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Today's Daf Yomi

April 24, 2015 | 讛壮 讘讗讬讬专 转砖注状讛

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

Ketubot 81

讬讜专砖讬讛 讬讜专砖讬 讻转讜讘转讛 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘拽讘讜专转讛 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗祝 讗谞谉 谞诪讬 转谞讬谞讗 讗诇诪谞讛 谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谞讻住讬 讬转讜诪讬谉 讜诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 砖诇讛谉 讜讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘拽讘讜专转讛 讬讜专砖讬讛 讬讜专砖讬 讻转讜讘转讛 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘拽讘讜专转讛 讜讗讬讝讜讛讬 讗诇诪谞讛 砖讬砖 诇讛 砖谞讬 讬讜专砖讬谉 讛讜讬 讗讜诪专 讝讜 砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐

her heirs, i.e., the heirs of her marriage contract, are obligated in her burial. This indicates that her husband鈥檚 heirs, who inherit her marriage contract, must attend to her burial. Abaye said: We too learn in a mishna (95b): A widow is sustained from the property of the orphans, and her earnings are theirs, and they are not obligated in her burial. Instead, her heirs, the heirs of her marriage contract, are obligated in her burial. And who is the widow who has two sets of heirs, necessitating the ruling that only the heirs of her marriage contract are obligated in her burial? You must say that this is a widow waiting for her yavam, as the yavam inherits her marriage contract.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讜诇讬诪讗 讗讞 讗谞讬 讬讜专砖 讗砖转讜 讗讬谉 讗谞讬 拽讜讘专 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讗讬谉 注诇讬讜 诪砖谞讬 爪讚讚讬谉 讗诐 讗讞讬讜 讬讜专砖 讬拽讘讜专 讗转 讗砖转讜 讗诐 讗讬谞讜 拽讜讘专 讗转 讗砖转讜 讬转谉 讻转讜讘转讛

Rava said: But let the yavam say: I inherit my brother, and I am therefore entitled to this marriage contract as my brother鈥檚 heir, while his wife I am not obligated to bury, as I have no connection to her. Abaye said to him: This claim is not valid because they come upon him from two sides, by force of two complementary claims: If he inherits his brother he should inherit his duties as well as his rights, and he should bury his wife. If he does not bury his wife, as he does not wish to take his brother鈥檚 place, he should give her marriage contract to her.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 拽讗 讗诪讬谞讗 讗讞 讗谞讬 讬讜专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讗讬谉 讗谞讬 拽讜讘专 讜讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讻转讜讘讛 诇讗 谞讬转谞讛 讻转讜讘讛 诇讙讘讜转 诪讞讬讬诐

Rava said to him: I say as follows: The yavam claims that I inherit my brother, and his wife I will not bury, as this is not my responsibility. And if the brother should be responsible due to her marriage contract, a marriage contract cannot be collected during the husband鈥檚 lifetime but only after his death. The yavam is the first husband鈥檚 replacement, as he is prepared to perform levirate marriage with the woman, and therefore she is not entitled to her marriage contract, which means he is also not obligated to bury her. This assumption that a marriage contract may not be claimed during the husband鈥檚 lifetime is derived from a close reading of the wording of the marriage contract, which states: When you may marry another you may claim this marriage contract, which indicates that if the woman is unable to marry another man because her husband is still alive she is not entitled to her marriage contract.

诪讗谉 砖诪注转 诇讬讛 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 诪讚专砖 讻转讜讘讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜砖诪注讬谞谉 诇讛讜 诇讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讚讗诪专讬 砖讟专 讛注讜诪讚 诇讙讘讜转 讻讙讘讜讬 讚诪讬

The Gemara asks: Who did you hear who is of the opinion that one expounds the marriage contract and infers halakhot from its exact language, like expositions from the Torah? It is the opinion of Beit Shammai, and yet we have heard that Beit Shammai say a document that is ready to be collected is considered collected. Here too, it should be considered as though she had already claimed her marriage contract, and he cannot claim to be acting as his brother鈥檚 heir.

讚转谞谉 诪转讜 讘注诇讬讛谉 注讚 砖诇讗 砖转讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘讛 讜诇讗 砖讜转讜转 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讜 砖讜转讜转 讗讜 诇讗 谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘讛

The proof of this is as we learned in a mishna (Sota 24a): If the husbands of women suspected of being unfaithful died before their wives drank from the bitter waters in accordance with the halakha of a sota, and it was never established whether they had engaged in relations with another man, Beit Shammai say: They take the marriage contract and do not drink, and Beit Hillel say: Either they drink or they do not take the marriage contract.

