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Today's Daf Yomi

October 14, 2014 | כ׳ בתשרי תשע״ה

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 10

Study Guide Yevamot 10


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וסימניך מת נולד ויבם מת נולד ויבם

And your mnemonic to remember how this might occur is as follows: Died, was born, entered into levirate marriage, died, was born, entered into levirate marriage. In other words, there were several brothers, and one, Reuven, died, before another, Yissakhar, was born, and another brother, Shimon, entered into levirate marriage with the deceased’s wife, and there was another brother, Levi, who died as well, and yet another brother, Zevulun, was born, and a sixth brother, Yehuda, entered into levirate marriage with the deceased’s wife. In this case, if Shimon and Yehuda were to die childless, their wives would come before the surviving brothers, Yissakhar and Zevulun, for levirate marriage. To one of them, Yissakhar, the wife of the first brother, Reuven, is prohibited, and for the other brother, Zevulun, the wife of the second brother, Levi, is likewise prohibited.
This is an example of the type of case analyzed in the third chapter, in which the ruling is that the woman who is forbidden to this brother is permitted to that one, and she who is forbidden to this one is permitted to that one. In any case, Rabbi Ḥiyya incorporates the opinion of Rabbi Shimon into this principle, as he maintains that this scenario can apply to each case stated in the mishna. If so, the mishna evidently does deal with disputed legal rulings. How, then, can Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi claim that the cases of the mishna are unanimous?

אלא לרבי הני כללי לית ליה רב אדא קרחינא קמיה דרב כהנא אמר משמיה דרבא לעולם אית ליה לרבי הני כללי והכי קאמר ליה אמו אנוסת אביו בחדא משכחת לה בתרתי לא קמשכחת לה

§ Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not hold in accordance with these general statements applied by Rabbi Ḥiyya, and therefore he maintains that no issue subject to dispute was taught in the mishna. Rav Adda KarḼina, who was sitting before Rav Kahana, said in the name of Rava: Actually, one can explain that Rabbi does hold in accordance with these general statements laid out by Rabbi Ḥiyya. And this is what he said to Levi: In the case of his mother who had been raped by his father, you find this case with only one of the women; however, you cannot find it with two. In other words, the terms mentioned by Rabbi Ḥiyya above: She who is forbidden to this one is permitted to that one, and: A sister who is a sister-in-law performs either Ḽalitza or levirate marriage, apply only partly to this complex case.

אי יעקב שתי אחיות אנס אחותה שהיא יבמתה משכחת לה האסורה לזה מותרת לזה לא משכחת

The Gemara elaborates: If Ya’akov, the father, raped two sisters who gave birth to two sons, and he had two other sons who married these raped sisters and died, in this scenario you find a case of her sister who is her sister-in-law, as there is a yevama who comes before one of the brothers who is a forbidden relative and also a sister and a sister-in-law of another yevama. However, you cannot find the principle of: She who is forbidden to this one is permitted to that one. Although it is possible that one’s brother’s wife who is one’s mother might come before one for levirate marriage, just as he is forbidden to his mother, he is likewise forbidden to his mother’s sister.

ואי שתי נכריות אנס האסורה לזה מותרת לזה משכחת לה אחותה שהיא יבמתה לא משכחת לה

And if the father raped two unrelated women, who gave birth to two sons and then married two other sons of the same father who subsequently died, you find the case of: She who is forbidden to this one is permitted to that one, as each of the two raped women comes before one of the brothers for levirate marriage while she is forbidden to the other as his mother. However, you do not find a situation of: Her sister who is her sister-in-law. Therefore, the case of one’s mother who was raped by one’s father cannot be included in the list of the mishna, as the characteristics stated by Rabbi Ḥiyya do not apply to this case.

רב אשי אמר לעולם לית ליה לרבי הני כללי ובפלוגתא קמיירי ומאי כמדומה אני שאין לו מוח בקדקדו דקאמר ליה

§ Rav Ashi stated a different explanation: Actually, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not hold in accordance with these general statements of Rabbi Ḥiyya, and the mishna does deal with halakhot that are in dispute. According to his opinion, what is the meaning of the phrase: It seems to me that he has no brain in his head, that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Levi?

הכי קאמר ליה מאי טעמא לא דייקת מתניתין דמתניתין רבי יהודה היא [דאסר באנוסת אביו]

According to Rav Ashi, this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Levi: What is the reason that you were not precise in your interpretation of the mishna? As the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibited the case of a woman who was raped by one’s father. Accordingly, the rulings of the mishna cannot be attributed to any opinion that is not in line with that of Rabbi Yehuda. What is the proof that this mishna is indeed in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda?

