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Today's Daf Yomi

January 30, 2015 | 讬壮 讘砖讘讟 转砖注状讛

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 118

Study Guide Yevamot 118


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讗砖讛 讗讜诪专转 诪转 讜讗砖讛 讗讜诪专转 诇讗 诪转 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗

or one woman says: He died, and another woman says: He did not die, this woman may not marry.

讙诪壮 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专讛 诇讗 诪转 讛讗 讗讬砖转讬拽讗 转谞砖讗 讛讗 讗讬谉 爪专讛 诪注讬讚讛 诇讞讘专转讛

GEMARA: The mishna taught that if one rival wife says their husband died, while the second maintains that he did not die, the one who says he did not die may not remarry. The Gemara infers: The reason is that the second rival wife said explicitly: He did not die, from which it may be inferred that if she was silent and said nothing, she is permitted to marry based on the testimony of the first. However, this conclusion is problematic, as there is a principle that one rival wife may not testify on behalf of another, and if so, how can she rely on the testimony of her rival wife?

诇讗 诪转 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讗 诇讬讛 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讗 诪讬讬转 讜讛讗 讚拽讗诪专讛 诇讗 诪转 诇拽诇拽讜诇讛 诇爪专讛 讛讬讗 讚拽诪讬讻讜讜谞讗 讜转诪讜转 谞驻砖讛 注诐 驻诇砖转讬诐 拽讗诪专讛 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers that this inference is incorrect, as it was necessary for the mishna to state: He did not die, as it might enter your mind to say that this man did in fact die, and with regard to that which she says: He did not die, she intends to ruin her rival wife. And as for herself she says: Let her die with the Philistines. This is a paraphrase of the verse: 鈥淟et me die with the Philistines鈥 (Judges 16:30), which is a shorthand expression for one鈥檚 desire to hurt his enemies even if he suffers the same fate himself. In this case it means that she is prepared to testify falsely that their husband did not die, so as to ruin her rival wife. Therefore the mishna teaches us that this is not the case, and she is not permitted to marry based on the testimony of her rival wife.

讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 诪转 讻讜壮 讜诇讬驻诇讜讙 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘专讬砖讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘诪讞诇讜拽转 砖谞讜讬讛 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讬讗 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘讛讗 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讜讚讛 讚讻诇 诇讗 诪转 讘注讚讜转 讗砖讛 诇讗讜 讛讻讞砖讛 讛讬讗

搂 The mishna taught that if one wife says: He died, and one says: He was killed, Rabbi Meir says that as they contradict one another, they may not remarry. The Gemara asks: And let Rabbi Meir also disagree in the first clause, when one witness says the husband died and the other claims he did not die. Rabbi Elazar said: This is taught as a tannaitic dispute. In other words, Rabbi Meir also disagreed with the first clause, and the unattributed opinion in the mishna is that of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Yo岣nan said: You can even say that the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as in this case even Rabbi Meir concedes that any claim of: He did not die, with regard to testimony enabling a woman to remarry, is not considered contradictory.

转谞谉 注讚 讗讜诪专 诪转 讜注讚 讗讜诪专 诇讗 诪转 讗砖讛 讗讜诪专转 诪转 讜讗砖讛 讗讜诪专转 诇讗 诪转 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 住转诪讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诇讗 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 拽砖讬讗 拽砖讬讗

The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this answer. We learned in the mishna If one witness says: He died, and one witness says: He did not die, or if one woman says: He died, and another woman says: He did not die, she may not marry. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, the unattributed statement in this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that when a rebuttal contradicts the original testimony, one cannot rely upon the testimony that the husband died. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, this is difficult. The Gemara answers: Yes, this is difficult.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗砖讛 砖讛诇讻讛 讛讬讗 讜讘注诇讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讘讗讛 讜讗诪专讛 诪转 讘注诇讬 转谞砖讗 讜转讟讜诇 讻转讜讘转讛 讜爪专转讛 讗住讜专讛 讛讬转讛 讘转 讬砖专讗诇 诇讻讛谉 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉

MISHNA: In the case of a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, and she comes and says: My husband died, she may marry, and she takes her marriage contract based on her own testimony. And it remains prohibited for her rival wife to remarry, as a woman cannot testify on behalf of her rival wife. If the rival wife was an Israelite woman married to a priest, she may continue to partake of teruma, as she is not permitted to remarry, and therefore the presumption that the husband is still alive is maintained in relation to her. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讝讜 讚专讱 诪讜爪讬讗转讜 诪讬讚讬 注讘讬专讛 注讚 砖转讛讗 讗住讜专讛 诇讬谞砖讗 讜讗住讜专讛 诪诇讗讻讜诇 讘转专讜诪讛

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare someone from transgression. According to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, there is a concern that she might be eating teruma unlawfully. There is no remedy for this situation unless it is prohibited for the rival wife to marry, as she cannot rely on the testimony of her rival wife, and it is also prohibited for her to partake of teruma, lest the other woman was speaking the truth. In other words, the halakha is stringent on both counts.

