Kiddushin 14

יבמה יבא עליה ולקחה לו לאשה ואימא לכולה מילתא כאשה לא סלקא דעתך דתניא יכול יהו כסף ושטר גומרים בה כדרך שהביאה גומרת בה תלמוד לומר ויבמה ביאה גומרת בה ואין כסף ושטר גומרים בה

“Her brother-in-law will engage in sexual intercourse with her and take her to him as a wife, and perform levirate marriage with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that intercourse renders her his wife. The Gemara asks: But one can say that with regard to all matters she is like a wife, and therefore she can also be acquired with money or a document like any other woman. The Gemara answers: It could not enter your mind to say this, as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that money and a document can complete the acquisition of a yevama and cause her to be married, in the manner that intercourse completes her acquisition. Therefore, the verse states: “And perform levirate marriage with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that only intercourse completes her acquisition, but money or a document do not complete her acquisition.

ואימא מאי ויבמה דבעל כרחה מיבם אם כן לימא קרא ויבם מאי ויבמה שמעת מינה תרתי:

The Gemara asks: But one can say: What is the meaning of: “And perform levirate marriage with her”? It teaches that he can perform levirate marriage without her consent, as unlike an ordinary marriage, a levirate marriage does not require the woman’s agreement. The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse say: And perform levirate marriage, and one would understand that the matter depends entirely on him. What is the meaning of: “And perform levirate marriage with her”? Learn two conclusions from this: First, that a levirate marriage can be performed against her will, and second, that the only way to acquire a yevama is through sexual intercourse.

בחליצה: מנלן דכתיב ונקרא שמו בישראל בית חלוץ הנעל כיון שחלץ בה נעל הותרה לכל ישראל

§ The mishna teaches that the yevama acquires herself through ḥalitza. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: As it is written with regard to levirate marriage, after the yavam has performed ḥalitza: “And his name shall be called in Israel: The house of him who had his shoe removed” (Deuteronomy 25:10). This indicates: Once his shoe is removed by her, she is permitted to all of Israel.

האי ישראל להכי הוא דאתא האי מיבעי ליה לכדתני רב שמואל בר יהודה בישראל בבית דין של ישראל ולא בבית דין של נכרים תרי בישראל כתיבי

The Gemara asks: This term “Israel,” does it come to teach this halakha? It is required for that which is taught by Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda: The verse says “in Israel” to teach that ḥalitza may be performed only in a Jewish court, but not in a gentile court. The Gemara answers that the phrase “in Israel” is written twice in that chapter: “And his name shall be called in Israel” (Deuteronomy 25:10), and: “To establish a name for his brother in Israel” (Deuteronomy 25:7). A different halakha is derived from each of these instances.

ואכתי מיבעי ליה לכדתניא אמר רבי יהודה פעם אחת היינו יושבים לפני רבי טרפון ובאתה יבמה לחלוץ ואמר לנו ענו כולכם ואמרו חלוץ הנעל חלוץ הנעל ההוא מונקרא שמו נפקא:

The Gemara asks: But still, we also require the additional term “in Israel” for that which is taught in a baraita, that Rabbi Yehuda said: Once we were sitting before Rabbi Tarfon and a yevama came to perform ḥalitza. And Rabbi Tarfon said to us after the ḥalitza: All of you should answer and say: The one whose shoe was removed, the one whose shoe was removed. This indicates that the phrase: “And his name shall be called in Israel” (Deuteronomy 25:10), teaches that the matter must be announced and publicized throughout the nation. The Gemara answers: That halakha is not derived from the phrase “in Israel.” Rather, it is derived from: “And his name shall be called,” which indicates that it must be announced that this is his name.

ובמיתת היבם: מנלן קל וחומר ומה אשת איש שהיא בחנק מיתת הבעל מתירתה יבמה שהיא בלאו לא כל שכן

§ The mishna further teaches that a yevama is released from levirate marriage and may remarry through the death of the yavam. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers that it is an a fortiori inference: If, with regard to a married woman, who is forbidden to other men by a prohibition punished with strangulation, and yet the death of her husband renders her permitted, is it not all the more so that with regard to a yevama, who is forbidden to other men while the yavam is alive by only a mere prohibition, that the death of the yavam should render her permitted?

