Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

January 25, 2015 | ื”ืณ ื‘ืฉื‘ื˜ ืชืฉืขืดื”

  • This month's learning is sponsored by the Kessler, Wolkenfeld and Grossman families in loving memory of Mia Rose bat Matan Yehoshua vโ€™ Elana Malka. "ื” ื ืชืŸ ื•ื” ืœืงื—. ื™ื”ื™ ืฉื ื” ืžื‘ื•ืจืš"

  • This month's shiurim are sponsored by Shoshana Shur for the refuah shleima of Meira Bat Zelda Zahava.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 113

Attached is a link to an article from the Beit Hillel Journal regarding marriage of individuals with mental health issues.

ืžื™ืžื ืขื™ ื•ืœื ื ืกื‘ื™ ืœื”

others would refrain from marrying her at all, as she can issue a declaration of refusal indefinitely, whereas in the case of a minor there is a time limit with regard to her option of a refusal.

ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืงื˜ื ื” ื“ืื›ืœื” ื‘ืชืจื•ืžื” ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื—ืจืฉืช ื“ืœื ืื›ืœื” ื‘ืชืจื•ืžื” ื“ืชื ืŸ ื”ืขื™ื“ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื’ื•ื“ื’ื“ื ืขืœ ื”ื—ืจืฉืช ืฉื”ืฉื™ืื” ืื‘ื™ื” ืฉื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ื•ืขืœ ืงื˜ื ื” ื‘ืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืฉื ืฉืืช ืœื›ื”ืŸ ืฉืื•ื›ืœืช ื‘ืชืจื•ืžื” ื•ืื™ืœื• ื—ืจืฉืช ืœื ืื›ืœื”

ยง The Gemara further asks: What is the difference between a minor girl, that she may partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, and a deaf-mute woman, that she may not partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, despite the fact that both of their marriages apply by rabbinic law? As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 55b): Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Gudgada testified with regard to a female deaf-mute whose father married her off, that she can be divorced with a bill of divorce. And he testified with regard to a minor girl, daughter of an non-priest who was married to a priest, that she may partake of teruma, whereas a deaf-mute woman, it may be inferred, may not partake of teruma.

ื’ื–ื™ืจื” ืฉืžื ื™ืื›ื™ืœ ื—ืจืฉ ื‘ื—ืจืฉืช ื•ืœื™ื›ื•ืœ ืงื˜ืŸ ืื•ื›ืœ ื ื‘ืœื•ืช ื”ื•ื

The Gemara answers: The reason that a deaf-mute woman may not partake of teruma, even if she is married to a halakhically competent priest, is due to a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest likewise feed teruma to his deaf-mute wife. The Gemara asks: And which prohibition would that violate? Let him feed her, as he is equivalent to a minor who eats meat from unslaughtered animals. This is referring to the halakha that there is no obligation to prevent minors from committing transgressions. Since a deaf-mute, who is not legally competent, has the status of a minor, the same reasoning should apply in this case. Consequently, the court should be under no obligation to prevent this deaf-mute woman from eating teruma unlawfully.

ื’ื–ื™ืจื” ืฉืžื ื™ืื›ื™ืœ ื—ืจืฉ ื‘ืคืงื—ืช ื•ื—ืจืฉ ื‘ืคืงื—ืช ื ืžื™ ืœื™ื›ื•ืœ ื‘ืชืจื•ืžื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื’ื–ื™ืจื” ื“ืœืžื ืืชื™ ืœืื•ื›ืœื” ื‘ืชืจื•ืžื” ื“ืื•ืจื™ื™ืชื

Rather, it is a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest feed teruma to a halakhically competent wife. Since by Torah law her marriage to a deaf-mute man is not valid, she may not eat teruma. The Gemara asks: As well, in the case of a deaf-mute priest who wishes to feed a halakhically competent wife, let her partake of teruma that applies by rabbinic law. There are types of produce from which there is no obligation to separate teruma by Torah law, and one separates teruma from them due to rabbinic decree. Just as the marriage of this woman is by rabbinic law, she should be permitted to eat teruma that applies by rabbinic law. The Gemara answers: It is a rabbinic decree, as perhaps he will come to feed her teruma that applies by Torah law.

ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืงื˜ื ื” ื“ืื™ืช ืœื” ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื—ืจืฉืช ื“ืœื™ืช ืœื” ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ื“ืื ื›ืŸ ืžื™ืžื ืขื™ ื•ืœื ื ืกื‘ื™ ืœื”

The Gemara further asks: And what is the difference between a minor girl, that she has a marriage contract, and a deaf-mute woman, that she does not have a marriage contract? The Gemara answers: The reason is that if so, if the husband of a deaf-mute would be obligated to give her a marriage contract, men would refrain from marrying her at all.

ื•ืงื˜ื ื” ืžื ืœืŸ ื“ืื™ืช ืœื” ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ื“ืชื ืŸ ื”ืžืžืื ืช ื•ื”ืฉื ื™ื™ื” ื•ืื™ื™ืœื•ื ื™ืช ืื™ืŸ ืœื”ืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ืื‘ืœ ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ื•ืงื˜ื ื” ื™ืฉ ืœื” ื›ืชื•ื‘ื”

The Gemara asks: And a minor girl, from where do we derive that she has a marriage contract? As we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 67a): With regard to a minor who refuses her husband and leaves him, and likewise a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative prohibited by rabbinic law, and a sexually underdeveloped woman who is incapable of bearing children, these women have no marriage contract. The Gemara infers: However, any other woman who can be divorced by means of a bill of divorce, and this includes a minor girl, is entitled to a marriage contract.

ื•ื—ืจืฉืช ืžื ืœืŸ ื“ืœื™ืช ืœื” ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ื“ืชื ื™ื ื—ืจืฉ ื•ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืฉื ืฉืื• ืคืงื—ื•ืช ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉื ืชืคืงื— ื”ื—ืจืฉ ื•ื ืฉืชืคื” ื”ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืื™ืŸ ืœื”ื ืขืœื™ื”ื ื›ืœื•ื ืจืฆื• ืœืงื™ื™ืžืŸ ื™ืฉ ืœื”ื ื›ืชื•ื‘ื”

The Gemara asks: And a deaf-mute woman, from where do we derive that she has no marriage contract? As it is taught in a baraita: A deaf-mute and an imbecile who married halakhically competent women, even if the deaf-mute subsequently regained his senses, and the imbecile regained his competence, their wives have no claim of anything against them, even if their wives received marriage contracts from them. However, if the men wish to maintain these women as their wives after they became fully competent, they have a marriage contract from that point onward.

ื•ืคืงื— ืฉื ืฉื ื—ืจืฉืช ืื• ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืืคื™ืœื• ื›ืชื‘ ืœื” ืžืื” ืžื ื” ื›ืชื•ื‘ืชื” ืงื™ื™ืžืช ืžืคื ื™ ืฉืจืฆื” ืœื–ื•ืง ื‘ื ื›ืกื™ื• ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจืฆื” ื”ื ืœื ืจืฆื” ืื™ืŸ ืœื” ื“ืื ื›ืŸ ืžื™ืžื ืขื™ ื•ืœื ื ืกื‘ื™ ืœื”

And in the case of a halakhically competent man who married a deaf-mute or an imbecile, and he decided to write a marriage contract for her, even if he wrote for her one hundred dinars her marriage contract is valid, because he wanted to harm his own property. In other words, as he acted willingly, despite the lack of obligation to do so, this is comparable to one who chooses to harm himself and give away property in any other manner; it is his prerogative. The Gemara infers: The reason for this halakha is that he wanted to write her a marriage contract, from which it may be inferred that if he does not want to write one, she will not have a marriage contract. The logic is as stated above, that if so, men would refrain from marrying her.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืคืงื—ืช ืœื—ืจืฉ ืœื™ืชืงืŸ ืœื” ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ื“ืื ื›ืŸ ืžื™ืžื ืขื™ ื•ืœื ืžื™ื ืกื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืชืจ ืžืฉื”ืื™ืฉ ืจื•ืฆื” ืœื™ืฉื ืืฉื” ืจื•ืฆื” ืœื”ื ืฉื

The Gemara asks: If so, in a case of a halakhically competent woman who was married to a deaf-mute, let the Sages enact a marriage contract for her, for if so, i.e., if women would not receive marriage contracts in this situation, they would refrain from marrying deaf-mute men entirely. The Gemara answers: More than the man wants to get married, a woman wants to be married. Consequently, women will not be too discriminating with regard to marriage with a deaf-mute, even if they are not entitled to a marriage contract.