讗诪专讛 诪转 (诇讬) 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讞诪讬 转谞砖讗 讜转讟讜诇 讻转讜讘转讛 讜讞诪讜转讛 讗住讜专讛 讛讬转讛 讘转 讬砖专讗诇 诇讻讛谉 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讝讜 讚专讱 诪讜爪讬讗讛 诪讬讚讬 注讘讬专讛 注讚 砖转讛讗 讗住讜专讛 诇讬谞砖讗 讜讗住讜专讛 诪诇讗讻讜诇 讘转专讜诪讛

The mishna discusses a similar case. If a woman said: My husband died and afterward my father-in-law died, she may marry and take her marriage contract, and it is prohibited for her mother-in-law to remarry, as a woman may not testify on behalf of her mother-in-law. If the mother-in-law was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, she may partake of teruma; this is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare her from transgression; there is no remedy unless it is prohibited for the mother-in-law to marry and also prohibited for her to partake of teruma.

讙诪壮 讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗讬转诪专 讛讱 拽诪讬讬转讗 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 诪砖讜诐 讚爪注专讗 讚讙讜驻讛 讗讘诇 讞诪讜转讛 讚爪注专讗 诪讬诇讬 讚注诇诪讗 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

GEMARA: The mishna states the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva with regard to two apparently identical cases. The Gemara explains: And it is necessary to state both of these examples. As, had the mishna stated the dispute only in this first case, I would have said: It is in this case that Rabbi Tarfon said the wife is suspected of lying, because the suffering is physical, i.e., she is jealous of her rival wife, with whom she shares her husband. However, with regard to her mother-in-law, where the suffering is merely verbal and not physical, one might say that he concedes to Rabbi Akiva, i.e., that she is not considered a liar, and therefore it should be prohibited for her mother-in-law to partake in teruma.

讜讗讬 讗讬转诪专 讘讛讗 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讘诇 讘讛讱 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讛 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 爪专讬讻讗

And vice-versa: Had the mishna stated the dispute only in this second case, I would have said: It is in this case that Rabbi Akiva said that the mother-in-law must refrain from eating teruma in case the daughter-in-law is not lying, but in this other case of the rival wife, you might say that he concedes to Rabbi Tarfon that she may eat teruma, as a rival wife is certainly not telling the truth. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to state the dispute in both two cases.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗祝 讗谞谉 谞诪讬 转谞讬谞讗 谞讬转谉 诇讬 讘谉 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 诪转 讘谞讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘注诇讬 谞讗诪谞转 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘谞讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon. The testimony of a woman who is suspected of harboring ill will toward another is entirely rejected with regard to that other person, and no credence is given to her account at all. Abaye said: Likewise, we, too, learn in a mishna (118b): If a woman came and said: A son was born to me overseas, and my son died and afterward my husband died, she is deemed credible in all regards, and she enters into levirate marriage. If she said: My husband died and afterward my son died, which means she is exempt from levirate marriage, she is not deemed credible.

讜讞讜砖砖讬谉 诇讚讘专讬讛 讜讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转 诇讚讘专讬讛 讛讜讗 讚讞讜砖砖讬谉 讛讗 诇讚讘专讬 爪专讛 讗讬谉 讞讜砖砖讬谉 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

That mishna adds: But in any case, the court is concerned about her statement, and she must perform 岣litza and she does not enter into levirate marriage. In other words, the court takes into consideration the possibility that she is speaking the truth, and if her son did die after her husband it is prohibited for her to enter into levirate marriage. Abaye infers from the language of the mishna on 118b: It is with regard to her own statement that the court is concerned. This indicates that the court is not concerned at all about the statement of her rival wife who testified with regard to her. The Gemara concludes: Learn from here that this is the case.

诪转谞讬壮 拽讬讚砖 讗讞转 诪讞诪砖 谞砖讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讬讜讚注 讗讬 讝讜 拽讬讚砖 讻诇 讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 讗讜转讬 拽讬讚砖 谞讜转谉 讙讟 诇讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讜诪谞讬讞 讻转讜讘讛 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜诪住转诇拽 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉

MISHNA: In relation to the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva in the previous mishna, in which Rabbi Akiva states that one must avoid a possible transgression, the mishna cites two similar cases involving other topics. With regard to one who betrothed one of five women, and he does not know which of them he betrothed, and each one of them says: He betrothed me, if he does not want to marry any of them he gives a bill of divorce to each and every one of them so none will have the status of a woman with regard to whom there is uncertainty whether she is divorced. And he leaves the marriage contract among them and departs. The marriage contract remains in dispute between the women until they clarify which of them is entitled to the money. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讝讜 讚专讱 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 注讘讬专讛 注讚 砖讬转谉 讙讟 讜讻转讜讘讛 诇讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讙讝诇 讗讞讚 诪讞诪砖讛 讜讗讬谉 讬讜讚注 诪讗讬讝讛 讙讝诇 讻诇 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讗讜转讬 讙讝诇 诪谞讬讞 讙讝讬诇讛 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜诪住转诇拽 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讝讜 讚专讱 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 注讘讬专讛 注讚 砖讬砖诇诐 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare someone from transgression, as perhaps the woman he actually betrothed will not receive the money to which she is entitled. There is no remedy unless he gives a bill of divorce and a marriage contract payment to each and every one. And likewise, in the case of one who stole money from one of five people and does not know from which of them he stole, and each one says: He stole from me, he leaves the stolen money among them and departs, and they will decide among themselves how to distribute the money; this is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare him from transgression; there is no remedy unless he pays each and every one of them.