讗讜 砖讜转讜转 讜讛讘讬讗 讛讗讬砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讗诇 讛讻讛谉 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜诇讬讻讗 讗诇讗 诪转讜讱 砖诇讗 砖讜转讜转 诇讗 谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara digresses to express puzzlement at the wording of this mishna: Either they drink? How can they drink the bitter waters? The Merciful One states: 鈥淭hen shall the man bring his wife to the priest鈥 (Numbers 5:15), and there is no way to fulfill that verse after the husband has died. Rather, Beit Hillel鈥檚 ruling should be understood as follows: Since they do not drink, as they have no husband who can compel them to drink the waters, they do not take the marriage contract, in case they were in fact unfaithful.

讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘讛 讜诇讗 砖讜转讜转 讜讗诪讗讬 住驻讬拽讗 讛讜讗 住驻拽 讝谞讗讬 住驻拽 诇讗 讝谞讗讬 讜拽讗转讬 住驻拽 讜诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讜讚讗讬

That mishna stated that Beit Shammai say: They take the marriage contract and do not drink. But why do they collect the marriage contract? It is a case of uncertainty: Perhaps she committed adultery; perhaps she did not commit adultery. If she was unfaithful she is not entitled to the marriage contract, and yet, although her position cannot be verified, Beit Shammai maintain that her uncertain claim comes and supersedes the certain claim of the heirs, as they are certainly the rightful heirs of their father.

拽住讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 砖讟专 讛注讜诪讚 诇讙讘讜转 讻讙讘讜讬 讚诪讬

It must therefore be concluded that Beit Shammai maintain: A document that is ready to be collected is considered collected. Consequently, the sum of the marriage contract is already considered in the woman鈥檚 possession, which means that when the heirs do not wish to pay the sum of the marriage contract they are actually trying to claim money due to an uncertainty.

讜讛讗 讘注讬谞谉 讻砖转谞砖讗讬 诇讗讞专 转讟诇讬 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 诇讬讻讬 讜诇讬讻讗

The Gemara questions the earlier statement that the marriage contract may not be collected during the husband鈥檚 lifetime due to the exposition of the language of the document: But even if the language of a marriage contract is not expounded, the simple meaning of its words indicates that she may not claim it during the lifetime of the yavam, as we require the fulfillment of the clause: When you may marry another you may take that which is written to you, and this is not the case here, as the yevama may not marry anyone else before she takes part in 岣litza. How, then, can the two claims come upon him, as Abaye suggested?

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讬讘诐 谞诪讬 讻讗讞专 讚诪讬

Rav Ashi said: The yavam is also considered like another man, and it is as though she were about to marry another. Therefore, she is entitled to the marriage contract.

砖诇讞 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诇讗讘讬讬 讘讬讚 专讘 砖诪注讬讛 讘专 讝讬专讗 讜诪讬 谞转谞讛 讻转讜讘讛 诇讙讘讜转 诪讞讬讬诐

The above discussion took place when Abaye and Rava were learning this halakha together. Sometime later, Rava sent Abaye the following related difficulty by way of Rav Shemaya bar Zeira: And can the marriage contract of a yevama be collected during his lifetime?

讜讛转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讗讜诪专 砖讗诇转讬 讗转 住讜诪讻讜住 讛专讜爪讛 砖讬诪讻讜专 讘谞讻住讬 讗讞讬讜 讻讬爪讚 讛讜讗 注讜砖讛 讗诐 讻讛谉 讛讜讗 讬注砖讛 住注讜讚讛 讜讬驻讬讬住 讗诐 讬砖专讗诇 讛讜讗 诪讙专砖 讘讙讟 讜讬讞讝讬专

But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Abba says: I asked Sumakhos: With regard to a yavam who wants to sell his brother鈥檚 property but is unable to do so because all his brother鈥檚 possessions are mortgaged to the yevama, how can he proceed? He replied: If he is a priest, who is prohibited from remarrying his divorced wife, he should prepare a feast for his wife after yibbum has been performed, and during the feast he should persuade her to allow him to sell the late brother鈥檚 property. If he is a regular Israelite, who may remarry his divorced wife, he can divorce her with a bill of divorce, at which point he is obligated to pay her only the sum of her marriage contract, and the rest of the property is then no longer mortgaged for it. While they are divorced he may sell the property and subsequently remarry her.

讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讬谉 谞转谞讛 讻转讜讘讛 诇讙讘讜转 诪讞讬讬诐 谞讬讬讞讚 诇讛 砖讬注讜专 讻转讜讘讛 讜讛砖讗专 诇讬讝讘讬谉 讜诇讟注诪讬讱 讜诇讜转讘讛 诪诪转谞讬转讬谉 诇讗 讬讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讻转讜讘转讬讱 诪讜谞讞转 诇讬讱 注诇 讛砖诇讞谉 讗诇讗 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 讗讞专讗讬谉 诇讻转讜讘转讛

And if it enters our mind that a marriage contract can be collected during his lifetime, why is all this necessary? Let him set aside for her part of the property that corresponds to the amount of the marriage contract, and the rest let him sell. Abaye replied: And according to your reasoning, rather than asking this question based on a baraita, let him raise this difficulty from the mishna, which teaches that he may not say to her: Your marriage contract is placed on the table for you. Rather, all his property is mortgaged for her marriage contract. Why can鈥檛 he designate property equivalent to the sum of her marriage contract and sell the rest?