ื”ื”ื•ื ื—ืจืฉ ื“ื”ื•ื” ื‘ืฉื‘ื‘ื•ืชื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืžืœื›ื™ื• ืื ืกื‘ื™ื” ืื™ืชืชื ื•ื›ืชื‘ ืœื” ืืจื‘ืข ืžืื” ื–ื•ื–ื™ ืžื ื›ืกื™ื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืžืืŸ ื—ื›ื™ื ื›ืจื‘ ืžืœื›ื™ื• ื“ื’ื‘ืจื ืจื‘ื” ื”ื•ื ืงืกื‘ืจ ืื™ืœื• ืจืฆื” ืฉืคื—ื” ืœืฉืžืฉื• ืžื™ ืœื ื–ื‘ื ื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื” ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ ื”ื›ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืชืจืชื™

The Gemara relates: There was a certain deaf-mute man who was in the neighborhood of Rav Malkiyyu. Rav Malkiyyu married him to a woman, and he wrote four-hundred dinars for her from the property of the deaf-mute as her marriage contract. Rava said: Who is as wise as Rav Malkiyyu, as he is a great man who found a way to achieve a desirable result by giving her a marriage contract, despite the fact that the deaf-mute was not obligated to do so. Rav Malkiyyu reasoned as follows: If that deaf-mute man wanted a maidservant to attend to him, would we not acquire one for him? All the more so here, as there are two advantages, for she will attend to his needs both as a maidservant and as a wife.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ื™ื™ื ื‘ืจ ืืฉื™ ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ืืฉืช ื—ืจืฉ ืื™ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืขืœื™ื” ืืฉื ืชืœื•ื™

ยง Rav แธคiyya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: If a man had unwitting relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, i.e., not knowing that she was married, he is not obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty on her account. He is not liable to bring an offering that is brought in cases where one is unsure whether he committed a sin that requires a sin-offering. A man who unwittingly has relations with a married woman must bring a sin-offering, whereas if the woman was doubtfully married, he brings a guilt-offering for uncertainty. However, the marriage of a deaf-mute is not even categorized as a doubtful marriage.

ืœื™ืžื ืžืกื™ื™ืข ืœื™ื” ื—ืžืฉื” ืœื ื™ืชืจื•ืžื• ื•ืื ืชืจืžื• ืื™ืŸ ืชืจื•ืžืชืŸ ืชืจื•ืžื” ื•ืืœื• ื”ืŸ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ื˜ื” ื•ืงื˜ืŸ ื•ื”ืชื•ืจื ืืช ืฉืื™ื ื• ืฉืœื• ื•ื’ื•ื™ ืฉืชืจื ืฉืœ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืืคื™ืœื• ื‘ืจืฉื•ืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืื™ืŸ ืชืจื•ืžืชื• ืชืจื•ืžื”

The Gemara comments: Let us say that the mishna (Terumot 1:1) supports Shmuelโ€™s opinion: There are five categories of people who may not separate teruma ab initio, and if they separated teruma, their teruma is not considered teruma. They are: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, and one who separates teruma from produce that is not his, and a gentile who separated teruma from the produce of a Jew even with the Jewโ€™s permission. In this last case, his teruma is not considered teruma, because a gentile cannot be appointed as an agent to separate teruma, and all the more so he cannot separate teruma on his own. This shows that the actions of a deaf-mute have no effect, and are not even considered of doubtful validity.

ื”ื•ื ื“ืืžืจ ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื“ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฆื—ืง ืื•ืžืจ ืžืฉื•ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืชืจื•ืžืช ื—ืจืฉ ืœื ืชืฆื ืœื—ื•ืœื™ืŸ ืžืคื ื™ ืฉื”ื•ื ืกืคืง ืื™ ืกื‘ื™ืจื ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืืฉื ืชืœื•ื™ ื ืžื™ ืœื™ื—ื™ื™ื‘

The Gemara responds: This is no proof, as with regard to teruma, Shmuel said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yitzแธฅak said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: The teruma of a deaf-mute is not released into a non-sacred status, because it is uncertain. Rabbi Elazar does not maintain that the actions of a deaf-mute have no consequence whatsoever. The Gemara asks: If Shmuel maintains, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that a deaf-mute is competent, let him also obligate a man who has relations with the wife of a deaf-mute to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty.

ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื—ืชื™ื›ื” ืžืฉืชื™ ื—ืชื™ื›ื•ืช

The Gemara answers: We require one piece from two pieces. Shmuel maintains that one is not liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty in every case where there is doubt whether or not there was a transgression, and where one would be liable to bring a sin-offering if it were certain that there was a transgression. Rather, a guilt-offering for uncertainty is brought if, for example, one had two pieces of meat before him, one of which was definitely forbidden while the other was permitted, but he does not know with certainty which one he ate. However, when the doubt involves a single item or action, which may or may not have been prohibited, in that situation one does not bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty. In the case discussed here, the doubt concerning the wife of a deaf-mute does not involve a choice between an action that is prohibited and one that is permitted. Rather, it depends on the status of the womanโ€™s marriage.

ื•ืžื™ ื‘ืขื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื—ืชื™ื›ื” ืžืฉืชื™ ื—ืชื™ื›ื•ืช ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ื›ื•ื™ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื—ืœื‘ื• ืืฉื ืชืœื•ื™

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Elazar need a case involving one piece from two pieces to render one liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty? But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to a koy, a kosher animal with characteristics of both a domesticated animal and a non-domesticated animal, one is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty for eating its forbidden fat. Certain fats, which are permitted in the case of a wild animal, are prohibited if they are from a domesticated animal, and one who partakes of them is liable to bring a sin-offering. Since a koy is of uncertain status, one must bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty for eating its fat. This shows that Rabbi Elazar maintains that one brings a guilt-offering for uncertainty even for a doubt involving one item or action.

ืฉืžื•ืืœ ืกื‘ืจ ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื‘ื—ื“ื ื•ืคืœื™ื’ ืขืœื™ื” ื‘ื—ื“ื

The Gemara answers: Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in one matter, the status of a deaf-mute, and disagrees with him in one other matter, the halakha of a guilt-offering for uncertainty.

ื•ืื™ื›ื ื“ืืžืจื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ื™ื™ื ื‘ืจ ืืฉื™ ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ืืฉืช ื—ืจืฉ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืขืœื™ื” ืืฉื ืชืœื•ื™ ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ื—ืžืฉื” ืœื ื™ืชืจื•ืžื• ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ

And there are those who say a different version of the above discussion. Rav แธคiyya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: If a man had unwitting relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, he is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty on her account, due to the doubt. The Gemara raises an objection: Five categories of people may not separate teruma, etc., which indicates that the actions of a deaf-mute have no legal effect. The Gemara answers that Shmuel maintains his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that the teruma of a deaf-mute is considered teruma that is of doubtful legal status.