讙诪壮 拽讬讚砖 拽转谞讬 讘注诇 诇讗 拽转谞讬 讙讝诇 拽转谞讬 诇拽讞 诇讗 拽转谞讬 诪谞讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 诇讗 转谞讗 拽诪讗 讜诇讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专

GEMARA: The Gemara infers: It is taught in the mishna that he betrothed one of five women, whereas it is not taught that he had sexual intercourse with one of five women, as a different ruling applies in this case. Similarly, with regard to the second case, it is taught that he stole from one of five people, and it is not taught that he purchased an item from one of five people. If so, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is not in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna and it is also not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 注诇 砖拽讬讚砖 讗讞转 诪讞诪砖 谞砖讬诐 讜讗讬谞讜 讬讜讚注 讗讬讝讜 拽讬讚砖 砖诪谞讬讞 讻转讜讘讛 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜诪住转诇拽 注诇 诪讛 谞讞诇拽讜 注诇 砖讘注诇 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 诪谞讬讞 讻转讜讘讛 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜诪住转诇拽 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 注讚 砖讬砖诇诐 诇讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转

The Gemara elaborates. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not dispute the case of a man who betrothed one of five women and he does not know which of them he betrothed, as everyone agrees in this case that he leaves the money of the marriage contract among them and departs. With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to the case of one who had sexual intercourse with one of them for the purpose of betrothal. Rabbi Tarfon says: He leaves the money among them and departs, while Rabbi Akiva says: He does not fulfill his obligation unless he pays each and every one of them. Since he married in an inappropriate manner, the Sages penalized him by compelling him to pay all the women.

诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 注诇 砖诇拽讞 诪拽讞 诪讞诪砖讛 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 讜讗讬谉 讬讜讚注 诪讗讬讝讛 诪讛谉 诇拽讞 砖诪谞讬讞 讚诪讬 诪拽讞 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜诪住转诇拽 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 砖讙讝诇 诪讞诪砖讛 砖讗诪专 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 诪谞讬讞 讙讝讬诇讛 讘讬谞讬讛诐 讜诪住转诇拽 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 注讚 砖讬砖诇诐 讙讝讬诇讛 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚

Likewise, Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not dispute the case of one who purchased an item from one of five people and he does not know from which of them he purchased it. Everyone agrees in this case that he leaves the price of the purchase among them and departs. They disagree only with regard to one who stole from five people, as Rabbi Tarfon says: He leaves the stolen money among them and departs, and Rabbi Akiva says: He does not fulfill his obligation unless he pays the stolen money to each and every one of them. In this case, as he committed a transgression, he must ensure that the stolen money is restored to its proper owner.

诪讚拽讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讘拽讬讚砖 讜诇拽讞 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 诪讻诇诇 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 驻诇讬讙讬 诪谞讬

The Gemara states: From the fact that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said that Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva do not disagree with regard to the cases of one who betrothed and one who purchased, one may learn by inference that the first tanna, with whom he disagrees, holds that they do disagree about the cases of betrothed and purchased, whereas with regard to one who had sexual intercourse and one who stole an item Rabbi Tarfon agrees with Rabbi Akiva. With this in mind, who is the author of the mishna?

讗讬 转谞讗 拽诪讗 诇讬转谞讬 拽讬讚砖 讜诇拽讞 讗讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 诇讬转谞讬 讘注诇 讜讙讝诇

The Gemara elaborates: If the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, let it teach the cases of betrothed and also purchased, but not that of one who stole or one who had intercourse, as the first tanna maintains that Rabbi Tarfon agrees with Rabbi Akiva in those cases. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, let it teach the cases of one who had sexual relations and that of one who stole. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagree in the case of one who had sexual relations, not in the case of a man who betrothed one of five women. Likewise, he maintains that they disagree in the case of one who stole from five people, not one who purchased an item from five people.

诇注讜诇诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讜诪讗讬 拽讬讚砖 拽讬讚砖 讘讘讬讗讛 转谞讗 拽讬讚砖 诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞讜 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and what is the meaning of the term: Betrothed? It means that he betrothed one of the women by means of sexual intercourse. And the mishna taught the term betrothed to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the stringent opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬住讜专讗 讚专讘谞谉 注讘讚 拽谞讬住 转谞讗 讙讝诇 诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞讜 讚专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬住讜专讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 注讘讚 诇讗 拽谞讬住