דקתני שש עריות חמורות מאלו מפני שהן נשואות לאחרים צרותיהן מותרות אמו ואשת אביו ואחות אביו מאי אמו אילימא נשואת אביו היינו אשת אביו

As it teaches in the next mishna: Six women with whom relations are forbidden are more severe than these enumerated in the previous mishna, because they may marry only others and can never be married to any of the brothers, and therefore their rival wives are permitted. These women include: His mother, his father’s wife, and his father’s sister. Rav Ashi infers: What is the meaning of: His mother? If we say that this mother is married to his father, then this is the same case as: His father’s wife, which would mean that the mishna lists only five cases, not six.

אלא לאו אנוסת אביו וקתני מפני שהן נשואות לאחרים לאחרים אין לאחין לא מאן שמעת ליה דאית ליה האי סברא רבי יהודה דאסר באנוסת אביו משום הכי לא תני ליה

Rather, is it not referring to a woman raped by his father? And it is taught in the mishna that the halakhot of levirate marriage do not apply to them because they may marry only others, which indicates: Others, yes; the brothers, no. Since each of the brothers are sons of the same father, each one is prohibited from marrying the mother of one of the other brothers, as although she is not his mother, she is nevertheless a woman raped by his father, whom one may not marry. Who did you hear who holds in accordance with this conclusion that a woman raped by one’s father is prohibited to all his sons? It is Rabbi Yehuda who prohibits a woman raped by his father. Due to that reason the case of a woman raped by one’s father was not taught in the first mishna.

אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי לרבי יהודה נמי משכחת לה דאי עבר ונסיב דאי לא קתני

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda you can find this possibility that a woman raped by a father comes before the son for levirate marriage. What if one of the brothers transgressed and married a woman raped by his father? Even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that this is a violation of a regular prohibition that does not incur karet, and therefore the marriage is valid. Consequently, if this brother died childless, this woman would come before her son for levirate marriage. The Gemara rejects this proof: The tanna does not teach cases of what if, i.e., the mishna does not cite an example that could result only from a transgression.

אמר ליה רב אשי לרב כהנא בלא דאי נמי משכחת לה יעקב אנס כלתו והוליד ממנה בן ומת [ראובן] בלא בנים ונפלה לה קמי ברה ומיגו דאיהי אסירה צרתה נמי אסירה

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: Even without a hypothetical: What if, you can find an example of a woman raped by a father who is not forbidden to the son in marriage. How so? Ya’akov, the father, raped his daughter-in-law, from whom he fathered a son. And the son, Reuven, the husband of the daughter-in-law, died childless. And as Ya’akov had two sons, the deceased Reuven and a son by Reuven’s wife whom Ya’akov had raped, Reuven’s wife would then come before her son for levirate marriage. And since she is forbidden, her rival wife is also forbidden. Consequently, a case of this kind is possible without the levirate marriage resulting from an illicit marriage.

אמר ליה באחותה דהתירא קמיירי באחותה דאיסורא לא קמיירי ואף על פי כן בדקה לוי במתניתין

Rav Kahana said to Rav Ashi: The mishna deals with cases of legitimate brothers, whereas it does not deal with cases of illegitimate brothers. The offspring of a man who rapes his daughter-in-law is a mamzer, and cases of this kind are not discussed in the mishna. The Gemara comments: Nevertheless, despite Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s criticism, Levi established this additional possibility of a woman raped by one’s father in his mishnayot.

דתני לוי אמו פעמים פוטרת צרתה ופעמים אינה פוטרת צרתה כיצד היתה אמו נשואת אביו ונשאת לאחיו מאביו ומת זו היא אמו שאין פוטרת צרתה

As Levi taught in his baraita: With regard to the case of his mother, at times she exempts her rival wife, and at other times she does not exempt her rival wife. How so? If his mother was married to his father and after his father’s death she illicitly married her son’s paternal brother, who then died, this is a case of: His mother who does not exempt her rival wife. The reason is that her marriage to his brother does not take effect at all, as it was forbidden on pain of karet. Since this marriage never occurred, only the other wife, the so-called rival wife, is considered a wife of the brother, and she may enter into levirate marriage.

היתה אמו אנוסת אביו ונשאת לאחיו מאביו ומת זו היא אמו שפוטרת צרתה

If, however, his mother was a woman who was raped by his father and subsequently married his paternal brother, and the brother died, this is a case of his mother who exempts her rival wife. According to the opinion of the Rabbis this marriage is permitted, and even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda the marriage is valid despite the transgression. Consequently, both the mother and her rival wife come before the son for levirate marriage. Since the mother is a forbidden relation to him, her rival wife is exempt as well.

