Kiddushin 35

ולרבי יוחנן בן ברוקא דאמר על שניהם הוא אומר ויברך אתם אלהים פרו ורבו מאי איכא למימר משום דהוה תלמוד תורה ופדיון הבן שני כתובים הבאים כאחד וכל שני כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדין

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, who says that with regard to both of them, men and women, the verse states: “And God blessed them, and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply, replenish the earth and conquer it” (Genesis 1:28), what can be said? According to his opinion, women are exempt from only one positive mitzva that is not time bound, Torah study; why not derive other mitzvot from this case? The Gemara answers: The reason this is not a difficulty is because Torah study and the redemption of the firstborn son, from which women are also exempt, are two verses that come as one, and any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent.

ולרבי יוחנן בן ברוקא נמי ניהוו פריה ורביה ומורא שני כתובים הבאים כאחד ואין מלמדין צריכי דאי כתב רחמנא מורא ולא כתב פריה ורביה הוה אמינא וכבשה אמר רחמנא איש דדרכו לכבש אין אשה דאין דרכה לכבש לא

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka as well, let procreation, which he maintains applies to women, and fear of one’s mother and father be considered two verses that come as one and they should not teach a precedent. The Gemara answers: Both cases are necessary. As, if the Merciful One had written only that women are obligated in fear of their parents, and had not written that they are obligated in procreation, I would say that as the Merciful One states: “Be fruitful and multiply, replenish the earth and conquer it” (Genesis 1:28), this leads to the conclusion that women are exempt from procreation, by the following reasoning: As it is the manner of a man to go to war and to conquer, yes, he is obligated in procreation, but as it is not the manner of a woman to conquer, she is not obligated in procreation.

ואי כתב פריה ורביה ולא כתב מורא הוה אמינא איש דסיפק בידו לעשות אין אשה דאין סיפק בידה לעשות לא וכיון דאין סיפק בידה לעשות לא תתחייב כלל צריכא

And if the Merciful One had written only that women are obligated in the mitzva of procreation, and had not written that they are obligated to fear their parents, I would say: With regard to a man, as it is in his power to perform this mitzva, yes, he is obligated to fear his mother and father, but with regard to a woman, as it is not in her power to perform this mitzva when she is married, since her obligations to her husband may prevent her from doing so, she is not obligated. And as it is not in her power to perform this mitzva when she is married, perhaps women should not be obligated at all and there should be no difference between a married and an unmarried woman. Therefore, it is necessary for the Torah to state that women are obligated in both procreation and the fear of parents, and these are not considered two verses that come as one.

הניחא למאן דאמר שני כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדין אלא למאן דאמר מלמדין מאי איכא למימר אמר רבא פפונאי ידעי לה לטעמא דהא מילתא

The Gemara notes that the earlier question remains difficult: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. But according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, what can be said? According to this opinion it can be derived that women are obligated in positive, time-bound mitzvot from matza and assembly, and that they are exempt from positive mitzvot that are not time bound, from Torah study and the redemption of the firstborn son. Rava said: The Sages of Pafunya know the reason for this matter.

ומנו רב אחא בר יעקב אמר קרא והיה לך לאות על ידך ולזכרון בין עיניך למען תהיה תורת ה׳ בפיך הוקשה כל התורה כולה לתפילין מה תפילין מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא ונשים פטורות אף כל מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא נשים פטורות ומדמצות עשה שהזמן גרמא נשים פטורות מכלל דמצות עשה שלא הזמן גרמא נשים חייבות

The Gemara comments: And who is the scholar called by the nickname: The Sages of Paphunya? It is Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, who said as follows: The verse states with regard to phylacteries: “And it shall be a sign for you on your arm and for a memorial between your eyes, that the Torah of the Lord may be in your mouth” (Exodus 13:9). In this manner the entire Torah is juxtaposed to phylacteries: Just as donning phylacteries is a positive, time-bound mitzva and women are exempt from it, so too are women exempt from every positive, time-bound mitzva in the Torah. And from the fact that women are exempt from every positive, time-bound mitzva, one can learn by inference that women are obligated in every positive mitzva that is not time bound.

