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Today's Daf Yomi

June 4, 2015 | 讬状讝 讘住讬讜谉 转砖注状讛

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Nedarim 11

Study Guide Nedarim 11


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讙诪壮 住讘专讜讛 诪讗讬 诇讞讜诇讬谉 诇讗 诇讞讜诇讬谉 诇讬讛讜讬 讗诇讗 拽专讘谉

GEMARA: They assumed: What is the meaning of the term la岣llin? The individual is saying: It shall not [la] be non-sacred [岣llin] but rather it should have the status of an offering.

诪谞讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讗讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪讻诇诇 诇讗讜 讗转讛 砖讜诪注 讛谉 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讻诇 转谞讗讬 砖讗讬谞讜 讻转谞讗讬 讘谞讬 讙讚 讜讘谞讬 专讗讜讘谉 讗讬谞讜 转谞讗讬

The Gemara says: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? If you say it is that of Rabbi Meir, he does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Meir says that any condition that is not like the condition of the sons of the tribe of Gad and the sons of the tribe of Reuben, when Moses gave them land on the eastern bank of the Jordan River (see Numbers 32:29鈥30), is not a valid condition. Moses phrased the agreement as a double condition, stating that if they would join the other tribes in battle they would receive their inheritance on the eastern bank of the Jordan River, and if not, they would not receive that territory. Because Rabbi Meir holds that only a condition expressed in this manner is valid, it is clear that he holds that one may not infer a negative statement from a positive one or vice versa.

讗诇讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讛讗讜诪专 讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 诪讚住讬驻讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讬砖讗 诇讗讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗

Rather, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara challenges this statement: Say the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: One who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not said anything. From the fact that the latter clause is stated by Rabbi Yehuda, it is clear that the first clause is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讜讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 砖专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讛讗讜诪专 讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara responds: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and this is what it is teaching: Although one who declares an item to be like Jerusalem has taken a vow rendering it forbidden, one who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not taken a vow. This is as Rabbi Yehuda says, that one who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not said anything, since this expression has no meaning.

讜讻讬 讗诪专 讻讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讬 诪讬转住专 讜讛转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讛讗讜诪专 讻讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 注讚 砖讬讚讜专 讘讚讘专 讛拽专讘 讘讬专讜砖诇讬诐

The Gemara asks: When one says that an item should be like Jerusalem, is it prohibited according to Rabbi Yehuda? Isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: One who says that an item shall be considered like Jerusalem has not said anything unless he vows by means of an item that is sacrificed in Jerusalem. Consequently, the first clause of the mishna, which states that one has vowed if he declares an item to be like Jerusalem, cannot be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讜转专讬 转谞讗讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara responds: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the mishna and baraita express the opinions of two tanna鈥檌m in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

转谞讬讗 讞讜诇讬谉 讛讞讜诇讬谉 讻讞讜诇讬谉 讘讬谉 砖讗讜讻诇 诇讱 讜讘讬谉 砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱 诪讜转专 诇讞讜诇讬谉 砖讗讜讻诇 诇讱 讗住讜专 诇讞讜诇讬谉 诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱 诪讜转专

It is taught in a baraita: If one declares food: Non-sacred, or: The non-sacred, or: Like the non-sacred, then whether he combines that expression with the phrase: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I do not eat of yours, he has not expressed a vow and the food remains permitted. However, if he says: That which I eat of yours shall be considered la岣llin, i.e., not non-sacred, but rather consecrated, the food is forbidden. If he says: That which I do not eat of yours shall be considered la岣llin, the other individual鈥檚 food remains permitted to him.

专讬砖讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪讻诇诇 诇讗讜 讗转讛 砖讜诪注 讛讬谉

The Gemara analyzes this baraita: Who is the author of the first clause of the baraita? It is Rabbi Meir, who does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. Consequently, even if one said: That which I do not eat of yours shall be considered non-sacred, that does not indicate that what he does eat shall be considered consecrated.

讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 诇讞讜诇讬谉 诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱 诪讜转专 讜讛转谞谉 诇拽专讘谉 诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜住专 讜拽砖讬讗 诇谉 讛讗 诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪讻诇诇 诇讗讜 讗转讛 砖讜诪注 讛讬谉

However, say the latter clause of that baraita: If one says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered la岣llin, the other individual鈥檚 food remains permitted to him. But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (13a) that if one says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered lakorban, Rabbi Meir prohibits him from eating food belonging to the other individual? Lakorban apparently means la korban, it is not an offering. The reason for this opinion is that his statement indicates that what he does not eat is not an offering, but what he does eat shall be considered an offering. This poses a difficulty for us because Rabbi Meir does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement.

讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讗 谞注砖讛 讻讗讜诪专 诇拽专讘谉 讬讛讗 诇驻讬讻讱 诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 讞讜诇讬谉 诇讬讛讜讬 诇驻讬讻讱 诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱

And to answer this difficulty, Rabbi Abba said: It is as though he said: It shall be for an offering [lekorban], and therefore I will not eat that which is yours. Here too, when he said: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered la岣llin, this is what he said to him: It shall not be non-sacred, and therefore I will not eat that which is yours. Consequently, the vow should take effect even according to Rabbi Meir; why does the baraita rule that the vow does not take effect and the food remains permitted?

讛讗讬 转谞讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘讞讚讗 讜驻诇讬讙 注诇讬讛 讘讞讚讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻讜转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪讻诇诇 诇讗讜 讗转讛 砖讜诪注 讛讬谉 讜驻诇讬讙 注诇讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讘拽专讘谉

The Gemara answers: This tanna of the baraita holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir in one case and disagrees with his opinion in another. He holds in accordance with his opinion in one case, in that he does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. And he disagrees with his opinion in another case, i.e., in the case of an offering. This tanna holds that if one says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered lakorban, he does not mean: It is to be considered an offering and therefore I will not eat from that which is yours. Similarly, in the case in the baraita, the tanna does not hold that the individual means to say: It shall not be non-sacred and therefore I will not eat that which is yours. In order to effect a vow, one must express it clearly.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛讗 讚讗诪专 诇讞讜诇讬谉 讜讛讗 讚讗诪专 诇讗 诇讞讜诇讬谉 讚诪砖诪注 诇讗 诇讬讛讜讬 讞讜诇讬谉 讗诇讗 讻拽专讘谉

Rav Ashi said: The apparent contradiction between the baraita and the mishna can be resolved in a different manner. This case in the baraita is where he said: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered as non-sacred, and that case, where it is forbidden, in accordance with Rabbi Meir鈥檚 ruling in the mishna, is where he said: That which I will not eat of yours should not be considered as non-sacred, which indicates: It shall not be considered non-sacred but rather like an offering, and therefore I will not eat it.

讟讛讜专 讜讟诪讗 谞讜转专 讜驻讬讙讜诇 讗住讜专 讘注讬 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讛专讬 注诇讬 讻讘砖专 讝讘讞讬 砖诇诪讬诐 诇讗讞专 讝专讬拽转 讚诪讬诐 诪讛讜

搂 It is stated in the mishna that if one says that a food item shall be considered not ritually pure, or if he said the food shall be considered an offering that has become ritually impure, left over [notar], or piggul, i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time, it is forbidden. Rami bar 岣ma raises a dilemma: If one said with regard to a particular item: This is prohibited to me like the meat of peace-offerings after the sprinkling of their blood, what is the halakha? Is this an effective vow, which prohibits the item?

讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 讘讛讚讬谉 诇讬砖谞讗 讘讛讬转专讗 拽讗 诪转驻讬住 讗诇讗 讻讙讜谉 讚诪讞讬转 讘砖专 讝讘讞讬 砖诇诪讬诐 讜诪讞讬转 讚讛讬转专讗 讙讘讬讛 讜讗诪专 讝讛 讻讝讛 诪讗讬 讘注讬拽专讜 拽讗 诪转驻讬住 讗讜 讘讛讬转专讗 拽讗 诪转驻讬住

The Gemara responds: If he said it with this formulation, he is associating the object of his vow with a permitted item, as the meat of peace-offerings is permitted to be eaten after the blood is sprinkled on the altar. Consequently, the declaration does not express a vow. Rather, it is a case where he places the meat of peace-offerings following the sprinkling of the blood in one place, and he places an item that is permitted next to it. And he says: This is like that. In this case, what is the halakha? Is he associating the object of his vow with the original forbidden status of the peace-offering before the blood is sprinkled, or is he associating the object of his vow with the current permitted status of the peace-offering?

