Kiddushin 27

נתון לו ליהושע ומקומו מושכר לו ועישור אחר שאני עתיד למוד נתון לו לעקיבא בן יוסף כדי שיזכה בו לעניים ומקומו מושכר לו שמע מינה בעינן צבורים בה שאני התם כי היכי דלא ליטרחינהו

is given as first tithe to Yehoshua ben Ḥananya, who was a Levite, and the place of the tithe is rented to him so that he can acquire the tithe by means of the land. And another tenth that I will measure out in the future as the poor man’s tithe is given to Akiva ben Yosef so that he will acquire it on behalf of the poor, and its place is rented to him. One can learn from here that we require the movable property to be piled on the land, as Rabban Gamliel emphasized: Its place. The Gemara rejects this argument: It is different there, as Rabban Gamliel did this so as not to trouble the Sages to whom he was giving the tithes by forcing them to transport the tithes to a different location. For reasons of convenience he transferred to the other Sages ownership of the land where the tithes were already situated.

תא שמע דאמר רבא בר יצחק אמר רב שני שטרות הן זכו בשדה זו לפלוני וכתבו לו את השטר חוזר בשטר ואינו חוזר בשדה על מנת שתכתבו לו את השטר חוזר בין בשטר בין בשדה

The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear a solution for this dilemma, as Rava bar Yitzḥak says that Rav says: There are two types of documents. If one says: Acquire this field for so-and-so and write the document for him as proof of the sale of the field, he can retract his agreement with regard to the document. He can change his mind and tell them not to write the document. But he cannot retract his agreement with regard to the field, as the buyer has already acquired it. By contrast, if he said: Acquire this field for so-and-so on the condition that you write him a document, if the document has not yet been given he can retract his agreement both with regard to the document and with regard to the field, as he transfers the field to him only on the condition that he writes a document.

ורב חייא בר אבין אמר רב הונא שלשה שטרות הן תרי הא דאמרן אידך אם קדם מוכר וכתב לו את השטר כאותה ששנינו כותבים שטר למוכר אף על פי שאין לוקח עמו כיון שהחזיק עמו בקרקע נקנה שטר בכל מקום שהוא

And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Rav Huna said: There are actually three types of documents. Two types are those that we said, and the other type is as follows. If the seller first wrote him the document, as a seller can write a bill of sale before the transaction and give it when he receives payment. This is as we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 167b): A scribe may write a deed of sale for the seller of property who requests one, even if the purchaser is not with him when he presents his request. In a case of this kind, once the buyer takes possession of the land from him, the document is acquired by the buyer wherever it is, i.e., even if it is not in the possession of the buyer.

שמע מינה לא בעינן צבורים בה שאני שטר דאפסירא דארעא הוא

One can learn from here that we do not require that the property be piled on it, as in this case the document is acquired by means of the land wherever the document is located. The Gemara rejects this proof: A document is different, as it is the bridle of the land. Since the document that refers to the land is the means by which one takes possession of the land, it is considered as though the document is part of the land. Therefore, one can take possession of the document by means of the land without it actually having to be placed there. The same does not necessarily apply to other movable property, which does not refer specifically to the land.

והא עלה קתני זו היא ששנינו נכסים שאין להם אחריות נקנין עם נכסים שיש להם אחריות בכסף בשטר ובחזקה שמע מינה לא בעינן צבורים בה שמע מינה:

The Gemara asks: But it was taught concerning this halakha that a document can effect acquisition wherever it is located: This is what we learned in the mishna: Property that does not serve as a guarantee can be acquired along with property that serves as a guarantee by means of giving money, by means of giving a document, or by means of taking possession of them. This indicates that there is no difference between a document and other types of movable property. Consequently, one can learn from here that we do not require that the property be piled on the land. The Gemara affirms: One can learn from here that this is the case.

איבעיא להו מי בעינן אגב או לא תא שמע דקתני כל הני ולא קתני אגב ולטעמיך קני מי קתני

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Do we require that one who sells movable property by means of land state explicitly that this is his intention, or not? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as those aforementioned baraitot teach all these halakhot of acquiring movable property through land, and they do not teach the expression: By means of. This indicates that it is not necessary to specify this aspect of the acquisition. The Gemara rejects this proof: And according to your reasoning, is it taught that he must say to him: Acquire it? The baraitot do not state this, and yet everyone agrees that the seller must say to him that he should acquire the land.

אלא עד דאמר קני הכא נמי עד דאמר אגב והלכתא צבורים לא בעינן אגב וקני בעינן:

Rather, one must say that the acquisition is not effective unless he says: Acquire it, and yet the tanna did not deem it necessary to mention this requirement. Here too, the acquisition is not effective unless he says: By means of. This requirement is not mentioned because these baraitot do not discuss the type of statements he must issue, but simply are referring to the basic legal issues involved. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that we do not require that the property be piled on the land, but we require that the seller say that he is transferring the movable property by means of the land, and he must say: Acquire it.

