Sanhedrin 6

וכי תימא פליגי רבנן עליה דרבן שמעון בן גמליאל והאמר רבי אבהו שנים שדנו לדברי הכל אין דיניהם דין גברא אגברא קא רמית

And if you would say the Rabbis disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to the minimum number of judges necessary to adjudicate, but doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say: With regard to a court of two judges that adjudicated cases of monetary law of any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a valid judgment, as a court with fewer than three judges is invalid? The Gemara rejects this question: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? Although Rabbi Abbahu asserts that all agree that two judges cannot issue a binding judgment, Shmuel differs. According to Shmuel, the Rabbis hold that the judgment of two judges is considered binding.

גופא אמר רבי אבהו שנים שדנו דיני ממונות לדברי הכל אין דיניהם דין איתיביה רבי אבא לרבי אבהו דן את הדין וזיכה את החייב וחייב את הזכאי טימא את הטהור טיהר את הטמא מה שעשה עשוי ומשלם מביתו

§ Since it was mentioned incidentally, the Gemara discusses the matter itself: Rabbi Abbahu says: With regard to a court of two judges that adjudicated cases of monetary law of any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a valid judgment. Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Rabbi Abbahu from a mishna (Bekhorot 28b): If a single judge adjudicated a case of monetary law and erroneously exonerated the litigant who should have been deemed liable, or deemed liable the litigant who should have been deemed exempt, or if one issued a halakhic ruling whereby he deemed ritually impure that which is actually pure, or deemed pure that which is impure, what he did is done, i.e., his ruling is binding. And the judge nevertheless pays from his house, i.e., from his own pocket, for the loss he has caused. Evidently, the ruling of even a single judge constitutes a valid judgment.

הכא במאי עסקינן דקיבלוהו עלייהו אי הכי אמאי משלם מביתו דאמרו ליה דיינת לן דין תורה

The Gemara responds: Here we are dealing with a case in which the litigants accepted the singular judge upon themselves, and it is for that reason that his ruling is binding. Otherwise, it would not be binding, as a halakhic court must contain a minimum of three judges. The Gemara asks: If so, that the litigants agreed to accept whatever ruling the judge issued, why must the judge pay from his own house? The Gemara answers: The judge is liable because the case is where they said to him: Adjudicate the case for us according to Torah law. Since he did not issue a halakhically proper judgment, he is liable.

אמר ליה רב ספרא לרבי אבא דטעה במאי אילימא דטעה בדבר משנה והאמר רב ששת אמר רבי אמי טעה בדבר משנה חוזר אלא דטעה בשיקול הדעת

Rav Safra said to Rabbi Abba: This ruling applies when he erred in what respect? If we say that he erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, and he mistakenly ruled against an explicitly stated halakha, that is difficult. But doesn’t Rav Sheshet say that Rabbi Ami says: If the judge erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked and the case retried? Rather, the case is where he erred in his deliberation.

היכי דמי בשיקול הדעת אמר רב פפא כגון תרי תנאי ותרי אמוראי דפליגי אהדדי ולא איתמר הלכתא לא כמר ולא כמר וסוגיין דעלמא אליבא דחד מינייהו ואזל איהו ועבד כאידך היינו שיקול הדעת

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of an error in deliberation? Rav Pappa said: The circumstances of an error in deliberation are where, for example, there are two tanna’im or two amora’im who disagree with one another, and the halakha was not stated in accordance with the opinion of one Sage or with the opinion of the other Sage; and the standard practice is in accordance with the opinion of one of them, and he went and executed the judgment in accordance with the other opinion; this is an error in deliberation.

לימא כתנאי ביצוע בשלשה דברי רבי מאיר וחכמים אומרים פשרה ביחיד סברוה לכולי עלמא מקשינן פשרה לדין

§ The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Abbahu about a court composed of two judges is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as detailed in the following baraita: Mediation can be performed by a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Compromise can be performed by even a single judge. The Sages assumed that everyone agrees that we compare compromise to judgment, and require the same amount of judges for each process.

מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר דין בשלשה ומר סבר דין בשנים לא דכולי עלמא דין בשלשה והכא בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר מקשינן פשרה לדין ומר סבר לא מקשינן פשרה לדין

What, is it not that they disagree in this matter, that one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed by a minimum of three judges, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed even by two judges? The Gemara rejects this analysis: No, it is that everyone holds that judgment must be performed by a minimum of three judges, and here, they disagree with regard to this matter: One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that we compare compromise to judgment, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that we do not compare compromise to judgment.