ואף על פי ששנו חכמים במשנתנו חמש עשרה יש לנו להוסיף שש עשרה כגון זו אמר ליה ריש לקיש לרבי יוחנן ללוי דאמר דאי נמי קתני לתני החולץ ליבמתו וחזר וקדשה ומת בלא בנים דמגו דאיהי אסורה צרתה נמי אסירא

And although the Sages taught in the mishna: Fifteen women, we must add a sixteenth case, for example, the situation described above. Reish Lakish said to Rabbi YoḼanan: According to the opinion of Levi, who said that the mishna teaches even cases of: What if, which involve a transgression, let the mishna also teach the case of one who performs Ḽalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her, and then died childless. His betrothal is a transgression, as after Ḽalitza the yevama is permanently forbidden to him. As, in this case, since she is forbidden to all the brothers, due to the Ḽalitza performed by the deceased yavam, her rival wife is also forbidden. This is an additional case of a woman who exempts her rival wife.

אמר ליה לפי שאינה בצרת צרה

Rabbi YoḼanan said to Reish Lakish: This example is not cited because the case does not include the possibility of a rival wife of a rival wife. All of the other cases listed in the mishna involve both rival wives and rival wives of rival wives. Here, however, this is impossible, as the same prohibition applies equally to all of the brothers, and therefore none of them may marry her.

ולימא ליה חייבי לאוין היא וחייבי לאוין בני חליצה ויבום נינהו

The Gemara asks: And let Rabbi YoḼanan say a different answer to Reish Lakish, as he could simply have pointed out that marriage to a woman who had performed Ḽalitza is not a violation that incurs karet, neither for the one who performed the Ḽalitza nor for his brothers if they marry her after he dies. Rather, it is an act for which they are liable for violating a regular prohibition, and those liable for violating a prohibition are obligated in Ḽalitza and levirate marriage. In these cases the mitzva of levirate marriage still applies, and although the woman should be released by Ḽalitza, she is not entirely exempt from levirate marriage, and therefore her rival wife is not exempt either.

לדבריו קאמר ליה לדידי חייבי לאוין הם וחייבי לאוין בני חליצה ויבום נינהו אלא לדידך חייבי כריתות נינהו לפי שאינן בצרת צרה

The Gemara responds that Rabbi YoḼanan is speaking in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish, as follows: According to my opinion your question is groundless, as they are liable for violating a prohibition, and those liable for violating a prohibition are obligated in Ḽalitza and levirate marriage. However, according to your opinion, those brothers who marry a yevama who had performed Ḽalitza are liable to receive karet, and therefore you must resolve the difficulty by saying that the mishna did not teach this case because it does not include the possibility of a rival wife of a rival wife.

איתמר החולץ ליבמתו וחזר וקדשה אמר ריש לקיש הוא אין חייב על החלוצה כרת

The Gemara discusses the dispute alluded to in the previous paragraph. It was stated: With regard to one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her, Reish Lakish said: The brother who earlier performed ḥalitza is not liable to receive karet for returning to the yevama who performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza]. She is no longer forbidden as a brother’s wife, although she is forbidden by a regular prohibition.

והאחין חייבין על החלוצה כרת על הצרה בין הוא ובין האחים חייבין על הצרה כרת

And the brothers who did not actually perform the ḥalitza are liable to receive karet for having relations with a ḥalutza. In their case, the woman retains her status as a forbidden brother’s wife even after the ḥalitza. With regard to the rival wife of the ḥalutza, although she too is released from the levirate bond, since the act of ḥalitza itself was not performed with her, both the brother who performed the ḥalitza and the other brothers are liable to receive karet for having relations with the rival wife, as she retains her forbidden status as a brother’s wife.

ורבי יוחנן אמר בין הוא ובין האחין אינן חייבין לא על החלוצה כרת ולא על הצרה כרת מאי טעמא דריש לקיש אמר קרא אשר לא יבנה כיון שלא בנה שוב לא יבנה

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Neither he nor the other brothers are liable to receive karet, neither for the ḥalutza nor for having relations with the rival wife. The Gemara explains: What is the rationale of Reish Lakish? The verse states with regard to one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama: “Who does not build up his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9), which teaches that since he did not build his brother’s house by entering into levirate marriage, opting instead for ḥalitza, he shall never build it again. This statement is understood not only as a negative description of events, but also as a prohibition against marrying this woman at any point in the future.