איבעיא להו שדה במכר ומטלטלין במתנה מהו תא שמע עישור שאני עתיד למוד נתון ליהושע ומקומו מושכר לו שמע מינה

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a seller wishes to give a field in the form of a sale and with it movable property as a gift, what is the halakha? Can he transfer them together by means of a transaction performed with the land? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for this dilemma from the incident involving Rabban Gamliel, as he said: One-tenth of produce that I will measure out in the future is given to Yehoshua, and its place is rented to him. Learn from this that even if the field is rented, which is equivalent to a sale, and the tithe is given as a gift, one can transfer the two together.

איבעיא להו שדה לאחד ומטלטלין לאחר מהו תא שמע עישור שאני עתיד למוד נתון לעקיבא בן יוסף כדי שיזכה בו לעניים ומקומו מושכר לו

Another dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one wishes to give a field to one person and movable property to another, what is the halakha? Can one transfer movable property to one person by means of land that is going to be gifted to another? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear that which Rabban Gamliel stated: One-tenth of that which I will measure out in the future is given to Akiva ben Yosef so that he will acquire it on behalf of the poor, and its place is rented to him. Although the gift is for the poor and the place is rented to Rabbi Akiva, the acquisition is effective.

מאי מושכר מושכר למעשר ואי בעית אימא שאני רבי עקיבא דיד עניים הוה

The Gemara rejects this proof: What is the meaning of: Rented, in this case? It means rented for tithe. This land was not rented to Rabbi Akiva for his own use, but only so that he could receive the tithe. Therefore, the land was also given to the poor. And if you wish, say a different refutation: Rabbi Akiva is different, as he was a charity collector, and therefore he was considered like the hand of the poor. Since a charity collector collects charity on behalf of the poor, he has the status of the poor himself. If so, this cannot be compared to a case in which one transfers a certain item to one person and land to someone else.

אמר רבא לא שנו אלא שנתן דמי כולן אבל לא נתן דמי כולן לא קנה אלא כנגד מעותיו

§ Rava says: The Sages taught that one can acquire movable property by way of land only when he gives all the money for the land and the movable property. But if he did not give the money for all the property, even if they were transferred to him he acquires only the movable property corresponding to the money that he paid.

תניא כוותיה דרבא יפה כח הכסף מכח השטר וכח השטר מכח הכסף יפה כח הכסף שהכסף פודין בו הקדשות ומעשר שני מה שאין כן בשטר ויפה כח השטר שהשטר מוציא בבת ישראל מה שאין כן בכסף

It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ketubot 2:3) in accordance with the opinion of Rava: The power of money is greater than the power of a document in one way, and the power of a document is greater than the power of money in a different way. The baraita elaborates: The power of money is greater in that money can be used to redeem consecrated property and second tithe, which is not the case with a document. And the power of a document is greater than the power of money, as a document releases a Jewish woman, i.e., a man can divorce his wife with a bill of divorce, which is not the case with money.

ויפה כח שניהם מכח חזקה וכח חזקה מכח שניהם יפה כח שניהם ששניהם קונים בעבד עברי מה שאין כן בחזקה יפה כח חזקה שחזקה מכר לו עשר שדות בעשר מדינות כיון שהחזיק באחת מהם קנאם כולם

The baraita continues: And furthermore, the power of each, money and a document, as a means to transfer ownership is greater than the power of acquisition by means of taking possession, and the power of taking possession is greater than the power of acquisition of each of them. How so? The power of each of them is greater than the power of acquisition of taking possession, as each of them effects acquisition in the case of a Hebrew slave, which is not the case for taking possession (see 14b). The power of taking possession is greater than the power of acquisition of each of them, as with regard to taking possession, if one sold another ten fields in ten countries, once the buyer takes possession one of the fields he acquires all of them.

במה דברים אמורים שנתן לו דמי כולן אבל לא נתן לו דמי כולן לא קנה אלא כנגד מעותיו מסייע ליה לשמואל דאמר שמואל מכר לו עשר שדות בעשר מדינות כיון שהחזיק באחת מהן קנה את כולן

In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case when he gave him money for all of the land. But if he did not give him money for all of it, he acquires only the land corresponding to the money that he paid, in accordance with the opinion of Rava. The Gemara comments: The baraita supports the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel says: If one sold another ten fields in ten countries, once he takes possession of one of them he acquires all of them.

אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא תדע שאילו מסר לו עשר בהמות באפסר אחד ואמר ליה קני מי לא קני אמר ליה מי דמי התם איגודו בידו הכא אין איגודו בידו

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: Know that this is true, as, if he handed him ten animals with one bridle [afsar] and said to him: Acquire them, doesn’t he acquire all of them? In this case, too, they are considered like one field. A Sage said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika: Is it comparable? There, its bond, i.e., the bridle that joins the animals, is in his hand. Here, in the case of ten fields, its bond is not in his hand.

