Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

January 29, 2015 | 讟壮 讘砖讘讟 转砖注状讛

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 117

砖讗讬谉 讛讗讞讬谉 谞讻谞住讬谉 诇谞讞诇讛 注诇 驻讬讛

that the brothers do not come into the inheritance from the deceased brother based on her testimony. Evidently, although this testimony is accepted with regard to forbidden sexual relationships, it is not effective for monetary matters.

讗诪专讜 诇讛诐 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讛诇讗 诪住驻专 讻转讜讘讛 谞诇诪讜讚 砖讛讜讗 讻讜转讘 诇讛 砖讗诐 转谞砖讗讬 诇讗讞专 转讟诇讬 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 诇讬讻讬 讜讞讝专讜 讘讬转 讛诇诇 诇讛讜专讜转 讻讚讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬

Beit Shammai said to them: But we can learn this halakha from the scroll of the marriage contract, as every husband writes for her that: If you marry another man, take what is written for you in this contract. This shows that her right to receive the money of her marriage contract is dependent upon her eligibility to remarry. In this case, as she is deemed credible when she says her husband died and she may marry again, she is likewise entitled to the money of the marriage contract. And Beit Hillel again retracted their opinion, and decided to teach in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 谞转讬讬讘诪讛 讬讘诪讛 谞讻谞住 诇谞讞诇讛 注诇 驻讬讛 讛诐 讚专砖讜 诪讚专砖 讻转讜讘讛 讗谞讜 诇讗 谞讚专讜砖 诪讚专砖 转讜专讛

GEMARA: Rav 岣sda said: If the woman entered into levirate marriage based upon her own testimony, her yavam comes into the inheritance of the property of his dead brother based on her testimony. He adds: If Beit Shammai taught their halakha that she is entitled to her money, by interpreting homiletically the language of a marriage contract, will we not teach by interpreting homiletically the Torah itself?

讬拽讜诐 注诇 砖诐 讗讞讬讜 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜讛专讬 拽诐

Rav 岣sda explains: The Merciful One states in the Torah: 鈥淗e shall succeed in the name of his dead brother鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:6), which is interpreted by the Sages as referring to the right of inheritance of the brother who consummates the levirate marriage. And this man did succeed with respect to the marital relationship, as he consummated the levirate marriage based on the testimony of his yevama that her husband died. Consequently, he takes the place of his brother with respect to his inheritance as well.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘讗转 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讗诪专讛 诪转 讘注诇讬 讛转讬专讜谞讬 诇讛谞砖讗 诪转讬专讬谉 讗讜转讛 诇讛谞砖讗 讜谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘转讛 转谞讜 诇讬 讻转讜讘转讬 讗祝 诇讛谞砖讗 讗讬谉 诪转讬专讬谉 讗讜转讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗讚注转讗 讚讻转讜讘讛 讗转讗讬

Rav Na岣an said: A woman came to the court and said: My husband died; permit me to marry. The halakha is that after investigating the matter, they permit her to marry, and also give her her marriage contract. However, if she came and said: Give me my marriage contract, they do not even permit her to marry. What is the reason? Since she came with the money of the marriage contract in mind, she is suspected of lying, and her testimony is rejected.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讛转讬专讜谞讬 诇讛谞砖讗 讜转谞讜 诇讬 讻转讜讘转讬 诪讛讜 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专讛 讻转讜讘转讛 讗讚注转讗 讚讻转讜讘讛 讗转讗讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻诇 诪讬诇讬 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇讗讬谞讬砖 讗诪专 诇讛讜 诇讘讬 讚讬谞讗 [讜讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 讻诇 诪讬诇讬 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇讗讬谞讬砖 讗诪专 诇讛讜 诇讘讬 讚讬谞讗] 转谞讜 诇讬 讻转讜讘转讬 讜讛转讬专讜谞讬 诇讛谞砖讗 诪讛讜

However, the following dilemma was raised before the scholars. If she came and said: Permit me to marry and give me my marriage contract, what is the halakha? Since she mentioned the money from her marriage contract, this shows that she came with the marriage contract in mind. Or perhaps every matter a person has in his favor he will say to the court, even if it is not of particular importance. And if you say that the ruling in this case is in accordance with the principle: Every matter a person has in his favor he will say to the court, then in a case where she said: Give me my marriage contract and permit me to marry, what is the halakha?

讛讻讗 讜讚讗讬 讗讚注转讗 讚讻转讜讘讛 讗转讗讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讚诇讗 讬讚注讛 讘诪讗讬 诪砖转专讬讗 转讬拽讜

The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: Here she certainly came with the marriage contract in mind, as she mentioned it first. Or perhaps she said it in this manner since she does not know what will set her free. In other words, she might have thought that taking the money guaranteed by her marriage contract is part of the process that enables her to remarry, but this does not prove that she is focused on the money. The Gemara states that the question shall stand unresolved.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讻诇 谞讗诪谞讬谉 诇讛注讬讚讛 讞讜抓 诪讞诪讜转讛 讜讘转 讞诪讜转讛 讜爪专转讛 讜讬讘诪转讛 讜讘转 讘注诇讛

MISHNA: All are deemed credible when they come to give testimony with regard to the death of a woman鈥檚 husband, apart from her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, the wife of her yavam, and her husband鈥檚 daughter, her stepdaughter. The reason is that these women are likely to hate her and will lie to her detriment.