איהו הוא דקאי בלא יבנה אבל אחיו כדקיימי קיימי

However, it is the man who performed the act of ḥalitza who stands liable to receive punishment for violating this prohibition of: Does not build up, i.e., the prohibition against marrying his ḥalutza. For him the prohibition involving karet has been replaced by the regular prohibition of: Who does not build up his brother’s house. However, with regard to his brothers, where they stood before, they stand now. In other words, just as before the mitzva of levirate marriage applied to them this woman was forbidden to them as a brother’s wife, once the obligation of levirate marriage has been removed they remain bound by the same prohibition. Consequently, she is forbidden to the brothers on pain of karet.

ועלה דידה הוא דקאי בלא יבנה הא צרה כדקיימי קיימי

And furthermore, only with regard to her, the Ḽalutza, does he stand liable for: Does not build up, but as for the rival wife, who did not perform Ḽalitza, where all the brothers stood before, they stand now. Just as before her rival wife performed Ḽalitza she was forbidden on pain of karet, the same applies after the Ḽalitza, both for the man who performed Ḽalitza and his brothers.

ורבי יוחנן מי איכא מידי דמעיקרא אי בעי האי חליץ ואי בעי האי חליץ ואי בעי להאי חליץ ואי בעי להאי חליץ והשתא קאי עלה בכרת

And Rabbi Yoḥanan claims: Is there anything of this kind in halakha? After all, at the outset, before the ḥalitza, if this brother wanted he could perform ḥalitza, and if that brother wanted he could perform ḥalitza, and if he wanted he could perform ḥalitza with this woman and if he wanted he could perform ḥalitza with that woman. All the deceased brother’s wives were included in the levirate obligation of marriage or ḥalitza, and therefore the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife was negated for all of them at that time. And now, after the ḥalitza, they stand to incur karet for having relations with her? How can the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife return after it was nullified by the death of the childless brother?

אלא איהו שליחותא דאחים קעביד איהי שליחותא דצרה קעבדה

Rather, he who performs Ḽalitza performs the agency of the other brothers, and therefore he also releases her from the levirate bond of his brothers. Similarly, she who performs Ḽalitza performs the agency of the rival wife, as the Ḽalitza of one wife serves to release the other one as well. Consequently, it is as though all of the brothers released all of the wives, and there is no longer any prohibition that incurs karet.

איתיביה רבי יוחנן לריש לקיש החולץ ליבמתו וחזר וקדשה ומת צריכה חליצה מן האחין בשלמא לדידי דאמינא חייבי לאוין נינהו היינו דצריכה חליצה מן האחין

§ The Gemara cites the ensuing discussion between the two disputing Sages. Rabbi YoḼanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a baraita: In the case of one who performs Ḽalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her, and then died, she requires Ḽalitza from one of the brothers. Granted, this makes sense according to my opinion, as I say that brothers who marry a Ḽalutza are liable only for violating a prohibition, and that is why she requires Ḽalitza from the other brothers. The principle is that a woman with whom relations are forbidden by a regular prohibition that does not incur karet may not enter into levirate marriage, but she must undergo Ḽalitza.

אלא לדידך אמאי צריכה חליצה

However, according to your opinion that the penalty of karet does apply here, why does she require Ḽalitza at all? The penalty of karet indicates that the betrothal did not take effect at all, and therefore she is not bound to the brothers with regard to the requirement of Ḽalitza.

ולטעמיך אימא סיפא עמד אחד מן האחין וקדשה אין לה עליו כלום ואי חייבי לאוין נינהו אמאי אין לה עליו כלום

Reish Lakish answered: And according to your reasoning, how would you state and explain the latter clause of the baraita: If one of the brothers arose and betrothed her, she has no claims on him, i.e., the marriage does not take effect at all and she does not require a bill of divorce from him? But if the brothers are liable only for violating a prohibition, why does she have no claim on him? After all, in cases of regular prohibitions a betrothal is valid. According to my opinion that these brothers are liable to receive karet the matter is clear, as the betrothal is invalid. This indicates that there is a contradiction between the first and latter clauses of the baraita. How, then, can Rabbi YoḼanan cite a proof from an apparently flawed baraita?

אמר רב ששת סיפא אתאן לרבי עקיבא דאמר אין קידושין תופסין בחייבי לאוין וליתני לדברי רבי עקיבא אין לו עליו כלום

Rav Sheshet said in resolution of this contradiction: In the latter clause of the baraita we have come to a different opinion, that of Rabbi Akiva, who said: Betrothal with those who are forbidden as they are liable for violating a prohibition is not valid. In Rabbi Akiva’s opinion there is no difference between regular prohibitions and prohibitions that incur karet in this regard, as in both cases the betrothals are invalid. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But if the first clause of the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, while the latter clause is in accordance with a different opinion, let the mishna teach explicitly: According to the statement of Rabbi Akiva she has no claims on him, as this represents a different opinion.

