Today's Daf Yomi
June 11, 2015 | כ״ד בסיון תשע״ה
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This month's learning is sponsored by Sami Groff in honor of Shoshana Keats Jaskoll and Chochmat Nashim.
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Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.
Nedarim 18
ותיובתא דרב הונא
and this is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav Huna.
לא לעולם הריני נזיר היום הריני למחר ומאי עלתה לו לבר מההוא יומא יתירא אי נמי כגון שקיבל שתי נזירות בבת אחת
The Gemara answers: No, actually the case is where he said: I am hereby a nazirite today, I am hereby a nazirite tomorrow. And what is the meaning of the statement: The second term of naziriteship is counted for him instead of the first? It is counted except for that additional day, which he still must observe. Alternatively, it may be a case where he accepted upon himself two periods of naziriteship simultaneously, i.e., he said: I am hereby a nazirite twice. Therefore, when the vow with regard to the first term of naziriteship is dissolved, the days he observed count entirely for his second term.
מתיב רב המנונא נזיר להזיר מכאן שהנזירות חל על הנזירות שיכול והלא דין הוא ומה שבועה חמורה אין שבועה חלה על שבועה נזירות קלה לא כל שכן תלמוד לומר נזיר להזיר מכאן שהנזירות חלה על הנזירות
Rav Hamnuna raised an additional objection against the opinion of Rav Huna from a baraita. It is stated in the verse: “A nazirite, to consecrate [nazir lehazzir]” (Numbers 6:2). From the use of similar, repetitive wording in the verse here it is derived that naziriteship takes effect upon a prior vow of naziriteship. As one might have thought that it could be derived through an a fortiori inference that naziriteship does not take effect, as follows: And just as with regard to an oath, which is more stringent, an oath does not take effect upon a prior oath, with regard to naziriteship, which is more lenient, all the more so is it not clear that it does not take effect where a vow of naziriteship was already in effect? Therefore, the verse states: “Nazir lehazzir.” From here it is derived that naziriteship takes effect upon a prior vow of naziriteship.
היכי דמי אילימא דאמר הריני נזיר היום הריני נזיר למחר הא קרא בעיא אלא לאו דאמר הריני נזיר היום הריני נזיר היום וקתני נזירות חל על נזירות
What are the circumstances? If we say it is a case where one said: I am hereby a nazirite today, I am hereby a nazirite tomorrow, does that case require proof from a verse that it takes effect? It is obvious that the second vow of naziriteship takes effect at least on the additional day. And as the minimum term of naziriteship is thirty days, an additional thirty days must be observed. Rather, is it not a case where one said: I am a nazirite today, I am a nazirite today? And the baraita teaches that in this case as well, naziriteship takes effect upon a prior vow of naziriteship, contrary to the opinion of Rav Huna.
לא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שקיבל עליו שתי נזירות בבת אחת
The Gemara answers: That is not the case. Rather, with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he accepted upon himself two terms of naziriteship simultaneously. The baraita teaches that he must observe two terms of naziriteship and bring a separate offering for each.
ומאי חומרא דשבועה מנדר אילימא משום דחיילא אפילו על דבר שאין בו ממש נדר נמי חמור שכן חל על המצוה כרשות אלא משום דכתיב בה בשבועה לא ינקה
The baraita stated that an oath is more stringent than a vow. The Gemara asks: And what is the stringency of an oath vis-à-vis a vow, such as a vow of naziriteship? If we say the baraita posits this because an oath, unlike a vow, takes effect even with regard to a matter that has no actual substance, there is a counterargument that a vow also has stringency vis-à-vis an oath, in that it, unlike an oath, takes effect with regard to a mitzva just as it does with regard to a matter that is permitted. Rather, oaths are more stringent because it is written with regard to an oath: “The Lord will not hold guiltless he who takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:6).
שבועה שלא אוכל שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל אינו חייב אלא אחת אמר רבא אם נשאל על הראשונה שניה חלה עליו ממאי מדלא קתני אינו אלא אחת וקתני אינו חייב אלא אחת רווחא הוא דלית לה כי מיתשיל על חבירתה חיילא
§ It is taught in the mishna that if one said: I hereby take an oath that I will not eat, I hereby take an oath that I will not eat, and he then ate, he is liable to bring an offering for only one violation of an oath. Rava said: If he requested and received dissolution from a halakhic authority for the first oath, the second oath takes effect upon him. From where is this derived? From the fact that it is not taught in the mishna that there is only one, i.e., it is as though he took only one oath as the oaths are identical. Rather, it is taught that he is liable for only one. Evidently, he is not liable for the second oath only because it does not have a span of time in which to take effect, as he is already under oath not to eat. However, when he requests dissolution of the other oath, i.e. the first oath, the second oath has a span of time in which to take effect, and takes effect.
