Nedarim 16

גמ׳ מני מתניתין רבי מאיר היא דאי רבי יהודה לא שני ליה קרבן ולא שני ליה הקרבן

GEMARA: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is apparently the opinion of Rabbi Meir. As, if it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, there is a contradiction, because he does not differentiate whether one takes a vow by saying: An offering, and he does not differentiate whether he takes a vow by saying: This offering. In both cases the vow does not take effect, as he did not use the phrase: Like an offering. The mishna, by contrast, indicates that only a vow that is phrased: An offering that I will not eat of yours, or: This offering that I will eat of yours, does not take effect. If it is phrased: An offering I will eat of yours, it takes effect, as it indicates that his eating will be like an offering.

אימא סיפא לקרבן לא אוכל לך מותר והתנן לקרבן לא אוכל לך רבי מאיר אוסר ואמר רבי אבא נעשה כאומר לקרבן יהא לפיכך לא אוכל לך

The Gemara continues its analysis: Say the latter clause of the mishna: If he says: That which I will not eat of yours is not an offering, the food is permitted. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in a mishna (13a) that if one said: That which I will not eat of yours will be for an offering [lekorban], Rabbi Meir forbids the food to him? And Rabbi Abba said that it is rendered as one who says: Your food will be to me for an offering; therefore, I will not eat of yours. The mishna appears to be incompatible with the opinion of Rabbi Meir as well.

לא קשיא הא דאמר לקרבן הא דאמר לא לקרבן דלא הוי קרבן קאמר

The Gemara answers that this is not difficult. That mishna is referring to one who said: For an offering [lekorban], and the vow therefore takes effect. This mishna is referring to one who said: Not for an offering [la lekorban], where he is saying that it should not be an offering, and therefore the vow does not take effect.

מתני׳ שבועה לא אוכל לך הא שבועה שאוכל לך לא שבועה לא אוכל לך אסור

MISHNA: If one says: An oath that I will not eat of yours, or: This is an oath that I will eat of yours [she’okhal lekha], or: Not an oath that I will not eat of yours, the food is forbidden.

גמ׳ מכלל דהא שבועה שאוכל לך דלא אכילנא משמע ורמינהו שבועות שתים שהן ארבע שאוכל ושלא אוכל שאכלתי ושלא אכלתי מדקאמר שלא אוכל שאכלתי ושלא אכלתי מכלל דשאוכל לך דאכילנא משמע

GEMARA: By inference from the mishna, it may be derived that the statement: This is an oath that I will eat of yours, indicates that I will not eat. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Shevuot 19b): There are two basic types of oaths that are in fact four: An oath that I will eat, and: That I will not eat; an oath that I ate, and: That I did not eat. From the fact that the mishna states: That I will eat, in contradistinction to: That I will not eat; that I ate, and in contradistinction: That I did not eat, it may be derived by inference that an oath that I will eat of yours [she’okhal lekha] indicates: An oath that I will eat. This contradicts our mishna.

אמר אביי שאוכל שתי לשונות משמע היו מסרבין בו לאכול ואמר אכילנא אכילנא ותו שבועה שאוכל דאכילנא משמע אבל אמר לא אכילנא לא אכילנא ותו אמר שבועה שאוכל דלא אכילנא קאמר

Abaye said: The phrase: That I will eat [she’okhal], indicates two expressions, depending on the context in which it is used. How so? If they were importuning [mesarevin] him to eat, and he said: I will eat, I will eat, and he furthermore said: An oath that I will eat [she’okhal], it indicates: That I will eat. However, if he said: I will not eat, I will not eat, and he furthermore said: An oath that I will eat [she’okhal], he is saying: That I will not eat. The oath is intended to reinforce his refusal to eat.

רב אשי אמר שאוכל דשבועה שאי אוכל קאמר אם כן פשיטא מאי למימרא מהו דתימא מיקם לישנא היא דאיתקיל ליה קא משמע לן

Rav Ashi said that the phrase: That I will eat [she’okhal], cited in the mishna with regard to an oath, is actually saying that he said: That I will not eat [she’i okhal]. The Gemara asks: If so, the prohibition is obvious, as he explicitly took an oath not to eat. What is the purpose of stating this halakha? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that he blundered in properly upholding the wording, i.e., he mispronounced the vow, as his intention was to say: An oath that I will eat [she’okhal], the mishna teaches us that he meant that he will not eat.

אביי לא אמר טעם כרב אשי דלא קתני שאי אוכל

Abaye did not state the reason for the ruling of the mishna that was stated by Rav Ashi, as the mishna does not teach the case of: That I will not eat [she’i okhal]. Rather, it teaches the case of that I will eat [she’okhal].

ורב אשי נאדי מן טעם דאביי קסבר שלא אוכל נמי משמע שתי לשונות היו מסרבין בו לאכול ואמר לא אכילנא לא אכילנא ואמר נמי שבועה בין שאוכל בין שלא אוכל הדין אכילנא משמע דאמר

And Rav Ashi turned away [nadei] from the reason that Abaye stated, because he held that the phrase: That I will not eat, also indicates two expressions, depending on the context. For example, if they were importuning him to eat and he said: I will not eat, I will not eat, and subsequently he also said: An oath, then, in this case, whether the wording of the oath was: That I will eat, or: That I will not eat, this expression indicates that he is saying: I will eat. The statement: An oath that I will not eat, should be interpreted rhetorically in this context: Did I take an oath that I will not eat? Certainly I did not, as I will eat.