讛转诐 注爪讛 讟讜讘讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗讬 诇讗 转讬诪讗 讛讻讬 住讬驻讗 讚拽转谞讬 讜讻谉 诇讗 讬讗诪专 讗讚诐 诇讗砖转讜 讛专讬 讻转讜讘转讬讱 诪讜谞讞转 诇讬讱 注诇 讛砖诇讞谉 讗诇讗 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 讗讞专讗讬谉 诇讻转讜讘转 讗砖转讜 讗讬 讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讝讘讜谞讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讚诇讗 诪爪讬 诪讝讘讬谉 讗诇讗 注爪讛 讟讜讘讛 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 注爪讛 讟讜讘讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers: The tanna in the mishna there teaches us good advice, i.e., that one should not do so ab initio, so as to ensure that the amount set aside for her marriage contract is not lost, which would necessitate writing a new marriage contract. However, it should not be inferred from the mishna that it is prohibited to do so. As, if you do not say so, that it is merely good advice, consider the latter clause of the mishna, which teaches: And similarly, a man may not say to his wife: Your marriage contract is placed on the table. Rather, all his property is mortgaged for her marriage contract. If he wants to sell, here too, may he not sell? Rather, in that case the tanna teaches us good advice, and therefore here too, with regard to a yevama, he teaches us good advice.

讗诇讗 讚专讘讬 讗讘讗 拽砖讬讗 讚专讘讬 讗讘讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 诪砖讜诐 讗讬讘讛

The Gemara asks: But if so, the question is raised once again, as the statement of Rabbi Abba said in the name of Sumakhos is difficult. Why is it necessary for the husband to divorce his wife when he can set aside the sum of her marriage contract? The Gemara answers: That teaching of Rabbi Abba is also not difficult, as the reason one may not do so is not that he cannot designate a sum as her marriage contract but due to enmity. If he were to set aside a certain portion for her marriage contract, she would perceive this as a sign that he desires to be rid of her. If he divorces and remarries her, she would realize it is only a ploy to allow him to sell the property and does not indicate his desire to divorce her.

讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚谞驻诇讛 诇讬讛 讬讘诪讛 讘驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 讘注讬 讗讞讜讛 诇诪驻住诇讛 诇讛 讘讙讬讟讗 诪讬谞讬讛

The Gemara relates: A certain man had a yevama who happened before him for levirate marriage in the city of Pumbedita. His brother wanted to disqualify her from him by means of a bill of divorce, as the halakha is that if one of the potential yevamin gives the yevama a bill of divorce she may no longer enter into levirate marriage with the others.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讚注转讬讱 诪砖讜诐 谞讻住讬 讗谞讗 讘谞讻住讬 驻诇讬讙谞讗 诇讱

The brother who wished to perform levirate marriage said to him: What is your opinion? Why are you doing this? Is it due to the property, as you are jealous that his property will belong to me, in accordance with the halakha that the brother who performs levirate marriage inherits the late brother鈥檚 property, whereas if the yevama receives 岣litza or a bill of divorce all the brothers share the inheritance equally? I will divide the property with you. Upon hearing this, the brother consented to him performing levirate marriage. However, when he married the woman, the husband refused to give his brother anything, and the case came before the court.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪讜专 专讘谞谉 诇讗 诇讬讝讘讬谉 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讝讘讬谉 诇讗 讛讜讛 讝讘讬谞讬讛 讝讘讬谞讬 讚转谞讬讗 诪讬 砖诪转 讜讛谞讬讞 砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐 讜讛谞讬讞 谞讻住讬诐 讘诪讗讛 诪谞讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讻转讜讘转讛 讗讬谞讛 讗诇讗 诪谞讛 诇讗 讬诪讻讜专 砖讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 讗讞专讗讬谉 诇讻转讜讘转讛

Rav Yosef said: Since the Sages have said that one may not sell the property of a widow waiting for her yavam before marrying her, although he sold it, his sale is not a valid sale. So too, his promise to give half the property to his brother, which is equivalent to a sale in this case, is of no consequence. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who died and left a widow waiting for her yavam and also left behind property worth the value of one hundred maneh, equivalent to ten thousand dinars, although her marriage contract is worth only one maneh, or one hundred dinars, the yavam may not sell any part of his possessions, as all of his property is mortgaged for her marriage contract. The Sages prohibited him from selling it. Therefore, if he did so the transaction is void.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讜讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗诪讜专 专讘谞谉 诇讗 诇讬讝讘讬谉 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讝讘讬谉 诇讗 讛讜讛 讝讘讬谞讬讛 讝讘讬谞讬 讜讛转谞谉 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 转诪讻讜专 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 转诪讻讜专 讗诇讜 讜讗诇讜 诪讜讚讬诐 砖讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐 砖诇讞讜讛 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘专 驻驻讬 砖诇讞讛 讻讚专讘 讬讜住祝