לישנא אחרינא חיובא הוא דליכא הא שבועה איכא למאי הלכתא לכדרבא דאמר רבא נשאל על הראשונה עלתה לו שניה תחתיה
Another version of Rava’s proof from the mishna is that it may be inferred from the statement: He is liable for only one, that although there is no liability to bring an offering for violating the second oath, there is an effective oath. But if there is no liability, then with regard to what halakha is it effective? Certainly it is effective with regard to the statement of Rava, as Rava said: If he requested and received dissolution from a halakhic authority for the first oath, the second is counted for him in its place.
לימא מסייע ליה מי שנדר שתי נזירות ומנה את הראשונה והפריש קרבן ונשאל עליה עלתה לו שניה בראשונה
The Gemara proposes: Let us say that the following mishna (Shevuot 27b) supports his opinion: In the case of one who took two vows of naziriteship, and counted the first term, and set aside an offering, and requested and received dissolution from a halakhic authority for the first oath, the second term counts for him instead of the first. Evidently, although initially the second term of naziriteship did not have a span of time in which to take effect, it was not completely void. Therefore, when the first vow was dissolved, the second one immediately took its place. It may be proved from here that this is true with regard to oaths as well.
כגון שקיבל עליו שתי נזירות בבת אחת
The Gemara refutes this proof: That mishna may be referring to a case where he accepted upon himself two terms of naziriteship simultaneously. Since two terms cannot be observed concurrently, when he accepts two terms simultaneously, the halakha is that the second term commences immediately following the close of the first, which immediately took effect upon sequential periods of time. However, when one takes an oath prohibiting himself from a matter that is already prohibited by an oath in the same period of time, the second oath may not take effect at all.
מתני׳ סתם נדרים להחמיר ופירושם להקל כיצד אמר הרי עלי כבשר מליח כיין נסך אם בשל שלמים נדר אסור
MISHNA: Unspecified vows are treated stringently, but their specification, if specification is necessary, is treated leniently. How so? If one said: This item is prohibited to me like salted meat, or: This item is prohibited to me like the wine used for libations, if he vowed in reference to meat or libations of a peace-offering, i.e., if he claimed that his intention was that the item will be forbidden to him like the salted meat of an offering, or like wine that is used for libations on the altar, it is forbidden, as he associated the item of the vow with an item forbidden by means of a vow, i.e., the offering.
אם בשל עבודה זרה נדר מותר ואם סתם אסור
If he claims that he vowed in reference to meat or libations of idol worship, i.e., that the item will be like the salted meat of an offering for an idol, or like wine that is used for libations as idol worship, it is permitted, as the item of the vow was associated with an item forbidden by the Torah. By enabling the one who took the vow to later clarify his intent, the vow is treated leniently. And if the vow was without specification, i.e., the one who took the vow did not specify whether his intention was to associate the item with an offering for Heaven or to associate the item with idol worship, it is forbidden.
הרי עלי כחרם אם כחרם של שמים אסור ואם כחרם של כהנים מותר ואם סתם אסור
Similarly, if one said: This item is hereby forbidden to me like an item dedicated to the Temple, if his intention was that it would be like a dedication to Heaven, which is a form of consecration, it is forbidden. And if his intention was that it would be like a dedication to priests, whereby one pledges his asset as a gift to priests, it is permitted, as this type of gift is not forbidden at all. And if he said it without specification, it is forbidden.
הרי עלי כמעשר אם כמעשר בהמה נדר אסור ואם של גורן מותר ואם סתם אסור
Likewise, if he said: This item is hereby forbidden to me like tithes, if he took a vow with the intention that it would be like the animal tithe, it is forbidden, as the item of the vow was associated with an item forbidden by a vow. And if his intention was that it will be like the tithe of the granary, i.e., grain that is given to the Levites and has no sanctity, it is permitted. And if he said it without specification, it is forbidden.
