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Today's Daf Yomi

December 3, 2017 | 讟状讜 讘讻住诇讜 转砖注状讞

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Shevuot 4

When Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi聽wrote in the mishna聽“Shevuot 2 that are 4,” was it his own opinion also or was he just using Rabbi Akiva’s opinion but he actually doesn’t hold that way?聽 Rebbi holds that “v’nelam” means he knew and then forgot – does that word mean that?聽 By Sotah that word is mentioned and doesn’t mean that.聽聽The mishna states “Taking things out on Shabbat 2 that are 4” – this is different from the mishna in Shabbat that states that there are 2 that are 4 inside and 2 that are 4 outside.聽 What are the mishnayot in each place referring to?


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讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讝讜 讛讬讗 砖讘讜注转 讘讬讟讜讬 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讛 诪讻讜转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讛 拽专讘谉 注讜诇讛 讜讬讜专讚

he is liable for only one violation. Since the second oath did not prohibit any act in addition to the first oath, he is not liable for violating it. The mishna concludes: This is an oath on an utterance for which one is liable to receive lashes for its intentional violation, and to bring a sliding-scale offering for its unwitting violation.

讝讜 讛讬讗 讚讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讛 诪讻讜转 讗讘诇 讗讜讻诇 讜诇讗 讗讻诇 诇讗 诇拽讬

The Gemara infers from the formulation of the mishna: It is specifically this case of an oath on an utterance for which one is liable to receive lashes for its intentional violation. But if a person stated: On my oath I will eat, and then he did not eat, he is not flogged. Presumably this is because the violation does not involve any action. This mishna, then, can provide a basis for Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 ruling.

诪讻讚讬 讛讗讬 住转诪讗 讜讛讗讬 住转诪讗 诪讗讬 讞讝讬 讚注讘讬讚 讻讬 讛讗讬 住转诪讗 诇注讘讬讚 讻讬 讛讗讬 住转诪讗

The Gemara asks: Now, this mishna (27b) is unattributed and that mishna (2a) is unattributed. What did Rabbi Yo岣nan see that he practiced in accordance with this unattributed mishna? Let him instead practice in accordance with that unattributed mishna.

讜诇讟注诪讬讱 专讘讬 讙讜驻讬讛 讛讬讻讬 住转诐 诇谉 讛讻讗 讛讻讬 讜讛讻讗 讛讻讬

The Gemara adds another question: And according to your reasoning that both mishnayot carry equal weight, then with regard to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi himself, when he redacted the Mishna, how could he teach us as unattributed both this opinion in the mishna here and that opinion in the mishna there? This would result in a contradiction.

讗诇讗 诪注讬拽专讗 住讘专 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讜住转诪讛 讜讛讚专 住讘专 讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讜住转诪讛 讜诪砖谞讛 诇讗 讝讝讛 诪诪拽讜诪讛

Rather, it is apparent that initially Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi held that for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action one is flogged, and so he taught it as an unattributed mishna, and later he retracted his opinion and held that one is not flogged for a violation of such a prohibition, and so he taught that opinion as an unattributed mishna. And he left the first mishna (2a) as it was because a mishna does not move from its place, i.e., since the students had already learned that mishna it was deemed inappropriate to remove it. Based on this logic, Rabbi Yo岣nan ruled in accordance with the later mishna (27b).

讘诪讗讬 讗讜拽讬诪转讗 讻专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜诇诪诇拽讜转 诪专讗讜转 谞讙注讬诐 诪讗讬 诪诇拽讜转 讗讬讻讗 讘拽讜爪抓 讘讛专转讜 讜讻专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讬诇注讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讬诇注讗 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 讛砖诪专 驻谉 讜讗诇 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 诇讗 转注砖讛

The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with which opinion did you interpret the mishna? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and it is referring to liability to receive lashes. The Gemara questions this: But in the parallel case of shades of leprous marks, what punishment of lashes is there? The Gemara answers: There is a punishment of lashes in a case where one cuts off his snow-white leprous mark [baheret], and in accordance with the principle that Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile鈥檃 says, as Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile鈥檃 says: Wherever it is stated: Observe, or: Lest, or: Do not, it is nothing other than a prohibition. So too, with regard to leprosy, the verse states: 鈥淥bserve the leprous mark鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:8), which according to Rabbi Ile鈥檃鈥檚 principle teaches a prohibition, namely that it is prohibited to remove the mark. Accordingly, one who violates this prohibition is liable to receive lashes.