诪讛 讘讬谉 讙讟 诇诪讬转讛 砖讛讻转讘 诪讜讻讬讞

The mishna explains: In the case of a divorce all people, including these women, may bring her bill of divorce and testify that it was written appropriately. What, then, is the difference between a bill of divorce and death? The mishna answers: The difference is that in the case of a bill of divorce the writing proves the accuracy of the testimony, i.e., her testimony is supported by the text of the document itself, whereas with regard to the death of her husband there is no proof apart from the statement of the woman herself.

讙诪壮 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讘转 讞诪讬讛 诪讛讜 讟注诪讗 讚讘转 讞诪讜转讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 讗讬诪讗 讚住谞讬讗 诇讛 讛讬讗 谞诪讬 住谞讬讗 诇讛 讜讛讻讗 诇讬讻讗 讗讬诪讗 讚住谞讬讗 诇讛

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the scholars: With regard to the daughter of her father-in-law, who is not the daughter of her mother-in-law, what is the halakha? May she testify to the death of the woman鈥檚 husband, or is she also under suspicion? The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: The reason that the daughter of her mother-in-law is suspected of lying is because she has a mother who hates her daughter-in-law, and therefore the daughter also hates her. But here, there is no mother who hates her, as she is not the mother-in-law鈥檚 daughter, and therefore she should be deemed credible.

讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚讘转 讞诪讜转讛 讚讗诪专讛 拽讗讻诇讛 诇讙讬专住谞讗 讚讗讬诪讗 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 拽讗诪专讛 讗讻诇讛 诇讙讬专住谞讗 讚讘讬 谞砖讗讬

Or perhaps the reason that the daughter of her mother-in-law hates her is that she says: She eats the food [girsena] that my mother prepares. Here too, in the case of the daughter of her father-in-law, she also says: She eats the food of my father鈥檚 house.

转讗 砖诪注 讛讻诇 谞讗诪谞讬谉 诇讛注讬讚讛 讞讜抓 诪讞诪砖 谞砖讬诐 讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 砖讬转 讛讜讬讬谉 讚诇诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚讘转 讞诪讜转讛 讚讗诪专讛 拽讗讻诇讛 诇讙讬专住谞讗 讚讘讬 谞砖讗讬 诇讗 砖谞讗 讘转 讞诪讜转讛 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 讘转 讞诪讬讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from the following baraita: All are deemed credible when they come to testify with regard to her except for five women. And if it is so, that the daughter of her father-in-law is also disqualified, there are actually six women. The Gemara rejects this: This is no proof, as perhaps the reason that the daughter of her mother-in-law is disqualified from testifying is that she says: She eats the food of my father鈥檚 house, and if so, the halakha is no different with regard to her mother-in-law鈥檚 daughter and no different with regard to her father-in-law鈥檚 daughter. Since the two women are disqualified for the same reason the Sages did not list these as two separate cases.

讜讛讗谞谉 转谞谉 讞讜抓 诪砖讘注 谞砖讬诐 讛讛讬讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讜住讬祝 讗祝 讗砖转 讗讘 讜讛讻诇讛

The Gemara raises a contradiction from another source. But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: Apart from seven women who are not trustworthy. Apparently that tanna added the daughter of her father-in-law as a separate category. The Gemara answers: That ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda adds also a father鈥檚 wife, who hates her stepdaughter, and a daughter-in-law, who hates her mother-in-law.

讗诪专讜 诇讜 讗砖转 讗讘 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讻诇诇 讘转 讛讘注诇 讻诇讛 讛专讬 讘讻诇诇 讞诪讜转讛

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: A father鈥檚 wife is included in the category of the husband鈥檚 daughter, while a daughter-in-law is included in the category of her mother-in-law. In other words, just as a mother-in-law is suspicious of her daughter-in-law, a daughter-in-law is equally suspicious of her mother-in-law, and they need not be listed separately.

讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘砖诇诪讗 讞诪讜转讛 住谞讬讗 诇讛 诇讻诇讛 讚讗诪专讛 拽讗讻诇讛 诇讙讬专住谞讬 讗诇讗 讻诇讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 住谞讬讗 诇讞诪讜转讛 讘砖诇诪讗 讘转 讛讘注诇 讚住谞讬讗 诇讗砖转 讛讗讘 讚讗诪专讛 拽讗讻诇讛 诇讙讬专住谞讬 讚讗诐 讗诇讗 讗砖转 讛讗讘 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 住谞讬讗 诇讘转 讛讘注诇

And Rabbi Yehuda, who counts them separately, can answer: Granted that her mother-in-law hates the daughter-in-law, as she says: She eats the food I prepare; but a daughter-in-law, what is the reason that she hates her mother-in-law? Similarly, granted the husband鈥檚 daughter, that she hates her father鈥檚 wife, as she says: This woman eats the food that my mother prepared. However, the father鈥檚 wife, what is the reason that she hates her husband鈥檚 daughter?

讗诇讗 诪讗讬 诪讜住讬祝 转专转讬 讗诇讗 讻诇讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 住谞讬讗 诇讞诪讜转讛 讚诪讙诇讛 诇讘谞讛 讻诇 讚注讘讚讛 讗砖转 讗讘 谞诪讬 住谞讬讗 诇讘转 讛讘注诇 讚诪讙诇讛 诇讗讘讬讛 讻诇 讚注讘讚讛

The Gemara asks: Rather, what is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda adds these two? Rather, his logic is: In the case of a daughter-in-law, what is the reason that she hates her mother-in-law? Because she reveals to her son everything his wife does. And likewise a father鈥檚 wife also hates the husband鈥檚 daughter, because she reveals to her father everything she does. In each case the reason for this hatred is different from the reason for the hatred of the other woman, the mother-in-law or the husband鈥檚 daughter, and therefore they belong in a separate category.