הרי עלי כתרומה אם כתרומת הלשכה נדר אסור ואם של גורן מותר ואם סתם אסור דברי רבי מאיר
Similarly, if he said: This item is hereby forbidden to me like teruma, if he took a vow with the intention that it would be like the collection of the Temple treasury chamber [terumat halishka], which is a tax for the communal offerings, it is forbidden, his vow was associated with an item forbidden by a vow. And if his intention was that it would be like teruma of the granary that is given to the priests, it is permitted, as teruma is not an item forbidden by a vow. And if the vow was taken without specification, it is forbidden. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
רבי יהודה אומר סתם תרומה ביהודה אסורה בגליל מותרת שאין אנשי גליל מכירין את תרומת הלשכה סתם חרמים ביהודה מותרין בגליל אסורין שאין אנשי גליל מכירין את חרמי הכהנים
Rabbi Yehuda says: Unspecified teruma in Judea is forbidden. However, in the Galilee it is permitted, as the people of the Galilee are unfamiliar with the collection of the chamber. When they say teruma they are referring to the teruma allotted to the priests, which is familiar to them. Conversely, unspecified dedications in Judea are permitted, but in the Galilee they are forbidden, as the people of the Galilee are unfamiliar with dedications allotted to the priests, so when they say dedication they are referring to dedication to Heaven.
גמ׳ והתנן ספק נזירות להקל
GEMARA: The Gemara raises a problem with the principle stated in the mishna that unspecified vows are treated stringently. But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Taharot 4:12): Uncertainty with regard to naziriteship is treated leniently? And naziriteship is a type of vow.
אמר רבי זירא לא קשיא הא רבי אליעזר הא רבנן דתניא המקדיש חייתו ובהמתו הקדיש את הכוי רבי אליעזר אומר לא הקדיש את הכוי
Rabbi Zeira said: This is not difficult. That mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with him. As it is taught in a baraita: One who consecrates his undomesticated animal and his domesticated animal has consecrated the koy as well, although it is uncertain whether it is an undomesticated or a domesticated animal. Rabbi Eliezer says: He has not consecrated the koy.
מאן דאמר ממונו מעייל לספיקא גופיה נמי מעייל ומאן דאמר ממונו לא מעייל לספיקא גופיה (נמי)
The Rabbis who said that one puts his possessions into a state of uncertainty, and therefore a koy is included in the aforementioned vow, hold that one enters himself into a state of uncertainty as well. Therefore, uncertainty with regard to naziriteship is treated stringently. And Rabbi Eliezer, who said that one does not put his possessions into a state of uncertainty, and therefore the phrase: Undomesticated and domesticated animals, refers only to definitely undomesticated and definitely domesticated animals,
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This month's learning is sponsored by Sami Groff in honor of Shoshana Keats Jaskoll and Chochmat Nashim.
-
Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.
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Nedarim 18
The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria
ותיובתא דרב הונא
and this is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav Huna.
לא לעולם הריני נזיר היום הריני למחר ומאי עלתה לו לבר מההוא יומא יתירא אי נמי כגון שקיבל שתי נזירות בבת אחת
The Gemara answers: No, actually the case is where he said: I am hereby a nazirite today, I am hereby a nazirite tomorrow. And what is the meaning of the statement: The second term of naziriteship is counted for him instead of the first? It is counted except for that additional day, which he still must observe. Alternatively, it may be a case where he accepted upon himself two periods of naziriteship simultaneously, i.e., he said: I am hereby a nazirite twice. Therefore, when the vow with regard to the first term of naziriteship is dissolved, the days he observed count entirely for his second term.
מתיב רב המנונא נזיר להזיר מכאן שהנזירות חל על הנזירות שיכול והלא דין הוא ומה שבועה חמורה אין שבועה חלה על שבועה נזירות קלה לא כל שכן תלמוד לומר נזיר להזיר מכאן שהנזירות חלה על הנזירות
Rav Hamnuna raised an additional objection against the opinion of Rav Huna from a baraita. It is stated in the verse: “A nazirite, to consecrate [nazir lehazzir]” (Numbers 6:2). From the use of similar, repetitive wording in the verse here it is derived that naziriteship takes effect upon a prior vow of naziriteship. As one might have thought that it could be derived through an a fortiori inference that naziriteship does not take effect, as follows: And just as with regard to an oath, which is more stringent, an oath does not take effect upon a prior oath, with regard to naziriteship, which is more lenient, all the more so is it not clear that it does not take effect where a vow of naziriteship was already in effect? Therefore, the verse states: “Nazir lehazzir.” From here it is derived that naziriteship takes effect upon a prior vow of naziriteship.