The Gemara explains: As, although this man performed an act that violated a prohibition that applies by rabbinic law, i.e., he did not have licentious sexual relations with her but rather engaged in intercourse for the purpose of betrothal, which is in violation of a rabbinic prohibition that one may not betroth a woman by sexual intercourse ab initio, even so Rabbi Akiva penalizes him. And the mishna taught the case of one who stole so as to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the lenient opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, as although he performed an act that violated a prohibition that applies by Torah law, nevertheless he does not penalize him even in this case.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗砖讛 砖讛诇讻讛 讛讬讗 讜讘注诇讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讘谞讛 注诪讛诐 讜讘讗转 讜讗诪专讛 诪转 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘谞讬 谞讗诪谞转 诪转 讘谞讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘注诇讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转 讜讞讜砖砖讬谉 诇讚讘专讬讛 讜讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

MISHNA: In the case of a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, and her son was with them, and later she came back and said: My husband died and afterward my son died, she is deemed credible. It is permitted for her to remarry, and she is exempt from levirate marriage. The reason is that she had children when she left, and therefore she retains her presumptive status of one who is exempt from levirate marriage. However, if she said: My son died and afterward my husband died, she is not deemed credible, i.e., she may not enter into levirate marriage. And yet we are concerned and give some credence to her statement, in case she was actually widowed by a childless husband, and therefore she performs 岣litza to exempt her from the levirate bond with her yavam, and she does not enter into levirate marriage.

谞讬转谉 诇讬 讘谉 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讗诪专讛 诪转 讘谞讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘注诇讬 谞讗诪谞转 诪转 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘谞讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转 讜讞讜砖砖讬谉 诇讚讘专讬讛 讜讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

If she went with her childless husband and returned alone and testified: A son was born to me overseas, and she further said: My son died and afterward my husband died, she is deemed credible and may even enter into levirate marriage, as she was presumed to be childless when she left and consequently she retains that presumptive status. However, if she said: My husband died and afterward my son died, she is not deemed credible for the purpose of exempting her from levirate marriage, but the court is concerned about her statement. And therefore she must perform 岣litza and she does not enter into levirate marriage.

谞讬转谉 诇讬 讬讘诐 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讗诪专讛 诪转 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讬讘诪讬 讬讘诪讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘注诇讬 谞讗诪谞转

If she said: A yavam was born for me overseas, i.e., when the family left the country her husband did not have a brother, and she claims that in the meantime a brother was born to her husband, and she also said: My husband died and afterward my yavam died, or: My yavam died and afterward my husband died, in either case she is deemed credible. This is because when she left she was not presumed to require levirate marriage, and the suggestion that her husband now has a brother is based solely on her testimony.

讛诇讻讛 讛讬讗 讜讘注诇讛 讜讬讘诪讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讗诪专讛 诪转 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讬讘诪讬 讬讘诪讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘注诇讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转 砖讗讬谉 讛讗砖讛 谞讗诪谞转 诇讜诪专 诪转 讬讘诪讬 砖转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 诪转讛 讗讞讜转讛 砖转讻谞住 诇讘讬转讜 讜讗讬谉 讛讗讬砖 谞讗诪谉 诇讜诪专 诪转 讗讞讬 砖讬讬讘诐 讗砖转讜 讜诇讗 诪转讛 讗砖转讜 砖讬砖讗 讗讞讜转讛

However, if she went, she and her husband and her yavam, overseas, and upon her return she said: My husband died and afterward my yavam died, or: My yavam died and afterward my husband died, she is not deemed credible, as a woman is not deemed credible if she says: My yavam died, in order that she may marry another man. And she is not deemed credible if she says that her sister died, in order that she may enter the house of her sister鈥檚 husband. And a man is not deemed credible if he says: My brother died, so that he may enter into levirate marriage with his brother鈥檚 wife, and he is not deemed credible when he says that his wife died, in order that he may marry his wife鈥檚 sister. The Sages accepted impaired testimony of this kind only when there was a concern about creating a situation of a deserted wife.

讙诪壮 讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛诪讝讻讛 讙讟 诇讗砖转讜 讘诪拽讜诐 讬讘诐 诪讛讜 讻讬讜谉 讚住谞讬讗 诇讬讛 讝讻讜转 讛讜讗 诇讛 讜讝讻讬谉 诇讗讚诐 砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬讜 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讝讬诪谞讬谉 讚专讞诪讗 诇讬讛 讞讜讘 讛讜讗 诇讛 讜讗讬谉 讞讘讬谉 诇讗讚诐 砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬讜

GEMARA: Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: In the case of a man who confers possession of a bill of divorce to his wife, i.e., he appoints an agent to take the bill of divorce to his wife, when she has a potential yavam, what is the halakha if her husband dies before she is divorced? One might say that since she hates her yavam, receiving the bill of divorce is for her benefit, as this act renders her prohibited to him, and it is a principle that one may act in a person鈥檚 interest in his absence. If so, as soon as the husband gives the bill of divorce to the agent she is divorced. Or perhaps, since she sometimes loves her yavam, this bill of divorce is to her disadvantage, and one may not act against a person鈥檚 interest in his absence. Consequently, she is not divorced until the bill of divorce reaches her possession.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬谞讗 讜讞讜砖砖讬谉 诇讚讘专讬讛 讜讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