讜专讘谞谉 讻诪讬诐 讛驻谞讬诐 诇驻谞讬诐 讻谉 诇讘 讛讗讚诐 诇讗讚诐 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讛讬讗 讘讚讘专讬 转讜专讛 讻转讬讘

And the Rabbis, who say that the reasons for the hatred are the same and therefore count only five disqualified women, how do they respond to this argument? They cite the verse: 鈥淎s in water face answers to face, so the heart of man to man鈥 (Proverbs 27:19). That is, if one person hates another, the feeling soon becomes mutual. Here too, there is no need for a separate reason in order that the hatred be reciprocated. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda, why doesn鈥檛 he rely on this verse? Rabbi Yehuda would retort: That verse was written about matters of Torah. In other words, it means that the more one studies Torah, the more Torah he understands.

讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 注讜讬讗 讘注讬 讘诪注专讘讗 讞诪讜转讛 讛讘讗讛 诇讗讞专 诪讬讻谉 诪讛讜 诪讬 诪住拽讛 讗讚注转讛 讚诪讬转 讘注诇 讜谞驻诇讛 拽诪讬 讬讘诐 讜住谞讬讗 诇讛 讗讜 诇讗

Rav A岣 bar Avya says: They raise a dilemma in the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael. With regard to her mother-in-law who comes afterward, what is the halakha? This refers to the mother of the husband鈥檚 brother, but not her husband鈥檚 mother, i.e., the wife鈥檚 future mother-in-law if the wife enters into levirate marriage. Can this woman testify with regard to the future wife of her son? The Gemara clarifies: Does it enter her mind that if this woman鈥檚 husband died, the widow will happen before the yavam, her son, for levirate marriage, and as the widow, when she then married her son, would eat her food she hates her already, or not?

转讗 砖诪注 讗诪专讛 诪转 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讞诪讬 转谞砖讗 讜转讟讜诇 讻转讜讘讛 讜讞诪讜转讛 讗住讜专讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讞诪讜转讛 讗住讜专讛 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讗 讘注诇讛 诪讬讬转 讜诇讗 讞诪讬讛 诪讬讬转 讜讛讗 讚拽讗诪专讛 讛讻讬 诇拽诇拽讜诇讗 诇讞诪讜转讛 讛讜讗 讚拽诪讬讻讜讜谞讗

Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma. If she said: My husband died and afterward my father-in-law died, she may marry and take her money from the marriage contract, and her mother-in-law is prohibited to remarry; she is not deemed credible to testify for her mother-in-law, as already stated. The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason that her mother-in-law is prohibited to remarry? Is it not because we say: Perhaps her husband did not really die, and she is still her mother-in-law, and her father-in-law did not die either, and the reason that she says this statement is that she intends to ruin her mother-in-law?

住讘专讛 诇讘转专 砖注转讗 诇讗 转讬转讬 转爪讟注专谉

The Gemara elaborates. She reasons: Later, when the husbands arrive, she will not come back and trouble me, because if the mother-in-law relies on this testimony and remarries she will no longer be able to return to her original husband, and she will be out of her daughter-in-law鈥檚 life. This shows that there is a concern that a daughter-in-law might lie in order to prevent future family relationships from coming into being. Similarly, a woman should be suspected of lying with regard to her future daughter-in-law.

讚诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚专讙讬砖 诇讛 爪注专讗

The Gemara rejects this suggestion. Perhaps it is different there, as the daughter-in-law has already felt oppressed by her mother-in-law. In other words, she is suspected of lying because she had previous dealings with that woman, whereas in the case of a future mother-in-law, with whom she had no previous dealings, there is no such concern. Consequently, the dilemma cannot be resolved from this case.

诪转谞讬壮 注讚 讗讜诪专 诪转 讜谞砖讗转 讜讘讗 讗讞讚 讜讗诪专 诇讗 诪转 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转爪讗 注讚 讗讜诪专 诪转 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 诪转 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞砖讗转 转爪讗 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪转 讜注讚 讗讜诪专 诇讗 诪转 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 谞砖讗转 转谞砖讗

MISHNA: If one witness says: The man died, and the wife married based on this testimony, and one other witness came and said: He did not die, she need not leave her new husband due to this testimony. However, if one witness comes and says: The husband died, and two witnesses say: He did not die, then even though she married based on the first witness she must leave her new husband. If two witnesses say: He died, and one witness says: He did not die, the testimony of the two witnesses is accepted, and even though she did not yet marry, she may marry.

讙诪壮 讟注诪讗 讚谞砖讗转 讛讗 诇讗 谞砖讗转 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讛讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讛讗诪讬谞讛 转讜专讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖谞讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讚讘专讬讜 砖诇 讗讞讚 讘诪拽讜诐 砖谞讬诐

GEMARA: The Gemara infers: The reason in the case of one witness contradicted by another witness is that she already married; however, if she did not yet marry and a second witness comes in the meantime and contradicts the statement of the first one, she may not marry. The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 Ulla say: Wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, his testimony is considered complete proof, as though there are two witnesses present here? If so, the witness who comes and testifies to the opposite is only one witness, and the statement of one witness has no standing in a place where it is contradicted by two witnesses. Why, then, may she not remarry, even ab initio?