מה לאשת איש שכן יוצאה בגט תאמר בזו שאינה יוצאה בגט הא נמי יוצאה בחליצה

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this a fortiori inference: What is unique about a married woman is that she can leave through a bill of divorce as well. Will you say the same with regard to this yevama, who does not leave through a bill of divorce? The Gemara answers: This is an insufficient refutation of the a fortiori inference, as this yevama also leaves through ḥalitza, which serves the same function as a bill of divorce.

אלא מה לאשת איש שכן אוסרה מתירה אמר רב אשי הא נמי אוסרה מתירה יבם אוסרה יבם שרי לה

Rather, one can challenge this a fortiori inference in the following manner. What is unique about a married woman is that the one who renders her forbidden to everyone else, i.e., her husband, also renders her permitted when he dies. This is not so with regard to a yevama, as she is rendered forbidden upon the death of her husband. Rav Ashi said: With regard to this yevama as well, he who renders her forbidden is also the one who renders her permitted: The yavam renders her forbidden, because if he was not alive she would automatically be permitted to other men. Likewise, the yavam renders her permitted through ḥalitza.

ותהא אשת איש יוצאה בחליצה מקל וחומר ומה יבמה שאינה יוצאה בגט יוצאה בחליצה זו שיוצאה בגט אינו דין שיוצאה בחליצה אמר קרא ספר כריתת ספר כורתה ואין דבר אחר כורתה

The Gemara asks: And let a married woman leave a marriage through ḥalitza, as derived by an a fortiori inference: If a yevama, who cannot leave through a bill of divorce, can leave through ḥalitza, is it not logical that this married woman, who can leave through a bill of divorce, can likewise leave through ḥalitza? The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to a married woman: “A scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:3), which indicates that a scroll, i.e., a written document, severs her from her husband and nothing else severs her from him. While the husband is alive only a bill of divorce can dissolve a marriage.

ותהא יבמה יוצאת בגט מקל וחומר ומה אשת איש שאין יוצאה בחליצה יוצאה בגט זו שיוצאה בחליצה אין דין שיוצאה בגט אמר קרא ככה וככה עיכובא

The Gemara further asks: And let a yevama leave through a bill of divorce, as derived by an a fortiori inference: If a married woman, who cannot leave through ḥalitza, can leave through a bill of divorce, is it not logical that this yevama, who can leave through ḥalitza, can also leave through a bill of divorce? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “So shall it be done to the man” (Deuteronomy 25:9), with regard to the ḥalitza of a yevama, and “so” precludes another option.

וכל היכא דאיכא עיכובא לא דרשי קל וחומר והא יום הכפורים דכתיב גורל וחוקה

The Gemara asks: And is it true that anywhere that there is a term that precludes another option one cannot learn an a fortiori inference? But there is the case of the designation of the goats on Yom Kippur, as it is written: “The goat upon which the lot came up for the Lord” (Leviticus 16:9), and: “This shall be an everlasting statute to you” (Leviticus 16:34), which indicates that everything stated with regard to the mitzvot of Yom Kippur is critical to the performance of the service of the day.

ותניא ועשהו חטאת הגורל עושה חטאת ואין השם עושה חטאת

And it is taught in a baraita that the verse states: “Aaron shall bring forward the goat upon which the lot came up for the Lord, and he shall offer it for a sin-offering” (Leviticus 16:9). The verse indicates that the lottery renders it a sin-offering, but a verbal designation of the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not render it a sin-offering.

שיכול והלא דין הוא ומה במקום שלא קידש הגורל קידש השם מקום שקידש הגורל אינו דין שיקדש השם

The baraita continues: A verse is necessary to teach this halakha, as one might have thought that the opposite conclusion is correct: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, as follows: Just as in a case in which the use of a lottery does not effect the consecration of the animals with a specific designation, e.g., with regard to a woman who has given birth and must bring two birds, one as a sin-offering and one as a burnt-offering, and nevertheless a verbal designation of the animals with the required status does effect the consecration of them, so too, in a case in which the use of a lottery does effect the consecration of the animals, is it not logically right that a verbal designation of the animals with the required status should effect the consecration of them?

