Nedarim 11

גמ׳ סברוה מאי לחולין לא לחולין ליהוי אלא קרבן

GEMARA: They assumed: What is the meaning of the term laḥullin? The individual is saying: It shall not [la] be non-sacred [ḥullin] but rather it should have the status of an offering.

מני מתניתין אי רבי מאיר לית ליה מכלל לאו אתה שומע הן דתנן רבי מאיר אומר כל תנאי שאינו כתנאי בני גד ובני ראובן אינו תנאי

The Gemara says: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? If you say it is that of Rabbi Meir, he does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Meir says that any condition that is not like the condition of the sons of the tribe of Gad and the sons of the tribe of Reuben, when Moses gave them land on the eastern bank of the Jordan River (see Numbers 32:29–30), is not a valid condition. Moses phrased the agreement as a double condition, stating that if they would join the other tribes in battle they would receive their inheritance on the eastern bank of the Jordan River, and if not, they would not receive that territory. Because Rabbi Meir holds that only a condition expressed in this manner is valid, it is clear that he holds that one may not infer a negative statement from a positive one or vice versa.

אלא רבי יהודה היא אימא סיפא רבי יהודה אומר האומר ירושלים לא אמר כלום מדסיפא רבי יהודה רישא לאו רבי יהודה היא

Rather, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara challenges this statement: Say the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: One who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not said anything. From the fact that the latter clause is stated by Rabbi Yehuda, it is clear that the first clause is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

כולה רבי יהודה היא והכי קתני שרבי יהודה אומר האומר ירושלים לא אמר כלום

The Gemara responds: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and this is what it is teaching: Although one who declares an item to be like Jerusalem has taken a vow rendering it forbidden, one who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not taken a vow. This is as Rabbi Yehuda says, that one who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not said anything, since this expression has no meaning.

וכי אמר כירושלים לרבי יהודה מי מיתסר והתניא רבי יהודה אומר האומר כירושלים לא אמר כלום עד שידור בדבר הקרב בירושלים

The Gemara asks: When one says that an item should be like Jerusalem, is it prohibited according to Rabbi Yehuda? Isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: One who says that an item shall be considered like Jerusalem has not said anything unless he vows by means of an item that is sacrificed in Jerusalem. Consequently, the first clause of the mishna, which states that one has vowed if he declares an item to be like Jerusalem, cannot be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

כולה רבי יהודה היא ותרי תנאי אליבא דרבי יהודה

The Gemara responds: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the mishna and baraita express the opinions of two tanna’im in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

תניא חולין החולין כחולין בין שאוכל לך ובין שלא אוכל לך מותר לחולין שאוכל לך אסור לחולין לא אוכל לך מותר

It is taught in a baraita: If one declares food: Non-sacred, or: The non-sacred, or: Like the non-sacred, then whether he combines that expression with the phrase: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I do not eat of yours, he has not expressed a vow and the food remains permitted. However, if he says: That which I eat of yours shall be considered laḥullin, i.e., not non-sacred, but rather consecrated, the food is forbidden. If he says: That which I do not eat of yours shall be considered laḥullin, the other individual’s food remains permitted to him.

רישא מני רבי מאיר היא דלית ליה מכלל לאו אתה שומע הין

The Gemara analyzes this baraita: Who is the author of the first clause of the baraita? It is Rabbi Meir, who does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. Consequently, even if one said: That which I do not eat of yours shall be considered non-sacred, that does not indicate that what he does eat shall be considered consecrated.

אימא סיפא לחולין לא אוכל לך מותר והתנן לקרבן לא אוכל לך רבי מאיר אוסר וקשיא לן הא לית ליה מכלל לאו אתה שומע הין

However, say the latter clause of that baraita: If one says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered laḥullin, the other individual’s food remains permitted to him. But didn’t we learn in a mishna (13a) that if one says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered lakorban, Rabbi Meir prohibits him from eating food belonging to the other individual? Lakorban apparently means la korban, it is not an offering. The reason for this opinion is that his statement indicates that what he does not eat is not an offering, but what he does eat shall be considered an offering. This poses a difficulty for us because Rabbi Meir does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement.

ואמר רבי אבא נעשה כאומר לקרבן יהא לפיכך לא אוכל לך הכא נמי הכי קאמר ליה לא חולין ליהוי לפיכך לא אוכל לך

And to answer this difficulty, Rabbi Abba said: It is as though he said: It shall be for an offering [lekorban], and therefore I will not eat that which is yours. Here too, when he said: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered laḥullin, this is what he said to him: It shall not be non-sacred, and therefore I will not eat that which is yours. Consequently, the vow should take effect even according to Rabbi Meir; why does the baraita rule that the vow does not take effect and the food remains permitted?

האי תנא סבר לה כרבי מאיר בחדא ופליג עליה בחדא סבר לה כותיה בחדא דלית ליה מכלל לאו אתה שומע הין ופליג עליה בחדא בקרבן

The Gemara answers: This tanna of the baraita holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir in one case and disagrees with his opinion in another. He holds in accordance with his opinion in one case, in that he does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. And he disagrees with his opinion in another case, i.e., in the case of an offering. This tanna holds that if one says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered lakorban, he does not mean: It is to be considered an offering and therefore I will not eat from that which is yours. Similarly, in the case in the baraita, the tanna does not hold that the individual means to say: It shall not be non-sacred and therefore I will not eat that which is yours. In order to effect a vow, one must express it clearly.

רב אשי אמר הא דאמר לחולין והא דאמר לא לחולין דמשמע לא ליהוי חולין אלא כקרבן

Rav Ashi said: The apparent contradiction between the baraita and the mishna can be resolved in a different manner. This case in the baraita is where he said: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered as non-sacred, and that case, where it is forbidden, in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s ruling in the mishna, is where he said: That which I will not eat of yours should not be considered as non-sacred, which indicates: It shall not be considered non-sacred but rather like an offering, and therefore I will not eat it.

טהור וטמא נותר ופיגול אסור בעי רמי בר חמא הרי עלי כבשר זבחי שלמים לאחר זריקת דמים מהו

§ It is stated in the mishna that if one says that a food item shall be considered not ritually pure, or if he said the food shall be considered an offering that has become ritually impure, left over [notar], or piggul, i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time, it is forbidden. Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: If one said with regard to a particular item: This is prohibited to me like the meat of peace-offerings after the sprinkling of their blood, what is the halakha? Is this an effective vow, which prohibits the item?

אי דקאמר בהדין לישנא בהיתרא קא מתפיס אלא כגון דמחית בשר זבחי שלמים ומחית דהיתרא גביה ואמר זה כזה מאי בעיקרו קא מתפיס או בהיתרא קא מתפיס

The Gemara responds: If he said it with this formulation, he is associating the object of his vow with a permitted item, as the meat of peace-offerings is permitted to be eaten after the blood is sprinkled on the altar. Consequently, the declaration does not express a vow. Rather, it is a case where he places the meat of peace-offerings following the sprinkling of the blood in one place, and he places an item that is permitted next to it. And he says: This is like that. In this case, what is the halakha? Is he associating the object of his vow with the original forbidden status of the peace-offering before the blood is sprinkled, or is he associating the object of his vow with the current permitted status of the peace-offering?

אמר רבא תא שמע נותר ופיגול

To resolve this question, Rava said: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If he said the food shall be considered an offering that has become notar or piggul, i.e. an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time, it is forbidden.