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Today's Daf Yomi

January 16, 2015 | ื›ืดื” ื‘ื˜ื‘ืช ืชืฉืขืดื”

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Yevamot 104

ื•ืฉืœ ืขื™ืจ ื”ื ื“ื—ืช ื•ืฉืœ ื–ืงืŸ ื”ืขืฉื•ื™ ืœื›ื‘ื•ื“ื• ืœื ืชื—ืœื•ืฅ ื•ืื ื—ืœืฆื” ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื”

or a sandal belonging to an inhabitant of an idolatrous city, a city the majority of whose inhabitants committed idolatry, which stands to be destroyed with all of the cityโ€™s property; and likewise, the sandal of an Elder made in accordance with his dignity to be worn upon his death as part of his shroud, i.e., it is not meant for walking as a normal shoe, the yevama may not perform แธฅalitza using any of these shoes. And if she did perform แธฅalitza, her แธฅalitza is invalid even after the fact, as these are not halakhically considered shoes.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ื ื ืœืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื–ืงืŸ ื”ืขืฉื•ื™ ืœื›ื‘ื•ื“ื• ื“ืœืื• ืœื”ื™ืœื•ื›ื ืขื‘ื™ื“ ื“ื‘ื™ ื“ื™ื ื ื ืžื™ ืœืื• ืœื”ื™ืœื•ื›ื ืขื‘ื™ื“

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: What is different about the sandal of an Elder that is made in accordance with his dignity that one should say that even though it is the proper size for his foot, it is not valid because it was not made for walking, but merely for him to wear after his death. But the courtโ€™s sandal also was not made for walking, as the court kept a sandal that met all the other necessary qualifications for a sandal for แธฅalitza and gave it to the yavam to be worn during the แธฅalitza procedure. Since the yavam would return the แธฅalitza sandal after the conclusion of the แธฅalitza, therefore, the sandal was never used for walking and should be invalidated for แธฅalitza just as the sandal made for the dignity of an Elder?

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ืœื• ืžืกื’ื™ ื‘ื™ื” ืฉืœื•ื—ื ื“ื‘ื™ ื“ื™ื ื ืžื™ ืงืคื™ื“ ืขืœื™ื” ื“ื™ื™ื ื

He said to him: If a messenger of the court had walked in the แธฅalitza shoe used by the court, would the judge reprimand him? Although the courtโ€™s sandal was designed for the express purpose of แธฅalitza, it may also be used for walking. A shoe designed for a dead person, on the other hand, is forbidden for any other use and is not made for walking at all, and it is consequently disqualified.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื—ืœืฆื” ื‘ืœื™ืœื” ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ื›ืฉืจื” ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืคื•ืกืœ ื‘ืฉืžืืœ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืžื›ืฉื™ืจ

MISHNA: If a woman performed แธฅalitza at night, her แธฅalitza is valid, but Rabbi Elazar invalidates it. If she performed แธฅalitza on the left foot, her แธฅalitza is invalid, but Rabbi Elazar validates it.

ื’ืžืณ ืœื™ืžื ื‘ื”ื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ื“ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ืจื™ื‘ื™ื ืœื ื’ืขื™ื ื•ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ืœื ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ืจื™ื‘ื™ื ืœื ื’ืขื™ื

GEMARA: Let us say that they disagree about this issue: One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that we compare the halakhot governing monetary disputes, which category includes แธฅalitza, as แธฅalitza carries with it monetary ramifications and requires payment of the marriage contract to the yevama, with the halakhot of leprosy. Just as leprosy cases are judged only during the day (see Leviticus 13:14), likewise, monetary cases may take place only during the day. And one Sage, the first tanna, holds that we do not compare monetary disputes with leprosy.

ืœื ื“ื›ื•ืœื™ ืขืœืžื ืœื ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ืจื™ื‘ื™ื ืœื ื’ืขื™ื ื“ืื™ ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ืืคื™ืœื• ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ืŸ ื‘ืœื™ืœื” ื ืžื™ ืœื ื•ื”ื›ื ื‘ื”ื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ื›ืชื—ืœืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื“ืžื™ื ื•ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ื›ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ืŸ ื“ืžื™ื

The Gemara responds: No, everyone holds that we do not compare monetary disputes with leprosy, for if we would compare them fully, then even delivering the verdict of the court case could not be done at night, but it is permitted to complete monetary judgments and deliver the verdict at night, provided the proceedings began during the day. And here, with respect to performing แธฅalitza at night they disagree about this issue: One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that แธฅalitza is considered like the commencement of judgment of monetary cases, and one Sage, the first tanna, holds that แธฅalitza is considered like the verdict of a monetary judgment, and therefore it may also be conducted at night.

ืจื‘ื” ื‘ืจ ื—ื™ื™ื ืงื˜ื•ืกืคืื” ืขื‘ื“ ืขื•ื‘ื“ื ื‘ืžื•ืง ื•ื‘ื™ื—ื™ื“ื™ ื•ื‘ืœื™ืœื” ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื›ืžื” ืจื‘ ื’ื•ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืขื‘ื™ื“ ื›ื™ื—ื™ื“ืื”

It is told: Rabba bar แธคiyya Ketosfaโ€™a, from Ctesiphon, conducted แธฅalitza using a slipper that was not made of leather, and he did so in private, as he was the only judge, and by night. Shmuel said disparagingly: How great is the power of this master who follows an individual opinion, as in his practice he relied on individual opinions that are not accepted as halakha.

ืžืื™ ืงืฉื™ื ืื™ ืžื•ืง ืกืชืžื ืชื ื™ื ืื™ ืœื™ืœื” ืกืชืžื ืชื ื™ื

The Gemara asks: What is difficult for Shmuel about Rabba bar แธคiyyaโ€™s actions? If it was the fact that he conducted แธฅalitza using a slipper, an unattributed opinion is taught in a baraita stating that this is valid. As the opinion is unattributed, this indicates that it is not the view of one individual, but rather the opinion of the majority. If it was the fact that he performed แธฅalitza at night, an unattributed opinion is taught in the mishna stating that it is valid as well.

ืืœื ื™ื—ื™ื“ื™ ืงื ืงืฉื™ื ืœื™ื” ื”ื™ื›ื™ ืขื‘ื™ื“ ื‘ื™ื—ื™ื“ื™ ื“ื™ื—ื™ื“ืื” ืงืชื ื™ ืœื” ื“ืชื ืŸ ื—ืœืฆื” ื‘ืฉื ื™ื ืื• ื‘ืฉืœืฉื” ื•ื ืžืฆื ืื—ื“ ืžื”ืŸ ืงืจื•ื‘ ืื• ืคืกื•ืœ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื”ืกื ื“ืœืจ ืžื›ืฉื™ืจื™ื ื•ืžืขืฉื” ื‘ืื—ื“ ืฉื—ืœืฅ ื‘ื™ื ื• ืœื‘ื™ื ื” ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื”ืืกื•ืจื™ื ื•ื‘ื ืžืขืฉื” ืœืคื ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื•ื”ื›ืฉื™ืจ

Rather, it was difficult for him that Rabba bar แธคiyya conducted แธฅalitza in private, as the sole judge: How could he do so in private, as that is taught only in accordance with an individual opinion, as we learned in a mishna: If she performed แธฅalitza before two or three judges and one of them is found to be a relative or disqualified, her แธฅalitza is invalid. And Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yoแธฅanan the Cobbler validate the judge who is not a relative or disqualified. If there are two judges who are not relatives, then they hold that the แธฅalitza is valid, as they validate a แธฅalitza performed before two judges. And an incident occurred involving one who performed แธฅalitza between him and her alone in prison, as there was no judge present at all, and the incident came before Rabbi Akiva and he validated it.

ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื•ืกืฃ ื‘ืจ ืžื ื™ื•ืžื™ [ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื ื—ืžืŸ] ืื™ืŸ ื”ืœื›ื” ื›ืื•ืชื• ื”ื–ื•ื’ ื•ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ื›ื•ืœื”ื• ื ืžื™ ื™ื—ื™ื“ืื” ืงืชื ื™ ืœื”ื• ื“ืชื ื™ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ืื ื™ ืจืื™ืชื™ ืืช ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ื‘ืŸ ืืœื™ืฉืข ืฉื—ืœืฅ ื‘ืžื•ืง ื‘ื™ื—ื™ื“ื™ ื•ื‘ืœื™ืœื”

And Rav Yosef bar Minyumi said that Rav Naแธฅman said: The halakha does not follow that pair, i.e., Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yoแธฅanan the Cobbler. Evidently, Rabba bar แธคiyya relied on the individual opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who permitted แธฅalitza in private, and therefore Shmuel commented regarding Rabbi bar แธคiyyaโ€™s power to rule based on an individualโ€™s opinion. And if you wish, say that not only does this detail follow an individual opinion, but rather all of these details are taught by an individual opinion. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: I saw that Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha performed a แธฅalitza using a slipper, in private, and at night. This statement implies that these details are all according to his individual opinion, contrary to the opinion of the rest of the Sages.

ื‘ืฉืžืืœ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ื›ื•ืณ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ืขื•ืœื ื™ืœืคื™ื ืŸ ืจื’ืœ ืจื’ืœ ืžืžืฆื•ืจืข ืžื” ืœื”ืœืŸ ื“ื™ืžื™ืŸ ืืฃ ื›ืืŸ ื“ื™ืžื™ืŸ

It was taught in the mishna that if แธฅalitza was performed using his left foot, her แธฅalitza is invalid, while Rabbi Elazar validates it. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of the Rabbisโ€™ opinion? Ulla said: We derive a verbal analogy from the word โ€œfootโ€ stated here, and the word โ€œfootโ€ stated regarding the leper. Just as there, with respect to the leper, it is the right foot (Leviticus 14:14), so too here, with respect to แธฅalitza, it is the right foot that must be used.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืœื ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืจื’ืœ ืจื’ืœ ืžืžืฆื•ืจืข ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ืžื ื™ืŸ ืœืจืฆื™ืขื” ืฉื”ื™ื ื‘ืื–ืŸ ื”ื™ืžื ื™ืช ื ืืžืจ ื›ืืŸ ืื–ืŸ ื•ื ืืžืจ ืœื”ืœืŸ ืื–ืŸ ืžื” ืœื”ืœืŸ ื™ืžื™ืŸ ืืฃ ื›ืืŸ ื™ืžื™ืŸ

The Gemara notes: And this would seem to indicate that Rabbi Elazar does not derive โ€œfootโ€ with regard to แธฅalitza from the word โ€œfootโ€ from the leper. But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar says: From where is it derived that piercing a Hebrew slaveโ€™s ear with an awl when the slave chooses to remain in servitude is done specifically on the right ear? โ€œEarโ€ is stated here in the halakhot pertaining to a pierced slave, and โ€œearโ€ is stated there in the halakhot of the leper. Just as there, with regard to leprosy, it is the right ear, as it is stated explicitly there, so too here, with regard to piercing the ear, it is the right ear. This statement of Rabbi Elazar implies that he does learn a verbal analogy about the word โ€œright.โ€

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื‘ืจ ื™ื•ืกืฃ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœืคืช ื”ืฉื™ื˜ื”

Rav Yitzแธฅak bar Yosef said that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: The attribution of the opinions is reversed, meaning that it is Rabbi Elazar who invalidates แธฅalitza on the left foot, as he learns an analogy from the halakha with regard to piercing the ear that the right must be used.

ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืœืขื•ืœื ืœื ืชื™ืคื•ืš ืื–ืŸ ืื–ืŸ ืžื•ืคื ื™ ืจื’ืœ ืจื’ืœ ืœื ืžื•ืคื ื™

Rava said: Actually, do not reverse the opinions. The words โ€œearโ€ and โ€œearโ€ are free terms, i.e., they are superfluous in their context and therefore it is clear that the Torah included those terms for the express purpose of establishing the verbal analogy. A verbal analogy that is based on otherwise extraneous terms cannot be logically refuted. Therefore, the superfluous โ€œearโ€ teaches that piercing is done on the right ear. However, the words โ€œfootโ€ and โ€œfootโ€ are not free, because the word โ€œfoot,โ€ written with regard to the yavam, is necessary in its context and is not superfluous. Therefore, the verbal analogy of the word โ€œfootโ€ is incomplete.

ื•ื›ื™ ืœื ืžื•ืคื ื™ ืžืื™ ืคื™ืจื›ื ืื™ื›ื ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืคืจืš ืžื” ืœืžืฆื•ืจืข ืฉื›ืŸ ื˜ืขื•ืŸ ืขืฅ ืืจื– ื•ืื–ื•ื‘ ื•ืฉื ื™ ืชื•ืœืขืช

The Gemara asks: And even if they are not both free to be used for exposition, what refutation is there? A verbal analogy that is free to be used for exposition in only one place is still valid, provided there is no reason to refute the comparison. The Gemara explains: It can be refuted, as the leper is unique in that there is a very specific process necessary for his purification: He requires that the blood of the offering be sprinkled upon him, and he requires cedarwood, hyssop, and scarlet thread. Therefore, it is possible to say that the Torah also specified the use of the right foot in the case of the leper. However, this would not necessarily be required with respect to แธฅalitza, which lacks such specific halakhot. Consequently, แธฅalitza performed using the left foot could be valid.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื—ืœืฆื” ื•ืจืงืงื” ืื‘ืœ ืœื ืงืจืื” ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ื›ืฉืจื” ืงืจืื” ื•ืจืงืงื” ืื‘ืœ ืœื ื—ืœืฆื” ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ื—ืœืฆื” ื•ืงืจืื” ืื‘ืœ ืœื ืจืงืงื” ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืื•ืžืจ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ื›ืฉืจื”

MISHNA: If she, i.e., the yevama, removed the shoe and spat in accordance with the halakha but did not recite the necessary text, her แธฅalitza is valid. If she recited the text and spat but did not remove the shoe, her แธฅalitza is disqualified. If she removed the shoe and recited the text but did not spit, Rabbi Elazar says: Her แธฅalitza is disqualified, while Rabbi Akiva says: Her แธฅalitza is valid.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื›ื›ื” ื™ืขืฉื” ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืžืขืฉื” ืžืขื›ื‘ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืžืฉื ืจืื™ื” ื›ื›ื” ื™ืขืฉื” ืœืื™ืฉ ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืžืขืฉื” ื‘ืื™ืฉ

Rabbi Elazar said to him: The verse states: โ€œSo shall it be done to the man who does not build his brotherโ€™s houseโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:9). โ€œSoโ€ is an exclusionary term indicating that only precisely in this fashion is แธฅalitza valid. Therefore, any term that constitutes an action for แธฅalitza is indispensable. Rabbi Akiva said to him: You derive proof from there? But it states: โ€œSo shall it be done to the manโ€ indicating that only a term constituting an action toward the man, namely any aspect of แธฅalitza that concerns the manโ€™s body, such as removal of his shoe, is indispensable. But spitting, which does not involve the man, although it takes place in his presence, is not indispensable.

