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Today's Daf Yomi

June 19, 2015 | 讘壮 讘转诪讜讝 转砖注状讛

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Nedarim 26

Study Guide Nedarim 26


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讜专讘讗 讗诪专 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬诇讜 讛讬讬转讬 讬讜讚注 砖讗讘讗 讘讬谞讬讻诐 讛讬讬转讬 讗讜诪专 驻诇讜谞讬 讜驻诇讜谞讬 讗住讜专讬谉 讜讗讘讗 诪讜转专 讻讜诇诐 诪讜转专讬谉 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 讘讗讜诪专 讗讬诇讜 讛讬讬转讬 讬讜讚注 砖讗讘讗 讘讬谞讬讻诐 讛讬讬转讬 讗讜诪专 讻讜诇讻诐 讗住讜专讬谉 讞讜抓 诪讗讘讗

And Rava said: Everyone holds that anywhere that one says: Had I known that father was among you I would have said: So-and-so and so-and-so are prohibited to partake and father is permitted to do so, then all are permitted to partake. They disagree only in a case where one says: Had I known that father was among you I would have said: All of you are prohibited from partaking except for father.

讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 住讘专讬 诇讛 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚讗诪专 转驻讜住 诇砖讜谉 专讗砖讜谉

The rationale of the dispute is the following: Beit Shammai hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: If one initially makes one declaration and immediately afterward makes a conflicting declaration, hold him accountable for the first expression. Since he initially said: All of you are prohibited from partaking, this expression is the effective one and they are all prohibited from doing so. The addition of the words: Except for father, is viewed as a clarification of the previous expression, simply indicating that his father is not included in the prohibition.

讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 住讘专讬 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讘讙诪专 讚讘专讬讜 讗讚诐 谞转驻住

And by contrast, Beit Hillel hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: A person is held accountable even for the conclusion of his statement, and the second formulation is the primary one. Therefore, the fact that one altered his formulation to exclude his father from the prohibition means that the vow is partially canceled, and a vow that is partially dissolved is dissolved completely.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘 驻驻讗 诇专讘讗 讻讬爪讚 讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 谞讚专 砖讛讜转专 诪拽爪转讜 讛讜转专 讻讜诇讜 拽讜谞诐 砖讗讬谞讬 谞讛谞讛 诇讻讜诇讻诐 讛讜转专 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讛讜转专讜 讻讜诇诐 砖讗讬谞讬 谞讛谞讛 诇讗 诇讝讛 讜诇讝讛 讛讜转专 讛专讗砖讜谉 讛讜转专讜 讻讜诇诐 讛讜转专 讛讗讞专讜谉 讛讗讞专讜谉 诪讜转专 讜讻讜诇谉 讗住讜专讬谉

Rav Pappa raised an objection to Rava from the following mishna (66a): In what case did Rabbi Akiva say that a vow which was partially dissolved is dissolved completely? For example, if one said: The property of all of you is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, if benefit from one of them was permitted for whatever reason, benefit from all of them is permitted. However, if one said: The property of this one and of that one is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, then if benefit from the first one was permitted for whatever reason, benefit from all of them is permitted, but if benefit from the last one was permitted, benefit from the last one alone is permitted and benefit from all the others is forbidden.

讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘讛 诪讜拽讬诐 诇讛 诇专讬砖讗 讚讗诪专 诇讝讛 讜诇讝讛

Rav Pappa explains his objection: Rabba stated that when one qualifies his words by saying: I would have said all of you are prohibited from partaking except father, then all agree that everyone except his father is prohibited from doing so, but that when he adds to his words by saying: I would have said that so-and-so and so-and-so are prohibited from partaking and father is permitted to do so, there is a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabba, he establishes Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 first clause, where benefit from all is permitted, as a case where he retracts and says: I meant to say that the property of this one and of that one, but not that of so-and-so, is konam for me, which accords with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

讜住讬驻讗 讚讗诪专 诇讻讜诇讻诐

And the last clause of the mishna, in which benefit from the last one alone is permitted, but benefit from all the others remains forbidden, is a case where he retracts and says: The property of all of you is konam for me except for that of one of you. According to the opinion of Rabba, both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel would agree that in this case the one who stated the vow is permitted to benefit only from the one excluded from the vow.