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 注讚 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 诪转 讜讛转讬专讜讛 诇讛谞砖讗 讜讘讗 讗讞讚 讜讗诪专 诇讗 诪转 诇讗 转爪讗 诪讛讬转讬专讛 讛专讗砖讜谉

The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna said: If one witness says: He died, and they permitted her to marry based on his testimony, and one other witness later came and said: He did not die, she does not leave her initial, permitted state, i.e., the permission she was granted to remarry is still in force, and she may marry ab initio.

注讚 讗讜诪专 诪转 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讗讬谉 讚讘专讬讜 砖诇 讗讞讚 讘诪拽讜诐 砖谞讬诐 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讘驻住讜诇讬 注讚讜转 讜讻讚专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛

搂 The mishna taught that if one witness says: He died, and two come and say: He did not die, she must leave her new husband. The Gemara asks: This is obvious, as the statement of one witness has no standing in a place where it is contradicted by two witnesses. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case of people disqualified from giving testimony. In other words, the mishna is referring to two people who are generally disqualified from serving as witnesses. In the case of a missing husband, however, their testimony is accepted in contradiction of the first, qualified, witness. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ne岣mya.

讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛 讗讜诪专 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讛讗诪讬谞讛 转讜专讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 讚注讜转 讜注砖讜 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚 讻砖谞讬 讗谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Ne岣mya says: Wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, follow the majority of opinions, even if they are disqualified. And the Sages established the testimony of two women against one man in this case like the testimony of two men against one man, i.e., the testimony of the two witnesses negates the earlier testimony of a single witness. The mishna is teaching that even if the first witness was qualified to give testimony, his account is negated by the statements of the two disqualified witnesses who contradicted him.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗转讗 注讚 讗讞讚 讻砖专 诪注讬拽专讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讗讛 谞砖讬诐 讻注讚 讗讞讚 讚诪讬讬谉 讗诇讗 讻讙讜谉 讚讗转讗讬 讗砖讛 诪注讬拽专讗

And if you wish, say: Anywhere that a qualified witness came initially and testified that he died, even if one hundred women came and contradicted his account, they are considered like one witness, and cannot negate his testimony. However, here it is speaking of a case where a woman came initially and they relied on her testimony to release the wife, and afterward two other women came and contradicted her.

讜转专爪讛 诇讚专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛 讛讻讬 专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛 讗讜诪专 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讛讗诪讬谞讛 转讜专讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 讚注讜转 讜注砖讜 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讘讗砖讛 讗讞转 讻砖谞讬 讗谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚 讗讘诇 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚 讻驻诇讙讗 讜驻诇讙讗 讚诪讬

The Gemara explains: And you can explain the ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ne岣mya as follows: Rabbi Ne岣mya says: Wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, e.g., in testimony concerning a woman鈥檚 missing husband, follow the majority of opinions, and they established two women against one woman like two men against one man. However, in a case involving two women against one man, the latter of whom is a qualified witness, this is like half against half, i.e., they are equal. The testimony of two women has no advantage over that of one male witness, who is considered like two witnesses in testimony concerning a missing husband.

砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪转 讜讻讜壮 诪讗讬 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉 讘驻住讜诇讬 注讚讜转 讜讻讚专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛 讚讗讝讬诇 讘转专 专讜讘 讚注讜转 讛讬讬谞讜 讛讱

搂 The mishna taught: If two witnesses say: He died, and one witness says: He did not die, even if she did not yet marry, she may marry. The Gemara asks: What is the mishna teaching us? If you say it is referring to people disqualified from giving testimony, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ne岣mya, who follows the majority of opinions, then this case is identical to that previous case.

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻讬 讗讝诇讬谞谉 讘转专 专讜讘 讚注讜转 诇讞讜诪专讗 讗讘诇 诇拽讜诇讗 诇讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers. This case is also necessary, lest you say that when we follow the majority of opinions, this is only when it leads to a stringency, but when this principle would lead to a leniency, to permit her to marry based on the majority of opinions, we do not follow the majority opinion. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that there is no difference in this regard, as the majority of opinions is accepted whether this leads to a lenient or a stringent outcome.

诪转谞讬壮 讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 诪转 讜讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 诇讗 诪转 讝讜 砖讗讜诪专转 诪转 转谞砖讗 讜转讟讜诇 讻转讜讘转讛 讜讝讜 砖讗讜诪专转 诇讗 诪转 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 转讟讜诇 讻转讜讘转讛

MISHNA: If two women who were married to the same man come forward, and one of them says that the husband died, and the other one says he did not die, the one who says he died may marry on the basis of her own testimony, and she takes the money of her marriage contract. And the one who said he did not die may not marry, and does not take the money of her marriage contract.

讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 诪转 讜讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 谞讛专讙 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜诪讻讞讬砖讜转 讝讜 讗转 讝讜 讛专讬 讗诇讜 诇讗 讬谞砖讗讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专讬诐 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讝讜 讜讝讜 诪讜讚讜转 砖讗讬谉 拽讬讬诐 讬谞砖讗讜 注讚 讗讜诪专 诪转 讜注讚 讗讜诪专 诇讗 诪转

If one wife says: He died in a normal manner, and the other one says: He was killed, Rabbi Meir says: Since they contradict one another, these women may not marry. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon say: Since they both agree that he is not alive they may marry, despite the fact that they dispute the circumstances of his demise. If a witness says: He died, and a witness says: He did not die,

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

talking talmud_square

Yevamot 117: The Hatred of the Mother-in-Law

Mishnayot! A women who testifies that her husband has died can remarry, but does she get the ketubah money? It's...