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And anywhere that the Sages said that one may not sell, is it the halakha that although he sold, his sale is no sale? But didn鈥檛 we learn in the mishna (78a) with regard to a betrothed woman selling property: Beit Shammai say: She may sell, and Beit Hillel say: She may not sell; both these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that if she sold it or gave it away, the transaction is valid? Evidently, even Beit Hillel agree that despite the violation of the Sages鈥 injunction, the sale is valid. Abaye therefore rejects Rav Yosef鈥檚 ruling. They sent this problem before Rabbi 岣nina bar Pappi, who sent back the following reply: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗讟讜 专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘专 驻驻讬 讻讬驻讬 转诇讛 诇讛 砖诇讞讜讛 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞讜诪讬 砖诇讞讛 讻讚讗讘讬讬 讜讗讬 讗诪专 讘讛 专讘 讬讜住祝 讟注诪讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 砖诇讞讜 诇讬

Abaye said in response: Is that to say that Rabbi 岣nina bar Pappi has hung jewelry upon it, i.e., this ruling? His blunt declaration that the halakha is in accordance with Rav Yosef鈥檚 opinion without a logical explanation adds nothing to the discussion, and his decision should be rejected. They sent this inquiry before Rav Minyumi, son of Rav Na岣mi, who sent back the following written reply: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye, but if Rav Yosef states a different reason for it, send his reasoning to me and I will reconsider the matter.

谞驻拽 专讘 讬讜住祝 讚拽 讜讗砖讻讞 讚转谞讬讗 讛专讬 砖讛讬讛 谞讜砖讛 讘讗讞讬讜 讜诪转 讜讛谞讬讞 砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐 诇讗 讬讗诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜砖讗谞讬 讬讜专砖 讛讞讝拽转讬 讗诇讗 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诪讬讘诐 讜讬拽讞 讘讛谉 拽专拽注 讜讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 驻讬专讜转

Rav Yosef went, examined the mishnayot carefully, and found the following source for his opinion. As it is taught in a baraita: If one claimed money from his brother that he had previously lent him, and then the lender died and left behind a widow waiting for her yavam, then the yavam who borrowed money may not say: Since I inherit my brother鈥檚 property by means of the yevama, I may also take possession of the debt, and I do not have to restore it to the other brothers. Rather, one appropriates the sum of the debt from the yavam, and he purchases land with it for the woman鈥檚 marriage contract, and he eats the produce. This serves as proof for Rav Yosef鈥檚 opinion that a yavam may not sell his brother鈥檚 property or take possession of a debt he owed his brother.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讚诇诪讗 讚讟讘讗 诇讬讛 注讘讚讜 诇讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讗 转谞讬 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 讜讗转 讗诪专转 讚讟讘讗 诇讬讛 注讘讚讜 诇讬讛

Abaye said to him: Perhaps they did for him that which is good for him. In other words, the baraita that states that one should purchase land and eat the produce is merely good advice to prevent the money from being lost. Rav Yosef said to him: The tanna teaches: One appropriates, i.e., against his will, and you say that they did for him that which is good for him? The language indicates that this is an obligation, not a matter of advice.

讛讚讜专 砖诇讞讜讛 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞讜诪讬 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讝讜 讗讬谞讛 诪砖谞讛

They once again sent this question before Rav Minyumi, son of Rav Na岣mi. He said to them: So said Rav Yosef bar Minyumi that Rav Na岣an said: This baraita is not a mishna and therefore is not authoritative. Consequently, no proof may be adduced from it.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讜 诇讛讜 诪讟诇讟诇讬 讜诪讟诇讟诇讬 诇讻转讜讘讛 诇讗 诪砖注讘讚讬 讚诇诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 诪讟诇讟诇讬 诪砖注讘讚讬 诇讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara inquires: What is the reason that this baraita is rejected? If we say it is because the money he owes is considered movable property, as it is not present, and movable property is not mortgaged to a marriage contract, as only land can be mortgaged for this purpose, such an argument does not negate the baraita. Perhaps it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said that movable property is mortgaged to a marriage contract.

讜讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专 诇讛 讗转 诇讗讜 讘注诇转 讚讘专讬诐 讚讬讚讬 讗转

Rather, the reason for doubting the reliability of the baraita is because he says to her: You are not my litigant. There is no legal dispute between the man and the yevama. He claims that she is not a party to this suit, as he owes money to his late brother. Therefore, she cannot claim the money from him by arguing that it is mortgaged for her marriage contract.