讗诇讗 诇讚讬讚讱 讘砖诇诪讗 专讬砖讗 诪讜拽讬诐 诇讛 讚讗诪专 诇讻讜诇讻诐

But according to you, Rava, who holds that if he said: I would have said that so-and-so and so-and-so are prohibited to partake and father is permitted to do so, all concede that everyone is permitted to partake, and that the dispute pertains to when one says: I would have said that all of you are prohibited to partake except for father, granted, he establishes the first clause of Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 statement as a case where he retracts and says: The property of all of you is konam for me except for that of father, and benefit from all is permitted, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

讗诇讗 住讬驻讗 讚讗诪专 诇讝讛 讜诇讝讛 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讬讗 讗诪讗讬 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讜讛讗诪专转 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 诪讜转专

But as the latter clause of that mishna, in the case where he said: I intended to prohibit eating figs to this one and to that one, and they are all permitted to do so, is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, which is evident from the fact that this halakha is cited in his name, then according to your opinion why do the Rabbis disagree with him? But haven鈥檛 you said that all agree that they are all permitted to partake when the one who took the vow explains that he meant: To this one and to that one?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讜诇专讘讛 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讬 谞讬讞讗 住讬驻讗 讘诪讗讬 诪讜拽讬诐 诇讛 讚讗诪专 诇讻讜诇讻诐 讛讬 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 专讗砖讜谉 讜讛讬 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讗讞专讜谉

Rava said to Rav Pappa: And according to Rabba, whose opinion you are supporting with this objection, does the latter clause work out well according to Rabbi Akiva? In what case does he establish it? In a case where one retracted and said: From all of you, which of them is the first one and which of them is the last one? The mishna stated that if benefit from the last one was permitted, benefit from the last one alone is permitted and benefit from all the others is forbidden. If he is now saying: From all of you, who is the first and who is the last?

讗诇讗 专讬砖讗 讚讗诪专 诇讻讜诇讻诐 讜住讬驻讗 讻讙讜谉 砖转诇讗谉 讝讛 讘讝讛 讜讗诪专 驻诇讜谞讬 讻驻诇讜谞讬 讜驻诇讜谞讬 讻驻诇讜谞讬

Rather, Rava explains as follows: The first clause is referring to where he said: From all of you, and this follows the opinion of Beit Hillel, who say, according to Rava, that the entire vow is dissolved. And in the latter clause, i.e., the last two cases, it is referring to where he did not specify: From this one and from that one, but where, for example, he linked them to one another and said: So-and-so should be prohibited to partake like so-and-so, and so-and-so like so-and-so, but there is no general prohibition on all of them. Rather, each prohibition is linked to another one. Therefore, if the prohibition pertaining to the first individual is dissolved, then all those prohibitions linked to that one are dissolved as well.

讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚转谞讬讗 讛讜转专 讛讗诪爪注讬 讛讬诪谞讜 讜诇诪讟讛 诪讜转专讬谉 讜诇诪注诇讛 讗住讜专讬谉

The Gemara comments: The language is also precise, as it is taught in a baraita concerning this mishna: If the middle one in this chain of people prohibited by the vow from partaking was permitted to do so, then from him and below, i.e., those who were mentioned after him, are permitted to partake, and from him and above, i.e., those who were mentioned before him, are prohibited from partaking. This indicates that the mishna speaks about a case where the prohibitions are linked together. Therefore, the prohibition is dissolved for those who were mentioned after that individual whose prohibition is dissolved.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 诇专讘讗 拽讜谞诐 讘爪诇 砖讗谞讬 讟讜注诐 砖讛讘爪诇 专注 诇诇讘 讗诪专讜 诇讜 讜讛诇讗 讛讻讜驻专讬 讬驻讛 诇诇讘 讛讜转专 讘讻讜驻专讬 讜诇讗 讘讻讜驻专讬 讘诇讘讚 讛讜转专 讗诇讗 讘讻诇 讛讘爪诇讬诐 诪注砖讛 讛讬讛 讜讛转讬专讜 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘讻诇 讛讘爪诇讬诐

Rav Adda bar Ahava raised an objection to Rava: The mishna (66a) states that if one says: Onions are konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste them, because onions are bad for the heart, and others said to him: But isn鈥檛 the kuferi onion good for the heart, the vow is dissolved with regard to kuferi onions, and not only with regard to kuferi onions is it dissolved, but with regard to all types of onions. The mishna relates that an incident of this kind occurred, and Rabbi Meir dissolved the vow with regard to all types of onions.