ื”ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื ื—ืœืฅ ื•ื”ื—ืจืฉืช ืฉื—ืœืฆื” ื•ื—ื•ืœืฆืช ืœืงื˜ืŸ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ืงื˜ื ื” ืฉื—ืœืฆื” ืชื—ืœื•ืฅ ืžืฉืชื’ื“ื™ืœ ื•ืื ืœื ื—ืœืฆื” ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ื—ืœืฆื” ื‘ืฉื ื™ื ืื• ื‘ืฉืœืฉื” ื•ื ืžืฆื ืื—ื“ ืžื”ืŸ ืงืจื•ื‘ ืื• ืคืกื•ืœ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื”ืกื ื“ืœืจ ืžื›ืฉื™ืจื™ืŸ ื•ืžืขืฉื” ื‘ืื—ื“ ืฉื—ืœืฅ ื‘ื™ื ื• ืœื‘ื™ื ื” ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื”ืืกื•ืจื™ื ื•ื‘ื ืžืขืฉื” ืœืคื ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื•ื”ื›ืฉื™ืจ

The mishna lists additional halakhot with regard to แธฅalitza. If a deaf-mute man underwent แธฅalitza, or a deaf-mute woman performed แธฅalitza, or if an adult woman performs แธฅalitza with a male minor, her แธฅalitza is invalid and the woman may not marry. If a female minor performed แธฅalitza, she must perform แธฅalitza a second time once she becomes an adult, and if she does not perform the second แธฅalitza, her first แธฅalitza is invalid. If she performed แธฅalitza before two or three judges and one of them is found to be a relative or disqualified as a judge for some other reason, her แธฅalitza is invalid. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yoแธฅanan the Cobbler validate the แธฅalitza in this case. And an incident occurred involving a certain person who performed แธฅalitza between him and her alone in prison, i.e., not in the presence of others, and the case came before Rabbi Akiva and he validated it.

ื’ืžืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื”ืฉืชื ื“ืืžืจืช ืงืจื™ืื” ืœื ืžื™ืขื›ื‘ื ืœืคื™ื›ืš ืืœื ื•ืืœืžืช ืฉื—ืœืฆื• ื—ืœื™ืฆืชืŸ ื›ืฉื™ืจื”

GEMARA: Rava said: Now that you have said that recitation of the text is not indispensable in order for the แธฅalitza to be valid, therefore if a mute man or a mute woman performed แธฅalitza, their แธฅalitza is valid. Although the statements should be recited ab initio, since the recitation is not indispensable, mute individuals can perform แธฅalitza.

ืชื ืŸ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื ื—ืœืฅ ื•ื”ื—ืจืฉืช ืฉื—ืœืฆื” ื•ื”ื—ื•ืœืฆืช ืžืŸ ื”ืงื˜ืŸ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ืœืื• ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืœื ื‘ื ื™ ืงืจื™ื™ื” ื ื™ื ื”ื• ืœื ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืœืื• ื‘ื ื™ ื“ืขื” ื ื™ื ื”ื•

The Gemara challenges: But we learned in the mishna above: If a deaf-mute man underwent แธฅalitza, or a deaf-mute woman performed แธฅalitza, or if a woman performs แธฅalitza with a male minor, her แธฅalitza is invalid. What is the reason that the แธฅalitza is invalid? Is it not because they are not competent to recite the text, thereby indicating that the recitation is necessary even after the fact? The Gemara rejects this assertion: No, the reason for disqualifying a deaf-mute man and woman is because they are not considered to have intellectual capacity, and therefore their actions do not have halakhic significance.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืืœื ื•ืืœืžืช ื ืžื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืืœื ื•ืืœืžืช ื‘ื ื™ ื“ืขื” ื ื™ื ื”ื• ื•ืคื•ืžื™ื™ื”ื• ื”ื•ื ื“ื›ืื™ื‘ ืœื”ื•

The Gemara asks: If that is so, let us also say that a mute man and woman do not have intellectual capacity. Rava said: A mute man and woman do have intellectual capacity. Rather, it is their mouth that hurts them. Mute individuals have full intellectual capacity; they merely lack a means of expression. The deaf-mute, on the other hand, is not considered to have the mental capacity to speak.

ื•ื”ื ืืžืจื™ ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื ืื™ ืœืคื™ ืฉืื™ื ื• ื‘ืืžืจ ื•ืืžืจื” ืืœื ื›ื™ ืืชืžืจ ื“ืจื‘ื ืืกื™ืคื ืืชืžืจ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื ื—ืœืฅ ื•ื”ื—ืจืฉืช ืฉื—ืœืฆื” ื•ื”ื—ื•ืœืฆืช ืžืŸ ื”ืงื˜ืŸ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื”

The Gemara challenges again: But didnโ€™t the scholars from the house of study of Rabbi Yannai say that a deaf-mute man and woman are disqualified from participation in แธฅalitza because they cannot fulfill the requirements of โ€œhe saysโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:8) and โ€œshe shall sayโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:9), and not due to insufficient intellectual capacity? Rather, when that first statement of Rava was said, it was stated concerning the latter clause of the mishna: If a deaf-mute man underwent แธฅalitza, or a deaf-mute woman performed แธฅalitza, or if a woman performs แธฅalitza on a male minor, her แธฅalitza is invalid.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื”ืฉืชื ื“ืืžืจืช ืงืจื™ื™ื” ืžืขื›ื‘ื ืœืคื™ื›ืš ืืœื ื•ืืœืžืช ืฉื—ืœืฆื• ื—ืœื™ืฆืชืŸ ืคืกื•ืœื” ื•ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื–ื™ืจื

Rava said: You have now said that recitation is indispensable, as can be inferred from the mishna disqualifying the deaf-mute. Therefore, if a mute man or woman performed แธฅalitza, their แธฅalitza is invalid. And the mishna, which indicates in its first clause that recitation is not indispensable, but later states that แธฅalitza performed by someone incapable of recitation is invalid, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Zeira with regard to a meal-offering. A meal-offering is generally a mixture of flour and oil. If flour is added to the oil but they are not mixed, they are considered to be fitting to be mixed so long as there is not an excessive amount of flour.

ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื–ื™ืจื ื›ืœ ื”ืจืื•ื™ ืœื‘ื™ืœื” ืื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืœื” ืžืขื›ื‘ืช ื‘ื• ื•ื›ืœ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืจืื•ื™ ืœื‘ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ืœื” ืžืขื›ื‘ืช

This is that which Rabbi Zeira said: Whatever is fitting to be mixed, mixing is not indispensable to it, and it is valid even if it is not mixed. And whatever is not fit to be mixed, e.g., if the quantity of flour is so great that the ingredients cannot be properly mixed, mixing is indispensable for it and it is invalid if it has not been mixed. From here one may learn a general halakhic principle: There are some actions for which their actual performance is not indispensable, provided they are capable of being performed. An action becomes indispensable only if one is unfit or unable to perform it. With regard to recitation of the verses, although it is not indispensable, a mute person is disqualified from performing แธฅalitza because he is not capable of reciting the verses.