Yevamot 117

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Yevamot 117

砖讗讬谉 讛讗讞讬谉 谞讻谞住讬谉 诇谞讞诇讛 注诇 驻讬讛

that the brothers do not come into the inheritance from the deceased brother based on her testimony. Evidently, although this testimony is accepted with regard to forbidden sexual relationships, it is not effective for monetary matters.

讗诪专讜 诇讛诐 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讛诇讗 诪住驻专 讻转讜讘讛 谞诇诪讜讚 砖讛讜讗 讻讜转讘 诇讛 砖讗诐 转谞砖讗讬 诇讗讞专 转讟诇讬 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 诇讬讻讬 讜讞讝专讜 讘讬转 讛诇诇 诇讛讜专讜转 讻讚讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬

Beit Shammai said to them: But we can learn this halakha from the scroll of the marriage contract, as every husband writes for her that: If you marry another man, take what is written for you in this contract. This shows that her right to receive the money of her marriage contract is dependent upon her eligibility to remarry. In this case, as she is deemed credible when she says her husband died and she may marry again, she is likewise entitled to the money of the marriage contract. And Beit Hillel again retracted their opinion, and decided to teach in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 谞转讬讬讘诪讛 讬讘诪讛 谞讻谞住 诇谞讞诇讛 注诇 驻讬讛 讛诐 讚专砖讜 诪讚专砖 讻转讜讘讛 讗谞讜 诇讗 谞讚专讜砖 诪讚专砖 转讜专讛

GEMARA: Rav 岣sda said: If the woman entered into levirate marriage based upon her own testimony, her yavam comes into the inheritance of the property of his dead brother based on her testimony. He adds: If Beit Shammai taught their halakha that she is entitled to her money, by interpreting homiletically the language of a marriage contract, will we not teach by interpreting homiletically the Torah itself?

讬拽讜诐 注诇 砖诐 讗讞讬讜 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜讛专讬 拽诐

Rav 岣sda explains: The Merciful One states in the Torah: 鈥淗e shall succeed in the name of his dead brother鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:6), which is interpreted by the Sages as referring to the right of inheritance of the brother who consummates the levirate marriage. And this man did succeed with respect to the marital relationship, as he consummated the levirate marriage based on the testimony of his yevama that her husband died. Consequently, he takes the place of his brother with respect to his inheritance as well.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘讗转 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讗诪专讛 诪转 讘注诇讬 讛转讬专讜谞讬 诇讛谞砖讗 诪转讬专讬谉 讗讜转讛 诇讛谞砖讗 讜谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘转讛 转谞讜 诇讬 讻转讜讘转讬 讗祝 诇讛谞砖讗 讗讬谉 诪转讬专讬谉 讗讜转讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗讚注转讗 讚讻转讜讘讛 讗转讗讬

Rav Na岣an said: A woman came to the court and said: My husband died; permit me to marry. The halakha is that after investigating the matter, they permit her to marry, and also give her her marriage contract. However, if she came and said: Give me my marriage contract, they do not even permit her to marry. What is the reason? Since she came with the money of the marriage contract in mind, she is suspected of lying, and her testimony is rejected.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讛转讬专讜谞讬 诇讛谞砖讗 讜转谞讜 诇讬 讻转讜讘转讬 诪讛讜 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专讛 讻转讜讘转讛 讗讚注转讗 讚讻转讜讘讛 讗转讗讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻诇 诪讬诇讬 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇讗讬谞讬砖 讗诪专 诇讛讜 诇讘讬 讚讬谞讗 [讜讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 讻诇 诪讬诇讬 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇讗讬谞讬砖 讗诪专 诇讛讜 诇讘讬 讚讬谞讗] 转谞讜 诇讬 讻转讜讘转讬 讜讛转讬专讜谞讬 诇讛谞砖讗 诪讛讜

However, the following dilemma was raised before the scholars. If she came and said: Permit me to marry and give me my marriage contract, what is the halakha? Since she mentioned the money from her marriage contract, this shows that she came with the marriage contract in mind. Or perhaps every matter a person has in his favor he will say to the court, even if it is not of particular importance. And if you say that the ruling in this case is in accordance with the principle: Every matter a person has in his favor he will say to the court, then in a case where she said: Give me my marriage contract and permit me to marry, what is the halakha?

讛讻讗 讜讚讗讬 讗讚注转讗 讚讻转讜讘讛 讗转讗讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讚诇讗 讬讚注讛 讘诪讗讬 诪砖转专讬讗 转讬拽讜

The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: Here she certainly came with the marriage contract in mind, as she mentioned it first. Or perhaps she said it in this manner since she does not know what will set her free. In other words, she might have thought that taking the money guaranteed by her marriage contract is part of the process that enables her to remarry, but this does not prove that she is focused on the money. The Gemara states that the question shall stand unresolved.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讻诇 谞讗诪谞讬谉 诇讛注讬讚讛 讞讜抓 诪讞诪讜转讛 讜讘转 讞诪讜转讛 讜爪专转讛 讜讬讘诪转讛 讜讘转 讘注诇讛

MISHNA: All are deemed credible when they come to give testimony with regard to the death of a woman鈥檚 husband, apart from her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, the wife of her yavam, and her husband鈥檚 daughter, her stepdaughter. The reason is that these women are likely to hate her and will lie to her detriment.