讗诪专 专讘讗 转讗 砖诪注 谞讜转专 讜驻讬讙讜诇

To resolve this question, Rava said: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If he said the food shall be considered an offering that has become notar or piggul, i.e. an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time, it is forbidden.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Nedarim 11

讙诪壮 住讘专讜讛 诪讗讬 诇讞讜诇讬谉 诇讗 诇讞讜诇讬谉 诇讬讛讜讬 讗诇讗 拽专讘谉

GEMARA: They assumed: What is the meaning of the term la岣llin? The individual is saying: It shall not [la] be non-sacred [岣llin] but rather it should have the status of an offering.

诪谞讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讗讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪讻诇诇 诇讗讜 讗转讛 砖讜诪注 讛谉 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讻诇 转谞讗讬 砖讗讬谞讜 讻转谞讗讬 讘谞讬 讙讚 讜讘谞讬 专讗讜讘谉 讗讬谞讜 转谞讗讬

The Gemara says: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? If you say it is that of Rabbi Meir, he does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Meir says that any condition that is not like the condition of the sons of the tribe of Gad and the sons of the tribe of Reuben, when Moses gave them land on the eastern bank of the Jordan River (see Numbers 32:29鈥30), is not a valid condition. Moses phrased the agreement as a double condition, stating that if they would join the other tribes in battle they would receive their inheritance on the eastern bank of the Jordan River, and if not, they would not receive that territory. Because Rabbi Meir holds that only a condition expressed in this manner is valid, it is clear that he holds that one may not infer a negative statement from a positive one or vice versa.

讗诇讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讛讗讜诪专 讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 诪讚住讬驻讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讬砖讗 诇讗讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗

Rather, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara challenges this statement: Say the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: One who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not said anything. From the fact that the latter clause is stated by Rabbi Yehuda, it is clear that the first clause is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讜讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 砖专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讛讗讜诪专 讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara responds: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and this is what it is teaching: Although one who declares an item to be like Jerusalem has taken a vow rendering it forbidden, one who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not taken a vow. This is as Rabbi Yehuda says, that one who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not said anything, since this expression has no meaning.

讜讻讬 讗诪专 讻讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讬 诪讬转住专 讜讛转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讛讗讜诪专 讻讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 注讚 砖讬讚讜专 讘讚讘专 讛拽专讘 讘讬专讜砖诇讬诐

The Gemara asks: When one says that an item should be like Jerusalem, is it prohibited according to Rabbi Yehuda? Isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: One who says that an item shall be considered like Jerusalem has not said anything unless he vows by means of an item that is sacrificed in Jerusalem. Consequently, the first clause of the mishna, which states that one has vowed if he declares an item to be like Jerusalem, cannot be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讜转专讬 转谞讗讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara responds: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the mishna and baraita express the opinions of two tanna鈥檌m in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

转谞讬讗 讞讜诇讬谉 讛讞讜诇讬谉 讻讞讜诇讬谉 讘讬谉 砖讗讜讻诇 诇讱 讜讘讬谉 砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱 诪讜转专 诇讞讜诇讬谉 砖讗讜讻诇 诇讱 讗住讜专 诇讞讜诇讬谉 诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱 诪讜转专

It is taught in a baraita: If one declares food: Non-sacred, or: The non-sacred, or: Like the non-sacred, then whether he combines that expression with the phrase: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I do not eat of yours, he has not expressed a vow and the food remains permitted. However, if he says: That which I eat of yours shall be considered la岣llin, i.e., not non-sacred, but rather consecrated, the food is forbidden. If he says: That which I do not eat of yours shall be considered la岣llin, the other individual鈥檚 food remains permitted to him.

专讬砖讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪讻诇诇 诇讗讜 讗转讛 砖讜诪注 讛讬谉

The Gemara analyzes this baraita: Who is the author of the first clause of the baraita? It is Rabbi Meir, who does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. Consequently, even if one said: That which I do not eat of yours shall be considered non-sacred, that does not indicate that what he does eat shall be considered consecrated.

讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 诇讞讜诇讬谉 诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱 诪讜转专 讜讛转谞谉 诇拽专讘谉 诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜住专 讜拽砖讬讗 诇谉 讛讗 诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪讻诇诇 诇讗讜 讗转讛 砖讜诪注 讛讬谉

However, say the latter clause of that baraita: If one says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered la岣llin, the other individual鈥檚 food remains permitted to him. But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (13a) that if one says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered lakorban, Rabbi Meir prohibits him from eating food belonging to the other individual? Lakorban apparently means la korban, it is not an offering. The reason for this opinion is that his statement indicates that what he does not eat is not an offering, but what he does eat shall be considered an offering. This poses a difficulty for us because Rabbi Meir does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement.

讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讗 谞注砖讛 讻讗讜诪专 诇拽专讘谉 讬讛讗 诇驻讬讻讱 诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 讞讜诇讬谉 诇讬讛讜讬 诇驻讬讻讱 诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱

And to answer this difficulty, Rabbi Abba said: It is as though he said: It shall be for an offering [lekorban], and therefore I will not eat that which is yours. Here too, when he said: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered la岣llin, this is what he said to him: It shall not be non-sacred, and therefore I will not eat that which is yours. Consequently, the vow should take effect even according to Rabbi Meir; why does the baraita rule that the vow does not take effect and the food remains permitted?

讛讗讬 转谞讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘讞讚讗 讜驻诇讬讙 注诇讬讛 讘讞讚讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻讜转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪讻诇诇 诇讗讜 讗转讛 砖讜诪注 讛讬谉 讜驻诇讬讙 注诇讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讘拽专讘谉

The Gemara answers: This tanna of the baraita holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir in one case and disagrees with his opinion in another. He holds in accordance with his opinion in one case, in that he does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. And he disagrees with his opinion in another case, i.e., in the case of an offering. This tanna holds that if one says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered lakorban, he does not mean: It is to be considered an offering and therefore I will not eat from that which is yours. Similarly, in the case in the baraita, the tanna does not hold that the individual means to say: It shall not be non-sacred and therefore I will not eat that which is yours. In order to effect a vow, one must express it clearly.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛讗 讚讗诪专 诇讞讜诇讬谉 讜讛讗 讚讗诪专 诇讗 诇讞讜诇讬谉 讚诪砖诪注 诇讗 诇讬讛讜讬 讞讜诇讬谉 讗诇讗 讻拽专讘谉

Rav Ashi said: The apparent contradiction between the baraita and the mishna can be resolved in a different manner. This case in the baraita is where he said: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered as non-sacred, and that case, where it is forbidden, in accordance with Rabbi Meir鈥檚 ruling in the mishna, is where he said: That which I will not eat of yours should not be considered as non-sacred, which indicates: It shall not be considered non-sacred but rather like an offering, and therefore I will not eat it.

讟讛讜专 讜讟诪讗 谞讜转专 讜驻讬讙讜诇 讗住讜专 讘注讬 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讛专讬 注诇讬 讻讘砖专 讝讘讞讬 砖诇诪讬诐 诇讗讞专 讝专讬拽转 讚诪讬诐 诪讛讜

搂 It is stated in the mishna that if one says that a food item shall be considered not ritually pure, or if he said the food shall be considered an offering that has become ritually impure, left over [notar], or piggul, i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time, it is forbidden. Rami bar 岣ma raises a dilemma: If one said with regard to a particular item: This is prohibited to me like the meat of peace-offerings after the sprinkling of their blood, what is the halakha? Is this an effective vow, which prohibits the item?

讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 讘讛讚讬谉 诇讬砖谞讗 讘讛讬转专讗 拽讗 诪转驻讬住 讗诇讗 讻讙讜谉 讚诪讞讬转 讘砖专 讝讘讞讬 砖诇诪讬诐 讜诪讞讬转 讚讛讬转专讗 讙讘讬讛 讜讗诪专 讝讛 讻讝讛 诪讗讬 讘注讬拽专讜 拽讗 诪转驻讬住 讗讜 讘讛讬转专讗 拽讗 诪转驻讬住

The Gemara responds: If he said it with this formulation, he is associating the object of his vow with a permitted item, as the meat of peace-offerings is permitted to be eaten after the blood is sprinkled on the altar. Consequently, the declaration does not express a vow. Rather, it is a case where he places the meat of peace-offerings following the sprinkling of the blood in one place, and he places an item that is permitted next to it. And he says: This is like that. In this case, what is the halakha? Is he associating the object of his vow with the original forbidden status of the peace-offering before the blood is sprinkled, or is he associating the object of his vow with the current permitted status of the peace-offering?

讗诪专 专讘讗 转讗 砖诪注 谞讜转专 讜驻讬讙讜诇

To resolve this question, Rava said: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If he said the food shall be considered an offering that has become notar or piggul, i.e. an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time, it is forbidden.

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