Ketubot 84

וסבר רב תנאו קיים והא איתמר האומר לחבירו על מנת שאין לך עלי אונאה רב אמר יש לו עליו אונאה ושמואל אמר אין לו עליו אונאה

The Gemara asks: And does Rav actually hold that if one stipulates counter to Torah law, his condition is valid? But it was stated: One who says to another: I am selling this to you on the condition that you have no claim of fraud against me, i.e., though there is a prohibition against fraud by Torah law, the purchaser agrees to forgo his right to register a complaint on this basis. Rav said: He does have the right to a claim of fraud against him, and therefore the seller must reimburse the purchaser, as he cannot abrogate the Torah prohibition “And you shall not wrong one another” (Leviticus 25:17). And Shmuel said: He does not have the right to a claim of fraud against him. It is evident from here that according to Rav, one cannot make a stipulation that contradicts Torah law.

אלא הלכה כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל דאמר המתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה תנאו בטל ולאו מטעמיה דאילו רבן שמעון בן גמליאל סבר מתה יירשנה ורב סבר מתה לא יירשנה

Rather, Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said: One who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void, but not because of his line of reasoning. As Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that if the wife died, he inherits from her, and Rav holds that if she died he does not inherit from her.

האי מטעמיה ולא כהילכתיה הוא

The Gemara asks: If this is what Rav meant, he should have said the opposite of what he said. This statement would be because of his line of reasoning but not in accordance with his halakha, whereas Rav said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel but not because of his line of reasoning.

אלא הלכה כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל דאמר אם מתה יירשנה ולאו מטעמיה דאילו רבן שמעון בן גמליאל סבר בדאורייתא תנאו בטל הא בדרבנן תנאו קיים ורב סבר אפילו בדרבנן תנאו בטל

Rather, Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said that if she died he inherits from her, but not because of his line of reasoning. As Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that in a case where one stipulated counter to Torah law his condition is void, indicating that in a case where his stipulation was counter to rabbinic law his condition is valid; and Rav holds that even in a case where one stipulated counter to rabbinic law, his condition is void.

האי כטעמיה וכהילכתיה הוא ורב מוסיף הוא

The Gemara asks: This statement would be in accordance with his line of reasoning and in accordance with his halakha, and Rav is merely adding a detail to the halakha of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

אלא הלכה כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל דאמר אם מתה יירשנה ולאו מטעמיה דאילו רבן שמעון בן גמליאל סבר ירושת הבעל דאורייתא וכל המתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה תנאו בטל ורב סבר ירושת הבעל דרבנן וחכמים עשו חיזוק לדבריהם כשל תורה

Rather, Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said that if she died he inherits from her, but not because of his line of reasoning. As Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the inheritance of a husband is by Torah law, and whoever stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void; and Rav holds that the inheritance of a husband is by rabbinic law, but his stipulation is nevertheless void, as the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with the severity of Torah law and ruled that their laws cannot be abrogated.

ורב סבר ירושת הבעל דרבנן והתנן רבי יוחנן בן ברוקא אומר היורש את אשתו יחזיר לבני משפחה וינכה להן מן הדמים

The Gemara asks: And does Rav hold that the inheritance of a husband is by rabbinic law? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Bekhorot 52b) that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: One who inherits from his wife must return the property to her family members in the Jubilee Year and deduct for them part of the monetary value of the property? He can claim only part, but not all, of the property’s value from the wife’s relatives.

והוינן בה מאי קסבר אי קסבר ירושת הבעל דאורייתא אמאי יחזיר ואי דרבנן דמים מאי עבידתייהו

And we discussed this halakha: What does Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka hold? If he holds that that the inheritance of a husband is by Torah law, why must he return the property to his wife’s relatives? An inheritance is not given back in the Jubilee Year. And if he holds that the inheritance is by rabbinic law, what is the purpose of the money that he receives from his wife’s relatives in exchange for the land? By Torah law, the property belongs to the woman’s family and they should not have to pay him anything.

ואמר רב לעולם קסבר ירושת הבעל דאורייתא וכגון שהורישתו אשתו בית הקברות משום פגם משפחה אמור רבנן לישקול דמי וליהדר

And Rav said: Actually, he holds that the inheritance of a husband is by Torah law, and he is discussing a case where his wife bequeathed to him her family’s graveyard. Due to the need to avoid a family flaw, i.e., harm to the family name if the wife’s family would have to be buried in plots belonging to others, the Sages said that he should take compensation from them and return the graveyard to them.