הניחא למאן דאמר תפילין מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא אלא למאן דאמר תפילין מצות עשה שלא הזמן גרמא מאי איכא למימר מאן שמעת ליה דאמר תפילין מצות עשה שלא הזמן גרמא רבי מאיר וסבר לה שני כתובים הבאים כאחד וכל שני כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדין

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that the mitzva of donning phylacteries is a positive, time-bound mitzva. But according to the one who says that donning phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound, as it is applicable the entire year, day and night, what can be said? The Gemara answers: Who did you hear who said that donning phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound? It is Rabbi Meir, and he holds that matza and assembly are verses that come as one, and he further maintains that any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent.

ולרבי יהודה דאמר שני כתובים הבאים כאחד מלמדין ותפילין מצות עשה שלא הזמן גרמא מאי איכא למימר משום דהואי מצה שמחה והקהל שלשה כתובים הבאים כאחד ושלשה כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדין

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, and who also says that donning phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound, what can be said? The Gemara answers: It is not derived from here that women are obligated in positive, time-bound mitzvot because the verses that mention matza, rejoicing, and assembly are three verses that come as one, and everyone agrees three verses that come as one do not teach a precedent.

וכל מצות לא תעשה וכו׳ מנהני מילי אמר רב יהודה אמר רב וכן תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל אמר קרא איש או אשה כי יעשו מכל חטאת האדם השוה הכתוב אשה לאיש לכל עונשים שבתורה

§ The mishna further teaches: And with regard to all prohibitions, whether or not they are time bound, both men and women are obligated to observe them. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, and likewise the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The verse states with regard to a guilt-offering: “When a man or woman shall commit any sin that a person commits” (Numbers 5:6). The verse equates a woman to a man with regard to all punishments in the Torah, as a woman is also required to bring an offering for atonement.

דבי רבי אליעזר תנא אמר קרא אשר תשים לפניהם השוה הכתוב אשה לאיש לכל דינים שבתורה דבי חזקיה תנא אמר קרא והמית איש או אשה השוה הכתוב אשה לאיש לכל מיתות שבתורה

The school of Rabbi Eliezer taught as follows. The verse states: “Now these are the ordinances which you shall set before them” (Exodus 21:1), stating “them” in the plural. This verse equates a woman to a man with regard to all judgments in the Torah, i.e., monetary cases and damages. The school of Ḥizkiyya taught: The verse states, with regard to the ransom one pays if his animal killed a person: “And killed a man or woman” (Exodus 21:29). Here too, the verse equates a woman to a man, with regard to all deaths in the Torah, i.e., the same halakha applies to an animal that kills either a man or a woman.

וצריכא דאי אשמעינן הך קמייתא משום כפרה חס רחמנא עלה אבל דינין אימא איש דבר משא ומתן אין אשה לא

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state all three of these verses. As, if the Torah had taught us only this first case, with regard to a woman’s obligation to sacrifice guilt-offerings, I would say that the Merciful One has pity on her due to atonement, i.e., God gave her the possibility to atone for her sin through an offering. But with regard to monetary judgments, I would say that with regard to a man, who generally conducts business negotiations, yes, these halakhot apply to him, but in the case of a woman, who generally does not conduct business negotiations, no, the halakhot of monetary judgments do not apply to her.

ואי אשמועינן הא משום דחיותה היא אבל כופר אימא

And similarly if the Torah had taught us only this case of monetary judgments, I would say that these judgments apply to a woman, because there are circumstances where engaging in business is her livelihood. But with regard to the ransom that is paid when one’s animal killed someone, I would say:

איש דבר מצות אין אשה לא ואי אשמעינן הא משום דאיכא איבוד נשמה חס רחמנא עלה אבל הנך תרתי אימא לא צריכא:

If the animal killed a man, who is commanded in all mitzvot, yes, its owner should have to pay the ransom, but if the animal killed a woman, who is obligated in only some mitzvot, no, he is exempt from the ransom. And conversely: If the Torah had taught us that men and women are equated only in this case of the ransom, one might say that because there is the loss of life the Merciful One has pity on her and therefore the owner of the animal is always obligated to pay the ransom. But with regard to those two other categories, I might say no, a woman is not equated to a man. Therefore it was necessary to mention them all.