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

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Ketubot 81

讬讜专砖讬讛 讬讜专砖讬 讻转讜讘转讛 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘拽讘讜专转讛 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗祝 讗谞谉 谞诪讬 转谞讬谞讗 讗诇诪谞讛 谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谞讻住讬 讬转讜诪讬谉 讜诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 砖诇讛谉 讜讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘拽讘讜专转讛 讬讜专砖讬讛 讬讜专砖讬 讻转讜讘转讛 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘拽讘讜专转讛 讜讗讬讝讜讛讬 讗诇诪谞讛 砖讬砖 诇讛 砖谞讬 讬讜专砖讬谉 讛讜讬 讗讜诪专 讝讜 砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐

her heirs, i.e., the heirs of her marriage contract, are obligated in her burial. This indicates that her husband鈥檚 heirs, who inherit her marriage contract, must attend to her burial. Abaye said: We too learn in a mishna (95b): A widow is sustained from the property of the orphans, and her earnings are theirs, and they are not obligated in her burial. Instead, her heirs, the heirs of her marriage contract, are obligated in her burial. And who is the widow who has two sets of heirs, necessitating the ruling that only the heirs of her marriage contract are obligated in her burial? You must say that this is a widow waiting for her yavam, as the yavam inherits her marriage contract.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讜诇讬诪讗 讗讞 讗谞讬 讬讜专砖 讗砖转讜 讗讬谉 讗谞讬 拽讜讘专 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讗讬谉 注诇讬讜 诪砖谞讬 爪讚讚讬谉 讗诐 讗讞讬讜 讬讜专砖 讬拽讘讜专 讗转 讗砖转讜 讗诐 讗讬谞讜 拽讜讘专 讗转 讗砖转讜 讬转谉 讻转讜讘转讛

Rava said: But let the yavam say: I inherit my brother, and I am therefore entitled to this marriage contract as my brother鈥檚 heir, while his wife I am not obligated to bury, as I have no connection to her. Abaye said to him: This claim is not valid because they come upon him from two sides, by force of two complementary claims: If he inherits his brother he should inherit his duties as well as his rights, and he should bury his wife. If he does not bury his wife, as he does not wish to take his brother鈥檚 place, he should give her marriage contract to her.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 拽讗 讗诪讬谞讗 讗讞 讗谞讬 讬讜专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讗讬谉 讗谞讬 拽讜讘专 讜讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讻转讜讘讛 诇讗 谞讬转谞讛 讻转讜讘讛 诇讙讘讜转 诪讞讬讬诐

Rava said to him: I say as follows: The yavam claims that I inherit my brother, and his wife I will not bury, as this is not my responsibility. And if the brother should be responsible due to her marriage contract, a marriage contract cannot be collected during the husband鈥檚 lifetime but only after his death. The yavam is the first husband鈥檚 replacement, as he is prepared to perform levirate marriage with the woman, and therefore she is not entitled to her marriage contract, which means he is also not obligated to bury her. This assumption that a marriage contract may not be claimed during the husband鈥檚 lifetime is derived from a close reading of the wording of the marriage contract, which states: When you may marry another you may claim this marriage contract, which indicates that if the woman is unable to marry another man because her husband is still alive she is not entitled to her marriage contract.

诪讗谉 砖诪注转 诇讬讛 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 诪讚专砖 讻转讜讘讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜砖诪注讬谞谉 诇讛讜 诇讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讚讗诪专讬 砖讟专 讛注讜诪讚 诇讙讘讜转 讻讙讘讜讬 讚诪讬

The Gemara asks: Who did you hear who is of the opinion that one expounds the marriage contract and infers halakhot from its exact language, like expositions from the Torah? It is the opinion of Beit Shammai, and yet we have heard that Beit Shammai say a document that is ready to be collected is considered collected. Here too, it should be considered as though she had already claimed her marriage contract, and he cannot claim to be acting as his brother鈥檚 heir.

讚转谞谉 诪转讜 讘注诇讬讛谉 注讚 砖诇讗 砖转讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘讛 讜诇讗 砖讜转讜转 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讜 砖讜转讜转 讗讜 诇讗 谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘讛

The proof of this is as we learned in a mishna (Sota 24a): If the husbands of women suspected of being unfaithful died before their wives drank from the bitter waters in accordance with the halakha of a sota, and it was never established whether they had engaged in relations with another man, Beit Shammai say: They take the marriage contract and do not drink, and Beit Hillel say: Either they drink or they do not take the marriage contract.