ומאי ינכה להן מן הדמים דמי קבר אשתו כדתניא המוכר קברו ודרך קברו מעמדו ומקום הספידו באין בני משפחה וקוברין אותו בעל כרחו משום פגם משפחה

The Gemara continues: And what is the meaning of: And deduct for them part of the monetary value of the property? This is referring to the monetary value of his wife’s grave. A husband is obligated to pay for his wife’s burial, and therefore he must deduct the value of her burial plot from the value of the field. As it is taught in a baraita that there are halakhot connected with burial to uphold family honor: In the case of one who sells his grave, or the path to his grave, or the place where visitors would stand to comfort the mourners, or the place of his eulogies, the members of his family may come and bury him in his ancestral plot against the purchaser’s wishes due to the need to avoid a family flaw, i.e., harm to the family name if a member of their family had to be buried in a graveyard of strangers. In any case, it is evident from here that Rav believes that the inheritance of a husband is by Torah law, in contrast to what the Gemara had said earlier.

רב לטעמיה דרבי יוחנן בן ברוקא קאמר וליה לא סבירא ליה

The Gemara answers: This is not proof that Rav himself is of the opinion that the inheritance of a husband is by Torah law, as Rav spoke in accordance with the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka. In other words, he was explaining the reason for the ruling of the tanna, but he himself does not hold accordingly.

מתני׳ מי שמת והניח אשה ובעל חוב ויורשין והיה לו פקדון או מלוה ביד אחרים רבי טרפון אומר ינתנו לכושל שבהן רבי עקיבא אומר אין מרחמין בדין אלא ינתנו ליורשין שכולן צריכין שבועה ואין היורשין צריכין שבועה

MISHNA: With regard to one who died and left behind a wife, and a creditor to whom he owed money, and heirs, all of whom claim payment from his property, and he had a deposit or a loan in the possession of others, Rabbi Tarfon says: The deposit or the loan will be given to the weakest one of them, i.e., the one most in need of the money. Rabbi Akiva says: One is not merciful in judgment. If the halakha is that it belongs to one party, one follows the halakha and leaves aside considerations of mercy. Rather, the halakha is that the money will be given to the heirs, as all people who wish to exact payment from orphans require an oath before they collect their debt, but the heirs do not require an oath. They therefore have a more absolute right than the others to their father’s property.

הניח פירות תלושין מן הקרקע כל הקודם בהן זכה בהן זכתה אשה יותר מכתובתה ובעל חוב יותר על חובו המותר רבי טרפון אומר ינתנו לכושל שבהן רבי עקיבא אומר אין מרחמין בדין אלא ינתנו ליורשין שכולם צריכין שבועה ואין היורשין צריכין שבועה

If the deceased left behind produce that was detached from the ground, whoever first took possession of them as compensation for what was owed, whether the creditor, the wife, or the heirs, acquired the produce. If the wife acquired this produce and it was worth more than the payment of her marriage contract, or the creditor acquired this produce and it was worth more than the value of his debt, what should be done with the surplus? Rabbi Tarfon says: It will be given to the weakest one of them, either the creditor or the wife, depending on the circumstances. Rabbi Akiva says: One is not merciful in judgment. Rather, it will be given to the heirs, as all people who wish to exact payment from orphans require an oath before they collect their debt, but the heirs do not require an oath.

גמ׳ למה לי למיתני מלוה למה לי למיתני פקדון צריכא דאי תנא מלוה בהא קאמר רבי טרפון משום דמלוה להוצאה ניתנה אבל פקדון דאיתיה בעיניה אימא מודי ליה לרבי עקיבא

GEMARA: The Gemara asks about the wording of the mishna: Why do I need the tanna to teach this halakha in the case of a loan, and why do I need him to teach it in the case of a deposit? Either example alone would have sufficed. The Gemara explains: It is necessary to teach the halakha in both cases, for if he had taught the halakha only in the case of a loan, one could have said: In that case Rabbi Tarfon says what he says due to the fact that a loan is given to be spent. Since there is no already existing property here, but only an obligation to pay back the loan, it can be given to the weakest party. However, in the case of a deposit, which exists in its pure, unadulterated form and not just as an obligation, one might say that he concedes to Rabbi Akiva that it belongs to the heirs.

ואי תנא הא בהא קאמר רבי עקיבא אבל בהך אימא מודי לרבי טרפון צריכא

And conversely, if the tanna had taught that halakha only in the case of a deposit, one could have said that in that case Rabbi Akiva says his ruling that the deposit belongs to the heirs. However, in this case of a loan, one could say that he concedes to Rabbi Tarfon that the loan is given to the weakest party. It is therefore necessary for the halakha to be taught in both cases.