היכי דמי אילימא דאמר הריני נזיר היום הריני נזיר למחר הא קרא בעיא אלא לאו דאמר הריני נזיר היום הריני נזיר היום וקתני נזירות חל על נזירות
What are the circumstances? If we say it is a case where one said: I am hereby a nazirite today, I am hereby a nazirite tomorrow, does that case require proof from a verse that it takes effect? It is obvious that the second vow of naziriteship takes effect at least on the additional day. And as the minimum term of naziriteship is thirty days, an additional thirty days must be observed. Rather, is it not a case where one said: I am a nazirite today, I am a nazirite today? And the baraita teaches that in this case as well, naziriteship takes effect upon a prior vow of naziriteship, contrary to the opinion of Rav Huna.
לא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שקיבל עליו שתי נזירות בבת אחת
The Gemara answers: That is not the case. Rather, with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he accepted upon himself two terms of naziriteship simultaneously. The baraita teaches that he must observe two terms of naziriteship and bring a separate offering for each.
ומאי חומרא דשבועה מנדר אילימא משום דחיילא אפילו על דבר שאין בו ממש נדר נמי חמור שכן חל על המצוה כרשות אלא משום דכתיב בה בשבועה לא ינקה
The baraita stated that an oath is more stringent than a vow. The Gemara asks: And what is the stringency of an oath vis-à-vis a vow, such as a vow of naziriteship? If we say the baraita posits this because an oath, unlike a vow, takes effect even with regard to a matter that has no actual substance, there is a counterargument that a vow also has stringency vis-à-vis an oath, in that it, unlike an oath, takes effect with regard to a mitzva just as it does with regard to a matter that is permitted. Rather, oaths are more stringent because it is written with regard to an oath: “The Lord will not hold guiltless he who takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:6).
שבועה שלא אוכל שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל אינו חייב אלא אחת אמר רבא אם נשאל על הראשונה שניה חלה עליו ממאי מדלא קתני אינו אלא אחת וקתני אינו חייב אלא אחת רווחא הוא דלית לה כי מיתשיל על חבירתה חיילא
§ It is taught in the mishna that if one said: I hereby take an oath that I will not eat, I hereby take an oath that I will not eat, and he then ate, he is liable to bring an offering for only one violation of an oath. Rava said: If he requested and received dissolution from a halakhic authority for the first oath, the second oath takes effect upon him. From where is this derived? From the fact that it is not taught in the mishna that there is only one, i.e., it is as though he took only one oath as the oaths are identical. Rather, it is taught that he is liable for only one. Evidently, he is not liable for the second oath only because it does not have a span of time in which to take effect, as he is already under oath not to eat. However, when he requests dissolution of the other oath, i.e. the first oath, the second oath has a span of time in which to take effect, and takes effect.
לישנא אחרינא חיובא הוא דליכא הא שבועה איכא למאי הלכתא לכדרבא דאמר רבא נשאל על הראשונה עלתה לו שניה תחתיה
Another version of Rava’s proof from the mishna is that it may be inferred from the statement: He is liable for only one, that although there is no liability to bring an offering for violating the second oath, there is an effective oath. But if there is no liability, then with regard to what halakha is it effective? Certainly it is effective with regard to the statement of Rava, as Rava said: If he requested and received dissolution from a halakhic authority for the first oath, the second is counted for him in its place.
לימא מסייע ליה מי שנדר שתי נזירות ומנה את הראשונה והפריש קרבן ונשאל עליה עלתה לו שניה בראשונה
The Gemara proposes: Let us say that the following mishna (Shevuot 27b) supports his opinion: In the case of one who took two vows of naziriteship, and counted the first term, and set aside an offering, and requested and received dissolution from a halakhic authority for the first oath, the second term counts for him instead of the first. Evidently, although initially the second term of naziriteship did not have a span of time in which to take effect, it was not completely void. Therefore, when the first vow was dissolved, the second one immediately took its place. It may be proved from here that this is true with regard to oaths as well.
כגון שקיבל עליו שתי נזירות בבת אחת
The Gemara refutes this proof: That mishna may be referring to a case where he accepted upon himself two terms of naziriteship simultaneously. Since two terms cannot be observed concurrently, when he accepts two terms simultaneously, the halakha is that the second term commences immediately following the close of the first, which immediately took effect upon sequential periods of time. However, when one takes an oath prohibiting himself from a matter that is already prohibited by an oath in the same period of time, the second oath may not take effect at all.
מתני׳ סתם נדרים להחמיר ופירושם להקל כיצד אמר הרי עלי כבשר מליח כיין נסך אם בשל שלמים נדר אסור
MISHNA: Unspecified vows are treated stringently, but their specification, if specification is necessary, is treated leniently. How so? If one said: This item is prohibited to me like salted meat, or: This item is prohibited to me like the wine used for libations, if he vowed in reference to meat or libations of a peace-offering, i.e., if he claimed that his intention was that the item will be forbidden to him like the salted meat of an offering, or like wine that is used for libations on the altar, it is forbidden, as he associated the item of the vow with an item forbidden by means of a vow, i.e., the offering.