讬爪讬讗讜转 砖讘转 诪讗讬 诪诇拽讜转 讗讬讻讗 诇讗讜 砖谞讬转谉 诇讗讝讛专转 诪讬转转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讜讻诇 诇讗讜 砖谞讬转谉 诇讗讝讛专转 诪讬转转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 拽讗 诪讜拽诪讬谞讗 讻专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讚讗诪专 诇讗讜 砖谞讬转谉 诇讗讝讛专转 诪讬转转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜

The Gemara asks further: But in the parallel clause of acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, what punishment of lashes is there? The prohibition against doing so is a prohibition in the Torah that potentially serves as a mandate for court-imposed capital punishment, and the generally accepted principle is that with regard to a violation of any prohibition in the Torah that potentially serves as a mandate for court-imposed capital punishment, one is not flogged for its violation even if no death penalty is imposed, as that prohibition is punishable only by death. The Gemara answers: It is due to that reason that we interpreted the mishna to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, as he says that with regard to a prohibition in the Torah that potentially serves as a mandate for court-imposed capital punishment, one is flogged for its violation in a case where there is no actual death penalty.

讛讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 拽讬讬诪讗 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 拽砖讬讗 讬讚讬注讜转 诇讗讜 讗诪专转 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讛讬讗 讜诇诪诇拽讜转 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 谞诪讬 讜诇诪诇拽讜转

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that were it not for this reason, the mishna could be interpreted in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that one is not flogged for violating such prohibitions? But then the question raised above with regard to the mishna鈥檚 detailing of the cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods poses a difficulty, as Rabbi Akiva holds that one is not liable if he entered the Temple during a lapse of awareness of the fact that the place he entered was actually the Temple, whereas the mishna indicates one is liable in such a case. The Gemara answers: Didn鈥檛 you say above that it is possible to conclude that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael and the liability referred to in the mishna is for liability to receive lashes? Similarly, it is also possible to say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and the liability referred to in the mishna is for liability to receive lashes.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讬讚讬注讜转 讛转专讗讜转 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 转谞讬 讬讚讬注讜转 讚讛转专讗讜转

The Gemara asks: If so, why did the tanna use the term: Cases of awareness, which is generally used for cases in which the transgression was performed during a lack of awareness and then subsequent awareness is necessary in order for the person to be liable to bring an offering? The tanna should have instead said: Forewarnings, as the forewarning is a necessary condition to be able to give lashes for an intentional transgression. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; emend and teach the mishna as saying: Cases of awareness of forewarnings.

讗讬 讛讻讬 砖转讬诐 砖讛谉 讗专讘注 转专转讬 讛讜讗 讚讛讜讬讬谉 讜转讜 讗转 砖讬砖 讘讛 讬讚讬注讛 讘转讞诇讛 讜讬讚讬注讛 讘住讜祝 讜讛注诇诐 讘讬谞转讬诐 讛注诇诪讛 诇诪诇拽讜转 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚转讬讛 讜转讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讘注讜诇讛 讜讬讜专讚

The Gemara rejects the suggestion that the mishna is referring to liability to receive lashes: If so, if the mishna is referring to liability to receive lashes, why does it state that there are two types that are four? There are only two types. Since the person was forewarned he is certainly fully aware of all aspects of his transgression. Accordingly, there are only two cases of liability: For a ritually impure person who enters the Temple and for a ritually impure person who partakes of sacrificial foods. And furthermore, the continuation of the mishna states the case: In which one had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end, but had a lapse of awareness in between, when he actually transgressed. The Gemara asks: What is the relevance of lapses of awareness to one鈥檚 liability to receive lashes? And furthermore, that clause explicitly concludes: This person is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. Clearly then, the mishna is not referring to liability to receive lashes.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 专讘讬 讛讬讗 讜谞住讬讘 诇讛 讗诇讬讘讗 讚转谞讗讬 讘讬讚讬注讜转 谞住讬讘 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讘砖讘讜注讜转 谞住讬讘 诇讛 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

Having rejected the suggestion that the mishna is referring to liability to be punished with lashes, it addresses the difficulty raised above that the mishna鈥檚 ruling with regard to oaths does not accord with Rabbi Yishmael鈥檚 opinion and its ruling with regard to cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods does not accord with Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion. If so, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? Rather, Rav Yosef said: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and he formulates the mishna according to different tanna鈥檌m, as follows: With regard to cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, he formulates it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and with regard to oaths, he formulates it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专讬转讗 诇砖诪注转讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讜讗诪专 诇讬 诇讗 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 谞住讬讘 诇讛 讗诇讬讘讗 讚转谞讗讬 讜诇讬讛 诇讗 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛

Rav Ashi said: I said this statement of Rav Yosef before Rav Kahana, and he said to me: Do not say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi formulates the mishna according to different tanna鈥檌m but he himself does not hold accordingly.