מאי לכושל רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אומר לכושל שבראיה רבי יוחנן אמר לכתובת אשה משום חינא

The mishna taught that according to Rabbi Tarfon, the money should be given to the weakest party. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: To the weakest? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: It means that the money is given to the one whose proof is the weakest, i.e., the one with the latest date on the document attesting to the debt. His document is the weakest, as one can collect from property that was sold by the deceased only if it was sold subsequent to his incurring the debt. Therefore, the others can collect from property that has been sold before the date listed on his document. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is referring to the wife’s marriage contract. The Sages instituted halakhot in marriage contracts that were to the advantage of women and to make them feel more secure in their marriages, due to the fact that they wanted men to find favor in the eyes of women.

כתנאי רבי בנימין אומר לכושל שבראיה והוא כשר רבי אלעזר אומר לכתובת אשה משום חינא

The Gemara comments: This discussion is like a dispute between tanna’im: Rabbi Binyamin says: The money is given to the one whose proof is the weakest, and this is the proper way to act. Rabbi Elazar says: It is referring to the wife’s marriage contract, due to the fact that they wanted men to find favor with women.

הניח פירות התלושין ורבי עקיבא מאי איריא מותר כולהו נמי דיורשין הוו אין הכי נמי ואיידי דאמר רבי טרפון מותר תנא איהו נמי מותר

§ The mishna taught that if the husband left behind produce that was detached, the claimant who first seizes it acquires it, and there is a dispute as to what should be done with the surplus. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Akiva, why discuss specifically this case of the surplus? All of the produce, not only the surplus, also belongs to the heirs, as he holds that the entire property goes to the heirs, even if the others took possession of it first. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so. Certainly Rabbi Akiva does not distinguish between a deposit and detached produce, but since Rabbi Tarfon spoke of a surplus, he also taught his halakha with regard to a surplus. However, according to Rabbi Akiva, the halakha is the same with regard to detached produce.

ורבי עקיבא תפיסה לא מהניא כלל אמר רבא אמר רב נחמן והוא שתפס מחיים

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Akiva, is the seizure of a debtor’s assets by a creditor, though there are others who have a more immediate right to the assets, not effective at all? Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: And this, that Rabbi Akiva agrees that the seizure of assets is effective, is the case provided that one seized the property from the debtor while he was alive. However, after his death the assets belong to the heirs.

ולרבי טרפון דמנחי היכא רב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו והוא שצבורין ומונחין ברשות הרבים אבל בסימטא לא ורבי יוחנן וריש לקיש דאמרי תרוייהו אפילו בסימטא

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Tarfon, who holds that whoever first takes possession of the produce has acquired it, where was this produce placed? The Gemara presents a dispute: There is the opinion of Rav and Shmuel, who both say: And this, that whoever first takes possession of the produce has acquired it, is the halakha provided that the produce is arranged in a pile and placed in the public domain. Since the public domain is not a suitable location for an act of acquisition, anyone can take the produce and acquire it. However, if it is situated in an alley [simta], a place adjacent to the public domain that is rarely frequented by the public, the produce does not belong to the first one who obtains it. Because an acquisition can be performed in an alley, any items that had belonged to the deceased are immediately acquired by the heirs. And there is the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, who both say: Even if one seizes produce left in an alley, he acquires it.

דון דייני כרבי טרפון ואהדריה ריש לקיש לעובדא מינייהו אמר ליה רבי יוחנן עשית כשל תורה

The Gemara relates: There were judges who judged a case of this kind in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, and Reish Lakish reversed their action. He dismissed the judges’ decision and restored the money to the heirs, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yoḥanan criticized his ruling and said to him: You acted in this case like one acts with regard to a ruling of Torah law, where any incorrect action taken by the court must be corrected.

לימא בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר טעה בדבר משנה חוזר ומר סבר טעה בדבר משנה אינו חוזר

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this: That one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that if one erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked. And one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that if one erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is not revoked.

לא דכולי עלמא טעה בדבר משנה חוזר והכא בהא קמיפלגי מר סבר הלכה כרבי עקיבא מחבירו ולא מרבו ומר סבר הלכה אפילו מרבו

The Gemara refutes this suggestion: No, it can be explained that according to everyone, where the judge erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked, and here they disagree about this: One Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in his disputes with his colleague, but not in his disputes with his teacher, and Rabbi Tarfon was Rabbi Akiva’s teacher. And one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva even in his disputes with his teacher.

ואיבעית אימא דכולי עלמא הלכה כרבי עקיבא מחבירו ולא מרבו והכא בהא קמיפלגי מר סבר רבי טרפון רבו הוה ומר סבר חבירו הוה

And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in his disputes with his colleague but not in his disputes with his teacher. And here they disagree about this: One Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that Rabbi Tarfon was Rabbi Akiva’s teacher, and one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that Rabbi Tarfon was his colleague.