讗讜 砖讜转讜转 讜讛讘讬讗 讛讗讬砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讗诇 讛讻讛谉 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜诇讬讻讗 讗诇讗 诪转讜讱 砖诇讗 砖讜转讜转 诇讗 谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara digresses to express puzzlement at the wording of this mishna: Either they drink? How can they drink the bitter waters? The Merciful One states: 鈥淭hen shall the man bring his wife to the priest鈥 (Numbers 5:15), and there is no way to fulfill that verse after the husband has died. Rather, Beit Hillel鈥檚 ruling should be understood as follows: Since they do not drink, as they have no husband who can compel them to drink the waters, they do not take the marriage contract, in case they were in fact unfaithful.

讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘讛 讜诇讗 砖讜转讜转 讜讗诪讗讬 住驻讬拽讗 讛讜讗 住驻拽 讝谞讗讬 住驻拽 诇讗 讝谞讗讬 讜拽讗转讬 住驻拽 讜诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讜讚讗讬

That mishna stated that Beit Shammai say: They take the marriage contract and do not drink. But why do they collect the marriage contract? It is a case of uncertainty: Perhaps she committed adultery; perhaps she did not commit adultery. If she was unfaithful she is not entitled to the marriage contract, and yet, although her position cannot be verified, Beit Shammai maintain that her uncertain claim comes and supersedes the certain claim of the heirs, as they are certainly the rightful heirs of their father.

拽住讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 砖讟专 讛注讜诪讚 诇讙讘讜转 讻讙讘讜讬 讚诪讬

It must therefore be concluded that Beit Shammai maintain: A document that is ready to be collected is considered collected. Consequently, the sum of the marriage contract is already considered in the woman鈥檚 possession, which means that when the heirs do not wish to pay the sum of the marriage contract they are actually trying to claim money due to an uncertainty.

讜讛讗 讘注讬谞谉 讻砖转谞砖讗讬 诇讗讞专 转讟诇讬 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 诇讬讻讬 讜诇讬讻讗

The Gemara questions the earlier statement that the marriage contract may not be collected during the husband鈥檚 lifetime due to the exposition of the language of the document: But even if the language of a marriage contract is not expounded, the simple meaning of its words indicates that she may not claim it during the lifetime of the yavam, as we require the fulfillment of the clause: When you may marry another you may take that which is written to you, and this is not the case here, as the yevama may not marry anyone else before she takes part in 岣litza. How, then, can the two claims come upon him, as Abaye suggested?

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讬讘诐 谞诪讬 讻讗讞专 讚诪讬

Rav Ashi said: The yavam is also considered like another man, and it is as though she were about to marry another. Therefore, she is entitled to the marriage contract.

砖诇讞 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诇讗讘讬讬 讘讬讚 专讘 砖诪注讬讛 讘专 讝讬专讗 讜诪讬 谞转谞讛 讻转讜讘讛 诇讙讘讜转 诪讞讬讬诐

The above discussion took place when Abaye and Rava were learning this halakha together. Sometime later, Rava sent Abaye the following related difficulty by way of Rav Shemaya bar Zeira: And can the marriage contract of a yevama be collected during his lifetime?

讜讛转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讗讜诪专 砖讗诇转讬 讗转 住讜诪讻讜住 讛专讜爪讛 砖讬诪讻讜专 讘谞讻住讬 讗讞讬讜 讻讬爪讚 讛讜讗 注讜砖讛 讗诐 讻讛谉 讛讜讗 讬注砖讛 住注讜讚讛 讜讬驻讬讬住 讗诐 讬砖专讗诇 讛讜讗 诪讙专砖 讘讙讟 讜讬讞讝讬专

But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Abba says: I asked Sumakhos: With regard to a yavam who wants to sell his brother鈥檚 property but is unable to do so because all his brother鈥檚 possessions are mortgaged to the yevama, how can he proceed? He replied: If he is a priest, who is prohibited from remarrying his divorced wife, he should prepare a feast for his wife after yibbum has been performed, and during the feast he should persuade her to allow him to sell the late brother鈥檚 property. If he is a regular Israelite, who may remarry his divorced wife, he can divorce her with a bill of divorce, at which point he is obligated to pay her only the sum of her marriage contract, and the rest of the property is then no longer mortgaged for it. While they are divorced he may sell the property and subsequently remarry her.

讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讬谉 谞转谞讛 讻转讜讘讛 诇讙讘讜转 诪讞讬讬诐 谞讬讬讞讚 诇讛 砖讬注讜专 讻转讜讘讛 讜讛砖讗专 诇讬讝讘讬谉 讜诇讟注诪讬讱 讜诇讜转讘讛 诪诪转谞讬转讬谉 诇讗 讬讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讻转讜讘转讬讱 诪讜谞讞转 诇讬讱 注诇 讛砖诇讞谉 讗诇讗 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 讗讞专讗讬谉 诇讻转讜讘转讛

And if it enters our mind that a marriage contract can be collected during his lifetime, why is all this necessary? Let him set aside for her part of the property that corresponds to the amount of the marriage contract, and the rest let him sell. Abaye replied: And according to your reasoning, rather than asking this question based on a baraita, let him raise this difficulty from the mishna, which teaches that he may not say to her: Your marriage contract is placed on the table for you. Rather, all his property is mortgaged for her marriage contract. Why can鈥檛 he designate property equivalent to the sum of her marriage contract and sell the rest?