ואיכא לתרוצה נמי לישנא שבועה שלא אוכל שבועה דלא אכילנא קאמר אלא תנא פסקה שאוכל דאכילנא משמע ושלא אוכל לא אוכל משמע

And there is also a way to interpret the expression: An oath that I will not eat, as indicating its straightforward meaning, i.e., that he is saying: An oath that I will not eat. Therefore, the mishna cannot be interpreted in this manner. Rather, the tanna in tractate Shevuot clearly established a principle: That I will eat, indicates that I will eat, and: That I will not eat, indicates I will not eat. Therefore, the correct version of the mishna must be: That I will not eat [she’i okhal].

מתני׳ זה חומר בשבועות מבנדרים וחומר בנדרים מבשבועות כיצד אמר קונם סוכה שאני עושה לולב שאני נוטל תפילין שאני מניח בנדרים אסור בשבועות מותר שאין נשבעין לעבור על המצות

MISHNA: This rule, that oaths can render actions, which do not have actual substance, either prohibited or obligatory, is a stringency of oaths vis-à-vis vows, which do not take effect with regard to matters that do not have actual substance. And there is also a stringency of vows vis-à-vis oaths. How so? With regard to one who said: Making a sukka is konam for me, or: Taking a lulav is konam for me, or: Donning phylacteries is konam for me, in the case of vows, the items are rendered forbidden, and he may not perform the mitzva until the vow is dissolved. However, in the case of similar oaths, these items are permitted, as one cannot take an oath to transgress the mitzvot.

גמ׳ חומר מכלל דנדר הוא והא מותר קתני

GEMARA: It is stated in the mishna: This is a stringency of oaths vis-à-vis vows. The Gemara presumes that the mishna is referring to the distinction stated in previous mishnayot between saying: An offering that I will not eat of yours, and saying: An oath that I will not eat of yours. The Gemara asks: Should it be derived by inference that the statement: An offering that I will not eat of yours, is a valid vow by rabbinic law, and it is merely less stringent than the corresponding oath, which takes effect by Torah law? But doesn’t the mishna teach that it is permitted for him to eat, implying that the vow does not take effect at all?

אסיפא דאידך בבא קתני שבועה שאיני ישן שאיני מדבר שאיני מהלך אסור זה חומר בשבועות מבנדרים

The Gemara answers: This is taught with regard to the latter clause of the other section. As opposed to a vow that is taken with regard to a matter that does not have actual substance, which takes effect only by rabbinic law, as articulated in the mishna (14b) and Gemara (15a), the subsequent mishna (15b) teaches that if someone says: An oath that I will not sleep, or: That I will not speak, or: That I will not walk, this activity is forbidden to him. It is concerning this contrast that the mishna says: This is a stringency of oaths vis-à-vis vows.

חומר בנדרים מבשבועות כיצד כו׳ רב כהנא מתני אמר רב גידל אמר רב ורב טביומי מתני אמר רב גידל אמר שמואל מנין שאין נשבעין לעבור על המצות תלמוד לומר לא יחל דברו דברו לא יחל אבל מיחל הוא לחפצי שמים

§ It is stated in the mishna that there is a stringency of vows vis-à-vis oaths. How so? Whereas a vow can override a mitzva, an oath cannot. Rav Kahana teaches that Rav Giddel said that Rav said, and Rav Tavyumei teaches the same statement with a different attribution, i.e., Rav Giddel said that Shmuel said: From where is it derived that one cannot take an oath to transgress the mitzvot? The verse states: “He shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3). It is inferred that his word, i.e., the prohibition he accepted upon himself, he shall not profane. However, he may profane it for the desires of Heaven. If he took an oath to act against the will of God, the oath does not take effect.

מאי שנא נדר דכתיב איש כי ידר נדר לה׳ לא יחל דברו שבועה נמי הא כתיב או השבע שבעה לה׳ לא יחל דברו

The Gemara asks: What is different about a vow that enables it to override mitzvot? Granted, as it is written in the Torah: “When a man takes a vow to the Lord…he shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3), which indicates that even with regard to matters that pertain to the Lord, i.e., mitzvot, one shall not profane his word, as the vow takes effect. However, with regard to an oath it is also written in the same verse: “Or swears an oath” to God, “he shall not profane his word.”

אמר אביי הא דאמר הנאת סוכה עלי הא דאמר שבועה שלא אהנה מן הסוכה

Abaye said: The distinction is not between oaths and vows per se, but rather between the phraseology in each case. How so? This case, in which the prohibition overrides the mitzva, is referring to one who said: The benefit derived from a sukka is hereby forbidden to me. Since the vow renders the sukka a forbidden object, it takes effect and overrides the mitzva, as one may not be fed what is forbidden to him, even if it is forbidden only to him. By contrast, that case, in which the prohibition does not take effect, is referring to one who said: I hereby take an oath that I will not derive benefit from the sukka. The oath does not take effect, as one is not entitled to take an oath to abstain from an act that he is obligated to perform.

אמר רבא וכי מצות ליהנות ניתנו אלא אמר רבא הא דאמר ישיבת סוכה עלי והא דאמר שבועה שלא אשב בסוכה

Rava said in objection to the explanation of Abaye: But were mitzvot given for the purpose of deriving benefit? The performance of mitzvot is not considered benefit. Why then would performance of the mitzva with the sukka be considered deriving benefit? Rather, Rava said a different explanation: This case is referring to one who said: Dwelling in a sukka is hereby prohibited to me, and that case is referring to one who said: I hereby take an oath that I will not dwell in a sukka.

ושאין נשבעין לעבור על המצות מהכא נפקא ליה מהתם נפקא ליה דתניא יכול נשבע לבטל את המצוה ולא ביטל יכול יהא חייב

§ The Gemara asks: And is the principle that one cannot take an oath to transgress the mitzvot derived from here, i.e., the above verse? It is derived from there, i.e., another verse, as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that if one takes an oath to nullify a mitzva and does not nullify it, one might have thought that he will be liable for violating an oath on a statement.