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Today's Daf Yomi

July 23, 2017 | 讻状讟 讘转诪讜讝 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Sanhedrin 6b

Study Guide Sanhedrin 6. Is compromise/mediation something that is a viable option? 聽Is it ideal? 聽Is it forbidden? 聽If it is allowed, at what point in the course of the case is it too late to use mediation? 聽Various opinions are suggested. 聽Various statements are brought regarding the seriousness with which a judge should have when ruling and the level of responsibility that he bears.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 砖谞讬诐 砖讚谞讜 诇讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讚讬谞讬讛诐 讚讬谉 讙讘专讗 讗讙讘专讗 拽讗 专诪讬转

And if you would say the Rabbis disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to the minimum number of judges necessary to adjudicate, but doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Abbahu say: With regard to a court of two judges that adjudicated cases of monetary law of any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a valid judgment, as a court with fewer than three judges is invalid? The Gemara rejects this question: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? Although Rabbi Abbahu asserts that all agree that two judges cannot issue a binding judgment, Shmuel differs. According to Shmuel, the Rabbis hold that the judgment of two judges is considered binding.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 砖谞讬诐 砖讚谞讜 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诇讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讚讬谞讬讛诐 讚讬谉 讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 诇专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讚谉 讗转 讛讚讬谉 讜讝讬讻讛 讗转 讛讞讬讬讘 讜讞讬讬讘 讗转 讛讝讻讗讬 讟讬诪讗 讗转 讛讟讛讜专 讟讬讛专 讗转 讛讟诪讗 诪讛 砖注砖讛 注砖讜讬 讜诪砖诇诐 诪讘讬转讜

搂 Since it was mentioned incidentally, the Gemara discusses the matter itself: Rabbi Abbahu says: With regard to a court of two judges that adjudicated cases of monetary law of any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a valid judgment. Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Rabbi Abbahu from a mishna (Bekhorot 28b): If a single judge adjudicated a case of monetary law and erroneously exonerated the litigant who should have been deemed liable, or deemed liable the litigant who should have been deemed exempt, or if one issued a halakhic ruling whereby he deemed ritually impure that which is actually pure, or deemed pure that which is impure, what he did is done, i.e., his ruling is binding. And the judge nevertheless pays from his house, i.e., from his own pocket, for the loss he has caused. Evidently, the ruling of even a single judge constitutes a valid judgment.

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚拽讬讘诇讜讛讜 注诇讬讬讛讜 讗讬 讛讻讬 讗诪讗讬 诪砖诇诐 诪讘讬转讜 讚讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讚讬讬谞转 诇谉 讚讬谉 转讜专讛

The Gemara responds: Here we are dealing with a case in which the litigants accepted the singular judge upon themselves, and it is for that reason that his ruling is binding. Otherwise, it would not be binding, as a halakhic court must contain a minimum of three judges. The Gemara asks: If so, that the litigants agreed to accept whatever ruling the judge issued, why must the judge pay from his own house? The Gemara answers: The judge is liable because the case is where they said to him: Adjudicate the case for us according to Torah law. Since he did not issue a halakhically proper judgment, he is liable.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 住驻专讗 诇专讘讬 讗讘讗 讚讟注讛 讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讟注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讜讛讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诪讬 讟注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讞讜讝专 讗诇讗 讚讟注讛 讘砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转

Rav Safra said to Rabbi Abba: This ruling applies when he erred in what respect? If we say that he erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, and he mistakenly ruled against an explicitly stated halakha, that is difficult. But doesn鈥檛 Rav Sheshet say that Rabbi Ami says: If the judge erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked and the case retried? Rather, the case is where he erred in his deliberation.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讘砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讻讙讜谉 转专讬 转谞讗讬 讜转专讬 讗诪讜专讗讬 讚驻诇讬讙讬 讗讛讚讚讬 讜诇讗 讗讬转诪专 讛诇讻转讗 诇讗 讻诪专 讜诇讗 讻诪专 讜住讜讙讬讬谉 讚注诇诪讗 讗诇讬讘讗 讚讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 讜讗讝诇 讗讬讛讜 讜注讘讚 讻讗讬讚讱 讛讬讬谞讜 砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of an error in deliberation? Rav Pappa said: The circumstances of an error in deliberation are where, for example, there are two tanna鈥檌m or two amora鈥檌m who disagree with one another, and the halakha was not stated in accordance with the opinion of one Sage or with the opinion of the other Sage; and the standard practice is in accordance with the opinion of one of them, and he went and executed the judgment in accordance with the other opinion; this is an error in deliberation.

诇讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬 讘讬爪讜注 讘砖诇砖讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 驻砖专讛 讘讬讞讬讚 住讘专讜讛 诇讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诪拽砖讬谞谉 驻砖专讛 诇讚讬谉

搂 The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Abbahu about a court composed of two judges is parallel to a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as detailed in the following baraita: Mediation can be performed by a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Compromise can be performed by even a single judge. The Sages assumed that everyone agrees that we compare compromise to judgment, and require the same amount of judges for each process.

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 讚讬谉 讘砖诇砖讛 讜诪专 住讘专 讚讬谉 讘砖谞讬诐 诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讚讬谉 讘砖诇砖讛 讜讛讻讗 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 诪拽砖讬谞谉 驻砖专讛 诇讚讬谉 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗 诪拽砖讬谞谉 驻砖专讛 诇讚讬谉

What, is it not that they disagree in this matter, that one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed by a minimum of three judges, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed even by two judges? The Gemara rejects this analysis: No, it is that everyone holds that judgment must be performed by a minimum of three judges, and here, they disagree with regard to this matter: One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that we compare compromise to judgment, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that we do not compare compromise to judgment.