Rav Na岣an said to Rava that we learned an answer to this dilemma in the mishna And we are concerned about her statement, and she must perform 岣litza and she does not enter into levirate marriage. The mishna states that the court gives her statement some credence in either case, both when her testimony would exempt her from levirate marriage and when it would allow her to marry her yavam. This indicates that levirate marriage is considered neither in her interest nor a disadvantage for her. Rather, its classification is uncertain.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘讗 讛诪讝讻讛 讙讟 诇讗砖转讜 讘诪拽讜诐 拽讟讟讛 诪讛讜 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬转 诇讛 拽讟讟讛 讘讛讚讬讛 讝讻讜转 讛讜讗 诇讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 谞讬讞讗 讚讙讜驻讗 注讚讬祝 诇讛 转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讟讘 诇诪讬转讘 讟谉 讚讜 诪诇诪讬转讘 讗专诪诇讜

Ravina said to Rava: With regard to one who confers possession of a bill of divorce to his wife through an agent in a situation when there was a quarrel between them, what is the halakha? The Gemara explains both sides of the question: Since she has a quarrel with him, the bill of divorce might be considered for her benefit. Or perhaps, her physical comfort is preferable to her, as she prefers to remain married despite the quarrel between her and her husband. Come and hear a resolution, as Reish Lakish said: There is a popular idiom among women: It is better to sit as two [tan du] than to sit lonely as a widow, i.e., a woman prefers the companionship of any husband over being alone.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讚砖讜诪砖诪谞讗 讙讘专讗 讻讜专住讬讛 讘讬 讞专转讗 专诪讜 诇讛 专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 讚谞驻爪讗 讙讘专讗 转讬拽专讬 讘住讬驻讬 讘讘讗 讜转讬转讬讘

Abaye said a similar popular expression: One whose husband is small as an ant, she places her seat among the noblewomen, as she considers herself important merely by virtue of being married. Rav Pappa said a different maxim: One whose husband is a wool comber [naftza], a lowly occupation, she calls him to sit with her at the entrance to the house, to display herself as a married woman.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗讜诪专 讚拽讜诇住讗 讙讘专讗 诇讗 讘注讬讗 讟诇驻讞讬 诇拽讬讚专讗 转谞讗 讜讻讜诇谉 诪讝谞讜转 讜转讜诇讜转 讘讘注诇讬讛谉

Similarly, Rav Ashi says: One whose husband sells cabbage heads [kulsa] does not require lentils for her pot. She is so happy she is married that she does not mind even if he does not provide her with food. The Gemara comments: A Sage taught: And all of these women who appear so satisfied with their marriage, they all commit adultery and attribute the children to their husbands. This is another reason why they are so keen to be married. This shows that even when there are quarrels between a couple, the wife still prefers the status of a married woman, and therefore the bill of divorce is not considered in her interest.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讛讗砖讛 砖诇讜诐

 

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot 118

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Yevamot 118

讗砖讛 讗讜诪专转 诪转 讜讗砖讛 讗讜诪专转 诇讗 诪转 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗

or one woman says: He died, and another woman says: He did not die, this woman may not marry.

讙诪壮 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专讛 诇讗 诪转 讛讗 讗讬砖转讬拽讗 转谞砖讗 讛讗 讗讬谉 爪专讛 诪注讬讚讛 诇讞讘专转讛

GEMARA: The mishna taught that if one rival wife says their husband died, while the second maintains that he did not die, the one who says he did not die may not remarry. The Gemara infers: The reason is that the second rival wife said explicitly: He did not die, from which it may be inferred that if she was silent and said nothing, she is permitted to marry based on the testimony of the first. However, this conclusion is problematic, as there is a principle that one rival wife may not testify on behalf of another, and if so, how can she rely on the testimony of her rival wife?

诇讗 诪转 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讗 诇讬讛 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讗 诪讬讬转 讜讛讗 讚拽讗诪专讛 诇讗 诪转 诇拽诇拽讜诇讛 诇爪专讛 讛讬讗 讚拽诪讬讻讜讜谞讗 讜转诪讜转 谞驻砖讛 注诐 驻诇砖转讬诐 拽讗诪专讛 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers that this inference is incorrect, as it was necessary for the mishna to state: He did not die, as it might enter your mind to say that this man did in fact die, and with regard to that which she says: He did not die, she intends to ruin her rival wife. And as for herself she says: Let her die with the Philistines. This is a paraphrase of the verse: 鈥淟et me die with the Philistines鈥 (Judges 16:30), which is a shorthand expression for one鈥檚 desire to hurt his enemies even if he suffers the same fate himself. In this case it means that she is prepared to testify falsely that their husband did not die, so as to ruin her rival wife. Therefore the mishna teaches us that this is not the case, and she is not permitted to marry based on the testimony of her rival wife.

讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 诪转 讻讜壮 讜诇讬驻诇讜讙 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘专讬砖讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘诪讞诇讜拽转 砖谞讜讬讛 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讬讗 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘讛讗 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讜讚讛 讚讻诇 诇讗 诪转 讘注讚讜转 讗砖讛 诇讗讜 讛讻讞砖讛 讛讬讗

搂 The mishna taught that if one wife says: He died, and one says: He was killed, Rabbi Meir says that as they contradict one another, they may not remarry. The Gemara asks: And let Rabbi Meir also disagree in the first clause, when one witness says the husband died and the other claims he did not die. Rabbi Elazar said: This is taught as a tannaitic dispute. In other words, Rabbi Meir also disagreed with the first clause, and the unattributed opinion in the mishna is that of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Yo岣nan said: You can even say that the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as in this case even Rabbi Meir concedes that any claim of: He did not die, with regard to testimony enabling a woman to remarry, is not considered contradictory.

转谞谉 注讚 讗讜诪专 诪转 讜注讚 讗讜诪专 诇讗 诪转 讗砖讛 讗讜诪专转 诪转 讜讗砖讛 讗讜诪专转 诇讗 诪转 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 住转诪讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诇讗 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 拽砖讬讗 拽砖讬讗

The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this answer. We learned in the mishna If one witness says: He died, and one witness says: He did not die, or if one woman says: He died, and another woman says: He did not die, she may not marry. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, the unattributed statement in this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that when a rebuttal contradicts the original testimony, one cannot rely upon the testimony that the husband died. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, this is difficult. The Gemara answers: Yes, this is difficult.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗砖讛 砖讛诇讻讛 讛讬讗 讜讘注诇讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讘讗讛 讜讗诪专讛 诪转 讘注诇讬 转谞砖讗 讜转讟讜诇 讻转讜讘转讛 讜爪专转讛 讗住讜专讛 讛讬转讛 讘转 讬砖专讗诇 诇讻讛谉 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉

MISHNA: In the case of a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, and she comes and says: My husband died, she may marry, and she takes her marriage contract based on her own testimony. And it remains prohibited for her rival wife to remarry, as a woman cannot testify on behalf of her rival wife. If the rival wife was an Israelite woman married to a priest, she may continue to partake of teruma, as she is not permitted to remarry, and therefore the presumption that the husband is still alive is maintained in relation to her. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讝讜 讚专讱 诪讜爪讬讗转讜 诪讬讚讬 注讘讬专讛 注讚 砖转讛讗 讗住讜专讛 诇讬谞砖讗 讜讗住讜专讛 诪诇讗讻讜诇 讘转专讜诪讛

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare someone from transgression. According to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, there is a concern that she might be eating teruma unlawfully. There is no remedy for this situation unless it is prohibited for the rival wife to marry, as she cannot rely on the testimony of her rival wife, and it is also prohibited for her to partake of teruma, lest the other woman was speaking the truth. In other words, the halakha is stringent on both counts.

讗诪专讛 诪转 (诇讬) 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讞诪讬 转谞砖讗 讜转讟讜诇 讻转讜讘转讛 讜讞诪讜转讛 讗住讜专讛 讛讬转讛 讘转 讬砖专讗诇 诇讻讛谉 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讝讜 讚专讱 诪讜爪讬讗讛 诪讬讚讬 注讘讬专讛 注讚 砖转讛讗 讗住讜专讛 诇讬谞砖讗 讜讗住讜专讛 诪诇讗讻讜诇 讘转专讜诪讛

The mishna discusses a similar case. If a woman said: My husband died and afterward my father-in-law died, she may marry and take her marriage contract, and it is prohibited for her mother-in-law to remarry, as a woman may not testify on behalf of her mother-in-law. If the mother-in-law was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, she may partake of teruma; this is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare her from transgression; there is no remedy unless it is prohibited for the mother-in-law to marry and also prohibited for her to partake of teruma.

讙诪壮 讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗讬转诪专 讛讱 拽诪讬讬转讗 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 诪砖讜诐 讚爪注专讗 讚讙讜驻讛 讗讘诇 讞诪讜转讛 讚爪注专讗 诪讬诇讬 讚注诇诪讗 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

GEMARA: The mishna states the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva with regard to two apparently identical cases. The Gemara explains: And it is necessary to state both of these examples. As, had the mishna stated the dispute only in this first case, I would have said: It is in this case that Rabbi Tarfon said the wife is suspected of lying, because the suffering is physical, i.e., she is jealous of her rival wife, with whom she shares her husband. However, with regard to her mother-in-law, where the suffering is merely verbal and not physical, one might say that he concedes to Rabbi Akiva, i.e., that she is not considered a liar, and therefore it should be prohibited for her mother-in-law to partake in teruma.

讜讗讬 讗讬转诪专 讘讛讗 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讘诇 讘讛讱 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讛 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 爪专讬讻讗

And vice-versa: Had the mishna stated the dispute only in this second case, I would have said: It is in this case that Rabbi Akiva said that the mother-in-law must refrain from eating teruma in case the daughter-in-law is not lying, but in this other case of the rival wife, you might say that he concedes to Rabbi Tarfon that she may eat teruma, as a rival wife is certainly not telling the truth. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to state the dispute in both two cases.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗祝 讗谞谉 谞诪讬 转谞讬谞讗 谞讬转谉 诇讬 讘谉 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 诪转 讘谞讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘注诇讬 谞讗诪谞转 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘谞讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon. The testimony of a woman who is suspected of harboring ill will toward another is entirely rejected with regard to that other person, and no credence is given to her account at all. Abaye said: Likewise, we, too, learn in a mishna (118b): If a woman came and said: A son was born to me overseas, and my son died and afterward my husband died, she is deemed credible in all regards, and she enters into levirate marriage. If she said: My husband died and afterward my son died, which means she is exempt from levirate marriage, she is not deemed credible.