חוץ מבל תקיף ובל תשחית כו׳: בשלמא בל תטמא למתים דכתיב אמר אל הכהנים בני אהרן בני אהרן ולא בנות אהרן אלא בל תקיף ובל תשחית מנלן

§ The mishna teaches that women are obligated in all prohibitions except for the prohibitions of: Do not round the corners of one’s head, and: Do not destroy the corners of your beard, and: Do not contract ritual impurity from a corpse. The Gemara asks: Granted, a woman of priestly lineage is not obligated in the mitzva of: Do not contract ritual impurity from a corpse, as it is written: “Speak to the priests, the sons of Aaron, and say to them: None shall become impure for the dead among his people” (Leviticus 21:1). This verse teaches that the prohibition applies to the sons of Aaron, but not the daughters of Aaron. But from where do we derive the prohibitions of: Do not round the corners of one’s head, and: Do not destroy the corners of your beard?

דכתיב לא תקפו פאת ראשכם ולא תשחית את פאת זקנך כל שישנו בהשחתה ישנו בהקפה והני נשי הואיל ולא איתנהו בהשחתה ליתנהו בהקפה

The Gemara answers that this is as it is written: “You shall not round the corners of your head and you shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27). The juxtaposition of the two prohibitions teaches that anyone who is included in the prohibition against destroying the beard is included in the prohibition against rounding the head. And since these women are not included in the prohibition against destroying, they are also not included in the prohibition against rounding the head.

ומנלן דלא איתנהו בהשחתה איבעית אימא סברא דהא לא אית להו זקן ואיבעית אימא קרא דאמר קרא לא תקפו פאת ראשכם ולא תשחית את פאת זקנך

The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that women are not obligated in the prohibition against destroying the corners of one’s beard? The Gemara answers: If you wish, propose a logical reason, as ordinarily women do not have a beard. And if you wish, cite a verse that teaches this point, as the verse states: “You shall not round the corners of your head [roshekhem] and you shall not destroy the corners of your beard [zekanekha]” (Leviticus 19:27).

מדשני קרא בדיבוריה דאם כן ניכתוב רחמנא פאת זקנכם מאי זקנך זקנך ולא זקן אשתך

The Gemara explains: From the fact that the verse changed its language, as the term “your head [roshekhem]” is in the plural while “your beard [zekanekha]” is in the singular, it can be inferred that if so, if the prohibition against destroying one’s beard applied to everyone, let the Merciful One write: And you shall not destroy the corners of your beards [zekanekhem], in the plural, so that the end of the verse parallels the beginning. What is indicated by the fact that the verse states: “And you shall not destroy the corners of your beard [zekanekha],” in the singular? This serves to teach: Your beard is included, but not your wife’s beard.

ולא והתניא זקן אשה והסריס שהעלו שער הרי הן כזקן לכל דבריהם מאי לאו להשחתה

The Gemara asks: And is a woman not included in this prohibition? But isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nega’im 4:8): The beard of a woman and that of a eunuch, if they grow facial hair, are considered like a beard for all matters. What, is it not the case that this statement is referring to the prohibition against destroying?

אמר אביי להשחתה לא מצית אמרת דיליף פאת פאת מבני אהרן מה להלן נשים פטורות אף כאן נשים פטורות

Abaye said: You cannot say that the baraita is referring to destroying, as it is derived that a woman is exempt through the verbal analogy of “the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27) here and “the corners of their beard” (Leviticus 21:5) from the sons of Aaron: Just as there, in the case of priests, women are certainly exempt from the mitzva, as the verse is referring to the male descendants of Aaron who perform the Temple service and not to women, so too here, with regard to the prohibition against destroying one’s beard, which is stated to all Jews, women are exempt. At this stage the Gemara assumes that the exclusion of women denoted by the verse: “Speak to the priests, the sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 21:1), which excludes women, is applied to all the mitzvot stated in that chapter, including destroying the corners of one’s beard.