诪讛 讘讬谉 讙讟 诇诪讬转讛 砖讛讻转讘 诪讜讻讬讞

The mishna explains: In the case of a divorce all people, including these women, may bring her bill of divorce and testify that it was written appropriately. What, then, is the difference between a bill of divorce and death? The mishna answers: The difference is that in the case of a bill of divorce the writing proves the accuracy of the testimony, i.e., her testimony is supported by the text of the document itself, whereas with regard to the death of her husband there is no proof apart from the statement of the woman herself.

讙诪壮 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讘转 讞诪讬讛 诪讛讜 讟注诪讗 讚讘转 讞诪讜转讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 讗讬诪讗 讚住谞讬讗 诇讛 讛讬讗 谞诪讬 住谞讬讗 诇讛 讜讛讻讗 诇讬讻讗 讗讬诪讗 讚住谞讬讗 诇讛

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the scholars: With regard to the daughter of her father-in-law, who is not the daughter of her mother-in-law, what is the halakha? May she testify to the death of the woman鈥檚 husband, or is she also under suspicion? The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: The reason that the daughter of her mother-in-law is suspected of lying is because she has a mother who hates her daughter-in-law, and therefore the daughter also hates her. But here, there is no mother who hates her, as she is not the mother-in-law鈥檚 daughter, and therefore she should be deemed credible.

讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚讘转 讞诪讜转讛 讚讗诪专讛 拽讗讻诇讛 诇讙讬专住谞讗 讚讗讬诪讗 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 拽讗诪专讛 讗讻诇讛 诇讙讬专住谞讗 讚讘讬 谞砖讗讬

Or perhaps the reason that the daughter of her mother-in-law hates her is that she says: She eats the food [girsena] that my mother prepares. Here too, in the case of the daughter of her father-in-law, she also says: She eats the food of my father鈥檚 house.

转讗 砖诪注 讛讻诇 谞讗诪谞讬谉 诇讛注讬讚讛 讞讜抓 诪讞诪砖 谞砖讬诐 讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 砖讬转 讛讜讬讬谉 讚诇诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚讘转 讞诪讜转讛 讚讗诪专讛 拽讗讻诇讛 诇讙讬专住谞讗 讚讘讬 谞砖讗讬 诇讗 砖谞讗 讘转 讞诪讜转讛 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 讘转 讞诪讬讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from the following baraita: All are deemed credible when they come to testify with regard to her except for five women. And if it is so, that the daughter of her father-in-law is also disqualified, there are actually six women. The Gemara rejects this: This is no proof, as perhaps the reason that the daughter of her mother-in-law is disqualified from testifying is that she says: She eats the food of my father鈥檚 house, and if so, the halakha is no different with regard to her mother-in-law鈥檚 daughter and no different with regard to her father-in-law鈥檚 daughter. Since the two women are disqualified for the same reason the Sages did not list these as two separate cases.

讜讛讗谞谉 转谞谉 讞讜抓 诪砖讘注 谞砖讬诐 讛讛讬讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讜住讬祝 讗祝 讗砖转 讗讘 讜讛讻诇讛

The Gemara raises a contradiction from another source. But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: Apart from seven women who are not trustworthy. Apparently that tanna added the daughter of her father-in-law as a separate category. The Gemara answers: That ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda adds also a father鈥檚 wife, who hates her stepdaughter, and a daughter-in-law, who hates her mother-in-law.

讗诪专讜 诇讜 讗砖转 讗讘 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讻诇诇 讘转 讛讘注诇 讻诇讛 讛专讬 讘讻诇诇 讞诪讜转讛

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: A father鈥檚 wife is included in the category of the husband鈥檚 daughter, while a daughter-in-law is included in the category of her mother-in-law. In other words, just as a mother-in-law is suspicious of her daughter-in-law, a daughter-in-law is equally suspicious of her mother-in-law, and they need not be listed separately.

讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘砖诇诪讗 讞诪讜转讛 住谞讬讗 诇讛 诇讻诇讛 讚讗诪专讛 拽讗讻诇讛 诇讙讬专住谞讬 讗诇讗 讻诇讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 住谞讬讗 诇讞诪讜转讛 讘砖诇诪讗 讘转 讛讘注诇 讚住谞讬讗 诇讗砖转 讛讗讘 讚讗诪专讛 拽讗讻诇讛 诇讙讬专住谞讬 讚讗诐 讗诇讗 讗砖转 讛讗讘 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 住谞讬讗 诇讘转 讛讘注诇

And Rabbi Yehuda, who counts them separately, can answer: Granted that her mother-in-law hates the daughter-in-law, as she says: She eats the food I prepare; but a daughter-in-law, what is the reason that she hates her mother-in-law? Similarly, granted the husband鈥檚 daughter, that she hates her father鈥檚 wife, as she says: This woman eats the food that my mother prepared. However, the father鈥檚 wife, what is the reason that she hates her husband鈥檚 daughter?

讗诇讗 诪讗讬 诪讜住讬祝 转专转讬 讗诇讗 讻诇讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 住谞讬讗 诇讞诪讜转讛 讚诪讙诇讛 诇讘谞讛 讻诇 讚注讘讚讛 讗砖转 讗讘 谞诪讬 住谞讬讗 诇讘转 讛讘注诇 讚诪讙诇讛 诇讗讘讬讛 讻诇 讚注讘讚讛

The Gemara asks: Rather, what is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda adds these two? Rather, his logic is: In the case of a daughter-in-law, what is the reason that she hates her mother-in-law? Because she reveals to her son everything his wife does. And likewise a father鈥檚 wife also hates the husband鈥檚 daughter, because she reveals to her father everything she does. In each case the reason for this hatred is different from the reason for the hatred of the other woman, the mother-in-law or the husband鈥檚 daughter, and therefore they belong in a separate category.