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot 10

וסימניך מת נולד ויבם מת נולד ויבם

And your mnemonic to remember how this might occur is as follows: Died, was born, entered into levirate marriage, died, was born, entered into levirate marriage. In other words, there were several brothers, and one, Reuven, died, before another, Yissakhar, was born, and another brother, Shimon, entered into levirate marriage with the deceased’s wife, and there was another brother, Levi, who died as well, and yet another brother, Zevulun, was born, and a sixth brother, Yehuda, entered into levirate marriage with the deceased’s wife. In this case, if Shimon and Yehuda were to die childless, their wives would come before the surviving brothers, Yissakhar and Zevulun, for levirate marriage. To one of them, Yissakhar, the wife of the first brother, Reuven, is prohibited, and for the other brother, Zevulun, the wife of the second brother, Levi, is likewise prohibited.
This is an example of the type of case analyzed in the third chapter, in which the ruling is that the woman who is forbidden to this brother is permitted to that one, and she who is forbidden to this one is permitted to that one. In any case, Rabbi Ḥiyya incorporates the opinion of Rabbi Shimon into this principle, as he maintains that this scenario can apply to each case stated in the mishna. If so, the mishna evidently does deal with disputed legal rulings. How, then, can Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi claim that the cases of the mishna are unanimous?

אלא לרבי הני כללי לית ליה רב אדא קרחינא קמיה דרב כהנא אמר משמיה דרבא לעולם אית ליה לרבי הני כללי והכי קאמר ליה אמו אנוסת אביו בחדא משכחת לה בתרתי לא קמשכחת לה

§ Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not hold in accordance with these general statements applied by Rabbi Ḥiyya, and therefore he maintains that no issue subject to dispute was taught in the mishna. Rav Adda KarḼina, who was sitting before Rav Kahana, said in the name of Rava: Actually, one can explain that Rabbi does hold in accordance with these general statements laid out by Rabbi Ḥiyya. And this is what he said to Levi: In the case of his mother who had been raped by his father, you find this case with only one of the women; however, you cannot find it with two. In other words, the terms mentioned by Rabbi Ḥiyya above: She who is forbidden to this one is permitted to that one, and: A sister who is a sister-in-law performs either Ḽalitza or levirate marriage, apply only partly to this complex case.

אי יעקב שתי אחיות אנס אחותה שהיא יבמתה משכחת לה האסורה לזה מותרת לזה לא משכחת

The Gemara elaborates: If Ya’akov, the father, raped two sisters who gave birth to two sons, and he had two other sons who married these raped sisters and died, in this scenario you find a case of her sister who is her sister-in-law, as there is a yevama who comes before one of the brothers who is a forbidden relative and also a sister and a sister-in-law of another yevama. However, you cannot find the principle of: She who is forbidden to this one is permitted to that one. Although it is possible that one’s brother’s wife who is one’s mother might come before one for levirate marriage, just as he is forbidden to his mother, he is likewise forbidden to his mother’s sister.

ואי שתי נכריות אנס האסורה לזה מותרת לזה משכחת לה אחותה שהיא יבמתה לא משכחת לה

And if the father raped two unrelated women, who gave birth to two sons and then married two other sons of the same father who subsequently died, you find the case of: She who is forbidden to this one is permitted to that one, as each of the two raped women comes before one of the brothers for levirate marriage while she is forbidden to the other as his mother. However, you do not find a situation of: Her sister who is her sister-in-law. Therefore, the case of one’s mother who was raped by one’s father cannot be included in the list of the mishna, as the characteristics stated by Rabbi Ḥiyya do not apply to this case.

רב אשי אמר לעולם לית ליה לרבי הני כללי ובפלוגתא קמיירי ומאי כמדומה אני שאין לו מוח בקדקדו דקאמר ליה

§ Rav Ashi stated a different explanation: Actually, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not hold in accordance with these general statements of Rabbi Ḥiyya, and the mishna does deal with halakhot that are in dispute. According to his opinion, what is the meaning of the phrase: It seems to me that he has no brain in his head, that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Levi?

הכי קאמר ליה מאי טעמא לא דייקת מתניתין דמתניתין רבי יהודה היא [דאסר באנוסת אביו]

According to Rav Ashi, this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Levi: What is the reason that you were not precise in your interpretation of the mishna? As the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibited the case of a woman who was raped by one’s father. Accordingly, the rulings of the mishna cannot be attributed to any opinion that is not in line with that of Rabbi Yehuda. What is the proof that this mishna is indeed in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda?