ואי סבירא לן דכי כתב בני אהרן אכוליה ענינא כתיב נישתוק קרא מיניה ותיתי בקל וחומר ואנא אמינא ומה כהנים שריבה בהם הכתוב מצות יתירות בני אהרן ולא בנות אהרן ישראל לא כל שכן

The Gemara asks: But if we maintain that when the Merciful One writes: “The sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 21:1), it is written with regard to the entire manner of that chapter, including the prohibition against destroying one’s beard, let the verse, i.e., the Torah, be silent and not state about this prohibition concerning all Jews. And this halakha could be derived through an a fortiori inference, as I could say the following: And if with regard to priests, for whom the verse includes additional mitzvot, this prohibition applies only to the sons of Aaron and not the daughters of Aaron, is it not all the more so the case with regard to Israelites, who have fewer mitzvot, that only men should be obligated and not women?

אי לאו גזירה שוה הוה אמינא הפסיק הענין

The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, the verbal analogy is necessary. Were it not for the verbal analogy, I would say that the halakhot of ritual impurity concluded discussion of that matter. In other words, the exclusion of women denoted by the phrase “the sons of Aaron” applies only to the halakhot of impurity, which appear immediately after that phrase. Conversely, the other halakhot mentioned in this chapter, including the prohibition against destroying the beard, apply to women as well.

השתא נמי נימא הפסיק הענין ואי משום גזירה שוה מיבעי ליה לכדתניא לא יגלחו יכול גילחו במספריים יהיה חייב תלמוד לומר לא תשחית

The Gemara asks: If so, now too, let us say that the halakhot of ritual impurity concluded discussion of that matter, and the daughters of Aaron are also prohibited to destroy their beards. And if you maintain that the reason the prohibition stated with regard to priests does not apply to women is due to the verbal analogy employing the term “the corners of,” which serves to connect the halakha stated with regard to priests with the halakha stated with regard to all Jews, that verbal analogy is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to priests: “Neither shall they shave off the corners of their beard” (Leviticus 21:5). One might have thought that a priest would be liable even if he shaved his beard with scissors. Therefore the verse states, in a command issued to all Jews: “And you shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27). This teaches that one is liable only for destroying the beard to the root, which is not achieved with scissors.

יכול לקטו במלקט וברהיטני יהא חייב תלמוד לומר לא יגלחו הא כיצד גילוח שיש בה השחתה הוי אומר זה תער

The baraita continues: One might have thought that if he extracted his hairs with tweezers, which uproot hairs, or small planes [uvirhitni], he should likewise be liable for destroying his hair. The verse therefore states: “Neither shall they shave off the corners of their beard,” to teach that shaving alone is prohibited and these actions are not considered shaving. How can both these requirements for the prohibition be met? The verse is referring to a type of shaving that involves destruction. You must say this is shaving with a razor. According to this baraita, the verbal analogy is necessary to define the action included in the prohibition against destroying, not to teach who is included in the prohibition.

אם כן ניכתוב קרא את שבזקנך מאי פאת זקנך שמע מינה תרתי

The Gemara explains: If it is so that the verbal analogy teaches only which action is included in the prohibition against destroying, let the verse write: That which is of your beard. What is added by the expression “the corners of your beard”? Conclude two conclusions from it, both the definition of the prohibition against shaving and the exemption of women.

ואלא הא דתניא זקן האשה והסריס שהעלו שער הרי הן כזקן לכל דבריהם למאי הלכתא אמר מר זוטרא לטומאת נגעים

The Gemara returns to its question. But that which is taught in the baraita: The beard of a woman and that of a eunuch, if they grew facial hair, are considered like a beard for all matters, with regard to what halakha is this stated? Mar Zutra says: It is stated with regard to ritual impurity from leprosy. A leprous sore in the beard of a woman or a eunuch is treated like an affliction of the beard, not like an affliction on the skin. Different halakhot apply to leprous sores that develop on various parts of the body.