ืฉืœื—ื• ืœื™ื” ืœืื‘ื•ื” ื“ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื™ื‘ืžื” ืฉืจืงืงื” ืชื—ืœื•ืฅ ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืื™ืคืกืœื ืœื” ืžืื—ื™ืŸ

They sent the following teaching from Eretz Yisrael to the father of Shmuel: Once a yevama has spat she must perform a complete แธฅalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage. The Gemara comments: By inference, you may learn that even though the spitting did not permit her to marry outside the family, she is disqualified from entering into levirate marriage with any of the brothers, and must therefore complete the แธฅalitza.

ืžื ื™ ืื™ืœื™ืžื ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื”ืฉืชื ื•ืžื” ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืžืฆื•ื” ื“ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืžืจ ืžื™ื“ื™ ื“ื”ื•ื” ืืื™ืžื•ืจื™ื ื“ื›ื™ ืœื™ืชื ื”ื• ืœื ืžืขื›ื‘ื™

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this halakha taught? If we say it is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who stated in the mishna that spitting is not required after the fact, it is difficult, as the following a fortiori reasoning indicates: Now if even in a case where there is a mitzva of แธฅalitza, and the yevama is still around and capable of fulfilling the Torah command of spitting, and one might say that spitting should be treated just as it is with regard to the fatty portions of offerings that are to be consumed on the altar, where the halakha is that when they are not present for offering, i.e., they were lost or became ritually impure, they are not considered indispensable to permit the consumption of the offering.

ื•ื›ื™ ืื™ืชื ื”ื• ืžืขื›ื‘ื™

When the fats of the offering are no longer present for offering, it is permitted for the sacrificial meat to be eaten by the priests through the sprinkling of blood alone, even without offering the fatty portions on the altar. But when the fatty portions are present and extant, then they are considered indispensable, and the priests are not permitted to eat their portions of the offering until the fatty portions are burned on the altar.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืœื ืžืขื›ื‘ื ืžืื—ื™ืŸ ืื™ืคืกืœื

Based on an analogy to the fatty portions of offerings, one would have said regarding the spitting of a yevama that even if it is not indispensable after the fact, so long as the yevama is around, one would expect that her spitting is indispensable. Yet even so, Rabbi Akiva said in the mishna that spitting is not indispensable to แธฅalitza even in such a case, and the แธฅalitza is validated by the removal of the shoe alone. Since Rabbi Akiva seems to accord little significance to the spitting, he cannot be the basis for this halakha, as if spitting is never indispensable, could spitting alone disqualify her from entering into levirate marriage with one of the brothers?

ื•ืืœื ืœืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ

But rather, one might say that this teaching is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who disagrees with Rabbi Akiva and states in the mishna that spitting is indispensable for validating แธฅalitza and is necessary alongside the removal of the shoe. Since he accords significance to the spitting, one might have thought that the teaching prohibiting the yevama from levirate marriage is in accordance with his view.

ื•ื”ื ืฉื ื™ ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ื”ืžืชื™ืจื™ืŸ ื ื™ื ื”ื• ื•ืฉื ื™ ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ื”ืžืชื™ืจื™ืŸ ืื™ืŸ ืžืขืœื™ืŸ ื–ื” ื‘ืœื ื–ื”

But that is difficult as well, as according to Rabbi Elazar, removal of the shoe and spitting are both necessary, and therefore, they are considered two permitting factors that must be completed in order to fulfill an obligation. And there is a principle accepted by Rabbi Elazar with regard to offerings that should be applicable here: Whenever there are two permitting factors that are indispensable for an offering to be valid, one of those factors cannot elevate one of the subordinate components of the offering to consecrated status without the other. Similarly, since Rabbi Elazar holds that แธฅalitza and spitting are both indispensable, if she performs only one of these actions, such as spitting, it is only one of two permitting factors and therefore should not disqualify her for levirate marriage with one of the other yevamin.

ืืœื ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื“ืชื ื™ื ื›ื‘ืฉื™ ืขืฆืจืช ืื™ืŸ ืžืงื“ืฉื™ืŸ ื”ืœื—ื ืืœื ื‘ืฉื—ื™ื˜ื”

Rather, one must say that this teaching is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who is of the opinion that even one of two permitting factors can effect a change in status without performance of the other factor, as it is taught in a baraita: The lambs sacrificed on the festival of Assembly, i.e., Shavuot, consecrate the loaves that accompany them only by means of their slaughter, as the slaughtering of the lambs consecrates the bread.

ื›ื™ืฆื“ ืฉื—ื˜ืŸ ืœืฉืžืŸ ื•ื–ืจืง ื“ืžืŸ ืœืฉืžืŸ ืงื“ืฉ ื”ืœื—ื ืฉื—ื˜ ืฉืœื ืœืฉืžืŸ ื•ื–ืจืง ืœืฉืžืŸ ืœื ืงื“ืฉ ื”ืœื—ื ืฉื—ื˜ืŸ ืœืฉืžืŸ ื•ื–ืจืง ื“ืžืŸ ืฉืœื ืœืฉืžืŸ ืงื“ื•ืฉ ื•ืื™ื ื• ืงื“ื•ืฉ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™

How so? If one slaughtered the lambs for their own sake, i.e., as lambs for Shavuot, and the priest sprinkled their blood for their own sake, the loaves are consecrated. However, if one slaughtered them not for their own sake, and the priest sprinkled their blood for their own sake, the loaves are not consecrated, as the factors indispensable in rendering the offering valid were not properly performed. If one slaughtered them for their own sake, and he sprinkled their blood not for their own sake, the fact that the lambs were properly slaughtered renders the loaves partially consecrated. Therefore, the loaves are consecrated to the extent that they cannot be redeemed, but they are not consecrated to the extent that they may be eaten. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืื•ืžืจ ืœืขื•ืœื ืื™ื ื• ืงื“ื•ืฉ ืขื“ ืฉื™ืฉื—ื•ื˜ ืœืฉืžืŸ ื•ื™ื–ืจื•ืง ื“ืžืŸ ืœืฉืžืŸ

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: Actually, the loaves are consecrated only when one slaughters the offerings for their own sake and sprinkles their blood for their own sake, i.e., only if both factors indispensable in rendering the offering valid were properly performed. If so, the teaching sent from Eretz Yisrael seems to be in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasiโ€™s opinion that even if only one of the two permitting factors of slaughter and sprinkling was performed, the loaves will still be consecrated. Likewise, with respect to แธฅalitza, where there is a need for two permitting factors, spitting and for removal of the shoe, performing one factor such as spitting is sufficient to disqualify the yevama from subsequently entering into levirate marriage.