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讗诪专 讗讬诇讜 讛讬讬转讬 讬讜讚注 砖讛讻讜驻专讬 讬驻讛 诇诇讘 讛讬讬转讬 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛讘爪诇讬诐 讗住讜专讬谉 讜讻讜驻专讬 诪讜转专

What, is it not speaking here of a case where that person said: Had I known that the kuferi onion is good for the heart I would have said: All onions are forbidden and the kuferi onion is permitted? This would be difficult for Rabba, who argues in similar cases that all opinions maintain that the other onions are forbidden, as well as for Rava, who would hold that only Beit Shammai, who follow the opinion of Rabbi Meir, maintain that all onions are forbidden in this type of case, and yet here Rabbi Meir himself permits all types of onions.

诇讗 讘讗讜诪专 讗讬诇讜 讛讬讬转讬 讬讜讚注 砖讛讻讜驻专讬 讬驻讛 诇诇讘 讛讬讬转讬 讗讜诪专 讘爪诇 驻诇讜谞讬 讜驻诇讜谞讬 讗住讜专讬谉 讜讻讜驻专讬 诪讜转专 讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉

The Gemara responds: No, this should be explained as a case where one says: If I had known that the kuferi onion is good for the heart, I would have said: Such an onion and such an onion are forbidden to me and the kuferi onion is permitted, and the opinion of Rabbi Meir is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and also in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. This is because, according to Rava, when one says: This one and that one, all agree that everything is permitted.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘讗 专讘讬 谞转谉 讗讜诪专 讬砖 谞讚专 砖诪拽爪转讜 诪讜转专 讜诪拽爪转讜 讗住讜专 讻讬爪讚 谞讚专 诪谉 讛讻诇讻诇讛

Ravina raised an objection to Rava: Rabbi Natan says there is a vow that is partially dissolved and partially binding. How so? One who took a vow that benefit from all the items in a basket be forbidden to him,

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Nedarim 26

讜专讘讗 讗诪专 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬诇讜 讛讬讬转讬 讬讜讚注 砖讗讘讗 讘讬谞讬讻诐 讛讬讬转讬 讗讜诪专 驻诇讜谞讬 讜驻诇讜谞讬 讗住讜专讬谉 讜讗讘讗 诪讜转专 讻讜诇诐 诪讜转专讬谉 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 讘讗讜诪专 讗讬诇讜 讛讬讬转讬 讬讜讚注 砖讗讘讗 讘讬谞讬讻诐 讛讬讬转讬 讗讜诪专 讻讜诇讻诐 讗住讜专讬谉 讞讜抓 诪讗讘讗

And Rava said: Everyone holds that anywhere that one says: Had I known that father was among you I would have said: So-and-so and so-and-so are prohibited to partake and father is permitted to do so, then all are permitted to partake. They disagree only in a case where one says: Had I known that father was among you I would have said: All of you are prohibited from partaking except for father.

讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 住讘专讬 诇讛 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚讗诪专 转驻讜住 诇砖讜谉 专讗砖讜谉

The rationale of the dispute is the following: Beit Shammai hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: If one initially makes one declaration and immediately afterward makes a conflicting declaration, hold him accountable for the first expression. Since he initially said: All of you are prohibited from partaking, this expression is the effective one and they are all prohibited from doing so. The addition of the words: Except for father, is viewed as a clarification of the previous expression, simply indicating that his father is not included in the prohibition.

讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 住讘专讬 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讘讙诪专 讚讘专讬讜 讗讚诐 谞转驻住

And by contrast, Beit Hillel hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: A person is held accountable even for the conclusion of his statement, and the second formulation is the primary one. Therefore, the fact that one altered his formulation to exclude his father from the prohibition means that the vow is partially canceled, and a vow that is partially dissolved is dissolved completely.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘 驻驻讗 诇专讘讗 讻讬爪讚 讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 谞讚专 砖讛讜转专 诪拽爪转讜 讛讜转专 讻讜诇讜 拽讜谞诐 砖讗讬谞讬 谞讛谞讛 诇讻讜诇讻诐 讛讜转专 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讛讜转专讜 讻讜诇诐 砖讗讬谞讬 谞讛谞讛 诇讗 诇讝讛 讜诇讝讛 讛讜转专 讛专讗砖讜谉 讛讜转专讜 讻讜诇诐 讛讜转专 讛讗讞专讜谉 讛讗讞专讜谉 诪讜转专 讜讻讜诇谉 讗住讜专讬谉

Rav Pappa raised an objection to Rava from the following mishna (66a): In what case did Rabbi Akiva say that a vow which was partially dissolved is dissolved completely? For example, if one said: The property of all of you is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, if benefit from one of them was permitted for whatever reason, benefit from all of them is permitted. However, if one said: The property of this one and of that one is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, then if benefit from the first one was permitted for whatever reason, benefit from all of them is permitted, but if benefit from the last one was permitted, benefit from the last one alone is permitted and benefit from all the others is forbidden.

讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘讛 诪讜拽讬诐 诇讛 诇专讬砖讗 讚讗诪专 诇讝讛 讜诇讝讛

Rav Pappa explains his objection: Rabba stated that when one qualifies his words by saying: I would have said all of you are prohibited from partaking except father, then all agree that everyone except his father is prohibited from doing so, but that when he adds to his words by saying: I would have said that so-and-so and so-and-so are prohibited from partaking and father is permitted to do so, there is a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabba, he establishes Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 first clause, where benefit from all is permitted, as a case where he retracts and says: I meant to say that the property of this one and of that one, but not that of so-and-so, is konam for me, which accords with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

讜住讬驻讗 讚讗诪专 诇讻讜诇讻诐

And the last clause of the mishna, in which benefit from the last one alone is permitted, but benefit from all the others remains forbidden, is a case where he retracts and says: The property of all of you is konam for me except for that of one of you. According to the opinion of Rabba, both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel would agree that in this case the one who stated the vow is permitted to benefit only from the one excluded from the vow.

讗诇讗 诇讚讬讚讱 讘砖诇诪讗 专讬砖讗 诪讜拽讬诐 诇讛 讚讗诪专 诇讻讜诇讻诐

But according to you, Rava, who holds that if he said: I would have said that so-and-so and so-and-so are prohibited to partake and father is permitted to do so, all concede that everyone is permitted to partake, and that the dispute pertains to when one says: I would have said that all of you are prohibited to partake except for father, granted, he establishes the first clause of Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 statement as a case where he retracts and says: The property of all of you is konam for me except for that of father, and benefit from all is permitted, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

讗诇讗 住讬驻讗 讚讗诪专 诇讝讛 讜诇讝讛 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讬讗 讗诪讗讬 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讜讛讗诪专转 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 诪讜转专

But as the latter clause of that mishna, in the case where he said: I intended to prohibit eating figs to this one and to that one, and they are all permitted to do so, is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, which is evident from the fact that this halakha is cited in his name, then according to your opinion why do the Rabbis disagree with him? But haven鈥檛 you said that all agree that they are all permitted to partake when the one who took the vow explains that he meant: To this one and to that one?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讜诇专讘讛 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讬 谞讬讞讗 住讬驻讗 讘诪讗讬 诪讜拽讬诐 诇讛 讚讗诪专 诇讻讜诇讻诐 讛讬 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 专讗砖讜谉 讜讛讬 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讗讞专讜谉

Rava said to Rav Pappa: And according to Rabba, whose opinion you are supporting with this objection, does the latter clause work out well according to Rabbi Akiva? In what case does he establish it? In a case where one retracted and said: From all of you, which of them is the first one and which of them is the last one? The mishna stated that if benefit from the last one was permitted, benefit from the last one alone is permitted and benefit from all the others is forbidden. If he is now saying: From all of you, who is the first and who is the last?