讜专讘谞谉 讻诪讬诐 讛驻谞讬诐 诇驻谞讬诐 讻谉 诇讘 讛讗讚诐 诇讗讚诐 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讛讬讗 讘讚讘专讬 转讜专讛 讻转讬讘

And the Rabbis, who say that the reasons for the hatred are the same and therefore count only five disqualified women, how do they respond to this argument? They cite the verse: 鈥淎s in water face answers to face, so the heart of man to man鈥 (Proverbs 27:19). That is, if one person hates another, the feeling soon becomes mutual. Here too, there is no need for a separate reason in order that the hatred be reciprocated. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda, why doesn鈥檛 he rely on this verse? Rabbi Yehuda would retort: That verse was written about matters of Torah. In other words, it means that the more one studies Torah, the more Torah he understands.

讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 注讜讬讗 讘注讬 讘诪注专讘讗 讞诪讜转讛 讛讘讗讛 诇讗讞专 诪讬讻谉 诪讛讜 诪讬 诪住拽讛 讗讚注转讛 讚诪讬转 讘注诇 讜谞驻诇讛 拽诪讬 讬讘诐 讜住谞讬讗 诇讛 讗讜 诇讗

Rav A岣 bar Avya says: They raise a dilemma in the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael. With regard to her mother-in-law who comes afterward, what is the halakha? This refers to the mother of the husband鈥檚 brother, but not her husband鈥檚 mother, i.e., the wife鈥檚 future mother-in-law if the wife enters into levirate marriage. Can this woman testify with regard to the future wife of her son? The Gemara clarifies: Does it enter her mind that if this woman鈥檚 husband died, the widow will happen before the yavam, her son, for levirate marriage, and as the widow, when she then married her son, would eat her food she hates her already, or not?

转讗 砖诪注 讗诪专讛 诪转 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讞诪讬 转谞砖讗 讜转讟讜诇 讻转讜讘讛 讜讞诪讜转讛 讗住讜专讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讞诪讜转讛 讗住讜专讛 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讗 讘注诇讛 诪讬讬转 讜诇讗 讞诪讬讛 诪讬讬转 讜讛讗 讚拽讗诪专讛 讛讻讬 诇拽诇拽讜诇讗 诇讞诪讜转讛 讛讜讗 讚拽诪讬讻讜讜谞讗

Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma. If she said: My husband died and afterward my father-in-law died, she may marry and take her money from the marriage contract, and her mother-in-law is prohibited to remarry; she is not deemed credible to testify for her mother-in-law, as already stated. The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason that her mother-in-law is prohibited to remarry? Is it not because we say: Perhaps her husband did not really die, and she is still her mother-in-law, and her father-in-law did not die either, and the reason that she says this statement is that she intends to ruin her mother-in-law?

住讘专讛 诇讘转专 砖注转讗 诇讗 转讬转讬 转爪讟注专谉

The Gemara elaborates. She reasons: Later, when the husbands arrive, she will not come back and trouble me, because if the mother-in-law relies on this testimony and remarries she will no longer be able to return to her original husband, and she will be out of her daughter-in-law鈥檚 life. This shows that there is a concern that a daughter-in-law might lie in order to prevent future family relationships from coming into being. Similarly, a woman should be suspected of lying with regard to her future daughter-in-law.

讚诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚专讙讬砖 诇讛 爪注专讗

The Gemara rejects this suggestion. Perhaps it is different there, as the daughter-in-law has already felt oppressed by her mother-in-law. In other words, she is suspected of lying because she had previous dealings with that woman, whereas in the case of a future mother-in-law, with whom she had no previous dealings, there is no such concern. Consequently, the dilemma cannot be resolved from this case.

诪转谞讬壮 注讚 讗讜诪专 诪转 讜谞砖讗转 讜讘讗 讗讞讚 讜讗诪专 诇讗 诪转 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转爪讗 注讚 讗讜诪专 诪转 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 诪转 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞砖讗转 转爪讗 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪转 讜注讚 讗讜诪专 诇讗 诪转 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 谞砖讗转 转谞砖讗

MISHNA: If one witness says: The man died, and the wife married based on this testimony, and one other witness came and said: He did not die, she need not leave her new husband due to this testimony. However, if one witness comes and says: The husband died, and two witnesses say: He did not die, then even though she married based on the first witness she must leave her new husband. If two witnesses say: He died, and one witness says: He did not die, the testimony of the two witnesses is accepted, and even though she did not yet marry, she may marry.

讙诪壮 讟注诪讗 讚谞砖讗转 讛讗 诇讗 谞砖讗转 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讛讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讛讗诪讬谞讛 转讜专讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖谞讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讚讘专讬讜 砖诇 讗讞讚 讘诪拽讜诐 砖谞讬诐

GEMARA: The Gemara infers: The reason in the case of one witness contradicted by another witness is that she already married; however, if she did not yet marry and a second witness comes in the meantime and contradicts the statement of the first one, she may not marry. The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 Ulla say: Wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, his testimony is considered complete proof, as though there are two witnesses present here? If so, the witness who comes and testifies to the opposite is only one witness, and the statement of one witness has no standing in a place where it is contradicted by two witnesses. Why, then, may she not remarry, even ab initio?