תלמוד לומר ועשהו חטאת הגורל עושה חטאת ואין השם עושה חטאת וטעמא דמעטיה קרא הא לאו הכי דרשינן קל וחומר אף על גב דכתיב ביה חוקה

To counter this reasoning, the verse states with regard to the goat: “He shall offer it for a sin-offering” (Leviticus 16:9), to indicate that the lottery renders it a sin-offering, but a verbal designation of the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not render it a sin-offering. And the reason that a verbal designation is ineffective is that the verse excluded this possibility, from which it may be inferred that if it were not so, one would learn an a fortiori inference, even though it is written with regard to it “statute.” The same logic should apply in the case of ḥalitza, i.e., the term “so” should not prevent one from learning an a fortiori inference, and therefore it might be argued that a yevama can be released through a bill of divorce.

אמר קרא לה לה ולא ליבמה ואימא לה לשמה

Rather, the Gemara explains that here too, there is a limitation derived from a verse. The verse states with regard to a bill of divorce: “And write for her a scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:3). “For her” is a limitation, which teaches: A bill of divorce is effective for a regular woman but not for a yevama. The Gemara asks: But one can say that the phrase “for her” indicates that the bill of divorce must be written for her sake.

תרי לה כתיבי ואכתי מיבעי ליה חד לה לשמה ואידך לה ולא לה ולחבירתה

The Gemara answers: “For her” is written twice (Deuteronomy 24:1, 3), and therefore both halakhot can be derived. The Gemara asks: And still, one instance of: “For her” is required to teach that the bill of divorce must be written for her sake, and the other “for her” is needed to teach: For her and not both for her and for another, i.e., her rival wife. One bill of divorce cannot be used for two women.

אלא אמר קרא נעל נעל אין מידי אחרינא לא

Rather, the Gemara suggests a different explanation as to why a bill of divorce is ineffective for a yevama. With regard to a yevama the verse states: “The house of him who had his shoe removed” (Deuteronomy 25:10), which teaches: If she is released by the ḥalitza of the shoe, yes, she is released from the yavam, but if she was released by means of something else, no, she is not released.

והאי נעל להכי הוא דאתא האי מיבעי ליה לכדתניא נעלו אין לי אלא נעלו נעל של כל אדם מנא ליה

The Gemara asks: But this term “shoe,” does it come to teach this? It is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse said: “And remove his shoe” (Deuteronomy 25:9). I have derived only that his shoe may be used. From where do I derive that the shoe of any person may also be used for ḥalitza?

תלמוד לומר נעל נעל ריבה אם כן מה תלמוד לומר נעלו נעלו הראוי לו פרט לגדול שאין יכול להלך בו פרט לקטן שאין חופה את רוב רגלו פרט

The verse states “shoe,” and states again in the next verse “shoe,” which includes any other shoe. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states “his shoe,” which is apparently referring to the shoe of that particular man? This teaches that it must be his shoe that is fit for him, excluding a shoe so large that he cannot walk in it, and excluding a shoe so small that it does not cover most of his foot, and excluding

למסולים שאין לו עקב אם כן ניכתוב קרא נעל מאי הנעל שמעת מינה תרתי:

sandals [mesulayim] that have no heels, which do not qualify as shoes. The Gemara answers: If so, that the term is stated only for that purpose, let the verse write “shoe.” What is the meaning of “the shoe”? Learn the two previously stated conclusions from it.

מתני׳ עבד עברי נקנה בכסף ובשטר וקונה עצמו בשנים וביובל ובגרעון כסף יתירה עליו אמה העבריה שקונה את עצמה בסימנין הנרצע נקנה ברציעה וקונה את עצמו ביובל ובמיתת האדון:

MISHNA: A Hebrew slave can be acquired by his master through money or through a document, and he can acquire himself, i.e., he is emancipated, through years, i.e., when he completes his six years of labor, or through the advent of the Jubilee Year, or through the deduction of money. The slave can redeem himself during the six years by paying for his remaining years of slavery. A Hebrew maidservant has one mode of emancipation more than him, as she acquires herself through signs indicating puberty. A slave who is pierced after serving six years is acquired as a slave for a longer period through piercing his ear with an awl, and he acquires himself through the advent of the Jubilee Year or through the death of the master.