讗诇讗 专讬砖讗 讚讗诪专 诇讻讜诇讻诐 讜住讬驻讗 讻讙讜谉 砖转诇讗谉 讝讛 讘讝讛 讜讗诪专 驻诇讜谞讬 讻驻诇讜谞讬 讜驻诇讜谞讬 讻驻诇讜谞讬

Rather, Rava explains as follows: The first clause is referring to where he said: From all of you, and this follows the opinion of Beit Hillel, who say, according to Rava, that the entire vow is dissolved. And in the latter clause, i.e., the last two cases, it is referring to where he did not specify: From this one and from that one, but where, for example, he linked them to one another and said: So-and-so should be prohibited to partake like so-and-so, and so-and-so like so-and-so, but there is no general prohibition on all of them. Rather, each prohibition is linked to another one. Therefore, if the prohibition pertaining to the first individual is dissolved, then all those prohibitions linked to that one are dissolved as well.

讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚转谞讬讗 讛讜转专 讛讗诪爪注讬 讛讬诪谞讜 讜诇诪讟讛 诪讜转专讬谉 讜诇诪注诇讛 讗住讜专讬谉

The Gemara comments: The language is also precise, as it is taught in a baraita concerning this mishna: If the middle one in this chain of people prohibited by the vow from partaking was permitted to do so, then from him and below, i.e., those who were mentioned after him, are permitted to partake, and from him and above, i.e., those who were mentioned before him, are prohibited from partaking. This indicates that the mishna speaks about a case where the prohibitions are linked together. Therefore, the prohibition is dissolved for those who were mentioned after that individual whose prohibition is dissolved.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 诇专讘讗 拽讜谞诐 讘爪诇 砖讗谞讬 讟讜注诐 砖讛讘爪诇 专注 诇诇讘 讗诪专讜 诇讜 讜讛诇讗 讛讻讜驻专讬 讬驻讛 诇诇讘 讛讜转专 讘讻讜驻专讬 讜诇讗 讘讻讜驻专讬 讘诇讘讚 讛讜转专 讗诇讗 讘讻诇 讛讘爪诇讬诐 诪注砖讛 讛讬讛 讜讛转讬专讜 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘讻诇 讛讘爪诇讬诐

Rav Adda bar Ahava raised an objection to Rava: The mishna (66a) states that if one says: Onions are konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste them, because onions are bad for the heart, and others said to him: But isn鈥檛 the kuferi onion good for the heart, the vow is dissolved with regard to kuferi onions, and not only with regard to kuferi onions is it dissolved, but with regard to all types of onions. The mishna relates that an incident of this kind occurred, and Rabbi Meir dissolved the vow with regard to all types of onions.

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讗诪专 讗讬诇讜 讛讬讬转讬 讬讜讚注 砖讛讻讜驻专讬 讬驻讛 诇诇讘 讛讬讬转讬 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛讘爪诇讬诐 讗住讜专讬谉 讜讻讜驻专讬 诪讜转专

What, is it not speaking here of a case where that person said: Had I known that the kuferi onion is good for the heart I would have said: All onions are forbidden and the kuferi onion is permitted? This would be difficult for Rabba, who argues in similar cases that all opinions maintain that the other onions are forbidden, as well as for Rava, who would hold that only Beit Shammai, who follow the opinion of Rabbi Meir, maintain that all onions are forbidden in this type of case, and yet here Rabbi Meir himself permits all types of onions.

诇讗 讘讗讜诪专 讗讬诇讜 讛讬讬转讬 讬讜讚注 砖讛讻讜驻专讬 讬驻讛 诇诇讘 讛讬讬转讬 讗讜诪专 讘爪诇 驻诇讜谞讬 讜驻诇讜谞讬 讗住讜专讬谉 讜讻讜驻专讬 诪讜转专 讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉

The Gemara responds: No, this should be explained as a case where one says: If I had known that the kuferi onion is good for the heart, I would have said: Such an onion and such an onion are forbidden to me and the kuferi onion is permitted, and the opinion of Rabbi Meir is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and also in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. This is because, according to Rava, when one says: This one and that one, all agree that everything is permitted.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘讗 专讘讬 谞转谉 讗讜诪专 讬砖 谞讚专 砖诪拽爪转讜 诪讜转专 讜诪拽爪转讜 讗住讜专 讻讬爪讚 谞讚专 诪谉 讛讻诇讻诇讛

Ravina raised an objection to Rava: Rabbi Natan says there is a vow that is partially dissolved and partially binding. How so? One who took a vow that benefit from all the items in a basket be forbidden to him,

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