaking of the fine that a father is paid in the case of the seduction of his daughter, and the fines paid to him if she is raped, and compensation due to him for injuries that she suffered, and the verse indicates that these rights are not bequeathed to his heirs. And Rav 岣nina likewise explicitly taught that the verse is speaking of payments a father is paid in the case of the seduction of his daughter, and the fines due to him if she is raped, and compensation for injuries she has suffered.

讞讘诇讜转 爪注专讗 讚讙讜驻讗 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗

The Gemara questions this interpretation: With regard to injuries, they are the result of her bodily pain, and the guiding principle is that any compensation for a daughter鈥檚 physical pain does not belong to her father, who merely keeps it in trust for her. If so, the category of injuries should not have been included in this list. Rabbi Yosei bar 岣nina said:

砖驻爪注讛 讘驻谞讬讛 讗诪专 专讘 讝讬专讗 讗诪专 专讘 诪转谞讛 讗诪专 专讘 讜讗诪专讬 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗诪专 专讘 诪转谞讛 讗诪专 专讘 讘转 讛谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 诇注爪诪讛 讚讻转讬讘 讜讛转谞讞诇转诐 讗讜转诐 诇讘谞讬讻诐 讗讞专讬讻诐 讗讜转诐 诇讘谞讬讻诐 讜诇讗 讘谞讜转讬讻诐 诇讘谞讬讻诐 诪讙讬讚 砖讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪讜专讬砖 讝讻讜转 讘转讜 诇讘谞讜

We are dealing with a case when he injured her in her face, and therefore he must also pay for the loss of her value, a sum that belongs to her father. Rav Zeira said that Rav Mattana said that Rav said, and some say Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Mattana said that Rav said: With regard to a daughter who is sustained by the brothers, her earnings belong to her, as it is written: 鈥淎nd you may make them an inheritance for your sons after you鈥 (Leviticus 25:46), which indicates: It is them, slaves, that you bequeath to your sons, and not your daughters to your sons. This verse teaches that a man does not bequeath a right that he has over his daughter to his son.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬诪讬 讘专 驻驻讬 砖拽讜讚 讗诪专讛 砖拽讜讚 诪谞讜 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讗 专讘 讗诪专讛 讗讬诪讗 讗祝 砖拽讜讚 讗诪专讛 讗诪专 诪专 讘专 讗诪讬诪专 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专讬 谞讛专讚注讬 讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 砖砖转 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 讜讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘

Avimi bar Pappi said to Rabbi Zeira: Shakud said this halakha. The Gemara asks: Who is Shakud? This is a nickname for Shmuel. The Gemara asks: Didn鈥檛 Rav say it? The Gemara answers: One should say that Avimi bar Pappi meant that even Shakud said it, i.e., Shmuel also agreed with this ruling. Mar bar Ameimar said to Rav Ashi: The Sages of Neharde鈥檃 say as follows: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet, that brothers who are sustaining their sister are entitled to her earnings. Rav Ashi said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, that her earnings belong to her. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav.

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪讗专住 讗转 讘转讜 讜讙专砖讛 讗讬专住讛 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讻转讜讘转讛 砖诇讜 讛砖讬讗讛 讜讙专砖讛 讛砖讬讗讛 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讻转讜讘转讛 砖诇讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 砖诇 讗讘 讗诪专讜 诇讜 讗诐 诪砖讛砖讬讗讛 讗讬谉 诇讗讘讬讛 专砖讜转 讘讛

MISHNA: One who betroths his minor daughter to a man, and the man subsequently divorces her, and her father then betroths her to another, and she is widowed, the payment specified in her marriage contract, even from her second husband, is his, i.e., it belongs to the father. However, if her father married her off and her husband divorced her, and her father then married her to another man and she was widowed, even the payment specified in her marriage contract from her first marriage is hers. Rabbi Yehuda says that the payment specified in the first marriage contract belongs to the father. They said to him: If it was after he married her off, even the first time, her father no longer has authority over her.