ื•ืžื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืจืงื™ืงื” ืœื ืคืกืœื” ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื—ืœืฆื” ื•ืœื

The Gemara questions the previous assumption with regard to Rabbi Akivaโ€™s opinion on the matter: But did Rabbi Akiva say that spitting does not disqualify the yevama from a later levirate marriage to one of the other brothers? But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: If she removed the shoe but did not

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Yevamot 104

ื•ืฉืœ ืขื™ืจ ื”ื ื“ื—ืช ื•ืฉืœ ื–ืงืŸ ื”ืขืฉื•ื™ ืœื›ื‘ื•ื“ื• ืœื ืชื—ืœื•ืฅ ื•ืื ื—ืœืฆื” ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื”

or a sandal belonging to an inhabitant of an idolatrous city, a city the majority of whose inhabitants committed idolatry, which stands to be destroyed with all of the cityโ€™s property; and likewise, the sandal of an Elder made in accordance with his dignity to be worn upon his death as part of his shroud, i.e., it is not meant for walking as a normal shoe, the yevama may not perform แธฅalitza using any of these shoes. And if she did perform แธฅalitza, her แธฅalitza is invalid even after the fact, as these are not halakhically considered shoes.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ื ื ืœืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื–ืงืŸ ื”ืขืฉื•ื™ ืœื›ื‘ื•ื“ื• ื“ืœืื• ืœื”ื™ืœื•ื›ื ืขื‘ื™ื“ ื“ื‘ื™ ื“ื™ื ื ื ืžื™ ืœืื• ืœื”ื™ืœื•ื›ื ืขื‘ื™ื“

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: What is different about the sandal of an Elder that is made in accordance with his dignity that one should say that even though it is the proper size for his foot, it is not valid because it was not made for walking, but merely for him to wear after his death. But the courtโ€™s sandal also was not made for walking, as the court kept a sandal that met all the other necessary qualifications for a sandal for แธฅalitza and gave it to the yavam to be worn during the แธฅalitza procedure. Since the yavam would return the แธฅalitza sandal after the conclusion of the แธฅalitza, therefore, the sandal was never used for walking and should be invalidated for แธฅalitza just as the sandal made for the dignity of an Elder?

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ืœื• ืžืกื’ื™ ื‘ื™ื” ืฉืœื•ื—ื ื“ื‘ื™ ื“ื™ื ื ืžื™ ืงืคื™ื“ ืขืœื™ื” ื“ื™ื™ื ื

He said to him: If a messenger of the court had walked in the แธฅalitza shoe used by the court, would the judge reprimand him? Although the courtโ€™s sandal was designed for the express purpose of แธฅalitza, it may also be used for walking. A shoe designed for a dead person, on the other hand, is forbidden for any other use and is not made for walking at all, and it is consequently disqualified.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื—ืœืฆื” ื‘ืœื™ืœื” ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ื›ืฉืจื” ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืคื•ืกืœ ื‘ืฉืžืืœ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืžื›ืฉื™ืจ

MISHNA: If a woman performed แธฅalitza at night, her แธฅalitza is valid, but Rabbi Elazar invalidates it. If she performed แธฅalitza on the left foot, her แธฅalitza is invalid, but Rabbi Elazar validates it.

ื’ืžืณ ืœื™ืžื ื‘ื”ื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ื“ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ืจื™ื‘ื™ื ืœื ื’ืขื™ื ื•ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ืœื ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ืจื™ื‘ื™ื ืœื ื’ืขื™ื

GEMARA: Let us say that they disagree about this issue: One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that we compare the halakhot governing monetary disputes, which category includes แธฅalitza, as แธฅalitza carries with it monetary ramifications and requires payment of the marriage contract to the yevama, with the halakhot of leprosy. Just as leprosy cases are judged only during the day (see Leviticus 13:14), likewise, monetary cases may take place only during the day. And one Sage, the first tanna, holds that we do not compare monetary disputes with leprosy.

ืœื ื“ื›ื•ืœื™ ืขืœืžื ืœื ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ืจื™ื‘ื™ื ืœื ื’ืขื™ื ื“ืื™ ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ืืคื™ืœื• ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ืŸ ื‘ืœื™ืœื” ื ืžื™ ืœื ื•ื”ื›ื ื‘ื”ื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ื›ืชื—ืœืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื“ืžื™ื ื•ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ื›ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ืŸ ื“ืžื™ื

The Gemara responds: No, everyone holds that we do not compare monetary disputes with leprosy, for if we would compare them fully, then even delivering the verdict of the court case could not be done at night, but it is permitted to complete monetary judgments and deliver the verdict at night, provided the proceedings began during the day. And here, with respect to performing แธฅalitza at night they disagree about this issue: One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that แธฅalitza is considered like the commencement of judgment of monetary cases, and one Sage, the first tanna, holds that แธฅalitza is considered like the verdict of a monetary judgment, and therefore it may also be conducted at night.

ืจื‘ื” ื‘ืจ ื—ื™ื™ื ืงื˜ื•ืกืคืื” ืขื‘ื“ ืขื•ื‘ื“ื ื‘ืžื•ืง ื•ื‘ื™ื—ื™ื“ื™ ื•ื‘ืœื™ืœื” ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื›ืžื” ืจื‘ ื’ื•ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืขื‘ื™ื“ ื›ื™ื—ื™ื“ืื”

It is told: Rabba bar แธคiyya Ketosfaโ€™a, from Ctesiphon, conducted แธฅalitza using a slipper that was not made of leather, and he did so in private, as he was the only judge, and by night. Shmuel said disparagingly: How great is the power of this master who follows an individual opinion, as in his practice he relied on individual opinions that are not accepted as halakha.

ืžืื™ ืงืฉื™ื ืื™ ืžื•ืง ืกืชืžื ืชื ื™ื ืื™ ืœื™ืœื” ืกืชืžื ืชื ื™ื

The Gemara asks: What is difficult for Shmuel about Rabba bar แธคiyyaโ€™s actions? If it was the fact that he conducted แธฅalitza using a slipper, an unattributed opinion is taught in a baraita stating that this is valid. As the opinion is unattributed, this indicates that it is not the view of one individual, but rather the opinion of the majority. If it was the fact that he performed แธฅalitza at night, an unattributed opinion is taught in the mishna stating that it is valid as well.

ืืœื ื™ื—ื™ื“ื™ ืงื ืงืฉื™ื ืœื™ื” ื”ื™ื›ื™ ืขื‘ื™ื“ ื‘ื™ื—ื™ื“ื™ ื“ื™ื—ื™ื“ืื” ืงืชื ื™ ืœื” ื“ืชื ืŸ ื—ืœืฆื” ื‘ืฉื ื™ื ืื• ื‘ืฉืœืฉื” ื•ื ืžืฆื ืื—ื“ ืžื”ืŸ ืงืจื•ื‘ ืื• ืคืกื•ืœ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื”ืกื ื“ืœืจ ืžื›ืฉื™ืจื™ื ื•ืžืขืฉื” ื‘ืื—ื“ ืฉื—ืœืฅ ื‘ื™ื ื• ืœื‘ื™ื ื” ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื”ืืกื•ืจื™ื ื•ื‘ื ืžืขืฉื” ืœืคื ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื•ื”ื›ืฉื™ืจ

Rather, it was difficult for him that Rabba bar แธคiyya conducted แธฅalitza in private, as the sole judge: How could he do so in private, as that is taught only in accordance with an individual opinion, as we learned in a mishna: If she performed แธฅalitza before two or three judges and one of them is found to be a relative or disqualified, her แธฅalitza is invalid. And Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yoแธฅanan the Cobbler validate the judge who is not a relative or disqualified. If there are two judges who are not relatives, then they hold that the แธฅalitza is valid, as they validate a แธฅalitza performed before two judges. And an incident occurred involving one who performed แธฅalitza between him and her alone in prison, as there was no judge present at all, and the incident came before Rabbi Akiva and he validated it.

ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื•ืกืฃ ื‘ืจ ืžื ื™ื•ืžื™ [ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื ื—ืžืŸ] ืื™ืŸ ื”ืœื›ื” ื›ืื•ืชื• ื”ื–ื•ื’ ื•ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ื›ื•ืœื”ื• ื ืžื™ ื™ื—ื™ื“ืื” ืงืชื ื™ ืœื”ื• ื“ืชื ื™ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ืื ื™ ืจืื™ืชื™ ืืช ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ื‘ืŸ ืืœื™ืฉืข ืฉื—ืœืฅ ื‘ืžื•ืง ื‘ื™ื—ื™ื“ื™ ื•ื‘ืœื™ืœื”

And Rav Yosef bar Minyumi said that Rav Naแธฅman said: The halakha does not follow that pair, i.e., Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yoแธฅanan the Cobbler. Evidently, Rabba bar แธคiyya relied on the individual opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who permitted แธฅalitza in private, and therefore Shmuel commented regarding Rabbi bar แธคiyyaโ€™s power to rule based on an individualโ€™s opinion. And if you wish, say that not only does this detail follow an individual opinion, but rather all of these details are taught by an individual opinion. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: I saw that Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha performed a แธฅalitza using a slipper, in private, and at night. This statement implies that these details are all according to his individual opinion, contrary to the opinion of the rest of the Sages.

ื‘ืฉืžืืœ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ื›ื•ืณ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ืขื•ืœื ื™ืœืคื™ื ืŸ ืจื’ืœ ืจื’ืœ ืžืžืฆื•ืจืข ืžื” ืœื”ืœืŸ ื“ื™ืžื™ืŸ ืืฃ ื›ืืŸ ื“ื™ืžื™ืŸ

It was taught in the mishna that if แธฅalitza was performed using his left foot, her แธฅalitza is invalid, while Rabbi Elazar validates it. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of the Rabbisโ€™ opinion? Ulla said: We derive a verbal analogy from the word โ€œfootโ€ stated here, and the word โ€œfootโ€ stated regarding the leper. Just as there, with respect to the leper, it is the right foot (Leviticus 14:14), so too here, with respect to แธฅalitza, it is the right foot that must be used.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืœื ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืจื’ืœ ืจื’ืœ ืžืžืฆื•ืจืข ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ืžื ื™ืŸ ืœืจืฆื™ืขื” ืฉื”ื™ื ื‘ืื–ืŸ ื”ื™ืžื ื™ืช ื ืืžืจ ื›ืืŸ ืื–ืŸ ื•ื ืืžืจ ืœื”ืœืŸ ืื–ืŸ ืžื” ืœื”ืœืŸ ื™ืžื™ืŸ ืืฃ ื›ืืŸ ื™ืžื™ืŸ

The Gemara notes: And this would seem to indicate that Rabbi Elazar does not derive โ€œfootโ€ with regard to แธฅalitza from the word โ€œfootโ€ from the leper. But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar says: From where is it derived that piercing a Hebrew slaveโ€™s ear with an awl when the slave chooses to remain in servitude is done specifically on the right ear? โ€œEarโ€ is stated here in the halakhot pertaining to a pierced slave, and โ€œearโ€ is stated there in the halakhot of the leper. Just as there, with regard to leprosy, it is the right ear, as it is stated explicitly there, so too here, with regard to piercing the ear, it is the right ear. This statement of Rabbi Elazar implies that he does learn a verbal analogy about the word โ€œright.โ€

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื‘ืจ ื™ื•ืกืฃ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœืคืช ื”ืฉื™ื˜ื”

Rav Yitzแธฅak bar Yosef said that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: The attribution of the opinions is reversed, meaning that it is Rabbi Elazar who invalidates แธฅalitza on the left foot, as he learns an analogy from the halakha with regard to piercing the ear that the right must be used.

ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืœืขื•ืœื ืœื ืชื™ืคื•ืš ืื–ืŸ ืื–ืŸ ืžื•ืคื ื™ ืจื’ืœ ืจื’ืœ ืœื ืžื•ืคื ื™

Rava said: Actually, do not reverse the opinions. The words โ€œearโ€ and โ€œearโ€ are free terms, i.e., they are superfluous in their context and therefore it is clear that the Torah included those terms for the express purpose of establishing the verbal analogy. A verbal analogy that is based on otherwise extraneous terms cannot be logically refuted. Therefore, the superfluous โ€œearโ€ teaches that piercing is done on the right ear. However, the words โ€œfootโ€ and โ€œfootโ€ are not free, because the word โ€œfoot,โ€ written with regard to the yavam, is necessary in its context and is not superfluous. Therefore, the verbal analogy of the word โ€œfootโ€ is incomplete.

ื•ื›ื™ ืœื ืžื•ืคื ื™ ืžืื™ ืคื™ืจื›ื ืื™ื›ื ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืคืจืš ืžื” ืœืžืฆื•ืจืข ืฉื›ืŸ ื˜ืขื•ืŸ ืขืฅ ืืจื– ื•ืื–ื•ื‘ ื•ืฉื ื™ ืชื•ืœืขืช

The Gemara asks: And even if they are not both free to be used for exposition, what refutation is there? A verbal analogy that is free to be used for exposition in only one place is still valid, provided there is no reason to refute the comparison. The Gemara explains: It can be refuted, as the leper is unique in that there is a very specific process necessary for his purification: He requires that the blood of the offering be sprinkled upon him, and he requires cedarwood, hyssop, and scarlet thread. Therefore, it is possible to say that the Torah also specified the use of the right foot in the case of the leper. However, this would not necessarily be required with respect to แธฅalitza, which lacks such specific halakhot. Consequently, แธฅalitza performed using the left foot could be valid.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื—ืœืฆื” ื•ืจืงืงื” ืื‘ืœ ืœื ืงืจืื” ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ื›ืฉืจื” ืงืจืื” ื•ืจืงืงื” ืื‘ืœ ืœื ื—ืœืฆื” ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ื—ืœืฆื” ื•ืงืจืื” ืื‘ืœ ืœื ืจืงืงื” ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืื•ืžืจ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ื›ืฉืจื”

MISHNA: If she, i.e., the yevama, removed the shoe and spat in accordance with the halakha but did not recite the necessary text, her แธฅalitza is valid. If she recited the text and spat but did not remove the shoe, her แธฅalitza is disqualified. If she removed the shoe and recited the text but did not spit, Rabbi Elazar says: Her แธฅalitza is disqualified, while Rabbi Akiva says: Her แธฅalitza is valid.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื›ื›ื” ื™ืขืฉื” ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืžืขืฉื” ืžืขื›ื‘ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืžืฉื ืจืื™ื” ื›ื›ื” ื™ืขืฉื” ืœืื™ืฉ ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืžืขืฉื” ื‘ืื™ืฉ

Rabbi Elazar said to him: The verse states: โ€œSo shall it be done to the man who does not build his brotherโ€™s houseโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:9). โ€œSoโ€ is an exclusionary term indicating that only precisely in this fashion is แธฅalitza valid. Therefore, any term that constitutes an action for แธฅalitza is indispensable. Rabbi Akiva said to him: You derive proof from there? But it states: โ€œSo shall it be done to the manโ€ indicating that only a term constituting an action toward the man, namely any aspect of แธฅalitza that concerns the manโ€™s body, such as removal of his shoe, is indispensable. But spitting, which does not involve the man, although it takes place in his presence, is not indispensable.