诇讬诪讗 转诇转讗 转谞讗讬 讘驻砖专讛 讚诪专 住讘专 讘砖诇砖讛 讜诪专 住讘专 讘砖谞讬诐 讜诪专 住讘专 讘讬讞讬讚 讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讬诪专 讘专 砖诇诪讬讗 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 转专讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讞讚 谞诪讬 讜讛讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 转专讬 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讬讛讜讜 注诇讬讛 住讛讚讬

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that there are three opinions of tanna鈥檌m with regard to mediation leading to compromise, as one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that mediation must be performed by a panel of three judges; and one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that it can be performed by two judges; and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that it can be performed by a single judge. The Gemara rejects this suggestion. Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, and some say Rabbi Yeimar bar Shelamya, said: The one who says mediation must be performed by two judges would say that it may even be performed by one. And the reason that he says two is merely that there would be two witnesses to the proceedings, who could testify about them if necessary. In that way, neither side could later deny the terms of the compromise.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 驻砖专讛 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 拽谞讬谉 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 爪专讬讻讛 拽谞讬谉 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 爪专讬讻讛 转诇转讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 转住讙讬 讘转专讬 讜诇讬拽谞讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讜讛诇讻转讗 驻砖专讛 爪专讬讻讛 拽谞讬谉

Rav Ashi says: Learn from that discussion that compromise does not require a formal act of acquisition, which would legally transfer rights to the settlement payment to the other party. As if it enters your mind that compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms, according to the one who says it requires an act of acquisition, why do I need a formal court of three judges? Let it suffice with two judges, and let one litigant perform an act of acquisition with the other litigant to signify their commitment to abide by the compromise. If a formal act is required to grant halakhic force to the compromise, there is no advantage to having a panel of three judges with the status of a formal court. The Gemara concludes: But nevertheless, the halakha is that a compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讻砖诐 砖讛讚讬谉 讘砖诇砖讛 讻讱 讘讬爪讜注 讘砖诇砖讛

The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:2鈥8): Just as judgment is performed by three judges, so too, mediation is performed by three judges.

谞讙诪专 讛讚讬谉 讗讬 讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讘爪讜注

Once the verdict of the judgment has been issued, it is not permitted for you to mediate a dispute.

住专诪砖 讘谞拽砖 住讬诪谉 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谞讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 讗住讜专 诇讘爪讜注 讜讻诇 讛讘讜爪注 讛专讬 讝讛 讞讜讟讗 讜讻诇 讛诪讘专讱 讗转 讛讘讜爪注 讛专讬 讝讛 诪谞讗抓 讜注诇 讝讛 谞讗诪专 壮讘爪注 讘专讱 谞讗抓 讛壮壮

The Gemara presents a mnemonic device alluding to the names of tanna鈥檌m in the coming discussion: Samekh, reish, mem, shin; beit, nun, kuf, shin. The Tosefta cites several statements of tanna鈥檌m related to compromise and the term botze鈥檃. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: It is prohibited to mediate a dispute; and anyone who mediates [habotze鈥檃] a dispute is a sinner; and anyone who blesses the mediator is cursing God. And of this, it is stated: 鈥淎nd the covetous [botze鈥檃] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord鈥 (Psalms 10:3).

讗诇讗 讬拽讜讘 讛讚讬谉 讗转 讛讛专 砖谞讗诪专 壮讻讬 讛诪砖驻讟 诇讗诇讛讬诐 讛讜讗壮 讜讻谉 诪砖讛 讛讬讛 讗讜诪专 壮讬拽讜讘 讛讚讬谉 讗转 讛讛专壮 讗讘诇 讗讛专谉 讗讜讛讘 砖诇讜诐 讜专讜讚祝 砖诇讜诐 讜诪砖讬诐 砖诇讜诐 讘讬谉 讗讚诐 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖谞讗诪专 壮转讜专转 讗诪转 讛讬转讛 讘驻讬讛讜 讜注讜诇讛 诇讗 谞诪爪讗 讘砖驻转讬讜 讘砖诇讜诐 讜讘诪讬砖讜专 讛诇讱 讗转讬 讜专讘讬诐 讛砖讬讘 诪注讜谉壮

Rather, the judge must assure that the true judgment will prevail at all costs and metaphorically pierce the mountain, as it is stated: 鈥淔or the judgment is God鈥檚鈥 (Deuteronomy 1:17). And similarly, Moses would say: Let the judgment pierce the mountain. But by contrast, Aaron, whose role was not that of a judge, was a lover of peace and a pursuer of peace, and he would apply peace between one person and the other, as it is stated: 鈥淭he law of truth was in his mouth, and unrighteousness was not found in his lips; he walked with Me in peace and uprightness, and turned many away from iniquity鈥 (Malachi 2:6).

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讛专讬 砖讙讝诇 住讗讛 砖诇 讞讟讬诐 讜讟讞谞讛 讜讗驻讗讛 讜讛驻专讬砖 诪诪谞讛 讞诇讛 讻讬爪讚 诪讘专讱 讗讬谉 讝讛 诪讘专讱 讗诇讗 诪谞讗抓 讜注诇 讝讛 谞讗诪专 壮讜讘爪注 讘专讱 谞讗抓 讛壮壮

The Tosefta cites several other interpretations of the above-mentioned verse from Psalms. Rabbi Eliezer says: If one stole a se鈥檃 of wheat and ground it and baked it and separated 岣lla from it, i.e., separated the portion of the dough that must be given to the priests, how can he possibly recite the blessing on the mitzva of 岣lla? He is not blessing; rather, he is cursing God. And of this offense it is stated: 鈥淎nd the covetous [uvotze鈥檃] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,鈥 interpreted homiletically as: And whoever blesses upon breaking [botze鈥檃] the bread despises the Lord.

专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诇讗 谞讗诪专 讘讜爪注 讗诇讗 讻谞讙讚 讬讛讜讚讛 砖谞讗诪专 壮讜讬讗诪专 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诇 讗讞讬讜 诪讛 讘爪注 讻讬 谞讛专讙 讗转 讗讞讬谞讜壮 讜讻诇 讛诪讘专讱 讗转 讬讛讜讚讛 讛专讬 讝讛 诪谞讗抓 讜注诇 讝讛 谞讗诪专 壮讜讘爪注 讘专讱 谞讗抓 讛壮壮

Rabbi Meir says: The term botze鈥檃 employed in that verse was stated only with regard to Judah, as it is stated: 鈥淎nd Judah said to his brothers: What profit [betza] is it if we slay our brother and conceal his blood? Come, and let us sell him to the Ishmaelites鈥 (Genesis 37:26鈥27). And consequently, anyone who blesses Judah for this act is cursing God, and of this it is stated: 鈥淎nd the covetous [uvotze鈥檃] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,鈥 interpreted homiletically as: 鈥淎nd whoever blesses the profiteer [botze鈥檃] despises the Lord.鈥