讙诪壮 讟注诪讗 讚讛砖讬讗讛 讜讙专砖讛 讛砖讬讗讛 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讘诇 谞转讗专诪诇讛 转专讬 讝诪谞讬 转讜 诇讗 讞讝讬讗 诇讗讬谞住讜讘讬 讜讗讙讘 讗讜专讞讬讛 拽讗 住转讬诐 诇谉 转谞讗 讻专讘讬 讚讗诪专 讘转专讬 讝诪谞讬 讛讜讬讗 讞讝拽讛

GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the language of the mishna: The reason is that he married her off, and the husband divorced her, and he married her off to another man, and she was widowed. However, if she was widowed twice she is no longer fit to be married, due to the concern that she is the cause of her husbands鈥 early demise. The Gemara comments: And the tanna incidentally teaches an unattributed opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said that presumption is established by two occasions. Consequently, she is already considered a danger after two husbands have passed away, as opposed to the opinion that three incidents are required to establish a presumption.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 砖诇 讗讘 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讘讛 讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讛讜讗讬诇 讜诪砖注转 讗讬专讜住讬谉 讝讻讛 讘讛谉 讛讗讘

搂 The mishna taught that Rabbi Yehuda says the payment specified in the first marriage contract belongs to the father. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara explains that Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: Since the father is entitled to the payments of the marriage contract from the time of her betrothal, when the first husband obligated himself to pay her marriage contract, as the girl was under her father鈥檚 authority at the time, the father receives the money. Although the money is actually paid only after the girl was married and divorced, at which time she is under her own jurisdiction, her father acquired his right to the marriage contract from the time of her betrothal, when she was under his authority.

诪转讬讘 专讘讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 砖诇 讗讘 讜诪讜讚讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘诪讗专住 讗转 讘转讜 讻砖讛讬讗 拽讟谞讛 讜讘讙专讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞砖讗转 砖讗讬谉 诇讗讘讬讛 专砖讜转 讘讛 讗诪讗讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讬诪讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜诪砖注转 讗讬专讜住讬谉 讝讻讛 讘讛谉 讛讗讘

Rava raised an objection from a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says that the payment specified in the first marriage contract belongs to her father. And Rabbi Yehuda concedes in the case of one who betroths his daughter when she is a minor, and she matures and subsequently marries, that her father no longer has authority over her once she becomes an adult, and he does not retain his rights to her marriage contract. According to the above explanation, why does Rabbi Yehuda agree in that case? Here too, let him say: Since the father is entitled to the payment of her marriage contract from the time of her betrothal, he receives the payment even if she married after she reached majority.

讗诇讗 讗讬 讗转诪专 讛讻讬 讗转诪专 专讘讛 讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讘专砖讜转讜 谞讻转讘讬谉

Rather, if this statement was stated, it was stated as follows: Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: Since the amounts of the marriage contract are written under his authority, as the marriage contract is drafted right before the marriage, at which point the girl was still under her father鈥檚 jurisdiction, he is therefore entitled to the money. This explains why the ruling is different if she reached majority before her marriage. In this case, the marriage contract was written when she was no longer under her father鈥檚 jurisdiction, and therefore her father is not entitled to the payment of her marriage contract.

讜诪讬讙讘讗 诪讗讬诪转 讙讘讬讗

And now that it has been established that even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, the rights to a marriage contract are determined based upon the time of marriage and not the time of betrothal, despite the fact that its sum is fixed at that time, the Gemara asks: From when does the husband鈥檚 property become liened to ensure collection of his wife鈥檚 marriage contract? Does the monetary claim take effect at the time of betrothal, so that there is a lien on any property he owned at that time, or is there a lien only on property that the husband owned at the time of marriage?

讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪谞讛 诪讗转讬诐 诪谉 讛讗讬专讜住讬谉 讜转讜住驻转 诪谉 讛谞砖讜讗讬谉 讜专讘 讗住讬 讗诪专 讗讞讚 讝讛 讜讗讞讚 讝讛 诪谉 讛谞砖讜讗讬谉

Rav Huna said: With regard to the one hundred dinars for a non-virgin and the two hundred for a virgin, the basic sums of a marriage contract instituted by the Sages, she has a lien on her husband鈥檚 property from the time of the betrothal, as she acquired this amount when she was betrothed, but with regard to the addition, i.e., additional sums of money stipulated by the husband himself, the wife鈥檚 lien on his property takes effect only from the time of the marriage. And Rav Asi said: The lien for both this and that take effect only from the time of their marriage.

讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讛讻讬 讜讛讗转诪专 讛讜爪讬讗讛 注诇讬讜 砖转讬 讻转讜讘讜转 讗讞转 砖诇 诪讗转讬诐 讜讗讞转 砖诇 砖诇砖 诪讗讜转 讜讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘讗转讛 诇讙讘讜转 诪讗转讬诐 讙讜讘讛 诪讝诪谉 专讗砖讜谉 砖诇砖 诪讗讜转 讙讜讘讛 诪讝诪谉 砖谞讬

The Gemara asks: And did Rav Huna actually say this, that a woman has a lien on her husband鈥檚 property from the time of betrothal with regard to payment of the one hundred or two hundred dinars that constitute the main sum of her marriage contract? But wasn鈥檛 it stated that amora鈥檌m discussed the case of a woman who produced against her husband, upon their divorce, two marriage contracts, written at different times, one of two hundred dinars and the other one of three hundred? And Rav Huna said: Since she can claim only one marriage contract, if she came to collect the first sum of two hundred dinars, she can collect that amount even from property her husband sold after the first point in time, when this marriage contract was written, and if she wishes to collect the one worth three hundred dinars, she can collect from property her husband sold after the second point in time.

讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 转讬讙讘讬 诪讗转讬诐 诪讝诪谉 专讗砖讜谉 讜诪讗讛 诪讝诪谉 砖谞讬

The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if it is so, that Rav Huna maintains that the lien for the basic sum and the addition can be ascribed to different dates, let her collect two hundred dinars from property sold after the first point in time, as she was already entitled to the basic sum of her marriage contract from that day, and she can collect the additional one hundred dinars from property sold after the second point in time.

讜诇讟注诪讬讱 转讬讙讘讬 讞诪砖 诪讗讜转 讻讜诇诐 诪讗转讬诐 诪讝诪谉 专讗砖讜谉 转诇转 诪讗讛 诪讝诪谉 砖谞讬

The Gemara refutes this argument: And even according to your reasoning, let her collect the entire five hundred dinars, the sum of both marriage contracts. She should be able to collect two hundred from property sold after the first point in time and three hundred from property sold after the second stipulated time.

讗诇讗 讞诪砖 诪讗讜转 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗 讙讘讬讗 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 爪讘讬转讬 讜讗讜住讬驻讬转 诇讱 转诇转 诪讗讛 讗诪讗转讬诐 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇讛 讗讬 诪讝诪谉 专讗砖讜谉 讙讘讬讗转 讙讘讬讗 诪讗转讬诐 讗讬 诪讝诪谉 砖谞讬 讙讘讬讗转 讙讘讬讗 转诇转 诪讗讛

Rather, what is the reason that she may not collect the entire sum of five hundred dinars? Since he did not write to her in the second marriage contract: I chose to add to the payment of your marriage contract, and therefore I am writing a contract for three hundred dinars in addition to the first two hundred dinars, it is apparent that this is what he meant to say to her by writing a second marriage contract: If you collect from property sold after the first point in time, you may collect two hundred dinars; if you collect from property sold after the second point in time, you may collect three hundred dinars.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

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Ketubot 43

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Ketubot 43

讜诪讜讚讛 讘拽谞住 驻讟讜专 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讻讬 拽讗 转讘注 讘讜砖转 讜驻讙诐 拽讗 转讘注

And the principle is that one who admits that he is liable to pay a fine is exempt. Since the man would not have been liable to pay even if he had admitted his guilt, his denial of guilt is not considered a denial of monetary liability, and even if he swears falsely that he is not liable, he still does not become liable to bring an offering. And the Rabbis hold that when the father claims payment in court, it is the compensation for the humiliation and degradation that he claims. His main focus is not on the fine, and therefore the denial refers to a regular monetary claim.

讘诪讗讬 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 住讘专 诇讗 砖讘讬拽 讗讬谞讬砖 诪讬讚讬 讚拽讬抓 讜转讘注 诪讬讚讬 讚诇讗 拽讬抓 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 砖讘讬拽 讗讬谞讬砖 诪讬讚讬 讚讻讬 诪讜讚讬 讘讬讛 诇讗 诪讬驻讟专 讜转讘注 诪讬讚讬 讚讻讬 诪讜讚讛 讘讬讛 诪讬驻讟专

The Gemara asks: If this explanation is correct, with regard to what do the tanna鈥檌m disagree? Rav Pappa said: Rabbi Shimon holds that a person does not leave aside something that is fixed, e.g., a fine, and claim something that is not fixed, e.g., the compensation for humiliation and degradation, which need to be assessed by the court. Consequently, a claim of rape is essentially a demand for the fine. And conversely, the Rabbis hold that a person does not leave aside something that, if the defendant admits to it, he is not exempt from payment, e.g., humiliation and degradation, and claim something that, if the defendant admits to it, he is exempt from payment. Consequently, they contend that the lawsuit is mainly focused on the compensation for the humiliation and degradation.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讬谞讗 诪专讘 砖砖转 讘转 讛谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 诇诪讬