טומאת נגעים בהדיא כתיבא ואיש או אשה כי יהיה בו נגע בראש או בזקן אלא אמר מר זוטרא לטהרת נגעים

The Gemara objects: Concerning ritual impurity from leprosy, it is written explicitly: “And when a man or woman has a plague upon the head or upon the beard” (Leviticus 13:29). This indicates that there is no difference between a man and woman with regard to the beard in the case of leprosy. The baraita would not state a halakha that is explicit in the verse. Rather, Mar Zutra says: This baraita is referring to ritual purification from leprosy, i.e., women can also be purified from leprosy of the beard.

טהרת נגעים נמי פשיטא כיון דבת טומאה היא בת טהרה היא איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא לצדדים כתיב איש או אשה כי יהיה בו נגע בראש או בזקן הדר אתאן לאיש קא משמע לן

The Gemara asks: With regard to ritual purification from leprosy it is also obvious: Since impurity applies to a woman, purity likewise applies to her. The Gemara answers: It was necessary to state this with regard to the impurity of afflictions of the beard, as it might enter your mind to say that this verse is written disjunctively, i.e., that the phrase: “And when a man or woman has a plague upon the head,” applies to both a man or a woman; whereas when it states: “Or upon the beard,” we have come back to the case of a man alone. Therefore the baraita teaches us that this phrase is not referring solely to a man, as there is no difference between a man and a woman with regard to leprosy.

איסי תני אף בל יקרחו נשים פטורות מאי טעמא דאיסי דדריש הכי בנים אתם לה׳ אלהיכם לא תתגדדו ולא תשימו קרחה בין עיניכם למת כי עם קדוש אתה לה׳ אלהיך בנים ולא בנות לקרחה

Isi taught in a baraita: Women are also exempt from the prohibition: Do not make baldness upon your heads, a prohibition against tearing out one’s hair in grief over someone’s death. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Isi? The Gemara explains that he teaches as follows: The verse states: “You are the sons of the Lord your God; you shall not cut yourselves, nor make any baldness between your eyes for the dead. For you are a holy people to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 14:1–2). This verse, which applies to sons and not daughters, is referring to causing baldness, and therefore this prohibition includes only men.

אתה אומר לקרחה או אינו אלא לגדידה כשהוא אומר כי עם קדוש אתה לה׳ אלהיך הרי גדידה אמור הא מה אני מקיים בנים ולא בנות לקרחה

The Gemara asks: Do you say that this is referring to causing baldness, or is it perhaps referring only to the prohibition against cutting, which appears first? The Gemara answers that when it states: “For you are a holy people to the Lord your God,” it is stated with regard to the prohibition against cutting, and this verse applies to both men and women, as they are all members of God’s people. How then do I realize and explain the emphasis on sons and not daughters? This is referring to the prohibition against causing baldness.

ומה ראית לרבות את הגדידה ולהוציא את הקרחה מרבה אני את הגדידה שישנה במקום השער ושלא במקום שער ומוציא אני את הקרחה שאינה אלא במקום שער

The Gemara asks: And what did you see to include cutting and to exclude causing baldness? Perhaps the opposite is true, and causing baldness applies to men and women whereas cutting applies only to men. The Gemara answers: I include cutting, whose prohibition is broader, as it is applicable both in a place of hair and not in a place of hair; and I exclude causing baldness, which is more limited, as it applies only in a place of hair.

ואימא בנים ולא בנות בין לקרחה בין לגדידה וכי כתב כי עם קדוש אתה לה׳ אלהיך בשריטה הוא דכתיב קסבר איסי שריטה וגדידה

The Gemara asks: But one can say that the limitation of sons and not daughters applies both to causing baldness and to cutting, and when the verse writes: “For you are a holy people to the Lord your God,” that is written with regard to scoring oneself. The prohibition against scoring oneself is derived from a verbal analogy from a verse stated with regard to priests (see Leviticus 21:5), which applies to both men and women. The Gemara answers: Isi maintains that scoring oneself and cutting