讗诇讗 专讘讬 讟注诪讬讛 讚谞驻砖讬讛 诪驻专砖 讚转谞讬讗 诪谞讬谉 砖讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 注诇 砖讬砖 讘讛 讬讚讬注讛 讘转讞诇讛 讜讬讚讬注讛 讘住讜祝 讜讛注诇诐 讘讬谞转讬诐 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜谞注诇诐 讜谞注诇诐 砖谞讬 驻注诪讬诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

Rav Kahana continued: Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is explicating his own reasoning, as it is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering only for cases in which one had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end and had a lapse of awareness only in between, when he actually transgressed? The verses state with regard to a person鈥檚 awareness of the fact that he was impure: 鈥淎nd it was concealed,鈥 鈥渁nd it was concealed鈥 (Leviticus 5:2鈥3), mentioning concealment twice. The first mention is necessary to teach that one is liable to bring an offering only where he was unaware of his status at the time of the transgression. The second mention is superfluous and serves to teach an additional condition for liability, that one must have had awareness of his status before the transgression. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讗讜诪专

The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This proof is not necessary, as it says in the verse:

讜谞注诇诐 诪讻诇诇 讚讬讚注 讜讛讜讗 讬讚注 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖转讬 讬讚讬注讜转 讗诐 讻谉 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜谞注诇诐 讜谞注诇诐 诇讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛注诇诐 讟讜诪讗讛 讜注诇 讛注诇诐 诪拽讚砖

鈥淎nd it was concealed,鈥 which indicates, by inference, that initially he had been aware, and nevertheless the verse continues to state: 鈥淎nd he was aware鈥 (Leviticus 5:3). It emerges that the verse refers here to two different periods of awareness, one before the transgression and one afterward. But if so, why must the verses state: 鈥淎nd it was concealed,鈥 鈥渁nd it was concealed,鈥 mentioning it twice? It is in order to render one liable both for a violation due to a lapse of awareness of the fact he was ritually impure and for a violation due to a lapse of awareness of the fact that the place he entered was actually the Temple. From this baraita it is apparent that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agrees with Rabbi Yishmael鈥檚 opinion concerning which types of lapses of awareness render one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.

讗砖讻讞谉 讘讬讚讬注讜转 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讟注诪讬讛 讚谞驻砖讬讛 砖讘讜注讜转 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 讟注诪讬讛 讚谞驻砖讬讛 诪谞诇谉 住讘专讗 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: We have found with regard to cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi has explained his own reasoning and it accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. With regard to oaths, where he has not explained his own reasoning, from where do we derive that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning.

(诇讬砖谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讗砖讻讞谉 讘讬讚讬注讜转 讚住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讘砖讘讜注讜转 讚住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪谞诇谉 住讘专讗 讛讜讗)

The Gemara presents another formulation of the preceding comment: The Gemara asks: We have found an explicit statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi with regard to cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods indicating that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. With regard to oaths, from where do we derive that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 拽讗 诪讞讬讬讘 诇砖注讘专 讚讚专讬砖 专讬讘讜讬讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讬 专讘讬 谞诪讬 讚专讬砖 专讬讘讜讬讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讬

The Gemara explains the logical reasoning: What is the reason that Rabbi Akiva deems one liable for oaths pertaining to the past? The reason is that he expounds verses using the method of amplifications and restrictions (see 26a). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also expounds verses using the method of amplifications and restrictions, and consequently he arrives at the same opinion as Rabbi Akiva.

讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讘讻诇 驻讜讚讬谉 讘讻讜专 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪谉 讛砖讟专讜转 讜专讘谞谉 讗诪专讬 讘讻诇 驻讜讚讬谉 讘讻讜专 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪注讘讚讬诐 讜砖讟专讜转 讜拽专拽注讜转

The Gemara demonstrates its point: As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that one can redeem a woman鈥檚 firstborn son with any item worth five shekels, except for promissory notes. And the Rabbis say that one can redeem a woman鈥檚 firstborn son with any item worth five shekels, except for Canaanite slaves, promissory notes, and land.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讚专讬砖 专讬讘讜讬讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讬 讜驻讚讜讬讜 诪讘谉 讞讚砖 专讬讘讛 讘注专讻讱 讻住祝 讞诪砖转 砖拽诇讬诐 诪讬注讟 转驻讚讛 讞讝专 讜专讬讘讛

The Gemara explains: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? He expounds verses using the method of amplifications and restrictions. Accordingly, he expounds the verse: 鈥淎nd its redemption from one month shall you redeem, according to the valuation of five silver shekels by the sacred shekel鈥 (Numbers 18:16), as follows: Concerning the phrase: 鈥淎nd its redemption from one month,鈥 since it does not specify that only certain items can be used for the redemption, the verse amplified the category of items that can be used to redeem the firstborn, intimating that many different items can be used. Then, with the phrase: 鈥淎ccording to the valuation of five silver shekels,鈥 the verse restricted the category to items that are similar to silver shekels. Then, with the term: 鈥淪hall you redeem,鈥 the verse again amplified the category.