אם בשל עבודה זרה נדר מותר ואם סתם אסור
If he claims that he vowed in reference to meat or libations of idol worship, i.e., that the item will be like the salted meat of an offering for an idol, or like wine that is used for libations as idol worship, it is permitted, as the item of the vow was associated with an item forbidden by the Torah. By enabling the one who took the vow to later clarify his intent, the vow is treated leniently. And if the vow was without specification, i.e., the one who took the vow did not specify whether his intention was to associate the item with an offering for Heaven or to associate the item with idol worship, it is forbidden.
הרי עלי כחרם אם כחרם של שמים אסור ואם כחרם של כהנים מותר ואם סתם אסור
Similarly, if one said: This item is hereby forbidden to me like an item dedicated to the Temple, if his intention was that it would be like a dedication to Heaven, which is a form of consecration, it is forbidden. And if his intention was that it would be like a dedication to priests, whereby one pledges his asset as a gift to priests, it is permitted, as this type of gift is not forbidden at all. And if he said it without specification, it is forbidden.
הרי עלי כמעשר אם כמעשר בהמה נדר אסור ואם של גורן מותר ואם סתם אסור
Likewise, if he said: This item is hereby forbidden to me like tithes, if he took a vow with the intention that it would be like the animal tithe, it is forbidden, as the item of the vow was associated with an item forbidden by a vow. And if his intention was that it will be like the tithe of the granary, i.e., grain that is given to the Levites and has no sanctity, it is permitted. And if he said it without specification, it is forbidden.
הרי עלי כתרומה אם כתרומת הלשכה נדר אסור ואם של גורן מותר ואם סתם אסור דברי רבי מאיר
Similarly, if he said: This item is hereby forbidden to me like teruma, if he took a vow with the intention that it would be like the collection of the Temple treasury chamber [terumat halishka], which is a tax for the communal offerings, it is forbidden, his vow was associated with an item forbidden by a vow. And if his intention was that it would be like teruma of the granary that is given to the priests, it is permitted, as teruma is not an item forbidden by a vow. And if the vow was taken without specification, it is forbidden. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
רבי יהודה אומר סתם תרומה ביהודה אסורה בגליל מותרת שאין אנשי גליל מכירין את תרומת הלשכה סתם חרמים ביהודה מותרין בגליל אסורין שאין אנשי גליל מכירין את חרמי הכהנים
Rabbi Yehuda says: Unspecified teruma in Judea is forbidden. However, in the Galilee it is permitted, as the people of the Galilee are unfamiliar with the collection of the chamber. When they say teruma they are referring to the teruma allotted to the priests, which is familiar to them. Conversely, unspecified dedications in Judea are permitted, but in the Galilee they are forbidden, as the people of the Galilee are unfamiliar with dedications allotted to the priests, so when they say dedication they are referring to dedication to Heaven.
גמ׳ והתנן ספק נזירות להקל
GEMARA: The Gemara raises a problem with the principle stated in the mishna that unspecified vows are treated stringently. But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Taharot 4:12): Uncertainty with regard to naziriteship is treated leniently? And naziriteship is a type of vow.
אמר רבי זירא לא קשיא הא רבי אליעזר הא רבנן דתניא המקדיש חייתו ובהמתו הקדיש את הכוי רבי אליעזר אומר לא הקדיש את הכוי
Rabbi Zeira said: This is not difficult. That mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with him. As it is taught in a baraita: One who consecrates his undomesticated animal and his domesticated animal has consecrated the koy as well, although it is uncertain whether it is an undomesticated or a domesticated animal. Rabbi Eliezer says: He has not consecrated the koy.
מאן דאמר ממונו מעייל לספיקא גופיה נמי מעייל ומאן דאמר ממונו לא מעייל לספיקא גופיה (נמי)
The Rabbis who said that one puts his possessions into a state of uncertainty, and therefore a koy is included in the aforementioned vow, hold that one enters himself into a state of uncertainty as well. Therefore, uncertainty with regard to naziriteship is treated stringently. And Rabbi Eliezer, who said that one does not put his possessions into a state of uncertainty, and therefore the phrase: Undomesticated and domesticated animals, refers only to definitely undomesticated and definitely domesticated animals,