איכא דאמרי אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא תדע דלא קני אילו מסר לו עשר בהמות באפסר אחד ואמר לו זו קני מי קני

There are those who say that Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: Know that he does not acquire all of the fields by taking possession of only one field, as, if one passed to him ten animals with one bridle and said to him: Acquire this one, does he acquire all of them? The same applies here when he takes possession of only one field; it is as though he said to him: Acquire this one, and therefore he does not acquire the other fields in this manner.

מי דמי התם גופים מוחלקים הכא סדנא דארעא חד הוא:

The Gemara rejects this argument: Is it comparable? There, the animals are separate entities, and therefore when he says to him: Acquire this one, there is no reason that the other animals should be acquired as well. Here, the mass of the earth is one. Consequently, if he acquires one plot of land, he acquires the other plots along with it.

וזוקקים את הנכסים וכו׳: אמר עולא מנין לגלגול שבועה מן התורה

§ The mishna teaches: And in a legal dispute involving both land and movable property, if the defendant makes a partial admission of the claim with regard to the movable property, thereby rendering himself obligated to take an oath denying any responsibility for the remaining property, the movable property binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., the land, so that he is forced to take an oath concerning the land as well, despite the fact that one is generally not obligated to take an oath for a claim involving land. Ulla says: From where is it derived from the Torah that one can impose the extension of an oath, i.e., if one is required to take an oath for one claim, the other party can obligate him to take an oath with regard to other claims which on their own would not lead to the imposition of an oath?

שנאמר ואמרה האשה אמן אמן ותנן על מה היא אומרת אמן אמן אמן על האלה אמן על השבועה אמן אם מאיש זה אמן אם מאיש אחר אמן שלא סטיתי ארוסה ונשואה ושומרת יבם וכנוסה

As it is stated with regard to a sota: “And the woman shall say: Amen, amen” (Numbers 5:22), and we learned in a mishna (Sota 18a): Concerning what does she say the double expression of: Amen, amen? She says amen on the curse, as she accepts the curse upon herself if she is guilty, and amen on the oath, as she declares that she is not defiled. She states: Amen if I committed adultery with this man about whom I was warned, amen if I committed adultery with another man. Amen that I did not stray when I was betrothed nor after I was married, nor as a widow waiting for my yavam to perform levirate marriage, since a woman at that stage is prohibited from engaging in sexual intercourse with any men, nor when married through levirate marriage to the yavam.

האי ארוסה היכי דמי אילימא דקני לה כשהיא ארוסה וקא משקי לה כשהיא ארוסה והתנן ארוסה ושומרת יבם לא שותות ולא נוטלות כתובה מאי טעמא תחת אישך אמר רחמנא וליכא

The Gemara analyzes this halakha: What are the circumstances with regard to this betrothed woman? If we say that he warned her not to seclude herself with a particular man when she was betrothed, and he gives her the bitter water of a sota to drink when she is betrothed, but didn’t we learn in a mishna (Sota 23b): With regard to a betrothed woman who secluded herself with another man after being warned by her betrothed, and a widow waiting for her yavam to perform levirate marriage who secluded herself with another man after being warned by her yavam, they neither drink the bitter water nor collect payment of their marriage contracts. What is the reason for this? The Merciful One states as part of her oath: “But if you have gone aside, being under your husband” (Numbers 5:20), and that does not apply here, as these women are not yet under their husband’s authority.

אלא דקני לה כשהיא ארוסה ונסתרה כשהיא ארוסה וקא משקי לה כשהיא נשואה

Rather, one must say that he warned her when she was betrothed, i.e., he warned her when she was betrothed not to seclude herself with a particular man, and she secluded herself with that man when she was betrothed, and he gave her the water to drink when she was married.

מי בדקי לה מיא ונקה האיש מעון אמר רחמנא בזמן שהאיש מנוקה מעון מים בודקים את אשתו אין איש מנוקה מעון אין המים בודקים את אשתו

The Gemara asks: But in this case, does the water she is given to drink examine her and cause her death? Doesn’t the Merciful One state: “And the man shall be clear from iniquity” (Numbers 5:31)? This verse indicates: When the man is clear from iniquity, the water examines his wife; but if the man is not clear from iniquity with regard to the matter of illicit sexual intercourse, the water does not examine his wife. Since he suspected her of impropriety when she was betrothed and warned her about a particular man, and she secluded herself with that man regardless of his warning, he was not allowed to engage in intercourse with her. If he did so, he is a sinner himself, and therefore the water will not affect his wife. If so, it is impossible for a betrothed woman to be examined as a sota.

אלא על ידי גלגול

Rather, it is clear that this oath is administered by means of an extension. Although the husband cannot force her to take an oath only with regard to her behavior before they were married, since she must take an oath with regard to her behavior during her marriage, he can extend the oath to include incidents that occurred while she was betrothed.

אשכחן סוטה דאיסורא ממונא מנלן תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל קל וחומר ומה סוטה

The Gemara comments: We found a source for the extension of an oath in the case of a sota, which is a halakha involving a prohibition. From where do we derive that an oath can be extended with regard to monetary matters as well? The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that this can be derived through an a fortiori inference: And just as in the case of a sota,