专讬讘讛 讜诪讬注讟 讜专讬讘讛 专讬讘讛 讛讻诇 诪讗讬 专讬讘讛 讻诇 诪讬诇讬 讜诪讗讬 诪讬注讟 诪讬注讟 砖讟专讜转

According to the hermeneutical principle that when a verse amplified and then restricted and then amplified, it amplified the relevant category to include everything except for the specific matter excluded in the restriction. The Gemara elaborates: What is included by the fact it amplified? Almost everything. And what is excluded by the fact it restricted? It restricted only promissory notes, which are the most fundamentally dissimilar to silver shekels.

讜专讘谞谉 讚专砖讬 讻诇诇讬 讜驻专讟讬 讜驻讚讜讬讜 诪讘谉 讞讚砖 讻诇诇 讘注专讻讱 讻住祝 讞诪砖转 砖拽诇讬诐 驻专讟 转驻讚讛 讞讝专 讜讻诇诇

The Gemara explains the reasoning of the Rabbis: And the Rabbis expound verses through the method of generalizations and details. Accordingly, they expound the verse as follows: The phrase: 鈥淎nd its redemption from one month,鈥 is a generalization which suggests that many different items can be used to redeem the firstborn. Then, the phrase: 鈥淎ccording to the valuation of five silver shekels,鈥 is a detail, which suggests that only items that are similar to silver shekels can be used. Then, with the term: 鈥淪hall you redeem,鈥 the verse again makes a generalization.

讻诇诇 讜驻专讟 讜讻诇诇 讗讬 讗转讛 讚谉 讗诇讗 讻注讬谉 讛驻专讟 诪讛 讛驻专讟 诪驻讜专砖 讚讘专 讛诪讟诇讟诇 讜讙讜驻讜 诪诪讜谉 讗祝 讻诇 讚讘专 讛诪讟诇讟诇 讜讙讜驻讜 诪诪讜谉 讬爪讗讜 拽专拽注讜转 砖讗讬谞谉 诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 讬爪讗讜 注讘讚讬诐 砖讛讜拽砖讜 诇拽专拽注讜转 讬爪讗讜 砖讟专讜转 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 讗讬谉 讙讜驻谉 诪诪讜谉

Based on this exegetical method, whenever a verse has a generalization and then a detail and then a generalization, the principle is that you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail; in this case, just as the detail, i.e., silver shekels, is explicitly something that is movable and has intrinsic monetary value, so too, anything that is movable and has intrinsic monetary value can be used. This excludes land, which is not movable property; it excludes Canaanite slaves, who are halakhically compared to land; and it excludes promissory notes, because even though they are movable property, they do not have intrinsic monetary value.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇讗诪讬诪专 专讘讬 讚专讬砖 专讬讘讜讬讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讬 讜讛讗 专讘讬 讻诇诇讬 讜驻专讟讬 讚专讬砖

Ravina said to Ameimar: Does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi really expound verses through the method of amplifications and restrictions? But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi expound verses through the method of generalizations and details?

讚转谞讬讗 诪专爪注 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 诪专爪注 诪谞讬谉 诇专讘讜转 讛住讜诇 讜讛住讬专讛 讛诪讞讟 讜讛诪拽讚讞 讜讛诪讻转讘 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜诇拽讞转 讻诇 讚讘专 砖谞诇拽讞 讘讬讚 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 诪专爪注 诪讛 诪专爪注 诪讬讜讞讚 砖诇 诪转讻转 讗祝 讻诇 砖诇 诪转讻转

This is as it is taught in a baraita: The Torah provides the process by which a Hebrew slave who has already completed his six years of servitude may continue on as a slave of his master: 鈥淎nd you shall take the awl and put it through his ear and in the door鈥 (Deuteronomy 15:17). From this verse, I have derived only that an awl can be used; from where do I know to include the thorn of a palm [hasol], and a thorn, a needle, and a gimlet, and a stylus for writing on wax, as valid tools for piercing his ear? The verse states: 鈥淎nd you shall take,鈥 which indicates that anything that can be taken by hand is a valid tool. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Not all these items can be used. Rather, since the verse specifies an 鈥渁wl,鈥 only items similar to an awl can be used; just as an awl is distinct in that it is fashioned of metal, so too, anything fashioned of metal can be used.