专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讗讜诪专 诪爪讜讛 诇讘爪讜注 砖谞讗诪专 壮讗诪转 讜诪砖驻讟 砖诇讜诐 砖驻讟讜 讘砖注专讬讻诐壮 讜讛诇讗 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讬砖 诪砖驻讟 讗讬谉 砖诇讜诐 讜讘诪拽讜诐 砖讬砖 砖诇讜诐 讗讬谉 诪砖驻讟 讗诇讗 讗讬讝讛讜 诪砖驻讟 砖讬砖 讘讜 砖诇讜诐 讛讜讬 讗讜诪专 讝讛 讘讬爪讜注

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 says: It is a mitzva to mediate a dispute, as it is stated: 鈥淓xecute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates鈥 (Zechariah 8:16). Is it not that in the place where there is strict judgment there is no true peace, and in a place where there is true peace, there is no strict judgment? Rather, which is the judgment that has peace within it? You must say: This is mediation, as both sides are satisfied with the result.

讜讻谉 讘讚讜讚 讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 壮讜讬讛讬 讚讜讚 注砖讛 诪砖驻讟 讜爪讚拽讛壮 讜讛诇讗 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讬砖 诪砖驻讟 讗讬谉 爪讚拽讛 讜爪讚拽讛 讗讬谉 诪砖驻讟 讗诇讗 讗讬讝讛讜 诪砖驻讟 砖讬砖 讘讜 爪讚拽讛 讛讜讬 讗讜诪专 讝讛 讘讬爪讜注

And similarly, with regard to David, it says: 鈥淎nd David executed justice and charity to all his people鈥 (II聽Samuel 8:15). And is it not that wherever there is strict justice, there is no charity, and wherever there is charity, there is no strict justice? Rather, which is the justice that has within it charity? You must say: This is mediation.

讗转讗谉 诇转谞讗 拽诪讗 讚谉 讗转 讛讚讬谉 讝讬讻讛 讗转 讛讝讻讗讬 讜讞讬讬讘 讗转 讛讞讬讬讘 讜专讗讛 砖谞转讞讬讬讘 注谞讬 诪诪讜谉 讜砖诇诐 诇讜 诪转讜讱 讘讬转讜 讝讛 诪砖驻讟 讜爪讚拽讛

The Gemara cites an alternative interpretation of David鈥檚 method of judgment, in which we come to the opinion of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that it is prohibited to mediate a dispute: If a judge adjudicated a case of monetary law, and he correctly exonerated the party who was exempt from payment and deemed liable the party who was liable to pay, if he then saw that due to his ruling a poor person became liable to pay an amount of money that is beyond his means and therefore the judge himself paid for him from his own house, this is justice and also charity.

诪砖驻讟 诇讝讛 讜爪讚拽讛 诇讝讛 诪砖驻讟 诇讝讛 砖讛讞讝讬专 诇讜 诪诪讜谉 讜爪讚拽讛 诇讝讛 砖砖讬诇诐 诇讜 诪转讜讱 讘讬转讜 讜讻谉 讘讚讜讚 讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 壮讜讬讛讬 讚讜讚 注砖讛 诪砖驻讟 讜爪讚拽讛 诇讻诇 注诪讜壮 诪砖驻讟 诇讝讛 砖讛讞讝讬专 诇讜 讗转 诪诪讜谞讜 讜爪讚拽讛 诇讝讛 砖砖讬诇诐 诇讜 诪转讜讱 讘讬转讜

The Gemara continues: It is justice for this one and charity for that one: It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him; and it is charity for that poor person, because the judge paid for him from his own house. And similarly, with regard to David, it says: 鈥淎nd David executed justice and charity to all his people鈥 (II聽Samuel 8:15). He executed justice for this one, because he restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because he paid for him from his own house.

拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讛讗讬 诇讻诇 注诪讜 诇注谞讬讬诐 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 砖讬诇诐 诪转讜讱 讘讬转讜 讝讛讜 诪砖驻讟 讜爪讚拽讛 诪砖驻讟 诇讝讛 讜爪讚拽讛 诇讝讛 诪砖驻讟 诇讝讛 砖讛讞讝讬专 诇讜 诪诪讜谞讜 讜爪讚拽讛 诇讝讛 砖讛讜爪讬讗 讙讝讬诇讛 诪转讞转 讬讚讜

This interpretation of the verse is difficult for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. If the word 鈥渃harity鈥 is meant to demonstrate that David supported the poor defendants, this term: 鈥淭o all his people,鈥 is incorrect. If the interpretation is correct, it should have stated: Charity to the poor people. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Although he did not pay from his own house, it is still justice and charity. It is justice for this one and charity for that one. It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because the judge removed the stolen item from his possession. By adjudicating the case correctly and compelling the liable party to pay his debt, the judge thereby ensures that the liable party does not illegitimately maintain property to which he is not entitled.

专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诪谞住讬讗 讗讜诪专 砖谞讬诐 砖讘讗讜 诇驻谞讬讱 诇讚讬谉 注讚 砖诇讗 转砖诪注 讚讘专讬讛谉 讗讜 诪砖转砖诪注 讚讘专讬讛谉 讜讗讬 讗转讛 讬讜讚注 诇讛讬讻谉 讚讬谉 谞讜讟讛 讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讜诪专 诇讛谉 爪讗讜 讜讘爪注讜 诪砖转砖诪注 讚讘专讬讛谉 讜讗转讛 讬讜讚注 诇讛讬讻谉 讛讚讬谉 谞讜讟讛 讗讬 讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讜诪专 诇讛谉 爪讗讜 讜讘爪注讜 砖谞讗诪专 壮驻讜讟专 诪讬诐 专讗砖讬转 诪讚讜谉 讜诇驻谞讬 讛转讙诇注 讛专讬讘 谞讟讜砖壮 拽讜讚诐 砖谞转讙诇注 讛专讬讘 讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇谞讟砖讜 诪砖谞转讙诇注 讛专讬讘 讗讬 讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇谞讟砖讜

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: If two litigants come before you for a judgment, before you hear their respective statements and claims; or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, meaning that it is not yet clear to the judge which party is in the right, you are permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate. But after you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you are not permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate, as it is stated: 鈥淭he beginning of strife is as when one releases water; therefore leave off contention before the quarrel breaks out鈥 (Proverbs 17:14). Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya interprets the verse to mean: Before the resolution of the contention is revealed, you can cast it off. Once the resolution of the contention is revealed, you cannot cast it off.

讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 砖谞讬诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讚讬谉 讗讞讚 专讱 讜讗讞讚 拽砖讛 注讚 砖诇讗 转砖诪注 讚讘专讬讛诐 讗讜 诪砖转砖诪注 讚讘专讬讛谉 讜讗讬谉 讗转讛 讬讜讚注 诇讛讬讻谉 讚讬谉 谞讜讟讛 讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讜诪专 诇讛诐 讗讬谉 讗谞讬 谞讝拽拽 诇讻诐 砖诪讗 谞转讞讬讬讘 讞讝拽 讜谞诪爪讗 讞讝拽 专讜讚驻讜 诪砖转砖诪注 讚讘专讬讛谉 讜讗转讛 讬讜讚注 诇讛讬讻谉 讛讚讬谉 谞讜讟讛 讗讬 讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讜诪专 诇讛谉 讗讬谞讬 谞讝拽拽 诇讻诐 砖谞讗诪专 诇讗 转讙讜专讜 诪驻谞讬 讗讬砖

And Reish Lakish says: If two litigants come for a judgment, and one is flexible and agreeable and one is rigid and contentious, before you hear their respective statements, or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, it is permitted for you to say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you. The judge may refuse the case out of fear that perhaps the strong and contentious one will be found liable, and it will turn out that the strong one will pursue the judge with intent to harm him. But once you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you may not say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you, as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall not be afraid before any man鈥 (Deuteronomy 1:17).

专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讗讜诪专 诪谞讬讬谉 诇转诇诪讬讚 砖讬讜砖讘 诇驻谞讬 专讘讜 讜专讗讛 讝讻讜转 诇注谞讬 讜讞讜讘讛 诇注砖讬专 诪谞讬讬谉 砖诇讗 讬砖转讜拽 砖谞讗诪专 壮诇讗 转讙讜专讜 诪驻谞讬 讗讬砖壮 专讘讬 讞谞讬谉 讗讜诪专 诇讗 转讻谞讬住 讚讘专讬讱 诪驻谞讬 讗讬砖 讜讬讛讜 注讚讬诐 讬讜讚注讬诐 讗转 诪讬 讛谉 诪注讬讚讬谉 讜诇驻谞讬 诪讬 讛谉 诪注讬讚讬谉 讜诪讬 注转讬讚 诇讬驻专注 诪讛谉 砖谞讗诪专 壮讜注诪讚讜 砖谞讬 讛讗谞砖讬诐 讗砖专 诇讛诐 讛专讬讘 诇驻谞讬 讛壮壮

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 says: From where is it derived that a student who is sitting before his teacher and he sees a point of merit for a poor person or liability for a wealthy person, from where is it derived that he should not be silent? As it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall not be afraid before any man鈥; he should fear neither his teacher nor the wealthy litigant. Rabbi 岣nin says: The verse intimates: Do not suppress your statement before any man. And the witnesses should know about whom they are testifying, and before Whom they are testifying, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: 鈥淭hen both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Lord鈥 (Deuteronomy 19:17).

讜讬讛讜 讛讚讬讬谞讬谉 讬讜讚注讬谉 讗转 诪讬 讛谉 讚谞讬谉 讜诇驻谞讬 诪讬 讛谉 讚谞讬谉 讜诪讬 注转讬讚 诇讬驻专注 诪讛谉 砖谞讗诪专 壮讗诇讛讬诐 谞爪讘 讘注讚转 讗诇壮 讜讻谉 讘讬讛讜砖驻讟 讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 壮讜讬讗诪专 讗诇 讛砖驻讟讬诐 专讗讜 诪讛 讗转诐 注砖讬诐 讻讬 诇讗 诇讗讚诐 转砖驻讟讜 讻讬 讗诐 诇讛壮壮 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专 讛讚讬讬谉 诪讛 诇讬 讘爪注专 讛讝讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮注诪讻诐 讘讚讘专 诪砖驻讟壮 讗讬谉 诇讜 诇讚讬讬谉 讗诇讗 诪讛 砖注讬谞讬讜 专讜讗讜转

And the judges should know whom they are judging, and before Whom they are judging, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: 鈥淕od stands in the congregation of God鈥 (Psalms 82:1). And similarly, with regard to Jehoshaphat it says: 鈥淎nd he said to the judges: Consider what you do; for you judge not for man, but for the Lord鈥 (II聽Chronicles 19:6). And lest the judge say: What value is there for me with this suffering? Why should I engage in such a burdensome and difficult task? The verse states: 鈥淗e is with you in giving judgment,鈥 from which it is derived that in rendering his decision, a judge has only that which his eyes see. He is enjoined to render the best judgment possible based on the information he has available, and he is not accountable for anything else.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗讬砖 驻诇讜谞讬 讗转讛 讞讬讬讘 讗讬砖 驻诇讜谞讬 讗转讛 讝讻讗讬 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讗讬谞讬 讜讛讗 专讘 讛讜谞讗 转诇诪讬讚讬讛 讚专讘 讛讜讛 讻讬 讛讜讛 讗转讜 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗讬 讚讬谞讗 讘注讬转讜 讗讬 驻砖专讛 讘注讬转讜 诪讗讬 诪爪讜讛 谞诪讬 讚拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛

Earlier, the Tosefta stated that once the verdict has been issued, it is not permitted for the judge to arrange a compromise. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a verdict, i.e., what is the formal action that signifies the conclusion of the case? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is when the judge says: So-and-so, you are liable; so-and-so, you are exonerated. Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣, who said it is a mitzva to mediate a dispute. The Gemara asks: Is that so? And was it not that Rav Huna was a student of Rav, and when litigants would come before Rav Huna he would say to them: Do you want a strict judgment, or do you want a compromise? Evidently, Rav鈥檚 student Rav Huna did not hold that it is a mitzva to specifically arrange a compromise. The Gemara clarifies: What does Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 mean that he says it is a mitzva?