דקתני שש עריות חמורות מאלו מפני שהן נשואות לאחרים צרותיהן מותרות אמו ואשת אביו ואחות אביו מאי אמו אילימא נשואת אביו היינו אשת אביו

As it teaches in the next mishna: Six women with whom relations are forbidden are more severe than these enumerated in the previous mishna, because they may marry only others and can never be married to any of the brothers, and therefore their rival wives are permitted. These women include: His mother, his father’s wife, and his father’s sister. Rav Ashi infers: What is the meaning of: His mother? If we say that this mother is married to his father, then this is the same case as: His father’s wife, which would mean that the mishna lists only five cases, not six.

אלא לאו אנוסת אביו וקתני מפני שהן נשואות לאחרים לאחרים אין לאחין לא מאן שמעת ליה דאית ליה האי סברא רבי יהודה דאסר באנוסת אביו משום הכי לא תני ליה

Rather, is it not referring to a woman raped by his father? And it is taught in the mishna that the halakhot of levirate marriage do not apply to them because they may marry only others, which indicates: Others, yes; the brothers, no. Since each of the brothers are sons of the same father, each one is prohibited from marrying the mother of one of the other brothers, as although she is not his mother, she is nevertheless a woman raped by his father, whom one may not marry. Who did you hear who holds in accordance with this conclusion that a woman raped by one’s father is prohibited to all his sons? It is Rabbi Yehuda who prohibits a woman raped by his father. Due to that reason the case of a woman raped by one’s father was not taught in the first mishna.

אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי לרבי יהודה נמי משכחת לה דאי עבר ונסיב דאי לא קתני

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda you can find this possibility that a woman raped by a father comes before the son for levirate marriage. What if one of the brothers transgressed and married a woman raped by his father? Even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that this is a violation of a regular prohibition that does not incur karet, and therefore the marriage is valid. Consequently, if this brother died childless, this woman would come before her son for levirate marriage. The Gemara rejects this proof: The tanna does not teach cases of what if, i.e., the mishna does not cite an example that could result only from a transgression.

אמר ליה רב אשי לרב כהנא בלא דאי נמי משכחת לה יעקב אנס כלתו והוליד ממנה בן ומת [ראובן] בלא בנים ונפלה לה קמי ברה ומיגו דאיהי אסירה צרתה נמי אסירה

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: Even without a hypothetical: What if, you can find an example of a woman raped by a father who is not forbidden to the son in marriage. How so? Ya’akov, the father, raped his daughter-in-law, from whom he fathered a son. And the son, Reuven, the husband of the daughter-in-law, died childless. And as Ya’akov had two sons, the deceased Reuven and a son by Reuven’s wife whom Ya’akov had raped, Reuven’s wife would then come before her son for levirate marriage. And since she is forbidden, her rival wife is also forbidden. Consequently, a case of this kind is possible without the levirate marriage resulting from an illicit marriage.

אמר ליה באחותה דהתירא קמיירי באחותה דאיסורא לא קמיירי ואף על פי כן בדקה לוי במתניתין

Rav Kahana said to Rav Ashi: The mishna deals with cases of legitimate brothers, whereas it does not deal with cases of illegitimate brothers. The offspring of a man who rapes his daughter-in-law is a mamzer, and cases of this kind are not discussed in the mishna. The Gemara comments: Nevertheless, despite Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s criticism, Levi established this additional possibility of a woman raped by one’s father in his mishnayot.

דתני לוי אמו פעמים פוטרת צרתה ופעמים אינה פוטרת צרתה כיצד היתה אמו נשואת אביו ונשאת לאחיו מאביו ומת זו היא אמו שאין פוטרת צרתה

As Levi taught in his baraita: With regard to the case of his mother, at times she exempts her rival wife, and at other times she does not exempt her rival wife. How so? If his mother was married to his father and after his father’s death she illicitly married her son’s paternal brother, who then died, this is a case of: His mother who does not exempt her rival wife. The reason is that her marriage to his brother does not take effect at all, as it was forbidden on pain of karet. Since this marriage never occurred, only the other wife, the so-called rival wife, is considered a wife of the brother, and she may enter into levirate marriage.

היתה אמו אנוסת אביו ונשאת לאחיו מאביו ומת זו היא אמו שפוטרת צרתה

If, however, his mother was a woman who was raped by his father and subsequently married his paternal brother, and the brother died, this is a case of his mother who exempts her rival wife. According to the opinion of the Rabbis this marriage is permitted, and even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda the marriage is valid despite the transgression. Consequently, both the mother and her rival wife come before the son for levirate marriage. Since the mother is a forbidden relation to him, her rival wife is exempt as well.