Rabbi Avina raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: With regard to a daughter who is sustained by her brothers, i.e., an orphan whose brothers provide her with her sustenance from their father鈥檚 estate, in accordance with the stipulation in the marriage contract between their parents that requires the father to pay for his daughter鈥檚 sustenance from his property, to whom do her earnings belong?

讘诪拽讜诐 讗讘 拽讬讬诪讬 诪讛 讛转诐 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 诇讗讘 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 诇讗讞讬谉 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讚诪讬 诇讗讘 讛转诐 诪讚讬讚讬讛 诪讬转讝谞讗 讛讻讗 诇讗讜 诪讚讬讚讛讜 诪讬转讝谞讗

Rabbi Avina explains the sides of the dilemma. One might say that the brothers stand in place of the father: Just as there, if their father is alive, her earnings go to the father, here too her earnings go to the brothers. Or perhaps this is not similar to the case of a living father. Why not? Because there, she is sustained from his own property, and therefore he is entitled to receive her earnings, whereas here, she is not sustained from their possessions but from the estate of their father, and consequently they should not receive her earnings.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 讗诇诪谞讛 谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谞讻住讬 讬转讜诪讬诐 讜诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 砖诇讛谉

Rav Sheshet said to him: You already learned the answer to this dilemma from a mishna (Ketubot 81a): A widow is sustained from the property of the orphans, and her earnings are theirs. This indicates that although a widow receives her sustenance from the estate of her deceased husband, in accordance with the stipulations of the marriage contract, the orphans are nevertheless entitled to her earnings. The same reasoning should apply to an orphan sustained by her brothers.

诪讬 讚诪讬 讗诇诪谞转讜 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讘讛专讜讜讞讛 讘转讜 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讘讛专讜讜讞讛

The Gemara refutes this argument: Are the two situations comparable? In the case of his widow, the deceased is not necessarily amenable to her living in comfort. Consequently, she is entitled only to the minimum guaranteed to her in the marriage contract, while her earnings go to his heirs. Conversely, with regard to his daughter, he is amenable and is interested in her living in comfort, and therefore he allows her to retain her earnings so that she can have the extra money.

诇诪讬诪专讗 讚讘转讜 注讚讬驻讗 诇讬讛 诪讗诇诪谞转讜 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 注砖讜 讗诇诪谞讛 讗爪诇 讛讘转 讻讘转 讗爪诇 讗讞讬谉 讘谞讻住讬谉 诪讜注讟讬谉

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the welfare of his daughter is more preferable to him than that of his widow? But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Abba say that Rabbi Yosei said: The Sages established the halakha of a widow with regard to the daughter, who is also entitled to sustenance from the estate, like the halakha of a daughter with regard to the brothers in a case of a small estate that is insufficient for the livelihoods of both the girl and her brothers?

诪讛 讛讘转 讗爪诇 讗讞讬谉 讛讘转 谞讬讝讜谞转 讜讛讗讞讬谉 讬砖讗诇讜 注诇 讛驻转讞讬诐 讗祝 讗诇诪谞讛 讗爪诇 讛讘转 讗诇诪谞讛 谞讬讝讜谞转 讜讛讘转 转砖讗诇 注诇 讛驻转讞讬诐 诇注谞讬谉 讝讬诇讜转讗 讗诇诪谞转讜 注讚讬驻讗 诇讬讛 诇注谞讬谉 讛专讜讜讞讛 讘转讜 注讚讬驻讗 诇讬讛

Rabbi Abba explains: Just as in the case of a daughter with regard to the brothers, the halakha is that the daughter is sustained from the father鈥檚 estate, and if the brothers have nothing to eat they must go and beg for charity at people鈥檚 doors, so too, in the case of a widow with regard to the daughter, the widow is sustained and the daughters beg for charity at people鈥檚 doors. This indicates that a man is more concerned for his widow than his daughter. The Gemara explains: The two cases are not comparable. With regard to degradation, one鈥檚 widow is preferable to him, i.e., if one of them must be forced to go around requesting handouts, a man would rather it be his daughter than his widow. By contrast, with regard to comfort, the comfort of his daughter is more preferable to him than that of his widow.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜诪爪讬讗转讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讙讘转讛 诪转 讛讗讘 讛专讬 讛谉 砖诇 讗讞讬谉 讟注诪讗 讚讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讛讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讛讗讘 诇注爪诪讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘谞讬讝讜谞转 诇讗 讘砖讗讬谞讛 谞讬讝讜谞转