讜讗诪专讬谞谉 讘诪讗讬 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 专讘讬 讚专讬砖 讻诇诇讬 讜驻专讟讬 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚专讬砖

And we say with regard to this dispute: About what do they disagree? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi expounds verses using the method of generalizations and details, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, expounds verses

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Shevuot 4

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Shevuot 4

讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讝讜 讛讬讗 砖讘讜注转 讘讬讟讜讬 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讛 诪讻讜转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讛 拽专讘谉 注讜诇讛 讜讬讜专讚

he is liable for only one violation. Since the second oath did not prohibit any act in addition to the first oath, he is not liable for violating it. The mishna concludes: This is an oath on an utterance for which one is liable to receive lashes for its intentional violation, and to bring a sliding-scale offering for its unwitting violation.

讝讜 讛讬讗 讚讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讛 诪讻讜转 讗讘诇 讗讜讻诇 讜诇讗 讗讻诇 诇讗 诇拽讬

The Gemara infers from the formulation of the mishna: It is specifically this case of an oath on an utterance for which one is liable to receive lashes for its intentional violation. But if a person stated: On my oath I will eat, and then he did not eat, he is not flogged. Presumably this is because the violation does not involve any action. This mishna, then, can provide a basis for Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 ruling.

诪讻讚讬 讛讗讬 住转诪讗 讜讛讗讬 住转诪讗 诪讗讬 讞讝讬 讚注讘讬讚 讻讬 讛讗讬 住转诪讗 诇注讘讬讚 讻讬 讛讗讬 住转诪讗

The Gemara asks: Now, this mishna (27b) is unattributed and that mishna (2a) is unattributed. What did Rabbi Yo岣nan see that he practiced in accordance with this unattributed mishna? Let him instead practice in accordance with that unattributed mishna.

讜诇讟注诪讬讱 专讘讬 讙讜驻讬讛 讛讬讻讬 住转诐 诇谉 讛讻讗 讛讻讬 讜讛讻讗 讛讻讬

The Gemara adds another question: And according to your reasoning that both mishnayot carry equal weight, then with regard to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi himself, when he redacted the Mishna, how could he teach us as unattributed both this opinion in the mishna here and that opinion in the mishna there? This would result in a contradiction.

讗诇讗 诪注讬拽专讗 住讘专 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讜住转诪讛 讜讛讚专 住讘专 讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讜住转诪讛 讜诪砖谞讛 诇讗 讝讝讛 诪诪拽讜诪讛

Rather, it is apparent that initially Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi held that for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action one is flogged, and so he taught it as an unattributed mishna, and later he retracted his opinion and held that one is not flogged for a violation of such a prohibition, and so he taught that opinion as an unattributed mishna. And he left the first mishna (2a) as it was because a mishna does not move from its place, i.e., since the students had already learned that mishna it was deemed inappropriate to remove it. Based on this logic, Rabbi Yo岣nan ruled in accordance with the later mishna (27b).

讘诪讗讬 讗讜拽讬诪转讗 讻专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜诇诪诇拽讜转 诪专讗讜转 谞讙注讬诐 诪讗讬 诪诇拽讜转 讗讬讻讗 讘拽讜爪抓 讘讛专转讜 讜讻专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讬诇注讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讬诇注讗 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 讛砖诪专 驻谉 讜讗诇 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 诇讗 转注砖讛

The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with which opinion did you interpret the mishna? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and it is referring to liability to receive lashes. The Gemara questions this: But in the parallel case of shades of leprous marks, what punishment of lashes is there? The Gemara answers: There is a punishment of lashes in a case where one cuts off his snow-white leprous mark [baheret], and in accordance with the principle that Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile鈥檃 says, as Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile鈥檃 says: Wherever it is stated: Observe, or: Lest, or: Do not, it is nothing other than a prohibition. So too, with regard to leprosy, the verse states: 鈥淥bserve the leprous mark鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:8), which according to Rabbi Ile鈥檃鈥檚 principle teaches a prohibition, namely that it is prohibited to remove the mark. Accordingly, one who violates this prohibition is liable to receive lashes.