גמ׳ עבד עברי נקנה בכסף מנלן אמר קרא מכסף מקנתו מלמד שנקנה בכסף אשכחן עבד עברי הנמכר לנכרי הואיל וכל קנינו בכסף

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that a Hebrew slave can be acquired through money. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers that the verse states: “Out of the money that he was bought for” (Leviticus 25:51), which teaches that he can be acquired through money. The Gemara asks: We found that a Hebrew slave who is sold to a gentile is acquired with money, which is the case discussed in that verse, but this proves nothing with regard to a Jew sold to a Jew. One could argue that since all of the acquisitions of a gentile are performed only with money, he can likewise purchase a Hebrew slave with money.

נמכר לישראל מנלן אמר קרא והפדה מלמד שמגרעת פדיונה ויוצאה

But from where do we derive that a Hebrew slave can be sold to a Jew with money? The Gemara explains that with regard to a Hebrew maidservant, the verse states: “Then he shall let her be redeemed” (Exodus 21:8), which teaches that if she acquires money and wishes to be emancipated before her time is complete, she deducts a sum from her redemption. The maidservant can deduct the value of time served from her purchase price and pay the remaining amount, and she then is emancipated. This teaches that a Hebrew maidservant is acquired through money, a halakha that applies to a male slave as well.

אשכחן אמה העבריה הואיל ומיקדשה בכסף מיקניא בכסף עבד עברי מנלן אמר קרא כי ימכר לך אחיך העברי או העבריה ועבדך שש שנים מקיש עברי לעבריה

The Gemara asks: Although we found this halakha with regard to a Hebrew maidservant, one cannot extrapolate from there to this case, as it is possible that it applies only to a female. The reason for this is that since she is ordinarily betrothed through money, she can also be acquired as a maidservant through money. From where do we derive that a Hebrew slave can likewise be acquired through money? The Gemara answers that the verse states: “If your brother, a Hebrew man, or a Hebrew woman is sold to you, and he shall serve you six years” (Deuteronomy 15:12). This verse juxtaposes a Hebrew man to a Hebrew woman, indicating that the modes through which they are acquired are the same.

אשכחן מכרוהו בית דין הואיל ונמכר בעל כורחו מוכר עצמו מנלן

The Gemara further asks: We found a source in this verse for a slave who is sold by the court. This verse is referring to a thief who is unable to repay the value of his theft and is sold as a slave so that he can repay his debt. One can therefore argue that this case is unique, since he is sold against his will. From where do we derive that one who sells himself can be sold through money?

יליף שכיר שכיר הניחא למאן דיליף שכיר שכיר אלא למאן דלא יליף שכיר שכיר מאי איכא למימר

The Gemara answers: One derives this through a verbal analogy between the terms “hired worker” and “hired worker.” This term appears both with regard to one who sells himself: “As a hired worker and as a settler he shall be with you” (Leviticus 25:40), and with regard to one who is sold by the court: “For double of the hire of a hired worker he has served you” (Deuteronomy 15:18). The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who derives this verbal analogy between the terms “hired worker” and “hired worker.” But according to the one who does not derive the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker,” what can be said? From where does he derive that one who sells himself may be purchased with money?

אמר קרא וכי תשיג מוסף על ענין ראשון וילמד עליון מתחתון

The Gemara answers: The verse states at the start of the passage dealing with one sold to a gentile: “And if a stranger who is a settler with you becomes rich” (Leviticus 25:47). The conjunction “and” serves to add to the first matter, i.e., the passage discussing one who sells himself to a Jew, as it joins the two issues. And therefore let the above case of one who sells himself to a Jew be derived from the case below of one who is sold to a gentile: Just as one who is sold to a gentile can be acquired with money, so too, one who sells himself to a Jew can be acquired with money.

ומאן תנא דלא יליף שכיר שכיר האי תנא הוא דתניא המוכר עצמו נמכר לשש ויתר על שש מכרוהו בית דין אינו נמכר אלא לשש

The Gemara comments: And who is the tanna who does not derive the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker”? It is this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: One who sells himself as a slave is sold for six years, and if he wishes he can be sold for more than six years, whereas one who is sold by the court is sold only for six years, but no more.