ואף על פי ששנו חכמים במשנתנו חמש עשרה יש לנו להוסיף שש עשרה כגון זו אמר ליה ריש לקיש לרבי יוחנן ללוי דאמר דאי נמי קתני לתני החולץ ליבמתו וחזר וקדשה ומת בלא בנים דמגו דאיהי אסורה צרתה נמי אסירא

And although the Sages taught in the mishna: Fifteen women, we must add a sixteenth case, for example, the situation described above. Reish Lakish said to Rabbi YoḼanan: According to the opinion of Levi, who said that the mishna teaches even cases of: What if, which involve a transgression, let the mishna also teach the case of one who performs Ḽalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her, and then died childless. His betrothal is a transgression, as after Ḽalitza the yevama is permanently forbidden to him. As, in this case, since she is forbidden to all the brothers, due to the Ḽalitza performed by the deceased yavam, her rival wife is also forbidden. This is an additional case of a woman who exempts her rival wife.

אמר ליה לפי שאינה בצרת צרה

Rabbi YoḼanan said to Reish Lakish: This example is not cited because the case does not include the possibility of a rival wife of a rival wife. All of the other cases listed in the mishna involve both rival wives and rival wives of rival wives. Here, however, this is impossible, as the same prohibition applies equally to all of the brothers, and therefore none of them may marry her.

ולימא ליה חייבי לאוין היא וחייבי לאוין בני חליצה ויבום נינהו

The Gemara asks: And let Rabbi YoḼanan say a different answer to Reish Lakish, as he could simply have pointed out that marriage to a woman who had performed Ḽalitza is not a violation that incurs karet, neither for the one who performed the Ḽalitza nor for his brothers if they marry her after he dies. Rather, it is an act for which they are liable for violating a regular prohibition, and those liable for violating a prohibition are obligated in Ḽalitza and levirate marriage. In these cases the mitzva of levirate marriage still applies, and although the woman should be released by Ḽalitza, she is not entirely exempt from levirate marriage, and therefore her rival wife is not exempt either.

לדבריו קאמר ליה לדידי חייבי לאוין הם וחייבי לאוין בני חליצה ויבום נינהו אלא לדידך חייבי כריתות נינהו לפי שאינן בצרת צרה

The Gemara responds that Rabbi YoḼanan is speaking in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish, as follows: According to my opinion your question is groundless, as they are liable for violating a prohibition, and those liable for violating a prohibition are obligated in Ḽalitza and levirate marriage. However, according to your opinion, those brothers who marry a yevama who had performed Ḽalitza are liable to receive karet, and therefore you must resolve the difficulty by saying that the mishna did not teach this case because it does not include the possibility of a rival wife of a rival wife.

איתמר החולץ ליבמתו וחזר וקדשה אמר ריש לקיש הוא אין חייב על החלוצה כרת

The Gemara discusses the dispute alluded to in the previous paragraph. It was stated: With regard to one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her, Reish Lakish said: The brother who earlier performed ḥalitza is not liable to receive karet for returning to the yevama who performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza]. She is no longer forbidden as a brother’s wife, although she is forbidden by a regular prohibition.

והאחין חייבין על החלוצה כרת על הצרה בין הוא ובין האחים חייבין על הצרה כרת

And the brothers who did not actually perform the ḥalitza are liable to receive karet for having relations with a ḥalutza. In their case, the woman retains her status as a forbidden brother’s wife even after the ḥalitza. With regard to the rival wife of the ḥalutza, although she too is released from the levirate bond, since the act of ḥalitza itself was not performed with her, both the brother who performed the ḥalitza and the other brothers are liable to receive karet for having relations with the rival wife, as she retains her forbidden status as a brother’s wife.

ורבי יוחנן אמר בין הוא ובין האחין אינן חייבין לא על החלוצה כרת ולא על הצרה כרת מאי טעמא דריש לקיש אמר קרא אשר לא יבנה כיון שלא בנה שוב לא יבנה

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Neither he nor the other brothers are liable to receive karet, neither for the ḥalutza nor for having relations with the rival wife. The Gemara explains: What is the rationale of Reish Lakish? The verse states with regard to one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama: “Who does not build up his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9), which teaches that since he did not build his brother’s house by entering into levirate marriage, opting instead for ḥalitza, he shall never build it again. This statement is understood not only as a negative description of events, but also as a prohibition against marrying this woman at any point in the future.