לימא תלתא תנאי בפשרה דמר סבר בשלשה ומר סבר בשנים ומר סבר ביחיד אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא ואיתימא רבי יימר בר שלמיא מאן דאמר תרי אפילו חד נמי והאי דקאמר תרי כי היכי דליהוו עליה סהדי

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that there are three opinions of tanna’im with regard to mediation leading to compromise, as one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that mediation must be performed by a panel of three judges; and one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that it can be performed by two judges; and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that it can be performed by a single judge. The Gemara rejects this suggestion. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, and some say Rabbi Yeimar bar Shelamya, said: The one who says mediation must be performed by two judges would say that it may even be performed by one. And the reason that he says two is merely that there would be two witnesses to the proceedings, who could testify about them if necessary. In that way, neither side could later deny the terms of the compromise.

אמר רב אשי שמע מינה פשרה אינה צריכה קנין דאי סלקא דעתך צריכה קנין למאן דאמר צריכה תלתא למה לי תסגי בתרי וליקני מיניה והלכתא פשרה צריכה קנין

Rav Ashi says: Learn from that discussion that compromise does not require a formal act of acquisition, which would legally transfer rights to the settlement payment to the other party. As if it enters your mind that compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms, according to the one who says it requires an act of acquisition, why do I need a formal court of three judges? Let it suffice with two judges, and let one litigant perform an act of acquisition with the other litigant to signify their commitment to abide by the compromise. If a formal act is required to grant halakhic force to the compromise, there is no advantage to having a panel of three judges with the status of a formal court. The Gemara concludes: But nevertheless, the halakha is that a compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms.

תנו רבנן כשם שהדין בשלשה כך ביצוע בשלשה

§ The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:2–8): Just as judgment is performed by three judges, so too, mediation is performed by three judges.

נגמר הדין אי אתה רשאי לבצוע

Once the verdict of the judgment has been issued, it is not permitted for you to mediate a dispute.

סרמש בנקש סימן רבי אליעזר בנו של רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר אסור לבצוע וכל הבוצע הרי זה חוטא וכל המברך את הבוצע הרי זה מנאץ ועל זה נאמר ׳בצע ברך נאץ ה׳׳

The Gemara presents a mnemonic device alluding to the names of tanna’im in the coming discussion: Samekh, reish, mem, shin; beit, nun, kuf, shin. The Tosefta cites several statements of tanna’im related to compromise and the term botze’a. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: It is prohibited to mediate a dispute; and anyone who mediates [habotze’a] a dispute is a sinner; and anyone who blesses the mediator is cursing God. And of this, it is stated: “And the covetous [botze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord” (Psalms 10:3).

אלא יקוב הדין את ההר שנאמר ׳כי המשפט לאלהים הוא׳ וכן משה היה אומר ׳יקוב הדין את ההר׳ אבל אהרן אוהב שלום ורודף שלום ומשים שלום בין אדם לחבירו שנאמר ׳תורת אמת היתה בפיהו ועולה לא נמצא בשפתיו בשלום ובמישור הלך אתי ורבים השיב מעון׳

Rather, the judge must assure that the true judgment will prevail at all costs and metaphorically pierce the mountain, as it is stated: “For the judgment is God’s” (Deuteronomy 1:17). And similarly, Moses would say: Let the judgment pierce the mountain. But by contrast, Aaron, whose role was not that of a judge, was a lover of peace and a pursuer of peace, and he would apply peace between one person and the other, as it is stated: “The law of truth was in his mouth, and unrighteousness was not found in his lips; he walked with Me in peace and uprightness, and turned many away from iniquity” (Malachi 2:6).

רבי אליעזר אומר הרי שגזל סאה של חטים וטחנה ואפאה והפריש ממנה חלה כיצד מברך אין זה מברך אלא מנאץ ועל זה נאמר ׳ובצע ברך נאץ ה׳׳

The Tosefta cites several other interpretations of the above-mentioned verse from Psalms. Rabbi Eliezer says: If one stole a se’a of wheat and ground it and baked it and separated ḥalla from it, i.e., separated the portion of the dough that must be given to the priests, how can he possibly recite the blessing on the mitzva of ḥalla? He is not blessing; rather, he is cursing God. And of this offense it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: And whoever blesses upon breaking [botze’a] the bread despises the Lord.