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 注讚 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 诪转 讜讛转讬专讜讛 诇讛谞砖讗 讜讘讗 讗讞讚 讜讗诪专 诇讗 诪转 诇讗 转爪讗 诪讛讬转讬专讛 讛专讗砖讜谉

The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna said: If one witness says: He died, and they permitted her to marry based on his testimony, and one other witness later came and said: He did not die, she does not leave her initial, permitted state, i.e., the permission she was granted to remarry is still in force, and she may marry ab initio.

注讚 讗讜诪专 诪转 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讗讬谉 讚讘专讬讜 砖诇 讗讞讚 讘诪拽讜诐 砖谞讬诐 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讘驻住讜诇讬 注讚讜转 讜讻讚专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛

搂 The mishna taught that if one witness says: He died, and two come and say: He did not die, she must leave her new husband. The Gemara asks: This is obvious, as the statement of one witness has no standing in a place where it is contradicted by two witnesses. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case of people disqualified from giving testimony. In other words, the mishna is referring to two people who are generally disqualified from serving as witnesses. In the case of a missing husband, however, their testimony is accepted in contradiction of the first, qualified, witness. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ne岣mya.

讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛 讗讜诪专 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讛讗诪讬谞讛 转讜专讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 讚注讜转 讜注砖讜 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚 讻砖谞讬 讗谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Ne岣mya says: Wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, follow the majority of opinions, even if they are disqualified. And the Sages established the testimony of two women against one man in this case like the testimony of two men against one man, i.e., the testimony of the two witnesses negates the earlier testimony of a single witness. The mishna is teaching that even if the first witness was qualified to give testimony, his account is negated by the statements of the two disqualified witnesses who contradicted him.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗转讗 注讚 讗讞讚 讻砖专 诪注讬拽专讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讗讛 谞砖讬诐 讻注讚 讗讞讚 讚诪讬讬谉 讗诇讗 讻讙讜谉 讚讗转讗讬 讗砖讛 诪注讬拽专讗

And if you wish, say: Anywhere that a qualified witness came initially and testified that he died, even if one hundred women came and contradicted his account, they are considered like one witness, and cannot negate his testimony. However, here it is speaking of a case where a woman came initially and they relied on her testimony to release the wife, and afterward two other women came and contradicted her.

讜转专爪讛 诇讚专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛 讛讻讬 专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛 讗讜诪专 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讛讗诪讬谞讛 转讜专讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 讚注讜转 讜注砖讜 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讘讗砖讛 讗讞转 讻砖谞讬 讗谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚 讗讘诇 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚 讻驻诇讙讗 讜驻诇讙讗 讚诪讬

The Gemara explains: And you can explain the ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ne岣mya as follows: Rabbi Ne岣mya says: Wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, e.g., in testimony concerning a woman鈥檚 missing husband, follow the majority of opinions, and they established two women against one woman like two men against one man. However, in a case involving two women against one man, the latter of whom is a qualified witness, this is like half against half, i.e., they are equal. The testimony of two women has no advantage over that of one male witness, who is considered like two witnesses in testimony concerning a missing husband.

砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪转 讜讻讜壮 诪讗讬 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉 讘驻住讜诇讬 注讚讜转 讜讻讚专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛 讚讗讝讬诇 讘转专 专讜讘 讚注讜转 讛讬讬谞讜 讛讱

搂 The mishna taught: If two witnesses say: He died, and one witness says: He did not die, even if she did not yet marry, she may marry. The Gemara asks: What is the mishna teaching us? If you say it is referring to people disqualified from giving testimony, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ne岣mya, who follows the majority of opinions, then this case is identical to that previous case.

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻讬 讗讝诇讬谞谉 讘转专 专讜讘 讚注讜转 诇讞讜诪专讗 讗讘诇 诇拽讜诇讗 诇讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers. This case is also necessary, lest you say that when we follow the majority of opinions, this is only when it leads to a stringency, but when this principle would lead to a leniency, to permit her to marry based on the majority of opinions, we do not follow the majority opinion. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that there is no difference in this regard, as the majority of opinions is accepted whether this leads to a lenient or a stringent outcome.

诪转谞讬壮 讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 诪转 讜讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 诇讗 诪转 讝讜 砖讗讜诪专转 诪转 转谞砖讗 讜转讟讜诇 讻转讜讘转讛 讜讝讜 砖讗讜诪专转 诇讗 诪转 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 转讟讜诇 讻转讜讘转讛

MISHNA: If two women who were married to the same man come forward, and one of them says that the husband died, and the other one says he did not die, the one who says he died may marry on the basis of her own testimony, and she takes the money of her marriage contract. And the one who said he did not die may not marry, and does not take the money of her marriage contract.

讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 诪转 讜讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 谞讛专讙 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜诪讻讞讬砖讜转 讝讜 讗转 讝讜 讛专讬 讗诇讜 诇讗 讬谞砖讗讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专讬诐 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讝讜 讜讝讜 诪讜讚讜转 砖讗讬谉 拽讬讬诐 讬谞砖讗讜 注讚 讗讜诪专 诪转 讜注讚 讗讜诪专 诇讗 诪转

If one wife says: He died in a normal manner, and the other one says: He was killed, Rabbi Meir says: Since they contradict one another, these women may not marry. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon say: Since they both agree that he is not alive they may marry, despite the fact that they dispute the circumstances of his demise. If a witness says: He died, and a witness says: He did not die,

Scroll To Top