ואיבעית אימא דכולי עלמא חבירו הוה והכא בהא קמיפלגי מר סבר הלכה איתמר ומר סבר מטין איתמר

And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that Rabbi Tarfon was Rabbi Akiva’s colleague, and here they disagree about this: One Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that the principle that the law is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva was stated as the halakha. And one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that what was stated was that one is inclined to follow the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Therefore, although Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is followed ab initio, the halakha was never established conclusively in accordance with it. As such, if judges went against the principle that the halakha follows Rabbi Akiva in opposition to his colleague, the Sages do not revoke their decision.

קריביה דרבי יוחנן תפוס פרה דיתמי מסימטא אתו לקמיה דרבי יוחנן אמר להו שפיר תפסתוה אתו לקמיה דרבי שמעון בן לקיש אמר להו זילו אהדור אתו לקמיה דרבי יוחנן אמר להו מה אעשה שכנגדי חלוק עלי

The Gemara relates: The relatives of Rabbi Yoḥanan seized a cow of orphans from an alley because the orphans’ father owed them money. They came before Rabbi Yoḥanan for judgment, and he said to them: It is well that you seized the cow and it is yours, in accordance with the ruling of Rabbi Tarfon. They subsequently came before Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said to them: Go and return the cow to the orphans. They again came before Rabbi Yoḥanan, complaining that Reish Lakish had told them they must give back the cow, in opposition to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling. He said to them: What can I do, as one whose stature corresponds to my stature disagrees with me, and I cannot dismiss his opinion.

ההוא בקרא דיתמי דתפסי תורא מיניה בעל חוב אמר מחיים תפיסנא ליה ובקרא אמר לאחר מיתה תפסיה אתו לקמיה דרב נחמן אמר ליה אית לך סהדי דתפסיה אמר ליה לאו אמר ליה מגו דיכול למימר לקוח הוא בידי יכול נמי למימר מחיים תפיסנא ליה

The Gemara relates another incident: There was a certain herdsman caring for the cattle of orphans from whom a creditor seized an ox as payment for a debt of the orphans’ father. The creditor said: I seized it from the herdsman while the debtor was still alive. In such a case, the action is effective even according to Rabbi Akiva, as stated earlier. And the herdsman said: He seized it after the debtor’s death. They came before Rav Naḥman for a ruling. Rav Naḥman said to the herdsman: Do you have witnesses that he seized the ox from you? He said to him: No. Rav Naḥman said to him: In that case, since the claimant can say: It is in my possession because it was purchased by me, as there is no proof that he gained possession of the ox unlawfully, he can also say: I seized it from the herdsman while the deceased was still alive.

והאמר ריש לקיש הגודרות אין להן חזקה שאני תורא דמסירה לרועה

The Gemara asks: But didn’t Reish Lakish say that moving livestock, e.g., sheep and oxen, provide no presumption of ownership to whoever is in possession of them? Since they wander from place to place, a person cannot claim that his mere possession of livestock demonstrates ownership, because it may have wandered into his property on its own. The Gemara answers: An ox is different from other livestock, as it is handed over to a shepherd, who does not let it wander off. Consequently, possession of an ox does establish a presumption of ownership.

דבי נשיאה תפוס אמתא דיתמי מסימטא יתיב רבי אבהו ורבי חנינא בר פפי ורבי יצחק נפחא ויתיב רבי אבא גבייהו אמר להו שפיר תפסיתוה אמר להו רבי אבא משום דבי נשיאה נינהו מחנפיתו להו והא דון דייני כרבי טרפון ואהדריה ריש לקיש עובדא מינייהו

The Gemara relates another incident: The members of the house of the prince of Eretz Yisrael seized hold of a maidservant of orphans in an alley, as payment for a debt owed to them by the orphans’ father. Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappi and Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa were sitting as judges, and Rabbi Abba was sitting with them. Rabbi Abbahu said to them: It is well that you seized the maidservant. Rabbi Abba said to the judges: Just because they are members of the house of the prince, will you curry favor with them by rendering an incorrect verdict? Isn’t it the halakha that there were judges who judged a case of this kind in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, and Reish Lakish reversed their action, indicating that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon?

יימר בר חשו הוה מסיק ביה זוזי בההוא גברא שכיב ושביק ארבא אמר ליה לשלוחיה זיל תפסה ניהליה אזל תפסה פגעו ביה רב פפא ורב הונא בריה דרב יהושע אמרו ליה את תופס לבעל חוב במקום שחב לאחרים ואמר רבי יוחנן התופס לבעל חוב במקום שחב לאחרים

The Gemara relates another incident: A man called Yeimar bar Ḥashu was owed money by a certain man who died and left behind a boat. Yeimar bar Ḥashu said to his agent: Go and seize the boat for me. The agent went and seized it. Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, encountered him. They said to him: You are seizing assets for a creditor in a situation where your action will cause a disadvantage for others, as the debtor owed money to other people as well. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said that one who seizes assets for a creditor in a situation that will result in a disadvantage for others