איהו הוא דקאי בלא יבנה אבל אחיו כדקיימי קיימי

However, it is the man who performed the act of ḥalitza who stands liable to receive punishment for violating this prohibition of: Does not build up, i.e., the prohibition against marrying his ḥalutza. For him the prohibition involving karet has been replaced by the regular prohibition of: Who does not build up his brother’s house. However, with regard to his brothers, where they stood before, they stand now. In other words, just as before the mitzva of levirate marriage applied to them this woman was forbidden to them as a brother’s wife, once the obligation of levirate marriage has been removed they remain bound by the same prohibition. Consequently, she is forbidden to the brothers on pain of karet.

ועלה דידה הוא דקאי בלא יבנה הא צרה כדקיימי קיימי

And furthermore, only with regard to her, the Ḽalutza, does he stand liable for: Does not build up, but as for the rival wife, who did not perform Ḽalitza, where all the brothers stood before, they stand now. Just as before her rival wife performed Ḽalitza she was forbidden on pain of karet, the same applies after the Ḽalitza, both for the man who performed Ḽalitza and his brothers.

ורבי יוחנן מי איכא מידי דמעיקרא אי בעי האי חליץ ואי בעי האי חליץ ואי בעי להאי חליץ ואי בעי להאי חליץ והשתא קאי עלה בכרת

And Rabbi Yoḥanan claims: Is there anything of this kind in halakha? After all, at the outset, before the ḥalitza, if this brother wanted he could perform ḥalitza, and if that brother wanted he could perform ḥalitza, and if he wanted he could perform ḥalitza with this woman and if he wanted he could perform ḥalitza with that woman. All the deceased brother’s wives were included in the levirate obligation of marriage or ḥalitza, and therefore the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife was negated for all of them at that time. And now, after the ḥalitza, they stand to incur karet for having relations with her? How can the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife return after it was nullified by the death of the childless brother?

אלא איהו שליחותא דאחים קעביד איהי שליחותא דצרה קעבדה

Rather, he who performs Ḽalitza performs the agency of the other brothers, and therefore he also releases her from the levirate bond of his brothers. Similarly, she who performs Ḽalitza performs the agency of the rival wife, as the Ḽalitza of one wife serves to release the other one as well. Consequently, it is as though all of the brothers released all of the wives, and there is no longer any prohibition that incurs karet.

איתיביה רבי יוחנן לריש לקיש החולץ ליבמתו וחזר וקדשה ומת צריכה חליצה מן האחין בשלמא לדידי דאמינא חייבי לאוין נינהו היינו דצריכה חליצה מן האחין

§ The Gemara cites the ensuing discussion between the two disputing Sages. Rabbi YoḼanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a baraita: In the case of one who performs Ḽalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her, and then died, she requires Ḽalitza from one of the brothers. Granted, this makes sense according to my opinion, as I say that brothers who marry a Ḽalutza are liable only for violating a prohibition, and that is why she requires Ḽalitza from the other brothers. The principle is that a woman with whom relations are forbidden by a regular prohibition that does not incur karet may not enter into levirate marriage, but she must undergo Ḽalitza.

אלא לדידך אמאי צריכה חליצה

However, according to your opinion that the penalty of karet does apply here, why does she require Ḽalitza at all? The penalty of karet indicates that the betrothal did not take effect at all, and therefore she is not bound to the brothers with regard to the requirement of Ḽalitza.

ולטעמיך אימא סיפא עמד אחד מן האחין וקדשה אין לה עליו כלום ואי חייבי לאוין נינהו אמאי אין לה עליו כלום

Reish Lakish answered: And according to your reasoning, how would you state and explain the latter clause of the baraita: If one of the brothers arose and betrothed her, she has no claims on him, i.e., the marriage does not take effect at all and she does not require a bill of divorce from him? But if the brothers are liable only for violating a prohibition, why does she have no claim on him? After all, in cases of regular prohibitions a betrothal is valid. According to my opinion that these brothers are liable to receive karet the matter is clear, as the betrothal is invalid. This indicates that there is a contradiction between the first and latter clauses of the baraita. How, then, can Rabbi YoḼanan cite a proof from an apparently flawed baraita?

אמר רב ששת סיפא אתאן לרבי עקיבא דאמר אין קידושין תופסין בחייבי לאוין וליתני לדברי רבי עקיבא אין לו עליו כלום

Rav Sheshet said in resolution of this contradiction: In the latter clause of the baraita we have come to a different opinion, that of Rabbi Akiva, who said: Betrothal with those who are forbidden as they are liable for violating a prohibition is not valid. In Rabbi Akiva’s opinion there is no difference between regular prohibitions and prohibitions that incur karet in this regard, as in both cases the betrothals are invalid. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But if the first clause of the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, while the latter clause is in accordance with a different opinion, let the mishna teach explicitly: According to the statement of Rabbi Akiva she has no claims on him, as this represents a different opinion.

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