讬爪讬讗讜转 砖讘转 诪讗讬 诪诇拽讜转 讗讬讻讗 诇讗讜 砖谞讬转谉 诇讗讝讛专转 诪讬转转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讜讻诇 诇讗讜 砖谞讬转谉 诇讗讝讛专转 诪讬转转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 拽讗 诪讜拽诪讬谞讗 讻专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讚讗诪专 诇讗讜 砖谞讬转谉 诇讗讝讛专转 诪讬转转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜

The Gemara asks further: But in the parallel clause of acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, what punishment of lashes is there? The prohibition against doing so is a prohibition in the Torah that potentially serves as a mandate for court-imposed capital punishment, and the generally accepted principle is that with regard to a violation of any prohibition in the Torah that potentially serves as a mandate for court-imposed capital punishment, one is not flogged for its violation even if no death penalty is imposed, as that prohibition is punishable only by death. The Gemara answers: It is due to that reason that we interpreted the mishna to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, as he says that with regard to a prohibition in the Torah that potentially serves as a mandate for court-imposed capital punishment, one is flogged for its violation in a case where there is no actual death penalty.

讛讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 拽讬讬诪讗 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 拽砖讬讗 讬讚讬注讜转 诇讗讜 讗诪专转 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讛讬讗 讜诇诪诇拽讜转 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 谞诪讬 讜诇诪诇拽讜转

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that were it not for this reason, the mishna could be interpreted in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that one is not flogged for violating such prohibitions? But then the question raised above with regard to the mishna鈥檚 detailing of the cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods poses a difficulty, as Rabbi Akiva holds that one is not liable if he entered the Temple during a lapse of awareness of the fact that the place he entered was actually the Temple, whereas the mishna indicates one is liable in such a case. The Gemara answers: Didn鈥檛 you say above that it is possible to conclude that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael and the liability referred to in the mishna is for liability to receive lashes? Similarly, it is also possible to say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and the liability referred to in the mishna is for liability to receive lashes.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讬讚讬注讜转 讛转专讗讜转 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 转谞讬 讬讚讬注讜转 讚讛转专讗讜转

The Gemara asks: If so, why did the tanna use the term: Cases of awareness, which is generally used for cases in which the transgression was performed during a lack of awareness and then subsequent awareness is necessary in order for the person to be liable to bring an offering? The tanna should have instead said: Forewarnings, as the forewarning is a necessary condition to be able to give lashes for an intentional transgression. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; emend and teach the mishna as saying: Cases of awareness of forewarnings.

讗讬 讛讻讬 砖转讬诐 砖讛谉 讗专讘注 转专转讬 讛讜讗 讚讛讜讬讬谉 讜转讜 讗转 砖讬砖 讘讛 讬讚讬注讛 讘转讞诇讛 讜讬讚讬注讛 讘住讜祝 讜讛注诇诐 讘讬谞转讬诐 讛注诇诪讛 诇诪诇拽讜转 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚转讬讛 讜转讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讘注讜诇讛 讜讬讜专讚

The Gemara rejects the suggestion that the mishna is referring to liability to receive lashes: If so, if the mishna is referring to liability to receive lashes, why does it state that there are two types that are four? There are only two types. Since the person was forewarned he is certainly fully aware of all aspects of his transgression. Accordingly, there are only two cases of liability: For a ritually impure person who enters the Temple and for a ritually impure person who partakes of sacrificial foods. And furthermore, the continuation of the mishna states the case: In which one had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end, but had a lapse of awareness in between, when he actually transgressed. The Gemara asks: What is the relevance of lapses of awareness to one鈥檚 liability to receive lashes? And furthermore, that clause explicitly concludes: This person is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. Clearly then, the mishna is not referring to liability to receive lashes.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 专讘讬 讛讬讗 讜谞住讬讘 诇讛 讗诇讬讘讗 讚转谞讗讬 讘讬讚讬注讜转 谞住讬讘 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讘砖讘讜注讜转 谞住讬讘 诇讛 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

Having rejected the suggestion that the mishna is referring to liability to be punished with lashes, it addresses the difficulty raised above that the mishna鈥檚 ruling with regard to oaths does not accord with Rabbi Yishmael鈥檚 opinion and its ruling with regard to cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods does not accord with Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion. If so, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? Rather, Rav Yosef said: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and he formulates the mishna according to different tanna鈥檌m, as follows: With regard to cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, he formulates it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and with regard to oaths, he formulates it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专讬转讗 诇砖诪注转讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讜讗诪专 诇讬 诇讗 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 谞住讬讘 诇讛 讗诇讬讘讗 讚转谞讗讬 讜诇讬讛 诇讗 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛

Rav Ashi said: I said this statement of Rav Yosef before Rav Kahana, and he said to me: Do not say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi formulates the mishna according to different tanna鈥檌m but he himself does not hold accordingly.