Rav Yosef raised an objection to Rav Sheshet鈥檚 conclusion that the orphan girl鈥檚 earnings belong to the brothers, from the mishna: With regard to her earnings and the lost items that she has found, although she has not collected them, if the father died, they belong to her brothers. Rav Yosef infers: The reason for this halakha is that she acquired her earnings in her father鈥檚 lifetime, which indicates that the money she earns after the father鈥檚 death belongs to her. What, is it not referring even to a daughter who is sustained from his estate? The Gemara refutes this claim: No, it deals with a daughter who is not sustained from his property but who sustains herself through her own earnings.

讗讬 讘砖讗讬谞讛 谞讬讝讜谞转 诪讗讬 诇诪讬诪专讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讬讻讜诇 讛专讘 诇讜诪专 诇注讘讚 注砖讛 注诪讬 讜讗讬谞讬 讝谞讱 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讘注讘讚 讻谞注谞讬 讚诇讗 讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 注诪讱

The Gemara asks: If the mishna is speaking of one who is not sustained from his estate, what is the purpose of stating this? It is obvious that this is the halakha, as even according to the one who said that a master can say to his slave: Work for me but I will not feed you, i.e., a master is not legally obligated to provide sustenance to his slave, this applies only to a Canaanite slave, with regard to whom it is not written in the Torah: 鈥淲ith you,鈥 and therefore his master is not obligated to feed him.

讗讘诇 注讘讚 注讘专讬 讚讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 注诪讱 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讘转讜

However, in the case of a Hebrew slave, as it is written with regard to him: 鈥淲ith you鈥 (Deuteronomy 15:16), which indicates that he is entitled to live with his master as an equal, the master may not compel the slave to serve him unless he feeds him. All the more so concerning his daughter, it cannot be the case that this young woman has to work and give her wages to the brothers if they are not obligated to sustain her at the same time.

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 注讜诇讗 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇讛注讚驻讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 讙讘专讗 专讘讛 讻专讘 讬讜住祝 诇讗 讬讚注 讚讗讬讻讗 讛注讚驻讛 讜拽诪讜转讬讘 转讬讜讘转讗

Rabba bar Ulla said: It is necessary only for the surplus. The mishna is not stating that the brothers take her earnings and do not sustain her, leaving her with nothing. Rather, the question concerns a young woman whose earnings provide her with more than she needs for her sustenance, leaving her with a surplus. It is this surplus that belongs to her brothers. Rava said in response to Rabba bar Ulla鈥檚 explanation: Is it possible that a man as great as Rav Yosef does not know that there is an explanation according to which the mishna is referring to the surplus, and in his ignorance he raises a refutation against Rav Sheshet? This certainly cannot be the case.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讙讜驻讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 讚拽转谞讬 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜诪爪讬讗转讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讙讘转讛 诪爪讬讗转讛 诪诪讗谉 讙讘讬讗

Rather, Rava said: The mishna itself poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Sheshet, and this difficulty led Rav Yosef to his conclusion. This is as the mishna teaches: Her earnings and the lost items that she has found, although she has not collected them. Rava analyzes this statement: With regard to items that she has found, from whom does she collect them? The concept of collecting is inappropriate in this case.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讻诪爪讬讗转讛 诪讛 诪爪讬讗转讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 诇讗讘 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讛讗讘 诇注爪诪讛 讗祝 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 谞诪讬 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 诇讗讘 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讛讗讘 诇注爪诪讛 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

Rather, is it not the case that this is what the mishna said: Her earnings are like items she has found: Just as items she has found in her father鈥檚 lifetime belong to her father, and after the father鈥檚 death they belong to her, so too, the same rule applies to her earnings as well: In the father鈥檚 lifetime, they go to the father, and after the father鈥檚 death they belong to her, even when she is sustained from the inheritance. The Gemara concludes: We can learn from this inference that the mishna deals with her earnings themselves, not their surplus, in contrast to the interpretation of Rav Sheshet.