רבי מאיר אומר לא נאמר בוצע אלא כנגד יהודה שנאמר ׳ויאמר יהודה אל אחיו מה בצע כי נהרג את אחינו׳ וכל המברך את יהודה הרי זה מנאץ ועל זה נאמר ׳ובצע ברך נאץ ה׳׳

Rabbi Meir says: The term botze’a employed in that verse was stated only with regard to Judah, as it is stated: “And Judah said to his brothers: What profit [betza] is it if we slay our brother and conceal his blood? Come, and let us sell him to the Ishmaelites” (Genesis 37:26–27). And consequently, anyone who blesses Judah for this act is cursing God, and of this it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: “And whoever blesses the profiteer [botze’a] despises the Lord.”

רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר מצוה לבצוע שנאמר ׳אמת ומשפט שלום שפטו בשעריכם׳ והלא במקום שיש משפט אין שלום ובמקום שיש שלום אין משפט אלא איזהו משפט שיש בו שלום הוי אומר זה ביצוע

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: It is a mitzva to mediate a dispute, as it is stated: “Execute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates” (Zechariah 8:16). Is it not that in the place where there is strict judgment there is no true peace, and in a place where there is true peace, there is no strict judgment? Rather, which is the judgment that has peace within it? You must say: This is mediation, as both sides are satisfied with the result.

וכן בדוד הוא אומר ׳ויהי דוד עשה משפט וצדקה׳ והלא כל מקום שיש משפט אין צדקה וצדקה אין משפט אלא איזהו משפט שיש בו צדקה הוי אומר זה ביצוע

And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). And is it not that wherever there is strict justice, there is no charity, and wherever there is charity, there is no strict justice? Rather, which is the justice that has within it charity? You must say: This is mediation.

אתאן לתנא קמא דן את הדין זיכה את הזכאי וחייב את החייב וראה שנתחייב עני ממון ושלם לו מתוך ביתו זה משפט וצדקה

The Gemara cites an alternative interpretation of David’s method of judgment, in which we come to the opinion of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that it is prohibited to mediate a dispute: If a judge adjudicated a case of monetary law, and he correctly exonerated the party who was exempt from payment and deemed liable the party who was liable to pay, if he then saw that due to his ruling a poor person became liable to pay an amount of money that is beyond his means and therefore the judge himself paid for him from his own house, this is justice and also charity.

משפט לזה וצדקה לזה משפט לזה שהחזיר לו ממון וצדקה לזה ששילם לו מתוך ביתו וכן בדוד הוא אומר ׳ויהי דוד עשה משפט וצדקה לכל עמו׳ משפט לזה שהחזיר לו את ממונו וצדקה לזה ששילם לו מתוך ביתו

The Gemara continues: It is justice for this one and charity for that one: It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him; and it is charity for that poor person, because the judge paid for him from his own house. And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). He executed justice for this one, because he restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because he paid for him from his own house.

קשיא ליה לרבי האי לכל עמו לעניים מיבעי ליה אלא רבי אומר אף על פי שלא שילם מתוך ביתו זהו משפט וצדקה משפט לזה וצדקה לזה משפט לזה שהחזיר לו ממונו וצדקה לזה שהוציא גזילה מתחת ידו

This interpretation of the verse is difficult for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. If the word “charity” is meant to demonstrate that David supported the poor defendants, this term: “To all his people,” is incorrect. If the interpretation is correct, it should have stated: Charity to the poor people. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Although he did not pay from his own house, it is still justice and charity. It is justice for this one and charity for that one. It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because the judge removed the stolen item from his possession. By adjudicating the case correctly and compelling the liable party to pay his debt, the judge thereby ensures that the liable party does not illegitimately maintain property to which he is not entitled.

רבי שמעון בן מנסיא אומר שנים שבאו לפניך לדין עד שלא תשמע דבריהן או משתשמע דבריהן ואי אתה יודע להיכן דין נוטה אתה רשאי לומר להן צאו ובצעו משתשמע דבריהן ואתה יודע להיכן הדין נוטה אי אתה רשאי לומר להן צאו ובצעו שנאמר ׳פוטר מים ראשית מדון ולפני התגלע הריב נטוש׳ קודם שנתגלע הריב אתה יכול לנטשו משנתגלע הריב אי אתה יכול לנטשו

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: If two litigants come before you for a judgment, before you hear their respective statements and claims; or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, meaning that it is not yet clear to the judge which party is in the right, you are permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate. But after you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you are not permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate, as it is stated: “The beginning of strife is as when one releases water; therefore leave off contention before the quarrel breaks out” (Proverbs 17:14). Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya interprets the verse to mean: Before the resolution of the contention is revealed, you can cast it off. Once the resolution of the contention is revealed, you cannot cast it off.