ื‘ืขื ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืžื™ืคืฉื˜ ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ืœื™ืณ ื“ื—ืจืฉ ื“ืขืชื ืงืœื™ืฉืชื ื”ื•ื ื•ืžื™ื”ื• ืžืกืคืงื ืœื™ืณ ืื™ ื“ืขืชื ืฆื™ืœื•ืชื

Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar? One possibility is that it is obvious to him that the mind of a deaf-mute is weak. However, he is uncertain as to whether his mind is clear. In other words, although a deaf-mute is weaker intellectually than an average person, and he does not understand everything, nevertheless he is aware of what he is doing with regard to certain undertakings.

ืื™ ืœืื• ื“ืขืชื ืฆื™ืœื•ืชื ื•ืœืขื•ืœื ื—ื“ื ื“ืขืชื ื”ื•ื ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ืœื™ื” ื“ื“ืขืชื™ื” ืงืœื™ืฉืชื ื•ืœืื• ื“ืขืชื ืฆื™ืœื•ืชื ื”ื•ื ื•ื”ื›ื ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื˜ืขืžื ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืขืชื™ื ื—ืœื™ื ื•ืขืชื™ื ืฉื•ื˜ื”

Or perhaps his mind is not clear, i.e., he cannot achieve full and clear understanding, and yet he is always of one mind. In other words, a deaf-mute functions at the same level of intellectual capacity every day. Rav Ashi explains the other possibility: Or perhaps it is obvious to Rabbi Elazar that the mind of a deaf-mute is weak and his mind is unclear, but in this case here, this is Rabbi Elazarโ€™s reasoning: Since he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, without clarity of mind, i.e., he does not function at the same level of understanding every day, therefore the teruma of a deaf-mute is considered teruma that is of doubtful legal status.

ืœืžืื™ ื ืคืงื ืžื™ื ื” ืœื”ื•ืฆื™ื ืืฉืชื• ื‘ื’ื˜ ืื™ ืืžืจืช ื—ื“ื ื“ืขืชื ื”ื•ื ื›ืงื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื›ืš ื’ื™ืจื•ืฉื™ืŸ

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference how one defines the intellectual capacity of a deaf-mute? The Gemara answers: It makes a difference with respect to divorcing his wife with a bill of divorce. If you say that a deaf-mute has one consistent mind, his divorce is equivalent in status to his betrothal. Since he had a weak mind at the time of his betrothal, he has the same level of competence at his divorce and therefore he may divorce his wife.

ื•ืื™ ืืžืจืช ืขืชื™ื ื—ืœื™ื ื•ืขืชื™ื ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืงื“ื•ืฉื™ ืžืฆื™ ืžืงื“ืฉ ื’ืจื•ืฉื™ ืœื ืžืฆื™ ืžื’ืจืฉ ืžืื™ ืชื™ืงื•

But if you say that he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, he may betroth a woman, as the Sages are stringent and assume that he was healthy and of clear mind at the time; however he cannot divorce her, due to a concern that he was competent when he betrothed her but he is incompetent now. If so, what is Rabbi Elazarโ€™s reasoning? No solution is found, and therefore the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

ื ืฉืชื˜ื™ืช ื•ื›ื•ืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื“ื‘ืจ ืชื•ืจื” ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืžืชื’ืจืฉืช ืžื™ื“ื™ ื“ื”ื•ื” ืืคืงื—ืช ื‘ืขืœ ื›ืจื—ื” ื•ืžื” ื˜ืขื ืืžืจื• ืื™ื ื” ืžื’ื•ืจืฉืช ืฉืœื ื™ื ื”ื’ื• ื‘ื” ืžื ื”ื’ ื”ืคืงืจ

ยง The mishna taught that one whose wife became imbecilic may not divorce her. Rabbi Yitzแธฅak said: By Torah law, an imbecilic woman may be divorced, just as it is in the analogous case of a halakhically competent woman who was divorced against her will. Since there is no need for a woman to agree to receive a bill of divorce, an imbecileโ€™s lack of sound mind does not prevent her from being divorced. And if so, what is the reason that the Sages said that an imbecilic woman may not be divorced? The reason is so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property. Since she is not of sound mind and has no husband to protect her, there is a concern that people might treat her in a disrespectful fashion.

ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืžื™ ืื™ืœื™ืžื ื“ื™ื•ื“ืขืช ืœืฉืžื•ืจ ื’ื™ื˜ื” ื•ื™ื•ื“ืขืช ืœืฉืžื•ืจ ืขืฆืžื” ืžื™ ื ื”ื’ื™ ื‘ื” ืžื ื”ื’ ื”ืคืงืจ ืืœื ื“ืื™ืŸ ื™ื•ื“ืขืช ืœืฉืžื•ืจ ืœื ื’ื™ื˜ื” ื•ืœื ืขืฆืžื”

The Gemara inquires: What are the precise circumstances of this case? If we say that this woman knows how to guard her bill of divorce, i.e., she understands the concept of a bill of divorce, and she also knows how to take care of herself, would people treat her in the manner of ownerless property? She is capable of protecting herself. Rather, the mishna is evidently referring to a woman who does not know how to guard her bill of divorce, nor does she know how to take care of herself.

ื“ื‘ืจ ืชื•ืจื” ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืžืชื’ืจืฉืช ื•ื”ื ืืžืจ ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื ืื™ ื•ื ืชืŸ ื‘ื™ื“ื” ืžื™ ืฉื™ืฉ ืœื” ื™ื“ ืœื’ืจืฉ ืขืฆืžื” ื™ืฆืชื” ื–ื• ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื” ื™ื“ ืœื’ืจืฉ ืขืฆืžื”

The Gemara asks: Is it correct that by Torah law an imbecilic woman may be divorced? But didnโ€™t a Sage of the school of Rabbi Yannai say, with regard to the verse: โ€œHe shall write her a bill of divorce and give it into her handโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:3), that this refers only to a woman who has a hand, i.e., she has enough intellectual capacity to accept a bill of divorce for herself. This serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, who does not have a hand to accept her divorce for herself.

ื•ืชื ื ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ื•ืฉืœื—ื” ืžื‘ื™ืชื• ืžื™ ืฉืžืฉืœื—ื” ื•ืื™ื ื” ื—ื•ื–ืจืช ื™ืฆืชื” ื–ื• ืฉืžืฉืœื—ื” ื•ื—ื•ื–ืจืช

And the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught this slightly differently. The verse continues: โ€œAnd send her out of his houseโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:3); this indicates that one may divorce only the type of woman whom he will send away and she will not return. It serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, as he will send her away and she will return, as she does not understand the concept of divorce.

ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื ื“ื™ื•ื“ืขืช ืœืฉืžื•ืจ ื’ื™ื˜ื” ื•ืื™ื ื” ื™ื•ื“ืขืช ืœืฉืžื•ืจ ืขืฆืžื” ื“ื‘ืจ ืชื•ืจื” ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืžืชื’ืจืฉืช ื“ื”ื ื™ื•ื“ืขืช ืœืฉืžื•ืจ ื’ื™ื˜ื” ื•ืืžื•ืจ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืœื ืœื™ืคืงื ืฉืœื ื™ื ื”ื’ื• ื‘ื” ืžื ื”ื’ ื”ืคืงืจ

The Gemara explains: No, Rabbi Yitzแธฅakโ€™s halakha is necessary in the case of a woman who knows how to guard her bill of divorce but does not know how to take care of herself. By Torah law this imbecilic woman may be divorced, as she knows how to safeguard her bill of divorce, and yet the Sages said that her husband should not divorce her, so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property, because she does not know how to take care of herself.

ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื“ื™ืงื ื ืžื™ ื“ืงืชื ื™ ื’ื‘ื™ ื“ื™ื“ื” ื ืฉืชื˜ื™ืช ืœื ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื’ื‘ื™ ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ืœื ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ืขื•ืœืžื™ืช ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื”ื›ื ื“ืงืชื ื™ ืขื•ืœืžื™ืช ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื”ืชื ื“ืœื ืงืชื ื™ ืขื•ืœืžื™ืช ืืœื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื”ื ื“ืื•ืจื™ื™ืชื ื”ื ื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ

Abaye said: The language of the mishna is also precise in this case, as it teaches with regard to this woman that if she became an imbecile he may not divorce her; and yet, with regard to the husband, the mishna states that if he became an imbecile he may never divorce her. What is different here, that the mishna teaches using the word: Never, and what is different there, that it does not teach: Never? Rather, one can learn from here that this halakha, that an imbecilic man may not give a divorce, applies by Torah law, and this one, that a man may not divorce an imbecilic woman, applies by rabbinic law, and therefore the mishna does not add the phrase: Never.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื ื•ืจื™ ื•ื›ื•ืณ ืื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื”ื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื ื•ืจื™ ืื™ืฉ ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ืœื™ื” ื•ืืฉื” ืงืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื™ื” ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืืฉื” ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ืœื™ื” ื•ืื™ืฉ ืงืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื™ื”

ยง The mishna taught that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Nuri said: What is the reason that the husband of a woman who became a deaf-mute may divorce her, whereas a man who becomes a deaf-mute may not divorce his wife? A dilemma was raised before the scholars with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Nuri: Is it obvious to him that a deaf-mute man may not divorce his wife, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a woman, i.e., why she may be divorced if she is a deaf-mute? Or perhaps, it is obvious to him why one may divorce a deaf-mute woman, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, i.e., why he may not divorce his wife.

ืชื ืฉืžืข ืžื“ืงืืžืจื• ืœื™ื” ืื™ื ื• ื“ื•ืžื” ื”ืื™ืฉ ื”ืžื’ืจืฉ ืœืืฉื” ื”ืžืชื’ืจืฉืช ืฉื”ืืฉื” ื™ื•ืฆืืช ืœืจืฆื•ื ื” ื•ืฉืœื ืœืจืฆื•ื ื” ื•ื”ืื™ืฉ ืื™ื ื• ืžื•ืฆื™ื ืืœื ืœืจืฆื•ื ื• ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืื™ืฉ ืงืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื™ื” ืื“ืจื‘ื” ืžื“ืงืืžืจื• ืœื™ื” ืืฃ ื–ื• ื›ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื” ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืืฉื” ืงืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื™ื”

The Gemara cites a proof: Come and hear from what the Rabbis said in response to Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Nuri: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced, as the woman is divorced whether she is willing or unwilling, and the man divorces his wife only willingly. Learn from here that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Nuri raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, not a woman, as the reply of the Rabbis is referring to the man, not the woman. The Gemara rejects this proof: On the contrary, from the fact that the Rabbis said to him: This woman, too, has a similar status, one can learn from here that he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute woman.

ืืœื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื ื•ืจื™ ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ื”ื ืงืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืœื“ื™ื“ื™ ื›ื™ ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืื™ืฉ ืœื ืžืฆื™ ืžื’ืจืฉ ืืฉื” ื ืžื™ ืœื ืžื™ื’ืจืฉื ืืœื ืœื“ื™ื“ื›ื• ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืืฉื” ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืื™ืฉ ืืžืจื• ืœื™ื” ืื™ื ื• ื“ื•ืžื” ื”ืื™ืฉ ื”ืžื’ืจืฉ ืœืืฉื” ื”ืžืชื’ืจืฉืช

Rather, Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Nuri spoke to the Rabbis in accordance with their statement, i.e., he formulated his statement so as best to argue with their opinion, as follows: According to my opinion, just as a deaf-mute man cannot divorce his wife, so too a deaf-mute woman cannot be divorced. However, according to your opinion, what is the difference between the case of a deaf-mute woman and the case of a deaf-mute man? They said to him: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced.

ื”ืขื™ื“ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื•ื›ื•ืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืžืขื“ื•ืชื• ืฉืœ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื’ื•ื“ื’ื“ื ืืžืจ ืœืขื“ื™ื ืจืื• ื’ื˜ ื–ื” ืฉืื ื™ ื ื•ืชืŸ ื•ืืžืจ ืœื” ื›ื ืกื™ ืฉื˜ืจ ื—ื•ื‘ ื–ื” ื”ืจื™ ื–ื• ืžื’ื•ืจืฉืช

The mishna taught: Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Gudgada testified that in the case of a deaf-mute minor whose father married her off, which is a marriage that is valid by Torah law, she may nevertheless be divorced once she matures. Rava said: From the testimony of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Gudgada one may learn that if a husband said to witnesses: See this bill of divorce that I am giving my wife, and yet he said to her: Take this promissory note, she is divorced, despite the fact when he gave his wife the bill of divorce she did not know what it was.

ืžื™ ืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื’ื•ื“ื’ื“ื ืœื ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื“ืขืชื” ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ืœื ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื“ืขืชื” ืคืฉื™ื˜ื

This halakha is derived from Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Gudgadaโ€™s statement in the following manner: Didnโ€™t Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Gudgada say that we do not require her consent, as there is no need for the woman to understand that she is receiving a bill of divorce? Here, too, we do not require her consent, and even if she believes that she is receiving a bill of debt, she is divorced. The Gemara asks: Isnโ€™t it obvious that there is no need for the womanโ€™s consent? What is the novel element in Ravaโ€™s statement?

ืžื”ื• ื“ืชื™ืžื ืžื“ืืžืจ ืœื” ื›ื ืกื™ ืฉื˜ืจ ื—ื•ื‘ ื–ื” ื‘ื˜ื•ืœื™ ื‘ื˜ืœื™ื” ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ ืื™ ืื™ืชื ื“ื‘ื˜ืœื™ื” ืœืขื“ื™ื ื”ื•ื” ืงืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ื•ืžื“ืœื ืืžืจ ืœืขื“ื™ื ืœื ื‘ื˜ืœื™ื” ื•ืœื ืžื™ื“ื™ ื•ื”ืื™ ื“ืงืืžืจ ื”ื›ื™ ืžื—ืžืช ื›ื™ืกื•ืคื ื”ื•ื ื“ืงืืžืจ ืœื”ื•

The Gemara answers that Ravaโ€™s statement is necessary, lest you say: From the fact that the husband said to her: Take this promissory note, he has thereby nullified the bill of divorce. Rava therefore teaches us that this is not the case, for if it is so, that he nullified the bill of divorce, he would have said so to the witnesses. And from the fact that he did not say this to the witnesses, he evidently did not nullify the bill of divorce at all. And the reason that the husband said this, i.e., that she should take this bill of debt, it was due to shame that he said this to her, as he meant to divorce her all along, but he did not want her to know at the time what he was doing.

ืจื‘ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื‘ืจ ื‘ื™ืกื ื ืื™ืจื›ืกื• ืœื™ื” ืžืคืชื—ื™ ื“ื‘ื™ ืžื“ืจืฉื ื‘ืจืฉื•ืช ื”ืจื‘ื™ื ื‘ืฉื‘ืชื ืืชื ืœืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืคื“ืช ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื–ื™ืœ

The Gemara relates a story: Rav Yitzแธฅak bar Bisna lost the keys to the study hall, and therefore they could not come into the study hall from the public domain on Shabbat. It was impossible to open the synagogue, as they could not bring the key because it is prohibited to carry in the public domain. He came before Rabbi Pedat to ask what to do. Rabbi Pedat said to him: Go

  • This month's learning is sponsored by the Kessler, Wolkenfeld and Grossman families in loving memory of Mia Rose bat Matan Yehoshua vโ€™ Elana Malka. "ื” ื ืชืŸ ื•ื” ืœืงื—. ื™ื”ื™ ืฉื ื” ืžื‘ื•ืจืš"

  • This month's shiurim are sponsored by Shoshana Shur for the refuah shleima of Meira Bat Zelda Zahava.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

talking talmud_square

Yevamot 113: Women Want to Marry More Than Men Do

A deaf-mute woman is not entitled to a ketubah. Why not? What is the rationale? It seems to be left...