讗讬转诪专 谞诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讘转 讛谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 诇注爪诪讛 讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讻转讬讘 讜讛转谞讞诇转诐 讗讜转诐 诇讘谞讬讻诐 讗讞专讬讻诐 讗讜转诐 诇讘谞讬讻诐 讜诇讗 讘谞讜转讬讻诐 诇讘谞讬讻诐 诪讙讬讚 砖讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪讜专讬砖 讝讻讜转 讘转讜 诇讘谞讜

This halakha was also stated by amora鈥檌m, as Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: In the case of a daughter who is sustained by the brothers, her earnings nevertheless belong to her. Rav Kahana said: What is the reason for this? As it is written with regard to slaves: 鈥淎nd you may make them an inheritance for your sons after you鈥 (Leviticus 25:46), from which it is inferred: It is them, slaves alone, that you bequeath to your sons, and you do not bequeath your daughters to your sons. This verse teaches that a man does not bequeath a right that he has over his daughter to his son. All the rights a man possesses over his daughter are personal rights, which are not transferable by inheritance.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讛 讜讗讬诪讗 讘驻讬转讜讬 讛讘转 讜拽谞住讜转 讜讞讘诇讜转 讛讻转讜讘 诪讚讘专 讜讻谉 转谞讗 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 讘驻转讜讬 讛讘转 讜拽谞住讜转 讜讞讘诇讜转 讛讻转讜讘 诪讚讘专

Rabba strongly objects to this explanation that the verse is referring to a man鈥檚 rights to his daughter鈥檚 earnings: But one can say that the verse is speaking of the fine that a father is paid in the case of the seduction of his daughter, and the fines paid to him if she is raped, and compensation due to him for injuries that she suffered, and the verse indicates that these rights are not bequeathed to his heirs. And Rav 岣nina likewise explicitly taught that the verse is speaking of payments a father is paid in the case of the seduction of his daughter, and the fines due to him if she is raped, and compensation for injuries she has suffered.

讞讘诇讜转 爪注专讗 讚讙讜驻讗 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗

The Gemara questions this interpretation: With regard to injuries, they are the result of her bodily pain, and the guiding principle is that any compensation for a daughter鈥檚 physical pain does not belong to her father, who merely keeps it in trust for her. If so, the category of injuries should not have been included in this list. Rabbi Yosei bar 岣nina said:

砖驻爪注讛 讘驻谞讬讛 讗诪专 专讘 讝讬专讗 讗诪专 专讘 诪转谞讛 讗诪专 专讘 讜讗诪专讬 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗诪专 专讘 诪转谞讛 讗诪专 专讘 讘转 讛谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 诇注爪诪讛 讚讻转讬讘 讜讛转谞讞诇转诐 讗讜转诐 诇讘谞讬讻诐 讗讞专讬讻诐 讗讜转诐 诇讘谞讬讻诐 讜诇讗 讘谞讜转讬讻诐 诇讘谞讬讻诐 诪讙讬讚 砖讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪讜专讬砖 讝讻讜转 讘转讜 诇讘谞讜

We are dealing with a case when he injured her in her face, and therefore he must also pay for the loss of her value, a sum that belongs to her father. Rav Zeira said that Rav Mattana said that Rav said, and some say Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Mattana said that Rav said: With regard to a daughter who is sustained by the brothers, her earnings belong to her, as it is written: 鈥淎nd you may make them an inheritance for your sons after you鈥 (Leviticus 25:46), which indicates: It is them, slaves, that you bequeath to your sons, and not your daughters to your sons. This verse teaches that a man does not bequeath a right that he has over his daughter to his son.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬诪讬 讘专 驻驻讬 砖拽讜讚 讗诪专讛 砖拽讜讚 诪谞讜 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讗 专讘 讗诪专讛 讗讬诪讗 讗祝 砖拽讜讚 讗诪专讛 讗诪专 诪专 讘专 讗诪讬诪专 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专讬 谞讛专讚注讬 讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 砖砖转 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 讜讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘

Avimi bar Pappi said to Rabbi Zeira: Shakud said this halakha. The Gemara asks: Who is Shakud? This is a nickname for Shmuel. The Gemara asks: Didn鈥檛 Rav say it? The Gemara answers: One should say that Avimi bar Pappi meant that even Shakud said it, i.e., Shmuel also agreed with this ruling. Mar bar Ameimar said to Rav Ashi: The Sages of Neharde鈥檃 say as follows: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet, that brothers who are sustaining their sister are entitled to her earnings. Rav Ashi said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, that her earnings belong to her. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav.