讗诇讗 专讘讬 讟注诪讬讛 讚谞驻砖讬讛 诪驻专砖 讚转谞讬讗 诪谞讬谉 砖讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 注诇 砖讬砖 讘讛 讬讚讬注讛 讘转讞诇讛 讜讬讚讬注讛 讘住讜祝 讜讛注诇诐 讘讬谞转讬诐 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜谞注诇诐 讜谞注诇诐 砖谞讬 驻注诪讬诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

Rav Kahana continued: Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is explicating his own reasoning, as it is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering only for cases in which one had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end and had a lapse of awareness only in between, when he actually transgressed? The verses state with regard to a person鈥檚 awareness of the fact that he was impure: 鈥淎nd it was concealed,鈥 鈥渁nd it was concealed鈥 (Leviticus 5:2鈥3), mentioning concealment twice. The first mention is necessary to teach that one is liable to bring an offering only where he was unaware of his status at the time of the transgression. The second mention is superfluous and serves to teach an additional condition for liability, that one must have had awareness of his status before the transgression. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讗讜诪专

The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This proof is not necessary, as it says in the verse:

讜谞注诇诐 诪讻诇诇 讚讬讚注 讜讛讜讗 讬讚注 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖转讬 讬讚讬注讜转 讗诐 讻谉 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜谞注诇诐 讜谞注诇诐 诇讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛注诇诐 讟讜诪讗讛 讜注诇 讛注诇诐 诪拽讚砖

鈥淎nd it was concealed,鈥 which indicates, by inference, that initially he had been aware, and nevertheless the verse continues to state: 鈥淎nd he was aware鈥 (Leviticus 5:3). It emerges that the verse refers here to two different periods of awareness, one before the transgression and one afterward. But if so, why must the verses state: 鈥淎nd it was concealed,鈥 鈥渁nd it was concealed,鈥 mentioning it twice? It is in order to render one liable both for a violation due to a lapse of awareness of the fact he was ritually impure and for a violation due to a lapse of awareness of the fact that the place he entered was actually the Temple. From this baraita it is apparent that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agrees with Rabbi Yishmael鈥檚 opinion concerning which types of lapses of awareness render one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.

讗砖讻讞谉 讘讬讚讬注讜转 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讟注诪讬讛 讚谞驻砖讬讛 砖讘讜注讜转 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 讟注诪讬讛 讚谞驻砖讬讛 诪谞诇谉 住讘专讗 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: We have found with regard to cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi has explained his own reasoning and it accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. With regard to oaths, where he has not explained his own reasoning, from where do we derive that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning.

(诇讬砖谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讗砖讻讞谉 讘讬讚讬注讜转 讚住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讘砖讘讜注讜转 讚住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪谞诇谉 住讘专讗 讛讜讗)

The Gemara presents another formulation of the preceding comment: The Gemara asks: We have found an explicit statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi with regard to cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods indicating that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. With regard to oaths, from where do we derive that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 拽讗 诪讞讬讬讘 诇砖注讘专 讚讚专讬砖 专讬讘讜讬讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讬 专讘讬 谞诪讬 讚专讬砖 专讬讘讜讬讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讬

The Gemara explains the logical reasoning: What is the reason that Rabbi Akiva deems one liable for oaths pertaining to the past? The reason is that he expounds verses using the method of amplifications and restrictions (see 26a). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also expounds verses using the method of amplifications and restrictions, and consequently he arrives at the same opinion as Rabbi Akiva.

讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讘讻诇 驻讜讚讬谉 讘讻讜专 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪谉 讛砖讟专讜转 讜专讘谞谉 讗诪专讬 讘讻诇 驻讜讚讬谉 讘讻讜专 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪注讘讚讬诐 讜砖讟专讜转 讜拽专拽注讜转

The Gemara demonstrates its point: As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that one can redeem a woman鈥檚 firstborn son with any item worth five shekels, except for promissory notes. And the Rabbis say that one can redeem a woman鈥檚 firstborn son with any item worth five shekels, except for Canaanite slaves, promissory notes, and land.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讚专讬砖 专讬讘讜讬讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讬 讜驻讚讜讬讜 诪讘谉 讞讚砖 专讬讘讛 讘注专讻讱 讻住祝 讞诪砖转 砖拽诇讬诐 诪讬注讟 转驻讚讛 讞讝专 讜专讬讘讛

The Gemara explains: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? He expounds verses using the method of amplifications and restrictions. Accordingly, he expounds the verse: 鈥淎nd its redemption from one month shall you redeem, according to the valuation of five silver shekels by the sacred shekel鈥 (Numbers 18:16), as follows: Concerning the phrase: 鈥淎nd its redemption from one month,鈥 since it does not specify that only certain items can be used for the redemption, the verse amplified the category of items that can be used to redeem the firstborn, intimating that many different items can be used. Then, with the phrase: 鈥淎ccording to the valuation of five silver shekels,鈥 the verse restricted the category to items that are similar to silver shekels. Then, with the term: 鈥淪hall you redeem,鈥 the verse again amplified the category.