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Sanhedrin 6b

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Sanhedrin 6b

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 砖谞讬诐 砖讚谞讜 诇讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讚讬谞讬讛诐 讚讬谉 讙讘专讗 讗讙讘专讗 拽讗 专诪讬转

And if you would say the Rabbis disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to the minimum number of judges necessary to adjudicate, but doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Abbahu say: With regard to a court of two judges that adjudicated cases of monetary law of any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a valid judgment, as a court with fewer than three judges is invalid? The Gemara rejects this question: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? Although Rabbi Abbahu asserts that all agree that two judges cannot issue a binding judgment, Shmuel differs. According to Shmuel, the Rabbis hold that the judgment of two judges is considered binding.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 砖谞讬诐 砖讚谞讜 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诇讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讚讬谞讬讛诐 讚讬谉 讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 诇专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讚谉 讗转 讛讚讬谉 讜讝讬讻讛 讗转 讛讞讬讬讘 讜讞讬讬讘 讗转 讛讝讻讗讬 讟讬诪讗 讗转 讛讟讛讜专 讟讬讛专 讗转 讛讟诪讗 诪讛 砖注砖讛 注砖讜讬 讜诪砖诇诐 诪讘讬转讜

搂 Since it was mentioned incidentally, the Gemara discusses the matter itself: Rabbi Abbahu says: With regard to a court of two judges that adjudicated cases of monetary law of any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a valid judgment. Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Rabbi Abbahu from a mishna (Bekhorot 28b): If a single judge adjudicated a case of monetary law and erroneously exonerated the litigant who should have been deemed liable, or deemed liable the litigant who should have been deemed exempt, or if one issued a halakhic ruling whereby he deemed ritually impure that which is actually pure, or deemed pure that which is impure, what he did is done, i.e., his ruling is binding. And the judge nevertheless pays from his house, i.e., from his own pocket, for the loss he has caused. Evidently, the ruling of even a single judge constitutes a valid judgment.

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚拽讬讘诇讜讛讜 注诇讬讬讛讜 讗讬 讛讻讬 讗诪讗讬 诪砖诇诐 诪讘讬转讜 讚讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讚讬讬谞转 诇谉 讚讬谉 转讜专讛

The Gemara responds: Here we are dealing with a case in which the litigants accepted the singular judge upon themselves, and it is for that reason that his ruling is binding. Otherwise, it would not be binding, as a halakhic court must contain a minimum of three judges. The Gemara asks: If so, that the litigants agreed to accept whatever ruling the judge issued, why must the judge pay from his own house? The Gemara answers: The judge is liable because the case is where they said to him: Adjudicate the case for us according to Torah law. Since he did not issue a halakhically proper judgment, he is liable.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 住驻专讗 诇专讘讬 讗讘讗 讚讟注讛 讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讟注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讜讛讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诪讬 讟注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讞讜讝专 讗诇讗 讚讟注讛 讘砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转

Rav Safra said to Rabbi Abba: This ruling applies when he erred in what respect? If we say that he erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, and he mistakenly ruled against an explicitly stated halakha, that is difficult. But doesn鈥檛 Rav Sheshet say that Rabbi Ami says: If the judge erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked and the case retried? Rather, the case is where he erred in his deliberation.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讘砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讻讙讜谉 转专讬 转谞讗讬 讜转专讬 讗诪讜专讗讬 讚驻诇讬讙讬 讗讛讚讚讬 讜诇讗 讗讬转诪专 讛诇讻转讗 诇讗 讻诪专 讜诇讗 讻诪专 讜住讜讙讬讬谉 讚注诇诪讗 讗诇讬讘讗 讚讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 讜讗讝诇 讗讬讛讜 讜注讘讚 讻讗讬讚讱 讛讬讬谞讜 砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of an error in deliberation? Rav Pappa said: The circumstances of an error in deliberation are where, for example, there are two tanna鈥檌m or two amora鈥檌m who disagree with one another, and the halakha was not stated in accordance with the opinion of one Sage or with the opinion of the other Sage; and the standard practice is in accordance with the opinion of one of them, and he went and executed the judgment in accordance with the other opinion; this is an error in deliberation.

诇讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬 讘讬爪讜注 讘砖诇砖讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 驻砖专讛 讘讬讞讬讚 住讘专讜讛 诇讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诪拽砖讬谞谉 驻砖专讛 诇讚讬谉

搂 The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Abbahu about a court composed of two judges is parallel to a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as detailed in the following baraita: Mediation can be performed by a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Compromise can be performed by even a single judge. The Sages assumed that everyone agrees that we compare compromise to judgment, and require the same amount of judges for each process.

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 讚讬谉 讘砖诇砖讛 讜诪专 住讘专 讚讬谉 讘砖谞讬诐 诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讚讬谉 讘砖诇砖讛 讜讛讻讗 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 诪拽砖讬谞谉 驻砖专讛 诇讚讬谉 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗 诪拽砖讬谞谉 驻砖专讛 诇讚讬谉

What, is it not that they disagree in this matter, that one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed by a minimum of three judges, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed even by two judges? The Gemara rejects this analysis: No, it is that everyone holds that judgment must be performed by a minimum of three judges, and here, they disagree with regard to this matter: One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that we compare compromise to judgment, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that we do not compare compromise to judgment.