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪讗专住 讗转 讘转讜 讜讙专砖讛 讗讬专住讛 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讻转讜讘转讛 砖诇讜 讛砖讬讗讛 讜讙专砖讛 讛砖讬讗讛 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讻转讜讘转讛 砖诇讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 砖诇 讗讘 讗诪专讜 诇讜 讗诐 诪砖讛砖讬讗讛 讗讬谉 诇讗讘讬讛 专砖讜转 讘讛

MISHNA: One who betroths his minor daughter to a man, and the man subsequently divorces her, and her father then betroths her to another, and she is widowed, the payment specified in her marriage contract, even from her second husband, is his, i.e., it belongs to the father. However, if her father married her off and her husband divorced her, and her father then married her to another man and she was widowed, even the payment specified in her marriage contract from her first marriage is hers. Rabbi Yehuda says that the payment specified in the first marriage contract belongs to the father. They said to him: If it was after he married her off, even the first time, her father no longer has authority over her.

讙诪壮 讟注诪讗 讚讛砖讬讗讛 讜讙专砖讛 讛砖讬讗讛 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讘诇 谞转讗专诪诇讛 转专讬 讝诪谞讬 转讜 诇讗 讞讝讬讗 诇讗讬谞住讜讘讬 讜讗讙讘 讗讜专讞讬讛 拽讗 住转讬诐 诇谉 转谞讗 讻专讘讬 讚讗诪专 讘转专讬 讝诪谞讬 讛讜讬讗 讞讝拽讛

GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the language of the mishna: The reason is that he married her off, and the husband divorced her, and he married her off to another man, and she was widowed. However, if she was widowed twice she is no longer fit to be married, due to the concern that she is the cause of her husbands鈥 early demise. The Gemara comments: And the tanna incidentally teaches an unattributed opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said that presumption is established by two occasions. Consequently, she is already considered a danger after two husbands have passed away, as opposed to the opinion that three incidents are required to establish a presumption.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 砖诇 讗讘 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讘讛 讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讛讜讗讬诇 讜诪砖注转 讗讬专讜住讬谉 讝讻讛 讘讛谉 讛讗讘

搂 The mishna taught that Rabbi Yehuda says the payment specified in the first marriage contract belongs to the father. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara explains that Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: Since the father is entitled to the payments of the marriage contract from the time of her betrothal, when the first husband obligated himself to pay her marriage contract, as the girl was under her father鈥檚 authority at the time, the father receives the money. Although the money is actually paid only after the girl was married and divorced, at which time she is under her own jurisdiction, her father acquired his right to the marriage contract from the time of her betrothal, when she was under his authority.

诪转讬讘 专讘讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 砖诇 讗讘 讜诪讜讚讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘诪讗专住 讗转 讘转讜 讻砖讛讬讗 拽讟谞讛 讜讘讙专讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞砖讗转 砖讗讬谉 诇讗讘讬讛 专砖讜转 讘讛 讗诪讗讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讬诪讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜诪砖注转 讗讬专讜住讬谉 讝讻讛 讘讛谉 讛讗讘

Rava raised an objection from a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says that the payment specified in the first marriage contract belongs to her father. And Rabbi Yehuda concedes in the case of one who betroths his daughter when she is a minor, and she matures and subsequently marries, that her father no longer has authority over her once she becomes an adult, and he does not retain his rights to her marriage contract. According to the above explanation, why does Rabbi Yehuda agree in that case? Here too, let him say: Since the father is entitled to the payment of her marriage contract from the time of her betrothal, he receives the payment even if she married after she reached majority.

讗诇讗 讗讬 讗转诪专 讛讻讬 讗转诪专 专讘讛 讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讘专砖讜转讜 谞讻转讘讬谉

Rather, if this statement was stated, it was stated as follows: Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: Since the amounts of the marriage contract are written under his authority, as the marriage contract is drafted right before the marriage, at which point the girl was still under her father鈥檚 jurisdiction, he is therefore entitled to the money. This explains why the ruling is different if she reached majority before her marriage. In this case, the marriage contract was written when she was no longer under her father鈥檚 jurisdiction, and therefore her father is not entitled to the payment of her marriage contract.