讛转诐 注爪讛 讟讜讘讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗讬 诇讗 转讬诪讗 讛讻讬 住讬驻讗 讚拽转谞讬 讜讻谉 诇讗 讬讗诪专 讗讚诐 诇讗砖转讜 讛专讬 讻转讜讘转讬讱 诪讜谞讞转 诇讬讱 注诇 讛砖诇讞谉 讗诇讗 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 讗讞专讗讬谉 诇讻转讜讘转 讗砖转讜 讗讬 讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讝讘讜谞讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讚诇讗 诪爪讬 诪讝讘讬谉 讗诇讗 注爪讛 讟讜讘讛 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 注爪讛 讟讜讘讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers: The tanna in the mishna there teaches us good advice, i.e., that one should not do so ab initio, so as to ensure that the amount set aside for her marriage contract is not lost, which would necessitate writing a new marriage contract. However, it should not be inferred from the mishna that it is prohibited to do so. As, if you do not say so, that it is merely good advice, consider the latter clause of the mishna, which teaches: And similarly, a man may not say to his wife: Your marriage contract is placed on the table. Rather, all his property is mortgaged for her marriage contract. If he wants to sell, here too, may he not sell? Rather, in that case the tanna teaches us good advice, and therefore here too, with regard to a yevama, he teaches us good advice.

讗诇讗 讚专讘讬 讗讘讗 拽砖讬讗 讚专讘讬 讗讘讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 诪砖讜诐 讗讬讘讛

The Gemara asks: But if so, the question is raised once again, as the statement of Rabbi Abba said in the name of Sumakhos is difficult. Why is it necessary for the husband to divorce his wife when he can set aside the sum of her marriage contract? The Gemara answers: That teaching of Rabbi Abba is also not difficult, as the reason one may not do so is not that he cannot designate a sum as her marriage contract but due to enmity. If he were to set aside a certain portion for her marriage contract, she would perceive this as a sign that he desires to be rid of her. If he divorces and remarries her, she would realize it is only a ploy to allow him to sell the property and does not indicate his desire to divorce her.

讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚谞驻诇讛 诇讬讛 讬讘诪讛 讘驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 讘注讬 讗讞讜讛 诇诪驻住诇讛 诇讛 讘讙讬讟讗 诪讬谞讬讛

The Gemara relates: A certain man had a yevama who happened before him for levirate marriage in the city of Pumbedita. His brother wanted to disqualify her from him by means of a bill of divorce, as the halakha is that if one of the potential yevamin gives the yevama a bill of divorce she may no longer enter into levirate marriage with the others.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讚注转讬讱 诪砖讜诐 谞讻住讬 讗谞讗 讘谞讻住讬 驻诇讬讙谞讗 诇讱

The brother who wished to perform levirate marriage said to him: What is your opinion? Why are you doing this? Is it due to the property, as you are jealous that his property will belong to me, in accordance with the halakha that the brother who performs levirate marriage inherits the late brother鈥檚 property, whereas if the yevama receives 岣litza or a bill of divorce all the brothers share the inheritance equally? I will divide the property with you. Upon hearing this, the brother consented to him performing levirate marriage. However, when he married the woman, the husband refused to give his brother anything, and the case came before the court.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪讜专 专讘谞谉 诇讗 诇讬讝讘讬谉 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讝讘讬谉 诇讗 讛讜讛 讝讘讬谞讬讛 讝讘讬谞讬 讚转谞讬讗 诪讬 砖诪转 讜讛谞讬讞 砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐 讜讛谞讬讞 谞讻住讬诐 讘诪讗讛 诪谞讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讻转讜讘转讛 讗讬谞讛 讗诇讗 诪谞讛 诇讗 讬诪讻讜专 砖讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 讗讞专讗讬谉 诇讻转讜讘转讛

Rav Yosef said: Since the Sages have said that one may not sell the property of a widow waiting for her yavam before marrying her, although he sold it, his sale is not a valid sale. So too, his promise to give half the property to his brother, which is equivalent to a sale in this case, is of no consequence. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who died and left a widow waiting for her yavam and also left behind property worth the value of one hundred maneh, equivalent to ten thousand dinars, although her marriage contract is worth only one maneh, or one hundred dinars, the yavam may not sell any part of his possessions, as all of his property is mortgaged for her marriage contract. The Sages prohibited him from selling it. Therefore, if he did so the transaction is void.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讜讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗诪讜专 专讘谞谉 诇讗 诇讬讝讘讬谉 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讝讘讬谉 诇讗 讛讜讛 讝讘讬谞讬讛 讝讘讬谞讬 讜讛转谞谉 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 转诪讻讜专 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 转诪讻讜专 讗诇讜 讜讗诇讜 诪讜讚讬诐 砖讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐 砖诇讞讜讛 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘专 驻驻讬 砖诇讞讛 讻讚专讘 讬讜住祝