Yevamot 113

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Yevamot 113

ืžื™ืžื ืขื™ ื•ืœื ื ืกื‘ื™ ืœื”

others would refrain from marrying her at all, as she can issue a declaration of refusal indefinitely, whereas in the case of a minor there is a time limit with regard to her option of a refusal.

ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืงื˜ื ื” ื“ืื›ืœื” ื‘ืชืจื•ืžื” ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื—ืจืฉืช ื“ืœื ืื›ืœื” ื‘ืชืจื•ืžื” ื“ืชื ืŸ ื”ืขื™ื“ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื’ื•ื“ื’ื“ื ืขืœ ื”ื—ืจืฉืช ืฉื”ืฉื™ืื” ืื‘ื™ื” ืฉื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ื•ืขืœ ืงื˜ื ื” ื‘ืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืฉื ืฉืืช ืœื›ื”ืŸ ืฉืื•ื›ืœืช ื‘ืชืจื•ืžื” ื•ืื™ืœื• ื—ืจืฉืช ืœื ืื›ืœื”

ยง The Gemara further asks: What is the difference between a minor girl, that she may partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, and a deaf-mute woman, that she may not partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, despite the fact that both of their marriages apply by rabbinic law? As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 55b): Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Gudgada testified with regard to a female deaf-mute whose father married her off, that she can be divorced with a bill of divorce. And he testified with regard to a minor girl, daughter of an non-priest who was married to a priest, that she may partake of teruma, whereas a deaf-mute woman, it may be inferred, may not partake of teruma.

ื’ื–ื™ืจื” ืฉืžื ื™ืื›ื™ืœ ื—ืจืฉ ื‘ื—ืจืฉืช ื•ืœื™ื›ื•ืœ ืงื˜ืŸ ืื•ื›ืœ ื ื‘ืœื•ืช ื”ื•ื

The Gemara answers: The reason that a deaf-mute woman may not partake of teruma, even if she is married to a halakhically competent priest, is due to a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest likewise feed teruma to his deaf-mute wife. The Gemara asks: And which prohibition would that violate? Let him feed her, as he is equivalent to a minor who eats meat from unslaughtered animals. This is referring to the halakha that there is no obligation to prevent minors from committing transgressions. Since a deaf-mute, who is not legally competent, has the status of a minor, the same reasoning should apply in this case. Consequently, the court should be under no obligation to prevent this deaf-mute woman from eating teruma unlawfully.

ื’ื–ื™ืจื” ืฉืžื ื™ืื›ื™ืœ ื—ืจืฉ ื‘ืคืงื—ืช ื•ื—ืจืฉ ื‘ืคืงื—ืช ื ืžื™ ืœื™ื›ื•ืœ ื‘ืชืจื•ืžื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื’ื–ื™ืจื” ื“ืœืžื ืืชื™ ืœืื•ื›ืœื” ื‘ืชืจื•ืžื” ื“ืื•ืจื™ื™ืชื

Rather, it is a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest feed teruma to a halakhically competent wife. Since by Torah law her marriage to a deaf-mute man is not valid, she may not eat teruma. The Gemara asks: As well, in the case of a deaf-mute priest who wishes to feed a halakhically competent wife, let her partake of teruma that applies by rabbinic law. There are types of produce from which there is no obligation to separate teruma by Torah law, and one separates teruma from them due to rabbinic decree. Just as the marriage of this woman is by rabbinic law, she should be permitted to eat teruma that applies by rabbinic law. The Gemara answers: It is a rabbinic decree, as perhaps he will come to feed her teruma that applies by Torah law.

ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืงื˜ื ื” ื“ืื™ืช ืœื” ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื—ืจืฉืช ื“ืœื™ืช ืœื” ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ื“ืื ื›ืŸ ืžื™ืžื ืขื™ ื•ืœื ื ืกื‘ื™ ืœื”

The Gemara further asks: And what is the difference between a minor girl, that she has a marriage contract, and a deaf-mute woman, that she does not have a marriage contract? The Gemara answers: The reason is that if so, if the husband of a deaf-mute would be obligated to give her a marriage contract, men would refrain from marrying her at all.

ื•ืงื˜ื ื” ืžื ืœืŸ ื“ืื™ืช ืœื” ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ื“ืชื ืŸ ื”ืžืžืื ืช ื•ื”ืฉื ื™ื™ื” ื•ืื™ื™ืœื•ื ื™ืช ืื™ืŸ ืœื”ืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ืื‘ืœ ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ื•ืงื˜ื ื” ื™ืฉ ืœื” ื›ืชื•ื‘ื”

The Gemara asks: And a minor girl, from where do we derive that she has a marriage contract? As we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 67a): With regard to a minor who refuses her husband and leaves him, and likewise a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative prohibited by rabbinic law, and a sexually underdeveloped woman who is incapable of bearing children, these women have no marriage contract. The Gemara infers: However, any other woman who can be divorced by means of a bill of divorce, and this includes a minor girl, is entitled to a marriage contract.

ื•ื—ืจืฉืช ืžื ืœืŸ ื“ืœื™ืช ืœื” ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ื“ืชื ื™ื ื—ืจืฉ ื•ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืฉื ืฉืื• ืคืงื—ื•ืช ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉื ืชืคืงื— ื”ื—ืจืฉ ื•ื ืฉืชืคื” ื”ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืื™ืŸ ืœื”ื ืขืœื™ื”ื ื›ืœื•ื ืจืฆื• ืœืงื™ื™ืžืŸ ื™ืฉ ืœื”ื ื›ืชื•ื‘ื”

The Gemara asks: And a deaf-mute woman, from where do we derive that she has no marriage contract? As it is taught in a baraita: A deaf-mute and an imbecile who married halakhically competent women, even if the deaf-mute subsequently regained his senses, and the imbecile regained his competence, their wives have no claim of anything against them, even if their wives received marriage contracts from them. However, if the men wish to maintain these women as their wives after they became fully competent, they have a marriage contract from that point onward.

ื•ืคืงื— ืฉื ืฉื ื—ืจืฉืช ืื• ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืืคื™ืœื• ื›ืชื‘ ืœื” ืžืื” ืžื ื” ื›ืชื•ื‘ืชื” ืงื™ื™ืžืช ืžืคื ื™ ืฉืจืฆื” ืœื–ื•ืง ื‘ื ื›ืกื™ื• ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจืฆื” ื”ื ืœื ืจืฆื” ืื™ืŸ ืœื” ื“ืื ื›ืŸ ืžื™ืžื ืขื™ ื•ืœื ื ืกื‘ื™ ืœื”

And in the case of a halakhically competent man who married a deaf-mute or an imbecile, and he decided to write a marriage contract for her, even if he wrote for her one hundred dinars her marriage contract is valid, because he wanted to harm his own property. In other words, as he acted willingly, despite the lack of obligation to do so, this is comparable to one who chooses to harm himself and give away property in any other manner; it is his prerogative. The Gemara infers: The reason for this halakha is that he wanted to write her a marriage contract, from which it may be inferred that if he does not want to write one, she will not have a marriage contract. The logic is as stated above, that if so, men would refrain from marrying her.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืคืงื—ืช ืœื—ืจืฉ ืœื™ืชืงืŸ ืœื” ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ื“ืื ื›ืŸ ืžื™ืžื ืขื™ ื•ืœื ืžื™ื ืกื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืชืจ ืžืฉื”ืื™ืฉ ืจื•ืฆื” ืœื™ืฉื ืืฉื” ืจื•ืฆื” ืœื”ื ืฉื

The Gemara asks: If so, in a case of a halakhically competent woman who was married to a deaf-mute, let the Sages enact a marriage contract for her, for if so, i.e., if women would not receive marriage contracts in this situation, they would refrain from marrying deaf-mute men entirely. The Gemara answers: More than the man wants to get married, a woman wants to be married. Consequently, women will not be too discriminating with regard to marriage with a deaf-mute, even if they are not entitled to a marriage contract.