讜诪讬讙讘讗 诪讗讬诪转 讙讘讬讗

And now that it has been established that even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, the rights to a marriage contract are determined based upon the time of marriage and not the time of betrothal, despite the fact that its sum is fixed at that time, the Gemara asks: From when does the husband鈥檚 property become liened to ensure collection of his wife鈥檚 marriage contract? Does the monetary claim take effect at the time of betrothal, so that there is a lien on any property he owned at that time, or is there a lien only on property that the husband owned at the time of marriage?

讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪谞讛 诪讗转讬诐 诪谉 讛讗讬专讜住讬谉 讜转讜住驻转 诪谉 讛谞砖讜讗讬谉 讜专讘 讗住讬 讗诪专 讗讞讚 讝讛 讜讗讞讚 讝讛 诪谉 讛谞砖讜讗讬谉

Rav Huna said: With regard to the one hundred dinars for a non-virgin and the two hundred for a virgin, the basic sums of a marriage contract instituted by the Sages, she has a lien on her husband鈥檚 property from the time of the betrothal, as she acquired this amount when she was betrothed, but with regard to the addition, i.e., additional sums of money stipulated by the husband himself, the wife鈥檚 lien on his property takes effect only from the time of the marriage. And Rav Asi said: The lien for both this and that take effect only from the time of their marriage.

讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讛讻讬 讜讛讗转诪专 讛讜爪讬讗讛 注诇讬讜 砖转讬 讻转讜讘讜转 讗讞转 砖诇 诪讗转讬诐 讜讗讞转 砖诇 砖诇砖 诪讗讜转 讜讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘讗转讛 诇讙讘讜转 诪讗转讬诐 讙讜讘讛 诪讝诪谉 专讗砖讜谉 砖诇砖 诪讗讜转 讙讜讘讛 诪讝诪谉 砖谞讬

The Gemara asks: And did Rav Huna actually say this, that a woman has a lien on her husband鈥檚 property from the time of betrothal with regard to payment of the one hundred or two hundred dinars that constitute the main sum of her marriage contract? But wasn鈥檛 it stated that amora鈥檌m discussed the case of a woman who produced against her husband, upon their divorce, two marriage contracts, written at different times, one of two hundred dinars and the other one of three hundred? And Rav Huna said: Since she can claim only one marriage contract, if she came to collect the first sum of two hundred dinars, she can collect that amount even from property her husband sold after the first point in time, when this marriage contract was written, and if she wishes to collect the one worth three hundred dinars, she can collect from property her husband sold after the second point in time.

讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 转讬讙讘讬 诪讗转讬诐 诪讝诪谉 专讗砖讜谉 讜诪讗讛 诪讝诪谉 砖谞讬

The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if it is so, that Rav Huna maintains that the lien for the basic sum and the addition can be ascribed to different dates, let her collect two hundred dinars from property sold after the first point in time, as she was already entitled to the basic sum of her marriage contract from that day, and she can collect the additional one hundred dinars from property sold after the second point in time.

讜诇讟注诪讬讱 转讬讙讘讬 讞诪砖 诪讗讜转 讻讜诇诐 诪讗转讬诐 诪讝诪谉 专讗砖讜谉 转诇转 诪讗讛 诪讝诪谉 砖谞讬

The Gemara refutes this argument: And even according to your reasoning, let her collect the entire five hundred dinars, the sum of both marriage contracts. She should be able to collect two hundred from property sold after the first point in time and three hundred from property sold after the second stipulated time.

讗诇讗 讞诪砖 诪讗讜转 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗 讙讘讬讗 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 爪讘讬转讬 讜讗讜住讬驻讬转 诇讱 转诇转 诪讗讛 讗诪讗转讬诐 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇讛 讗讬 诪讝诪谉 专讗砖讜谉 讙讘讬讗转 讙讘讬讗 诪讗转讬诐 讗讬 诪讝诪谉 砖谞讬 讙讘讬讗转 讙讘讬讗 转诇转 诪讗讛

Rather, what is the reason that she may not collect the entire sum of five hundred dinars? Since he did not write to her in the second marriage contract: I chose to add to the payment of your marriage contract, and therefore I am writing a contract for three hundred dinars in addition to the first two hundred dinars, it is apparent that this is what he meant to say to her by writing a second marriage contract: If you collect from property sold after the first point in time, you may collect two hundred dinars; if you collect from property sold after the second point in time, you may collect three hundred dinars.

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