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And anywhere that the Sages said that one may not sell, is it the halakha that although he sold, his sale is no sale? But didn鈥檛 we learn in the mishna (78a) with regard to a betrothed woman selling property: Beit Shammai say: She may sell, and Beit Hillel say: She may not sell; both these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that if she sold it or gave it away, the transaction is valid? Evidently, even Beit Hillel agree that despite the violation of the Sages鈥 injunction, the sale is valid. Abaye therefore rejects Rav Yosef鈥檚 ruling. They sent this problem before Rabbi 岣nina bar Pappi, who sent back the following reply: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗讟讜 专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘专 驻驻讬 讻讬驻讬 转诇讛 诇讛 砖诇讞讜讛 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞讜诪讬 砖诇讞讛 讻讚讗讘讬讬 讜讗讬 讗诪专 讘讛 专讘 讬讜住祝 讟注诪讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 砖诇讞讜 诇讬

Abaye said in response: Is that to say that Rabbi 岣nina bar Pappi has hung jewelry upon it, i.e., this ruling? His blunt declaration that the halakha is in accordance with Rav Yosef鈥檚 opinion without a logical explanation adds nothing to the discussion, and his decision should be rejected. They sent this inquiry before Rav Minyumi, son of Rav Na岣mi, who sent back the following written reply: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye, but if Rav Yosef states a different reason for it, send his reasoning to me and I will reconsider the matter.

谞驻拽 专讘 讬讜住祝 讚拽 讜讗砖讻讞 讚转谞讬讗 讛专讬 砖讛讬讛 谞讜砖讛 讘讗讞讬讜 讜诪转 讜讛谞讬讞 砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐 诇讗 讬讗诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜砖讗谞讬 讬讜专砖 讛讞讝拽转讬 讗诇讗 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诪讬讘诐 讜讬拽讞 讘讛谉 拽专拽注 讜讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 驻讬专讜转

Rav Yosef went, examined the mishnayot carefully, and found the following source for his opinion. As it is taught in a baraita: If one claimed money from his brother that he had previously lent him, and then the lender died and left behind a widow waiting for her yavam, then the yavam who borrowed money may not say: Since I inherit my brother鈥檚 property by means of the yevama, I may also take possession of the debt, and I do not have to restore it to the other brothers. Rather, one appropriates the sum of the debt from the yavam, and he purchases land with it for the woman鈥檚 marriage contract, and he eats the produce. This serves as proof for Rav Yosef鈥檚 opinion that a yavam may not sell his brother鈥檚 property or take possession of a debt he owed his brother.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讚诇诪讗 讚讟讘讗 诇讬讛 注讘讚讜 诇讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讗 转谞讬 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 讜讗转 讗诪专转 讚讟讘讗 诇讬讛 注讘讚讜 诇讬讛

Abaye said to him: Perhaps they did for him that which is good for him. In other words, the baraita that states that one should purchase land and eat the produce is merely good advice to prevent the money from being lost. Rav Yosef said to him: The tanna teaches: One appropriates, i.e., against his will, and you say that they did for him that which is good for him? The language indicates that this is an obligation, not a matter of advice.

讛讚讜专 砖诇讞讜讛 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞讜诪讬 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讝讜 讗讬谞讛 诪砖谞讛

They once again sent this question before Rav Minyumi, son of Rav Na岣mi. He said to them: So said Rav Yosef bar Minyumi that Rav Na岣an said: This baraita is not a mishna and therefore is not authoritative. Consequently, no proof may be adduced from it.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讜 诇讛讜 诪讟诇讟诇讬 讜诪讟诇讟诇讬 诇讻转讜讘讛 诇讗 诪砖注讘讚讬 讚诇诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 诪讟诇讟诇讬 诪砖注讘讚讬 诇讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara inquires: What is the reason that this baraita is rejected? If we say it is because the money he owes is considered movable property, as it is not present, and movable property is not mortgaged to a marriage contract, as only land can be mortgaged for this purpose, such an argument does not negate the baraita. Perhaps it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said that movable property is mortgaged to a marriage contract.

讜讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专 诇讛 讗转 诇讗讜 讘注诇转 讚讘专讬诐 讚讬讚讬 讗转

Rather, the reason for doubting the reliability of the baraita is because he says to her: You are not my litigant. There is no legal dispute between the man and the yevama. He claims that she is not a party to this suit, as he owes money to his late brother. Therefore, she cannot claim the money from him by arguing that it is mortgaged for her marriage contract.

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