וריש לקיש אמר שנים שבאו לדין אחד רך ואחד קשה עד שלא תשמע דבריהם או משתשמע דבריהן ואין אתה יודע להיכן דין נוטה אתה רשאי לומר להם אין אני נזקק לכם שמא נתחייב חזק ונמצא חזק רודפו משתשמע דבריהן ואתה יודע להיכן הדין נוטה אי אתה יכול לומר להן איני נזקק לכם שנאמר לא תגורו מפני איש

And Reish Lakish says: If two litigants come for a judgment, and one is flexible and agreeable and one is rigid and contentious, before you hear their respective statements, or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, it is permitted for you to say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you. The judge may refuse the case out of fear that perhaps the strong and contentious one will be found liable, and it will turn out that the strong one will pursue the judge with intent to harm him. But once you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you may not say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you, as it is stated: “You shall not be afraid before any man” (Deuteronomy 1:17).

רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר מניין לתלמיד שיושב לפני רבו וראה זכות לעני וחובה לעשיר מניין שלא ישתוק שנאמר ׳לא תגורו מפני איש׳ רבי חנין אומר לא תכניס דבריך מפני איש ויהו עדים יודעים את מי הן מעידין ולפני מי הן מעידין ומי עתיד ליפרע מהן שנאמר ׳ועמדו שני האנשים אשר להם הריב לפני ה׳׳

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: From where is it derived that a student who is sitting before his teacher and he sees a point of merit for a poor person or liability for a wealthy person, from where is it derived that he should not be silent? As it is stated: “You shall not be afraid before any man”; he should fear neither his teacher nor the wealthy litigant. Rabbi Ḥanin says: The verse intimates: Do not suppress your statement before any man. And the witnesses should know about whom they are testifying, and before Whom they are testifying, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: “Then both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Lord” (Deuteronomy 19:17).

ויהו הדיינין יודעין את מי הן דנין ולפני מי הן דנין ומי עתיד ליפרע מהן שנאמר ׳אלהים נצב בעדת אל׳ וכן ביהושפט הוא אומר ׳ויאמר אל השפטים ראו מה אתם עשים כי לא לאדם תשפטו כי אם לה׳׳ שמא יאמר הדיין מה לי בצער הזה תלמוד לומר ׳עמכם בדבר משפט׳ אין לו לדיין אלא מה שעיניו רואות

And the judges should know whom they are judging, and before Whom they are judging, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: “God stands in the congregation of God” (Psalms 82:1). And similarly, with regard to Jehoshaphat it says: “And he said to the judges: Consider what you do; for you judge not for man, but for the Lord” (II Chronicles 19:6). And lest the judge say: What value is there for me with this suffering? Why should I engage in such a burdensome and difficult task? The verse states: “He is with you in giving judgment,” from which it is derived that in rendering his decision, a judge has only that which his eyes see. He is enjoined to render the best judgment possible based on the information he has available, and he is not accountable for anything else.

היכי דמי גמר דין אמר רב יהודה אמר רב איש פלוני אתה חייב איש פלוני אתה זכאי אמר רב הלכה כרבי יהושע בן קרחה איני והא רב הונא תלמידיה דרב הוה כי הוה אתו לקמיה דרב הונא אמר להו אי דינא בעיתו אי פשרה בעיתו מאי מצוה נמי דקאמר רבי יהושע בן קרחה

Earlier, the Tosefta stated that once the verdict has been issued, it is not permitted for the judge to arrange a compromise. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a verdict, i.e., what is the formal action that signifies the conclusion of the case? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is when the judge says: So-and-so, you are liable; so-and-so, you are exonerated. Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, who said it is a mitzva to mediate a dispute. The Gemara asks: Is that so? And was it not that Rav Huna was a student of Rav, and when litigants would come before Rav Huna he would say to them: Do you want a strict judgment, or do you want a compromise? Evidently, Rav’s student Rav Huna did not hold that it is a mitzva to specifically arrange a compromise. The Gemara clarifies: What does Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa mean that he says it is a mitzva?