ื”ื”ื•ื ื—ืจืฉ ื“ื”ื•ื” ื‘ืฉื‘ื‘ื•ืชื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืžืœื›ื™ื• ืื ืกื‘ื™ื” ืื™ืชืชื ื•ื›ืชื‘ ืœื” ืืจื‘ืข ืžืื” ื–ื•ื–ื™ ืžื ื›ืกื™ื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืžืืŸ ื—ื›ื™ื ื›ืจื‘ ืžืœื›ื™ื• ื“ื’ื‘ืจื ืจื‘ื” ื”ื•ื ืงืกื‘ืจ ืื™ืœื• ืจืฆื” ืฉืคื—ื” ืœืฉืžืฉื• ืžื™ ืœื ื–ื‘ื ื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื” ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ ื”ื›ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืชืจืชื™

The Gemara relates: There was a certain deaf-mute man who was in the neighborhood of Rav Malkiyyu. Rav Malkiyyu married him to a woman, and he wrote four-hundred dinars for her from the property of the deaf-mute as her marriage contract. Rava said: Who is as wise as Rav Malkiyyu, as he is a great man who found a way to achieve a desirable result by giving her a marriage contract, despite the fact that the deaf-mute was not obligated to do so. Rav Malkiyyu reasoned as follows: If that deaf-mute man wanted a maidservant to attend to him, would we not acquire one for him? All the more so here, as there are two advantages, for she will attend to his needs both as a maidservant and as a wife.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ื™ื™ื ื‘ืจ ืืฉื™ ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ืืฉืช ื—ืจืฉ ืื™ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืขืœื™ื” ืืฉื ืชืœื•ื™

ยง Rav แธคiyya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: If a man had unwitting relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, i.e., not knowing that she was married, he is not obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty on her account. He is not liable to bring an offering that is brought in cases where one is unsure whether he committed a sin that requires a sin-offering. A man who unwittingly has relations with a married woman must bring a sin-offering, whereas if the woman was doubtfully married, he brings a guilt-offering for uncertainty. However, the marriage of a deaf-mute is not even categorized as a doubtful marriage.

ืœื™ืžื ืžืกื™ื™ืข ืœื™ื” ื—ืžืฉื” ืœื ื™ืชืจื•ืžื• ื•ืื ืชืจืžื• ืื™ืŸ ืชืจื•ืžืชืŸ ืชืจื•ืžื” ื•ืืœื• ื”ืŸ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ื˜ื” ื•ืงื˜ืŸ ื•ื”ืชื•ืจื ืืช ืฉืื™ื ื• ืฉืœื• ื•ื’ื•ื™ ืฉืชืจื ืฉืœ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืืคื™ืœื• ื‘ืจืฉื•ืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืื™ืŸ ืชืจื•ืžืชื• ืชืจื•ืžื”

The Gemara comments: Let us say that the mishna (Terumot 1:1) supports Shmuelโ€™s opinion: There are five categories of people who may not separate teruma ab initio, and if they separated teruma, their teruma is not considered teruma. They are: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, and one who separates teruma from produce that is not his, and a gentile who separated teruma from the produce of a Jew even with the Jewโ€™s permission. In this last case, his teruma is not considered teruma, because a gentile cannot be appointed as an agent to separate teruma, and all the more so he cannot separate teruma on his own. This shows that the actions of a deaf-mute have no effect, and are not even considered of doubtful validity.

ื”ื•ื ื“ืืžืจ ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื“ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฆื—ืง ืื•ืžืจ ืžืฉื•ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืชืจื•ืžืช ื—ืจืฉ ืœื ืชืฆื ืœื—ื•ืœื™ืŸ ืžืคื ื™ ืฉื”ื•ื ืกืคืง ืื™ ืกื‘ื™ืจื ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืืฉื ืชืœื•ื™ ื ืžื™ ืœื™ื—ื™ื™ื‘

The Gemara responds: This is no proof, as with regard to teruma, Shmuel said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yitzแธฅak said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: The teruma of a deaf-mute is not released into a non-sacred status, because it is uncertain. Rabbi Elazar does not maintain that the actions of a deaf-mute have no consequence whatsoever. The Gemara asks: If Shmuel maintains, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that a deaf-mute is competent, let him also obligate a man who has relations with the wife of a deaf-mute to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty.

ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื—ืชื™ื›ื” ืžืฉืชื™ ื—ืชื™ื›ื•ืช

The Gemara answers: We require one piece from two pieces. Shmuel maintains that one is not liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty in every case where there is doubt whether or not there was a transgression, and where one would be liable to bring a sin-offering if it were certain that there was a transgression. Rather, a guilt-offering for uncertainty is brought if, for example, one had two pieces of meat before him, one of which was definitely forbidden while the other was permitted, but he does not know with certainty which one he ate. However, when the doubt involves a single item or action, which may or may not have been prohibited, in that situation one does not bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty. In the case discussed here, the doubt concerning the wife of a deaf-mute does not involve a choice between an action that is prohibited and one that is permitted. Rather, it depends on the status of the womanโ€™s marriage.

ื•ืžื™ ื‘ืขื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื—ืชื™ื›ื” ืžืฉืชื™ ื—ืชื™ื›ื•ืช ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ื›ื•ื™ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื—ืœื‘ื• ืืฉื ืชืœื•ื™

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Elazar need a case involving one piece from two pieces to render one liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty? But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to a koy, a kosher animal with characteristics of both a domesticated animal and a non-domesticated animal, one is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty for eating its forbidden fat. Certain fats, which are permitted in the case of a wild animal, are prohibited if they are from a domesticated animal, and one who partakes of them is liable to bring a sin-offering. Since a koy is of uncertain status, one must bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty for eating its fat. This shows that Rabbi Elazar maintains that one brings a guilt-offering for uncertainty even for a doubt involving one item or action.

ืฉืžื•ืืœ ืกื‘ืจ ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื‘ื—ื“ื ื•ืคืœื™ื’ ืขืœื™ื” ื‘ื—ื“ื

The Gemara answers: Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in one matter, the status of a deaf-mute, and disagrees with him in one other matter, the halakha of a guilt-offering for uncertainty.

ื•ืื™ื›ื ื“ืืžืจื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ื™ื™ื ื‘ืจ ืืฉื™ ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ืืฉืช ื—ืจืฉ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืขืœื™ื” ืืฉื ืชืœื•ื™ ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ื—ืžืฉื” ืœื ื™ืชืจื•ืžื• ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ

And there are those who say a different version of the above discussion. Rav แธคiyya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: If a man had unwitting relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, he is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty on her account, due to the doubt. The Gemara raises an objection: Five categories of people may not separate teruma, etc., which indicates that the actions of a deaf-mute have no legal effect. The Gemara answers that Shmuel maintains his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that the teruma of a deaf-mute is considered teruma that is of doubtful legal status.