המוכר עצמו אינו נרצע מכרוהו בית דין נרצע מוכר עצמו אין מעניקים לו מכרוהו בית דין מעניקים לו המוכר עצמו אין רבו מוסר לו שפחה כנענית מכרוהו בית דין רבו מוסר לו שפחה כנענית

The baraita adds that there are additional differences between these two slaves: One who sells himself may not be pierced with an awl, whereas one who is sold by the court may be pierced with an awl. One who sells himself is not granted a severance gift by his master when he is emancipated, whereas one who is sold by the court is granted a severance gift. With regard to one who sells himself, his master may not provide him with a Canaanite maidservant as a wife to produce slave children, whereas with regard to one sold by the court, his master may provide him with a Canaanite maidservant.

רבי אלעזר אומר זה וזה אינו נמכר אלא לשש זה וזה נרצע וזה וזה מעניקים לו וזה וזה רבו מוסר לו שפחה כנענית מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דתנא קמא לא יליף שכיר שכיר ורבי אלעזר יליף שכיר שכיר

Rabbi Elazar says that there is no difference between these two types of slaves. Rather, both this slave and that slave may be sold for only six years; both this and that one may be pierced with an awl, both this and that one are granted a severance gift, and in both this case and that case his master may provide him with a Canaanite maidservant. What, is it not the case that they disagree with regard to this, that the first tanna does not derive the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker,” and Rabbi Elazar derives the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker”? If one holds that the two cases are juxtaposed, one will equate the halakhot of both slaves. This is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, in contrast to the opinion of the first tanna, who holds that the halakhot of each type of slave are discrete.

אמר רב טביומי משמיה דאביי דכולי עלמא יליף שכיר שכיר והכא בהאי קרא קמיפלגי מאי טעמא דתנא קמא דאמר מוכר עצמו נמכר לשש ויתר על שש מיעט רחמנא גבי מכרוהו בית דין ועבדך שש שנים זה ולא מוכר עצמו

Rav Tavyumei said in the name of Abaye: That is not so; rather, everyone derives the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker,” and here, in the dispute in the baraita, they disagree about this following verse. What is the reasoning of the first tanna, who says that one who sells himself is sold for six years and more than six years? He maintains that with regard to one sold by the court, the Merciful One excludes a certain case by the verse: “If your brother, a Hebrew man, or a Hebrew woman, is sold to you, and he shall serve you six years” (Deuteronomy 15:12). That teaches that only this type of slave serves for six years and no more, but the same does not apply to one who sells himself. If he so stipulates, he may serve for more than six years.

ואידך ועבדך לך ולא ליורש

The Gemara explains: And the other, Rabbi Elazar, learns a different halakha from this verse. “And he shall serve you” means that he works for you and not for an heir other than a son. If a master has no sons, his slave is not transferred as an inheritance to a daughter or to a brother like his other property. If he does have sons, they inherit a Hebrew slave.

ואידך ועבדך אחרינא כתיב ואידך ההוא להרצאת אדון הוא דאתא

The Gemara asks: And the other, the first tanna, from where does he derive that a slave is not transferred as an inheritance? The Gemara answers that the phrase, “And he shall serve you,” is written another time, and he derives this halakha from there. The Gemara asks: And the other, Rabbi Elazar, what does he do with that other verse? The Gemara answers: In his opinion that verse comes to appease the master. The verse emphasizes that the servitude is of limited duration to encourage the master to free the slave without hesitation.

מאי טעמא דתנא קמא דאמר מוכר עצמו אינו נרצע מדמיעט רחמנא גבי מכרוהו בית דין ורצע אדניו את אזנו במרצע אזנו שלו ולא אזנו של מוכר עצמו

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of the first tanna, who says that one who sells himself is not pierced with an awl? The Gemara answers: He derives this from the fact that with regard to one sold by the court, the Merciful One excludes a certain case by the verse: “And his master shall pierce his ear with an awl” (Exodus 21:6), which teaches: His ear, of this slave, and not the ear of a slave who sells himself.