ื”ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื ื—ืœืฅ ื•ื”ื—ืจืฉืช ืฉื—ืœืฆื” ื•ื—ื•ืœืฆืช ืœืงื˜ืŸ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ืงื˜ื ื” ืฉื—ืœืฆื” ืชื—ืœื•ืฅ ืžืฉืชื’ื“ื™ืœ ื•ืื ืœื ื—ืœืฆื” ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ื—ืœืฆื” ื‘ืฉื ื™ื ืื• ื‘ืฉืœืฉื” ื•ื ืžืฆื ืื—ื“ ืžื”ืŸ ืงืจื•ื‘ ืื• ืคืกื•ืœ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื”ืกื ื“ืœืจ ืžื›ืฉื™ืจื™ืŸ ื•ืžืขืฉื” ื‘ืื—ื“ ืฉื—ืœืฅ ื‘ื™ื ื• ืœื‘ื™ื ื” ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื”ืืกื•ืจื™ื ื•ื‘ื ืžืขืฉื” ืœืคื ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื•ื”ื›ืฉื™ืจ

The mishna lists additional halakhot with regard to แธฅalitza. If a deaf-mute man underwent แธฅalitza, or a deaf-mute woman performed แธฅalitza, or if an adult woman performs แธฅalitza with a male minor, her แธฅalitza is invalid and the woman may not marry. If a female minor performed แธฅalitza, she must perform แธฅalitza a second time once she becomes an adult, and if she does not perform the second แธฅalitza, her first แธฅalitza is invalid. If she performed แธฅalitza before two or three judges and one of them is found to be a relative or disqualified as a judge for some other reason, her แธฅalitza is invalid. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yoแธฅanan the Cobbler validate the แธฅalitza in this case. And an incident occurred involving a certain person who performed แธฅalitza between him and her alone in prison, i.e., not in the presence of others, and the case came before Rabbi Akiva and he validated it.

ื’ืžืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื”ืฉืชื ื“ืืžืจืช ืงืจื™ืื” ืœื ืžื™ืขื›ื‘ื ืœืคื™ื›ืš ืืœื ื•ืืœืžืช ืฉื—ืœืฆื• ื—ืœื™ืฆืชืŸ ื›ืฉื™ืจื”

GEMARA: Rava said: Now that you have said that recitation of the text is not indispensable in order for the แธฅalitza to be valid, therefore if a mute man or a mute woman performed แธฅalitza, their แธฅalitza is valid. Although the statements should be recited ab initio, since the recitation is not indispensable, mute individuals can perform แธฅalitza.

ืชื ืŸ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื ื—ืœืฅ ื•ื”ื—ืจืฉืช ืฉื—ืœืฆื” ื•ื”ื—ื•ืœืฆืช ืžืŸ ื”ืงื˜ืŸ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ืœืื• ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืœื ื‘ื ื™ ืงืจื™ื™ื” ื ื™ื ื”ื• ืœื ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืœืื• ื‘ื ื™ ื“ืขื” ื ื™ื ื”ื•

The Gemara challenges: But we learned in the mishna above: If a deaf-mute man underwent แธฅalitza, or a deaf-mute woman performed แธฅalitza, or if a woman performs แธฅalitza with a male minor, her แธฅalitza is invalid. What is the reason that the แธฅalitza is invalid? Is it not because they are not competent to recite the text, thereby indicating that the recitation is necessary even after the fact? The Gemara rejects this assertion: No, the reason for disqualifying a deaf-mute man and woman is because they are not considered to have intellectual capacity, and therefore their actions do not have halakhic significance.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืืœื ื•ืืœืžืช ื ืžื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืืœื ื•ืืœืžืช ื‘ื ื™ ื“ืขื” ื ื™ื ื”ื• ื•ืคื•ืžื™ื™ื”ื• ื”ื•ื ื“ื›ืื™ื‘ ืœื”ื•

The Gemara asks: If that is so, let us also say that a mute man and woman do not have intellectual capacity. Rava said: A mute man and woman do have intellectual capacity. Rather, it is their mouth that hurts them. Mute individuals have full intellectual capacity; they merely lack a means of expression. The deaf-mute, on the other hand, is not considered to have the mental capacity to speak.

ื•ื”ื ืืžืจื™ ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื ืื™ ืœืคื™ ืฉืื™ื ื• ื‘ืืžืจ ื•ืืžืจื” ืืœื ื›ื™ ืืชืžืจ ื“ืจื‘ื ืืกื™ืคื ืืชืžืจ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื ื—ืœืฅ ื•ื”ื—ืจืฉืช ืฉื—ืœืฆื” ื•ื”ื—ื•ืœืฆืช ืžืŸ ื”ืงื˜ืŸ ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื”

The Gemara challenges again: But didnโ€™t the scholars from the house of study of Rabbi Yannai say that a deaf-mute man and woman are disqualified from participation in แธฅalitza because they cannot fulfill the requirements of โ€œhe saysโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:8) and โ€œshe shall sayโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:9), and not due to insufficient intellectual capacity? Rather, when that first statement of Rava was said, it was stated concerning the latter clause of the mishna: If a deaf-mute man underwent แธฅalitza, or a deaf-mute woman performed แธฅalitza, or if a woman performs แธฅalitza on a male minor, her แธฅalitza is invalid.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื”ืฉืชื ื“ืืžืจืช ืงืจื™ื™ื” ืžืขื›ื‘ื ืœืคื™ื›ืš ืืœื ื•ืืœืžืช ืฉื—ืœืฆื• ื—ืœื™ืฆืชืŸ ืคืกื•ืœื” ื•ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื–ื™ืจื

Rava said: You have now said that recitation is indispensable, as can be inferred from the mishna disqualifying the deaf-mute. Therefore, if a mute man or woman performed แธฅalitza, their แธฅalitza is invalid. And the mishna, which indicates in its first clause that recitation is not indispensable, but later states that แธฅalitza performed by someone incapable of recitation is invalid, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Zeira with regard to a meal-offering. A meal-offering is generally a mixture of flour and oil. If flour is added to the oil but they are not mixed, they are considered to be fitting to be mixed so long as there is not an excessive amount of flour.

ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื–ื™ืจื ื›ืœ ื”ืจืื•ื™ ืœื‘ื™ืœื” ืื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืœื” ืžืขื›ื‘ืช ื‘ื• ื•ื›ืœ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืจืื•ื™ ืœื‘ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ืœื” ืžืขื›ื‘ืช

This is that which Rabbi Zeira said: Whatever is fitting to be mixed, mixing is not indispensable to it, and it is valid even if it is not mixed. And whatever is not fit to be mixed, e.g., if the quantity of flour is so great that the ingredients cannot be properly mixed, mixing is indispensable for it and it is invalid if it has not been mixed. From here one may learn a general halakhic principle: There are some actions for which their actual performance is not indispensable, provided they are capable of being performed. An action becomes indispensable only if one is unfit or unable to perform it. With regard to recitation of the verses, although it is not indispensable, a mute person is disqualified from performing แธฅalitza because he is not capable of reciting the verses.