诇讬诪讗 转诇转讗 转谞讗讬 讘驻砖专讛 讚诪专 住讘专 讘砖诇砖讛 讜诪专 住讘专 讘砖谞讬诐 讜诪专 住讘专 讘讬讞讬讚 讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讬诪专 讘专 砖诇诪讬讗 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 转专讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讞讚 谞诪讬 讜讛讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 转专讬 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讬讛讜讜 注诇讬讛 住讛讚讬

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that there are three opinions of tanna鈥檌m with regard to mediation leading to compromise, as one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that mediation must be performed by a panel of three judges; and one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that it can be performed by two judges; and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that it can be performed by a single judge. The Gemara rejects this suggestion. Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, and some say Rabbi Yeimar bar Shelamya, said: The one who says mediation must be performed by two judges would say that it may even be performed by one. And the reason that he says two is merely that there would be two witnesses to the proceedings, who could testify about them if necessary. In that way, neither side could later deny the terms of the compromise.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 驻砖专讛 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 拽谞讬谉 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 爪专讬讻讛 拽谞讬谉 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 爪专讬讻讛 转诇转讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 转住讙讬 讘转专讬 讜诇讬拽谞讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讜讛诇讻转讗 驻砖专讛 爪专讬讻讛 拽谞讬谉

Rav Ashi says: Learn from that discussion that compromise does not require a formal act of acquisition, which would legally transfer rights to the settlement payment to the other party. As if it enters your mind that compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms, according to the one who says it requires an act of acquisition, why do I need a formal court of three judges? Let it suffice with two judges, and let one litigant perform an act of acquisition with the other litigant to signify their commitment to abide by the compromise. If a formal act is required to grant halakhic force to the compromise, there is no advantage to having a panel of three judges with the status of a formal court. The Gemara concludes: But nevertheless, the halakha is that a compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讻砖诐 砖讛讚讬谉 讘砖诇砖讛 讻讱 讘讬爪讜注 讘砖诇砖讛

The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:2鈥8): Just as judgment is performed by three judges, so too, mediation is performed by three judges.

谞讙诪专 讛讚讬谉 讗讬 讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讘爪讜注

Once the verdict of the judgment has been issued, it is not permitted for you to mediate a dispute.

住专诪砖 讘谞拽砖 住讬诪谉 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谞讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 讗住讜专 诇讘爪讜注 讜讻诇 讛讘讜爪注 讛专讬 讝讛 讞讜讟讗 讜讻诇 讛诪讘专讱 讗转 讛讘讜爪注 讛专讬 讝讛 诪谞讗抓 讜注诇 讝讛 谞讗诪专 壮讘爪注 讘专讱 谞讗抓 讛壮壮

The Gemara presents a mnemonic device alluding to the names of tanna鈥檌m in the coming discussion: Samekh, reish, mem, shin; beit, nun, kuf, shin. The Tosefta cites several statements of tanna鈥檌m related to compromise and the term botze鈥檃. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: It is prohibited to mediate a dispute; and anyone who mediates [habotze鈥檃] a dispute is a sinner; and anyone who blesses the mediator is cursing God. And of this, it is stated: 鈥淎nd the covetous [botze鈥檃] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord鈥 (Psalms 10:3).

讗诇讗 讬拽讜讘 讛讚讬谉 讗转 讛讛专 砖谞讗诪专 壮讻讬 讛诪砖驻讟 诇讗诇讛讬诐 讛讜讗壮 讜讻谉 诪砖讛 讛讬讛 讗讜诪专 壮讬拽讜讘 讛讚讬谉 讗转 讛讛专壮 讗讘诇 讗讛专谉 讗讜讛讘 砖诇讜诐 讜专讜讚祝 砖诇讜诐 讜诪砖讬诐 砖诇讜诐 讘讬谉 讗讚诐 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖谞讗诪专 壮转讜专转 讗诪转 讛讬转讛 讘驻讬讛讜 讜注讜诇讛 诇讗 谞诪爪讗 讘砖驻转讬讜 讘砖诇讜诐 讜讘诪讬砖讜专 讛诇讱 讗转讬 讜专讘讬诐 讛砖讬讘 诪注讜谉壮

Rather, the judge must assure that the true judgment will prevail at all costs and metaphorically pierce the mountain, as it is stated: 鈥淔or the judgment is God鈥檚鈥 (Deuteronomy 1:17). And similarly, Moses would say: Let the judgment pierce the mountain. But by contrast, Aaron, whose role was not that of a judge, was a lover of peace and a pursuer of peace, and he would apply peace between one person and the other, as it is stated: 鈥淭he law of truth was in his mouth, and unrighteousness was not found in his lips; he walked with Me in peace and uprightness, and turned many away from iniquity鈥 (Malachi 2:6).

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讛专讬 砖讙讝诇 住讗讛 砖诇 讞讟讬诐 讜讟讞谞讛 讜讗驻讗讛 讜讛驻专讬砖 诪诪谞讛 讞诇讛 讻讬爪讚 诪讘专讱 讗讬谉 讝讛 诪讘专讱 讗诇讗 诪谞讗抓 讜注诇 讝讛 谞讗诪专 壮讜讘爪注 讘专讱 谞讗抓 讛壮壮

The Tosefta cites several other interpretations of the above-mentioned verse from Psalms. Rabbi Eliezer says: If one stole a se鈥檃 of wheat and ground it and baked it and separated 岣lla from it, i.e., separated the portion of the dough that must be given to the priests, how can he possibly recite the blessing on the mitzva of 岣lla? He is not blessing; rather, he is cursing God. And of this offense it is stated: 鈥淎nd the covetous [uvotze鈥檃] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,鈥 interpreted homiletically as: And whoever blesses upon breaking [botze鈥檃] the bread despises the Lord.

专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诇讗 谞讗诪专 讘讜爪注 讗诇讗 讻谞讙讚 讬讛讜讚讛 砖谞讗诪专 壮讜讬讗诪专 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诇 讗讞讬讜 诪讛 讘爪注 讻讬 谞讛专讙 讗转 讗讞讬谞讜壮 讜讻诇 讛诪讘专讱 讗转 讬讛讜讚讛 讛专讬 讝讛 诪谞讗抓 讜注诇 讝讛 谞讗诪专 壮讜讘爪注 讘专讱 谞讗抓 讛壮壮

Rabbi Meir says: The term botze鈥檃 employed in that verse was stated only with regard to Judah, as it is stated: 鈥淎nd Judah said to his brothers: What profit [betza] is it if we slay our brother and conceal his blood? Come, and let us sell him to the Ishmaelites鈥 (Genesis 37:26鈥27). And consequently, anyone who blesses Judah for this act is cursing God, and of this it is stated: 鈥淎nd the covetous [uvotze鈥檃] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,鈥 interpreted homiletically as: 鈥淎nd whoever blesses the profiteer [botze鈥檃] despises the Lord.鈥