ื‘ืขื ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืžื™ืคืฉื˜ ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ืœื™ืณ ื“ื—ืจืฉ ื“ืขืชื ืงืœื™ืฉืชื ื”ื•ื ื•ืžื™ื”ื• ืžืกืคืงื ืœื™ืณ ืื™ ื“ืขืชื ืฆื™ืœื•ืชื

Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar? One possibility is that it is obvious to him that the mind of a deaf-mute is weak. However, he is uncertain as to whether his mind is clear. In other words, although a deaf-mute is weaker intellectually than an average person, and he does not understand everything, nevertheless he is aware of what he is doing with regard to certain undertakings.

ืื™ ืœืื• ื“ืขืชื ืฆื™ืœื•ืชื ื•ืœืขื•ืœื ื—ื“ื ื“ืขืชื ื”ื•ื ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ืœื™ื” ื“ื“ืขืชื™ื” ืงืœื™ืฉืชื ื•ืœืื• ื“ืขืชื ืฆื™ืœื•ืชื ื”ื•ื ื•ื”ื›ื ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื˜ืขืžื ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืขืชื™ื ื—ืœื™ื ื•ืขืชื™ื ืฉื•ื˜ื”

Or perhaps his mind is not clear, i.e., he cannot achieve full and clear understanding, and yet he is always of one mind. In other words, a deaf-mute functions at the same level of intellectual capacity every day. Rav Ashi explains the other possibility: Or perhaps it is obvious to Rabbi Elazar that the mind of a deaf-mute is weak and his mind is unclear, but in this case here, this is Rabbi Elazarโ€™s reasoning: Since he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, without clarity of mind, i.e., he does not function at the same level of understanding every day, therefore the teruma of a deaf-mute is considered teruma that is of doubtful legal status.

ืœืžืื™ ื ืคืงื ืžื™ื ื” ืœื”ื•ืฆื™ื ืืฉืชื• ื‘ื’ื˜ ืื™ ืืžืจืช ื—ื“ื ื“ืขืชื ื”ื•ื ื›ืงื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื›ืš ื’ื™ืจื•ืฉื™ืŸ

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference how one defines the intellectual capacity of a deaf-mute? The Gemara answers: It makes a difference with respect to divorcing his wife with a bill of divorce. If you say that a deaf-mute has one consistent mind, his divorce is equivalent in status to his betrothal. Since he had a weak mind at the time of his betrothal, he has the same level of competence at his divorce and therefore he may divorce his wife.

ื•ืื™ ืืžืจืช ืขืชื™ื ื—ืœื™ื ื•ืขืชื™ื ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืงื“ื•ืฉื™ ืžืฆื™ ืžืงื“ืฉ ื’ืจื•ืฉื™ ืœื ืžืฆื™ ืžื’ืจืฉ ืžืื™ ืชื™ืงื•

But if you say that he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, he may betroth a woman, as the Sages are stringent and assume that he was healthy and of clear mind at the time; however he cannot divorce her, due to a concern that he was competent when he betrothed her but he is incompetent now. If so, what is Rabbi Elazarโ€™s reasoning? No solution is found, and therefore the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

ื ืฉืชื˜ื™ืช ื•ื›ื•ืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื“ื‘ืจ ืชื•ืจื” ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืžืชื’ืจืฉืช ืžื™ื“ื™ ื“ื”ื•ื” ืืคืงื—ืช ื‘ืขืœ ื›ืจื—ื” ื•ืžื” ื˜ืขื ืืžืจื• ืื™ื ื” ืžื’ื•ืจืฉืช ืฉืœื ื™ื ื”ื’ื• ื‘ื” ืžื ื”ื’ ื”ืคืงืจ

ยง The mishna taught that one whose wife became imbecilic may not divorce her. Rabbi Yitzแธฅak said: By Torah law, an imbecilic woman may be divorced, just as it is in the analogous case of a halakhically competent woman who was divorced against her will. Since there is no need for a woman to agree to receive a bill of divorce, an imbecileโ€™s lack of sound mind does not prevent her from being divorced. And if so, what is the reason that the Sages said that an imbecilic woman may not be divorced? The reason is so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property. Since she is not of sound mind and has no husband to protect her, there is a concern that people might treat her in a disrespectful fashion.

ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืžื™ ืื™ืœื™ืžื ื“ื™ื•ื“ืขืช ืœืฉืžื•ืจ ื’ื™ื˜ื” ื•ื™ื•ื“ืขืช ืœืฉืžื•ืจ ืขืฆืžื” ืžื™ ื ื”ื’ื™ ื‘ื” ืžื ื”ื’ ื”ืคืงืจ ืืœื ื“ืื™ืŸ ื™ื•ื“ืขืช ืœืฉืžื•ืจ ืœื ื’ื™ื˜ื” ื•ืœื ืขืฆืžื”

The Gemara inquires: What are the precise circumstances of this case? If we say that this woman knows how to guard her bill of divorce, i.e., she understands the concept of a bill of divorce, and she also knows how to take care of herself, would people treat her in the manner of ownerless property? She is capable of protecting herself. Rather, the mishna is evidently referring to a woman who does not know how to guard her bill of divorce, nor does she know how to take care of herself.

ื“ื‘ืจ ืชื•ืจื” ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืžืชื’ืจืฉืช ื•ื”ื ืืžืจ ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื ืื™ ื•ื ืชืŸ ื‘ื™ื“ื” ืžื™ ืฉื™ืฉ ืœื” ื™ื“ ืœื’ืจืฉ ืขืฆืžื” ื™ืฆืชื” ื–ื• ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื” ื™ื“ ืœื’ืจืฉ ืขืฆืžื”

The Gemara asks: Is it correct that by Torah law an imbecilic woman may be divorced? But didnโ€™t a Sage of the school of Rabbi Yannai say, with regard to the verse: โ€œHe shall write her a bill of divorce and give it into her handโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:3), that this refers only to a woman who has a hand, i.e., she has enough intellectual capacity to accept a bill of divorce for herself. This serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, who does not have a hand to accept her divorce for herself.

ื•ืชื ื ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ื•ืฉืœื—ื” ืžื‘ื™ืชื• ืžื™ ืฉืžืฉืœื—ื” ื•ืื™ื ื” ื—ื•ื–ืจืช ื™ืฆืชื” ื–ื• ืฉืžืฉืœื—ื” ื•ื—ื•ื–ืจืช

And the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught this slightly differently. The verse continues: โ€œAnd send her out of his houseโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:3); this indicates that one may divorce only the type of woman whom he will send away and she will not return. It serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, as he will send her away and she will return, as she does not understand the concept of divorce.

ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื ื“ื™ื•ื“ืขืช ืœืฉืžื•ืจ ื’ื™ื˜ื” ื•ืื™ื ื” ื™ื•ื“ืขืช ืœืฉืžื•ืจ ืขืฆืžื” ื“ื‘ืจ ืชื•ืจื” ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืžืชื’ืจืฉืช ื“ื”ื ื™ื•ื“ืขืช ืœืฉืžื•ืจ ื’ื™ื˜ื” ื•ืืžื•ืจ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืœื ืœื™ืคืงื ืฉืœื ื™ื ื”ื’ื• ื‘ื” ืžื ื”ื’ ื”ืคืงืจ

The Gemara explains: No, Rabbi Yitzแธฅakโ€™s halakha is necessary in the case of a woman who knows how to guard her bill of divorce but does not know how to take care of herself. By Torah law this imbecilic woman may be divorced, as she knows how to safeguard her bill of divorce, and yet the Sages said that her husband should not divorce her, so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property, because she does not know how to take care of herself.

ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื“ื™ืงื ื ืžื™ ื“ืงืชื ื™ ื’ื‘ื™ ื“ื™ื“ื” ื ืฉืชื˜ื™ืช ืœื ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื’ื‘ื™ ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ืœื ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ืขื•ืœืžื™ืช ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื”ื›ื ื“ืงืชื ื™ ืขื•ืœืžื™ืช ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื”ืชื ื“ืœื ืงืชื ื™ ืขื•ืœืžื™ืช ืืœื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื”ื ื“ืื•ืจื™ื™ืชื ื”ื ื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ

Abaye said: The language of the mishna is also precise in this case, as it teaches with regard to this woman that if she became an imbecile he may not divorce her; and yet, with regard to the husband, the mishna states that if he became an imbecile he may never divorce her. What is different here, that the mishna teaches using the word: Never, and what is different there, that it does not teach: Never? Rather, one can learn from here that this halakha, that an imbecilic man may not give a divorce, applies by Torah law, and this one, that a man may not divorce an imbecilic woman, applies by rabbinic law, and therefore the mishna does not add the phrase: Never.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื ื•ืจื™ ื•ื›ื•ืณ ืื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื”ื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื ื•ืจื™ ืื™ืฉ ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ืœื™ื” ื•ืืฉื” ืงืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื™ื” ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืืฉื” ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ืœื™ื” ื•ืื™ืฉ ืงืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื™ื”

ยง The mishna taught that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Nuri said: What is the reason that the husband of a woman who became a deaf-mute may divorce her, whereas a man who becomes a deaf-mute may not divorce his wife? A dilemma was raised before the scholars with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Nuri: Is it obvious to him that a deaf-mute man may not divorce his wife, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a woman, i.e., why she may be divorced if she is a deaf-mute? Or perhaps, it is obvious to him why one may divorce a deaf-mute woman, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, i.e., why he may not divorce his wife.

ืชื ืฉืžืข ืžื“ืงืืžืจื• ืœื™ื” ืื™ื ื• ื“ื•ืžื” ื”ืื™ืฉ ื”ืžื’ืจืฉ ืœืืฉื” ื”ืžืชื’ืจืฉืช ืฉื”ืืฉื” ื™ื•ืฆืืช ืœืจืฆื•ื ื” ื•ืฉืœื ืœืจืฆื•ื ื” ื•ื”ืื™ืฉ ืื™ื ื• ืžื•ืฆื™ื ืืœื ืœืจืฆื•ื ื• ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืื™ืฉ ืงืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื™ื” ืื“ืจื‘ื” ืžื“ืงืืžืจื• ืœื™ื” ืืฃ ื–ื• ื›ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื” ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืืฉื” ืงืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื™ื”

The Gemara cites a proof: Come and hear from what the Rabbis said in response to Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Nuri: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced, as the woman is divorced whether she is willing or unwilling, and the man divorces his wife only willingly. Learn from here that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Nuri raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, not a woman, as the reply of the Rabbis is referring to the man, not the woman. The Gemara rejects this proof: On the contrary, from the fact that the Rabbis said to him: This woman, too, has a similar status, one can learn from here that he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute woman.

ืืœื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื ื•ืจื™ ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ื”ื ืงืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืœื“ื™ื“ื™ ื›ื™ ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืื™ืฉ ืœื ืžืฆื™ ืžื’ืจืฉ ืืฉื” ื ืžื™ ืœื ืžื™ื’ืจืฉื ืืœื ืœื“ื™ื“ื›ื• ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืืฉื” ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืื™ืฉ ืืžืจื• ืœื™ื” ืื™ื ื• ื“ื•ืžื” ื”ืื™ืฉ ื”ืžื’ืจืฉ ืœืืฉื” ื”ืžืชื’ืจืฉืช

Rather, Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Nuri spoke to the Rabbis in accordance with their statement, i.e., he formulated his statement so as best to argue with their opinion, as follows: According to my opinion, just as a deaf-mute man cannot divorce his wife, so too a deaf-mute woman cannot be divorced. However, according to your opinion, what is the difference between the case of a deaf-mute woman and the case of a deaf-mute man? They said to him: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced.

ื”ืขื™ื“ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื•ื›ื•ืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืžืขื“ื•ืชื• ืฉืœ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื’ื•ื“ื’ื“ื ืืžืจ ืœืขื“ื™ื ืจืื• ื’ื˜ ื–ื” ืฉืื ื™ ื ื•ืชืŸ ื•ืืžืจ ืœื” ื›ื ืกื™ ืฉื˜ืจ ื—ื•ื‘ ื–ื” ื”ืจื™ ื–ื• ืžื’ื•ืจืฉืช

The mishna taught: Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Gudgada testified that in the case of a deaf-mute minor whose father married her off, which is a marriage that is valid by Torah law, she may nevertheless be divorced once she matures. Rava said: From the testimony of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Gudgada one may learn that if a husband said to witnesses: See this bill of divorce that I am giving my wife, and yet he said to her: Take this promissory note, she is divorced, despite the fact when he gave his wife the bill of divorce she did not know what it was.

ืžื™ ืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื’ื•ื“ื’ื“ื ืœื ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื“ืขืชื” ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ืœื ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื“ืขืชื” ืคืฉื™ื˜ื

This halakha is derived from Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Gudgadaโ€™s statement in the following manner: Didnโ€™t Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Gudgada say that we do not require her consent, as there is no need for the woman to understand that she is receiving a bill of divorce? Here, too, we do not require her consent, and even if she believes that she is receiving a bill of debt, she is divorced. The Gemara asks: Isnโ€™t it obvious that there is no need for the womanโ€™s consent? What is the novel element in Ravaโ€™s statement?

ืžื”ื• ื“ืชื™ืžื ืžื“ืืžืจ ืœื” ื›ื ืกื™ ืฉื˜ืจ ื—ื•ื‘ ื–ื” ื‘ื˜ื•ืœื™ ื‘ื˜ืœื™ื” ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ ืื™ ืื™ืชื ื“ื‘ื˜ืœื™ื” ืœืขื“ื™ื ื”ื•ื” ืงืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ื•ืžื“ืœื ืืžืจ ืœืขื“ื™ื ืœื ื‘ื˜ืœื™ื” ื•ืœื ืžื™ื“ื™ ื•ื”ืื™ ื“ืงืืžืจ ื”ื›ื™ ืžื—ืžืช ื›ื™ืกื•ืคื ื”ื•ื ื“ืงืืžืจ ืœื”ื•

The Gemara answers that Ravaโ€™s statement is necessary, lest you say: From the fact that the husband said to her: Take this promissory note, he has thereby nullified the bill of divorce. Rava therefore teaches us that this is not the case, for if it is so, that he nullified the bill of divorce, he would have said so to the witnesses. And from the fact that he did not say this to the witnesses, he evidently did not nullify the bill of divorce at all. And the reason that the husband said this, i.e., that she should take this bill of debt, it was due to shame that he said this to her, as he meant to divorce her all along, but he did not want her to know at the time what he was doing.

ืจื‘ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื‘ืจ ื‘ื™ืกื ื ืื™ืจื›ืกื• ืœื™ื” ืžืคืชื—ื™ ื“ื‘ื™ ืžื“ืจืฉื ื‘ืจืฉื•ืช ื”ืจื‘ื™ื ื‘ืฉื‘ืชื ืืชื ืœืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืคื“ืช ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื–ื™ืœ

The Gemara relates a story: Rav Yitzแธฅak bar Bisna lost the keys to the study hall, and therefore they could not come into the study hall from the public domain on Shabbat. It was impossible to open the synagogue, as they could not bring the key because it is prohibited to carry in the public domain. He came before Rabbi Pedat to ask what to do. Rabbi Pedat said to him: Go

Scroll To Top