ืฉืœื—ื• ืœื™ื” ืœืื‘ื•ื” ื“ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื™ื‘ืžื” ืฉืจืงืงื” ืชื—ืœื•ืฅ ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืื™ืคืกืœื ืœื” ืžืื—ื™ืŸ

They sent the following teaching from Eretz Yisrael to the father of Shmuel: Once a yevama has spat she must perform a complete แธฅalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage. The Gemara comments: By inference, you may learn that even though the spitting did not permit her to marry outside the family, she is disqualified from entering into levirate marriage with any of the brothers, and must therefore complete the แธฅalitza.

ืžื ื™ ืื™ืœื™ืžื ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื”ืฉืชื ื•ืžื” ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืžืฆื•ื” ื“ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืžืจ ืžื™ื“ื™ ื“ื”ื•ื” ืืื™ืžื•ืจื™ื ื“ื›ื™ ืœื™ืชื ื”ื• ืœื ืžืขื›ื‘ื™

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this halakha taught? If we say it is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who stated in the mishna that spitting is not required after the fact, it is difficult, as the following a fortiori reasoning indicates: Now if even in a case where there is a mitzva of แธฅalitza, and the yevama is still around and capable of fulfilling the Torah command of spitting, and one might say that spitting should be treated just as it is with regard to the fatty portions of offerings that are to be consumed on the altar, where the halakha is that when they are not present for offering, i.e., they were lost or became ritually impure, they are not considered indispensable to permit the consumption of the offering.

ื•ื›ื™ ืื™ืชื ื”ื• ืžืขื›ื‘ื™

When the fats of the offering are no longer present for offering, it is permitted for the sacrificial meat to be eaten by the priests through the sprinkling of blood alone, even without offering the fatty portions on the altar. But when the fatty portions are present and extant, then they are considered indispensable, and the priests are not permitted to eat their portions of the offering until the fatty portions are burned on the altar.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืœื ืžืขื›ื‘ื ืžืื—ื™ืŸ ืื™ืคืกืœื

Based on an analogy to the fatty portions of offerings, one would have said regarding the spitting of a yevama that even if it is not indispensable after the fact, so long as the yevama is around, one would expect that her spitting is indispensable. Yet even so, Rabbi Akiva said in the mishna that spitting is not indispensable to แธฅalitza even in such a case, and the แธฅalitza is validated by the removal of the shoe alone. Since Rabbi Akiva seems to accord little significance to the spitting, he cannot be the basis for this halakha, as if spitting is never indispensable, could spitting alone disqualify her from entering into levirate marriage with one of the brothers?

ื•ืืœื ืœืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ

But rather, one might say that this teaching is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who disagrees with Rabbi Akiva and states in the mishna that spitting is indispensable for validating แธฅalitza and is necessary alongside the removal of the shoe. Since he accords significance to the spitting, one might have thought that the teaching prohibiting the yevama from levirate marriage is in accordance with his view.

ื•ื”ื ืฉื ื™ ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ื”ืžืชื™ืจื™ืŸ ื ื™ื ื”ื• ื•ืฉื ื™ ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ื”ืžืชื™ืจื™ืŸ ืื™ืŸ ืžืขืœื™ืŸ ื–ื” ื‘ืœื ื–ื”

But that is difficult as well, as according to Rabbi Elazar, removal of the shoe and spitting are both necessary, and therefore, they are considered two permitting factors that must be completed in order to fulfill an obligation. And there is a principle accepted by Rabbi Elazar with regard to offerings that should be applicable here: Whenever there are two permitting factors that are indispensable for an offering to be valid, one of those factors cannot elevate one of the subordinate components of the offering to consecrated status without the other. Similarly, since Rabbi Elazar holds that แธฅalitza and spitting are both indispensable, if she performs only one of these actions, such as spitting, it is only one of two permitting factors and therefore should not disqualify her for levirate marriage with one of the other yevamin.

ืืœื ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื“ืชื ื™ื ื›ื‘ืฉื™ ืขืฆืจืช ืื™ืŸ ืžืงื“ืฉื™ืŸ ื”ืœื—ื ืืœื ื‘ืฉื—ื™ื˜ื”

Rather, one must say that this teaching is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who is of the opinion that even one of two permitting factors can effect a change in status without performance of the other factor, as it is taught in a baraita: The lambs sacrificed on the festival of Assembly, i.e., Shavuot, consecrate the loaves that accompany them only by means of their slaughter, as the slaughtering of the lambs consecrates the bread.

ื›ื™ืฆื“ ืฉื—ื˜ืŸ ืœืฉืžืŸ ื•ื–ืจืง ื“ืžืŸ ืœืฉืžืŸ ืงื“ืฉ ื”ืœื—ื ืฉื—ื˜ ืฉืœื ืœืฉืžืŸ ื•ื–ืจืง ืœืฉืžืŸ ืœื ืงื“ืฉ ื”ืœื—ื ืฉื—ื˜ืŸ ืœืฉืžืŸ ื•ื–ืจืง ื“ืžืŸ ืฉืœื ืœืฉืžืŸ ืงื“ื•ืฉ ื•ืื™ื ื• ืงื“ื•ืฉ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™

How so? If one slaughtered the lambs for their own sake, i.e., as lambs for Shavuot, and the priest sprinkled their blood for their own sake, the loaves are consecrated. However, if one slaughtered them not for their own sake, and the priest sprinkled their blood for their own sake, the loaves are not consecrated, as the factors indispensable in rendering the offering valid were not properly performed. If one slaughtered them for their own sake, and he sprinkled their blood not for their own sake, the fact that the lambs were properly slaughtered renders the loaves partially consecrated. Therefore, the loaves are consecrated to the extent that they cannot be redeemed, but they are not consecrated to the extent that they may be eaten. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืื•ืžืจ ืœืขื•ืœื ืื™ื ื• ืงื“ื•ืฉ ืขื“ ืฉื™ืฉื—ื•ื˜ ืœืฉืžืŸ ื•ื™ื–ืจื•ืง ื“ืžืŸ ืœืฉืžืŸ

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: Actually, the loaves are consecrated only when one slaughters the offerings for their own sake and sprinkles their blood for their own sake, i.e., only if both factors indispensable in rendering the offering valid were properly performed. If so, the teaching sent from Eretz Yisrael seems to be in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasiโ€™s opinion that even if only one of the two permitting factors of slaughter and sprinkling was performed, the loaves will still be consecrated. Likewise, with respect to แธฅalitza, where there is a need for two permitting factors, spitting and for removal of the shoe, performing one factor such as spitting is sufficient to disqualify the yevama from subsequently entering into levirate marriage.

ื•ืžื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืจืงื™ืงื” ืœื ืคืกืœื” ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื—ืœืฆื” ื•ืœื

The Gemara questions the previous assumption with regard to Rabbi Akivaโ€™s opinion on the matter: But did Rabbi Akiva say that spitting does not disqualify the yevama from a later levirate marriage to one of the other brothers? But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: If she removed the shoe but did not

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