专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讗讜诪专 诪爪讜讛 诇讘爪讜注 砖谞讗诪专 壮讗诪转 讜诪砖驻讟 砖诇讜诐 砖驻讟讜 讘砖注专讬讻诐壮 讜讛诇讗 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讬砖 诪砖驻讟 讗讬谉 砖诇讜诐 讜讘诪拽讜诐 砖讬砖 砖诇讜诐 讗讬谉 诪砖驻讟 讗诇讗 讗讬讝讛讜 诪砖驻讟 砖讬砖 讘讜 砖诇讜诐 讛讜讬 讗讜诪专 讝讛 讘讬爪讜注

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 says: It is a mitzva to mediate a dispute, as it is stated: 鈥淓xecute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates鈥 (Zechariah 8:16). Is it not that in the place where there is strict judgment there is no true peace, and in a place where there is true peace, there is no strict judgment? Rather, which is the judgment that has peace within it? You must say: This is mediation, as both sides are satisfied with the result.

讜讻谉 讘讚讜讚 讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 壮讜讬讛讬 讚讜讚 注砖讛 诪砖驻讟 讜爪讚拽讛壮 讜讛诇讗 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讬砖 诪砖驻讟 讗讬谉 爪讚拽讛 讜爪讚拽讛 讗讬谉 诪砖驻讟 讗诇讗 讗讬讝讛讜 诪砖驻讟 砖讬砖 讘讜 爪讚拽讛 讛讜讬 讗讜诪专 讝讛 讘讬爪讜注

And similarly, with regard to David, it says: 鈥淎nd David executed justice and charity to all his people鈥 (II聽Samuel 8:15). And is it not that wherever there is strict justice, there is no charity, and wherever there is charity, there is no strict justice? Rather, which is the justice that has within it charity? You must say: This is mediation.

讗转讗谉 诇转谞讗 拽诪讗 讚谉 讗转 讛讚讬谉 讝讬讻讛 讗转 讛讝讻讗讬 讜讞讬讬讘 讗转 讛讞讬讬讘 讜专讗讛 砖谞转讞讬讬讘 注谞讬 诪诪讜谉 讜砖诇诐 诇讜 诪转讜讱 讘讬转讜 讝讛 诪砖驻讟 讜爪讚拽讛

The Gemara cites an alternative interpretation of David鈥檚 method of judgment, in which we come to the opinion of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that it is prohibited to mediate a dispute: If a judge adjudicated a case of monetary law, and he correctly exonerated the party who was exempt from payment and deemed liable the party who was liable to pay, if he then saw that due to his ruling a poor person became liable to pay an amount of money that is beyond his means and therefore the judge himself paid for him from his own house, this is justice and also charity.

诪砖驻讟 诇讝讛 讜爪讚拽讛 诇讝讛 诪砖驻讟 诇讝讛 砖讛讞讝讬专 诇讜 诪诪讜谉 讜爪讚拽讛 诇讝讛 砖砖讬诇诐 诇讜 诪转讜讱 讘讬转讜 讜讻谉 讘讚讜讚 讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 壮讜讬讛讬 讚讜讚 注砖讛 诪砖驻讟 讜爪讚拽讛 诇讻诇 注诪讜壮 诪砖驻讟 诇讝讛 砖讛讞讝讬专 诇讜 讗转 诪诪讜谞讜 讜爪讚拽讛 诇讝讛 砖砖讬诇诐 诇讜 诪转讜讱 讘讬转讜

The Gemara continues: It is justice for this one and charity for that one: It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him; and it is charity for that poor person, because the judge paid for him from his own house. And similarly, with regard to David, it says: 鈥淎nd David executed justice and charity to all his people鈥 (II聽Samuel 8:15). He executed justice for this one, because he restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because he paid for him from his own house.

拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讛讗讬 诇讻诇 注诪讜 诇注谞讬讬诐 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 砖讬诇诐 诪转讜讱 讘讬转讜 讝讛讜 诪砖驻讟 讜爪讚拽讛 诪砖驻讟 诇讝讛 讜爪讚拽讛 诇讝讛 诪砖驻讟 诇讝讛 砖讛讞讝讬专 诇讜 诪诪讜谞讜 讜爪讚拽讛 诇讝讛 砖讛讜爪讬讗 讙讝讬诇讛 诪转讞转 讬讚讜

This interpretation of the verse is difficult for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. If the word 鈥渃harity鈥 is meant to demonstrate that David supported the poor defendants, this term: 鈥淭o all his people,鈥 is incorrect. If the interpretation is correct, it should have stated: Charity to the poor people. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Although he did not pay from his own house, it is still justice and charity. It is justice for this one and charity for that one. It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because the judge removed the stolen item from his possession. By adjudicating the case correctly and compelling the liable party to pay his debt, the judge thereby ensures that the liable party does not illegitimately maintain property to which he is not entitled.

专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诪谞住讬讗 讗讜诪专 砖谞讬诐 砖讘讗讜 诇驻谞讬讱 诇讚讬谉 注讚 砖诇讗 转砖诪注 讚讘专讬讛谉 讗讜 诪砖转砖诪注 讚讘专讬讛谉 讜讗讬 讗转讛 讬讜讚注 诇讛讬讻谉 讚讬谉 谞讜讟讛 讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讜诪专 诇讛谉 爪讗讜 讜讘爪注讜 诪砖转砖诪注 讚讘专讬讛谉 讜讗转讛 讬讜讚注 诇讛讬讻谉 讛讚讬谉 谞讜讟讛 讗讬 讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讜诪专 诇讛谉 爪讗讜 讜讘爪注讜 砖谞讗诪专 壮驻讜讟专 诪讬诐 专讗砖讬转 诪讚讜谉 讜诇驻谞讬 讛转讙诇注 讛专讬讘 谞讟讜砖壮 拽讜讚诐 砖谞转讙诇注 讛专讬讘 讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇谞讟砖讜 诪砖谞转讙诇注 讛专讬讘 讗讬 讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇谞讟砖讜

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: If two litigants come before you for a judgment, before you hear their respective statements and claims; or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, meaning that it is not yet clear to the judge which party is in the right, you are permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate. But after you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you are not permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate, as it is stated: 鈥淭he beginning of strife is as when one releases water; therefore leave off contention before the quarrel breaks out鈥 (Proverbs 17:14). Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya interprets the verse to mean: Before the resolution of the contention is revealed, you can cast it off. Once the resolution of the contention is revealed, you cannot cast it off.

讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 砖谞讬诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讚讬谉 讗讞讚 专讱 讜讗讞讚 拽砖讛 注讚 砖诇讗 转砖诪注 讚讘专讬讛诐 讗讜 诪砖转砖诪注 讚讘专讬讛谉 讜讗讬谉 讗转讛 讬讜讚注 诇讛讬讻谉 讚讬谉 谞讜讟讛 讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讜诪专 诇讛诐 讗讬谉 讗谞讬 谞讝拽拽 诇讻诐 砖诪讗 谞转讞讬讬讘 讞讝拽 讜谞诪爪讗 讞讝拽 专讜讚驻讜 诪砖转砖诪注 讚讘专讬讛谉 讜讗转讛 讬讜讚注 诇讛讬讻谉 讛讚讬谉 谞讜讟讛 讗讬 讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讜诪专 诇讛谉 讗讬谞讬 谞讝拽拽 诇讻诐 砖谞讗诪专 诇讗 转讙讜专讜 诪驻谞讬 讗讬砖

And Reish Lakish says: If two litigants come for a judgment, and one is flexible and agreeable and one is rigid and contentious, before you hear their respective statements, or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, it is permitted for you to say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you. The judge may refuse the case out of fear that perhaps the strong and contentious one will be found liable, and it will turn out that the strong one will pursue the judge with intent to harm him. But once you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you may not say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you, as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall not be afraid before any man鈥 (Deuteronomy 1:17).

专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讗讜诪专 诪谞讬讬谉 诇转诇诪讬讚 砖讬讜砖讘 诇驻谞讬 专讘讜 讜专讗讛 讝讻讜转 诇注谞讬 讜讞讜讘讛 诇注砖讬专 诪谞讬讬谉 砖诇讗 讬砖转讜拽 砖谞讗诪专 壮诇讗 转讙讜专讜 诪驻谞讬 讗讬砖壮 专讘讬 讞谞讬谉 讗讜诪专 诇讗 转讻谞讬住 讚讘专讬讱 诪驻谞讬 讗讬砖 讜讬讛讜 注讚讬诐 讬讜讚注讬诐 讗转 诪讬 讛谉 诪注讬讚讬谉 讜诇驻谞讬 诪讬 讛谉 诪注讬讚讬谉 讜诪讬 注转讬讚 诇讬驻专注 诪讛谉 砖谞讗诪专 壮讜注诪讚讜 砖谞讬 讛讗谞砖讬诐 讗砖专 诇讛诐 讛专讬讘 诇驻谞讬 讛壮壮

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 says: From where is it derived that a student who is sitting before his teacher and he sees a point of merit for a poor person or liability for a wealthy person, from where is it derived that he should not be silent? As it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall not be afraid before any man鈥; he should fear neither his teacher nor the wealthy litigant. Rabbi 岣nin says: The verse intimates: Do not suppress your statement before any man. And the witnesses should know about whom they are testifying, and before Whom they are testifying, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: 鈥淭hen both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Lord鈥 (Deuteronomy 19:17).

讜讬讛讜 讛讚讬讬谞讬谉 讬讜讚注讬谉 讗转 诪讬 讛谉 讚谞讬谉 讜诇驻谞讬 诪讬 讛谉 讚谞讬谉 讜诪讬 注转讬讚 诇讬驻专注 诪讛谉 砖谞讗诪专 壮讗诇讛讬诐 谞爪讘 讘注讚转 讗诇壮 讜讻谉 讘讬讛讜砖驻讟 讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 壮讜讬讗诪专 讗诇 讛砖驻讟讬诐 专讗讜 诪讛 讗转诐 注砖讬诐 讻讬 诇讗 诇讗讚诐 转砖驻讟讜 讻讬 讗诐 诇讛壮壮 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专 讛讚讬讬谉 诪讛 诇讬 讘爪注专 讛讝讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮注诪讻诐 讘讚讘专 诪砖驻讟壮 讗讬谉 诇讜 诇讚讬讬谉 讗诇讗 诪讛 砖注讬谞讬讜 专讜讗讜转

And the judges should know whom they are judging, and before Whom they are judging, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: 鈥淕od stands in the congregation of God鈥 (Psalms 82:1). And similarly, with regard to Jehoshaphat it says: 鈥淎nd he said to the judges: Consider what you do; for you judge not for man, but for the Lord鈥 (II聽Chronicles 19:6). And lest the judge say: What value is there for me with this suffering? Why should I engage in such a burdensome and difficult task? The verse states: 鈥淗e is with you in giving judgment,鈥 from which it is derived that in rendering his decision, a judge has only that which his eyes see. He is enjoined to render the best judgment possible based on the information he has available, and he is not accountable for anything else.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗讬砖 驻诇讜谞讬 讗转讛 讞讬讬讘 讗讬砖 驻诇讜谞讬 讗转讛 讝讻讗讬 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讗讬谞讬 讜讛讗 专讘 讛讜谞讗 转诇诪讬讚讬讛 讚专讘 讛讜讛 讻讬 讛讜讛 讗转讜 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗讬 讚讬谞讗 讘注讬转讜 讗讬 驻砖专讛 讘注讬转讜 诪讗讬 诪爪讜讛 谞诪讬 讚拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛

Earlier, the Tosefta stated that once the verdict has been issued, it is not permitted for the judge to arrange a compromise. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a verdict, i.e., what is the formal action that signifies the conclusion of the case? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is when the judge says: So-and-so, you are liable; so-and-so, you are exonerated. Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣, who said it is a mitzva to mediate a dispute. The Gemara asks: Is that so? And was it not that Rav Huna was a student of Rav, and when litigants would come before Rav Huna he would say to them: Do you want a strict judgment, or do you want a compromise? Evidently, Rav鈥檚 student Rav Huna did not hold that it is a mitzva to specifically arrange a compromise. The Gemara clarifies: What does Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 mean that he says it is a mitzva?

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