专讬讘讛 讜诪讬注讟 讜专讬讘讛 专讬讘讛 讛讻诇 诪讗讬 专讬讘讛 讻诇 诪讬诇讬 讜诪讗讬 诪讬注讟 诪讬注讟 砖讟专讜转

According to the hermeneutical principle that when a verse amplified and then restricted and then amplified, it amplified the relevant category to include everything except for the specific matter excluded in the restriction. The Gemara elaborates: What is included by the fact it amplified? Almost everything. And what is excluded by the fact it restricted? It restricted only promissory notes, which are the most fundamentally dissimilar to silver shekels.

讜专讘谞谉 讚专砖讬 讻诇诇讬 讜驻专讟讬 讜驻讚讜讬讜 诪讘谉 讞讚砖 讻诇诇 讘注专讻讱 讻住祝 讞诪砖转 砖拽诇讬诐 驻专讟 转驻讚讛 讞讝专 讜讻诇诇

The Gemara explains the reasoning of the Rabbis: And the Rabbis expound verses through the method of generalizations and details. Accordingly, they expound the verse as follows: The phrase: 鈥淎nd its redemption from one month,鈥 is a generalization which suggests that many different items can be used to redeem the firstborn. Then, the phrase: 鈥淎ccording to the valuation of five silver shekels,鈥 is a detail, which suggests that only items that are similar to silver shekels can be used. Then, with the term: 鈥淪hall you redeem,鈥 the verse again makes a generalization.

讻诇诇 讜驻专讟 讜讻诇诇 讗讬 讗转讛 讚谉 讗诇讗 讻注讬谉 讛驻专讟 诪讛 讛驻专讟 诪驻讜专砖 讚讘专 讛诪讟诇讟诇 讜讙讜驻讜 诪诪讜谉 讗祝 讻诇 讚讘专 讛诪讟诇讟诇 讜讙讜驻讜 诪诪讜谉 讬爪讗讜 拽专拽注讜转 砖讗讬谞谉 诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 讬爪讗讜 注讘讚讬诐 砖讛讜拽砖讜 诇拽专拽注讜转 讬爪讗讜 砖讟专讜转 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 讗讬谉 讙讜驻谉 诪诪讜谉

Based on this exegetical method, whenever a verse has a generalization and then a detail and then a generalization, the principle is that you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail; in this case, just as the detail, i.e., silver shekels, is explicitly something that is movable and has intrinsic monetary value, so too, anything that is movable and has intrinsic monetary value can be used. This excludes land, which is not movable property; it excludes Canaanite slaves, who are halakhically compared to land; and it excludes promissory notes, because even though they are movable property, they do not have intrinsic monetary value.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇讗诪讬诪专 专讘讬 讚专讬砖 专讬讘讜讬讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讬 讜讛讗 专讘讬 讻诇诇讬 讜驻专讟讬 讚专讬砖

Ravina said to Ameimar: Does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi really expound verses through the method of amplifications and restrictions? But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi expound verses through the method of generalizations and details?

讚转谞讬讗 诪专爪注 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 诪专爪注 诪谞讬谉 诇专讘讜转 讛住讜诇 讜讛住讬专讛 讛诪讞讟 讜讛诪拽讚讞 讜讛诪讻转讘 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜诇拽讞转 讻诇 讚讘专 砖谞诇拽讞 讘讬讚 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 诪专爪注 诪讛 诪专爪注 诪讬讜讞讚 砖诇 诪转讻转 讗祝 讻诇 砖诇 诪转讻转

This is as it is taught in a baraita: The Torah provides the process by which a Hebrew slave who has already completed his six years of servitude may continue on as a slave of his master: 鈥淎nd you shall take the awl and put it through his ear and in the door鈥 (Deuteronomy 15:17). From this verse, I have derived only that an awl can be used; from where do I know to include the thorn of a palm [hasol], and a thorn, a needle, and a gimlet, and a stylus for writing on wax, as valid tools for piercing his ear? The verse states: 鈥淎nd you shall take,鈥 which indicates that anything that can be taken by hand is a valid tool. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Not all these items can be used. Rather, since the verse specifies an 鈥渁wl,鈥 only items similar to an awl can be used; just as an awl is distinct in that it is fashioned of metal, so too, anything fashioned of metal can be used.

讜讗诪专讬谞谉 讘诪讗讬 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 专讘讬 讚专讬砖 讻诇诇讬 讜驻专讟讬 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚专讬砖

And we say with regard to this dispute: About what do they disagree? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi expounds verses using the method of generalizations and details, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, expounds verses

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