讜讞讜砖砖讬谉 诇讚讘专讬讛 讜讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转 诇讚讘专讬讛 讛讜讗 讚讞讜砖砖讬谉 讛讗 诇讚讘专讬 爪专讛 讗讬谉 讞讜砖砖讬谉 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

That mishna adds: But in any case, the court is concerned about her statement, and she must perform 岣litza and she does not enter into levirate marriage. In other words, the court takes into consideration the possibility that she is speaking the truth, and if her son did die after her husband it is prohibited for her to enter into levirate marriage. Abaye infers from the language of the mishna on 118b: It is with regard to her own statement that the court is concerned. This indicates that the court is not concerned at all about the statement of her rival wife who testified with regard to her. The Gemara concludes: Learn from here that this is the case.

诪转谞讬壮 拽讬讚砖 讗讞转 诪讞诪砖 谞砖讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讬讜讚注 讗讬 讝讜 拽讬讚砖 讻诇 讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 讗讜转讬 拽讬讚砖 谞讜转谉 讙讟 诇讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讜诪谞讬讞 讻转讜讘讛 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜诪住转诇拽 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉

MISHNA: In relation to the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva in the previous mishna, in which Rabbi Akiva states that one must avoid a possible transgression, the mishna cites two similar cases involving other topics. With regard to one who betrothed one of five women, and he does not know which of them he betrothed, and each one of them says: He betrothed me, if he does not want to marry any of them he gives a bill of divorce to each and every one of them so none will have the status of a woman with regard to whom there is uncertainty whether she is divorced. And he leaves the marriage contract among them and departs. The marriage contract remains in dispute between the women until they clarify which of them is entitled to the money. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讝讜 讚专讱 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 注讘讬专讛 注讚 砖讬转谉 讙讟 讜讻转讜讘讛 诇讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讙讝诇 讗讞讚 诪讞诪砖讛 讜讗讬谉 讬讜讚注 诪讗讬讝讛 讙讝诇 讻诇 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讗讜转讬 讙讝诇 诪谞讬讞 讙讝讬诇讛 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜诪住转诇拽 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讝讜 讚专讱 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 注讘讬专讛 注讚 砖讬砖诇诐 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare someone from transgression, as perhaps the woman he actually betrothed will not receive the money to which she is entitled. There is no remedy unless he gives a bill of divorce and a marriage contract payment to each and every one. And likewise, in the case of one who stole money from one of five people and does not know from which of them he stole, and each one says: He stole from me, he leaves the stolen money among them and departs, and they will decide among themselves how to distribute the money; this is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare him from transgression; there is no remedy unless he pays each and every one of them.

讙诪壮 拽讬讚砖 拽转谞讬 讘注诇 诇讗 拽转谞讬 讙讝诇 拽转谞讬 诇拽讞 诇讗 拽转谞讬 诪谞讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 诇讗 转谞讗 拽诪讗 讜诇讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专

GEMARA: The Gemara infers: It is taught in the mishna that he betrothed one of five women, whereas it is not taught that he had sexual intercourse with one of five women, as a different ruling applies in this case. Similarly, with regard to the second case, it is taught that he stole from one of five people, and it is not taught that he purchased an item from one of five people. If so, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is not in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna and it is also not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 注诇 砖拽讬讚砖 讗讞转 诪讞诪砖 谞砖讬诐 讜讗讬谞讜 讬讜讚注 讗讬讝讜 拽讬讚砖 砖诪谞讬讞 讻转讜讘讛 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜诪住转诇拽 注诇 诪讛 谞讞诇拽讜 注诇 砖讘注诇 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 诪谞讬讞 讻转讜讘讛 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜诪住转诇拽 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 注讚 砖讬砖诇诐 诇讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转

The Gemara elaborates. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not dispute the case of a man who betrothed one of five women and he does not know which of them he betrothed, as everyone agrees in this case that he leaves the money of the marriage contract among them and departs. With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to the case of one who had sexual intercourse with one of them for the purpose of betrothal. Rabbi Tarfon says: He leaves the money among them and departs, while Rabbi Akiva says: He does not fulfill his obligation unless he pays each and every one of them. Since he married in an inappropriate manner, the Sages penalized him by compelling him to pay all the women.

诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 注诇 砖诇拽讞 诪拽讞 诪讞诪砖讛 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 讜讗讬谉 讬讜讚注 诪讗讬讝讛 诪讛谉 诇拽讞 砖诪谞讬讞 讚诪讬 诪拽讞 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜诪住转诇拽 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 砖讙讝诇 诪讞诪砖讛 砖讗诪专 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 诪谞讬讞 讙讝讬诇讛 讘讬谞讬讛诐 讜诪住转诇拽 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 注讚 砖讬砖诇诐 讙讝讬诇讛 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚

Likewise, Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not dispute the case of one who purchased an item from one of five people and he does not know from which of them he purchased it. Everyone agrees in this case that he leaves the price of the purchase among them and departs. They disagree only with regard to one who stole from five people, as Rabbi Tarfon says: He leaves the stolen money among them and departs, and Rabbi Akiva says: He does not fulfill his obligation unless he pays the stolen money to each and every one of them. In this case, as he committed a transgression, he must ensure that the stolen money is restored to its proper owner.

诪讚拽讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讘拽讬讚砖 讜诇拽讞 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 诪讻诇诇 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 驻诇讬讙讬 诪谞讬

The Gemara states: From the fact that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said that Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva do not disagree with regard to the cases of one who betrothed and one who purchased, one may learn by inference that the first tanna, with whom he disagrees, holds that they do disagree about the cases of betrothed and purchased, whereas with regard to one who had sexual intercourse and one who stole an item Rabbi Tarfon agrees with Rabbi Akiva. With this in mind, who is the author of the mishna?

讗讬 转谞讗 拽诪讗 诇讬转谞讬 拽讬讚砖 讜诇拽讞 讗讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 诇讬转谞讬 讘注诇 讜讙讝诇

The Gemara elaborates: If the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, let it teach the cases of betrothed and also purchased, but not that of one who stole or one who had intercourse, as the first tanna maintains that Rabbi Tarfon agrees with Rabbi Akiva in those cases. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, let it teach the cases of one who had sexual relations and that of one who stole. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagree in the case of one who had sexual relations, not in the case of a man who betrothed one of five women. Likewise, he maintains that they disagree in the case of one who stole from five people, not one who purchased an item from five people.

诇注讜诇诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讜诪讗讬 拽讬讚砖 拽讬讚砖 讘讘讬讗讛 转谞讗 拽讬讚砖 诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞讜 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and what is the meaning of the term: Betrothed? It means that he betrothed one of the women by means of sexual intercourse. And the mishna taught the term betrothed to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the stringent opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬住讜专讗 讚专讘谞谉 注讘讚 拽谞讬住 转谞讗 讙讝诇 诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞讜 讚专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬住讜专讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 注讘讚 诇讗 拽谞讬住

The Gemara explains: As, although this man performed an act that violated a prohibition that applies by rabbinic law, i.e., he did not have licentious sexual relations with her but rather engaged in intercourse for the purpose of betrothal, which is in violation of a rabbinic prohibition that one may not betroth a woman by sexual intercourse ab initio, even so Rabbi Akiva penalizes him. And the mishna taught the case of one who stole so as to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the lenient opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, as although he performed an act that violated a prohibition that applies by Torah law, nevertheless he does not penalize him even in this case.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗砖讛 砖讛诇讻讛 讛讬讗 讜讘注诇讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讘谞讛 注诪讛诐 讜讘讗转 讜讗诪专讛 诪转 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘谞讬 谞讗诪谞转 诪转 讘谞讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘注诇讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转 讜讞讜砖砖讬谉 诇讚讘专讬讛 讜讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

MISHNA: In the case of a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, and her son was with them, and later she came back and said: My husband died and afterward my son died, she is deemed credible. It is permitted for her to remarry, and she is exempt from levirate marriage. The reason is that she had children when she left, and therefore she retains her presumptive status of one who is exempt from levirate marriage. However, if she said: My son died and afterward my husband died, she is not deemed credible, i.e., she may not enter into levirate marriage. And yet we are concerned and give some credence to her statement, in case she was actually widowed by a childless husband, and therefore she performs 岣litza to exempt her from the levirate bond with her yavam, and she does not enter into levirate marriage.

谞讬转谉 诇讬 讘谉 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讗诪专讛 诪转 讘谞讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘注诇讬 谞讗诪谞转 诪转 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘谞讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转 讜讞讜砖砖讬谉 诇讚讘专讬讛 讜讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

If she went with her childless husband and returned alone and testified: A son was born to me overseas, and she further said: My son died and afterward my husband died, she is deemed credible and may even enter into levirate marriage, as she was presumed to be childless when she left and consequently she retains that presumptive status. However, if she said: My husband died and afterward my son died, she is not deemed credible for the purpose of exempting her from levirate marriage, but the court is concerned about her statement. And therefore she must perform 岣litza and she does not enter into levirate marriage.

谞讬转谉 诇讬 讬讘诐 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讗诪专讛 诪转 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讬讘诪讬 讬讘诪讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘注诇讬 谞讗诪谞转

If she said: A yavam was born for me overseas, i.e., when the family left the country her husband did not have a brother, and she claims that in the meantime a brother was born to her husband, and she also said: My husband died and afterward my yavam died, or: My yavam died and afterward my husband died, in either case she is deemed credible. This is because when she left she was not presumed to require levirate marriage, and the suggestion that her husband now has a brother is based solely on her testimony.

讛诇讻讛 讛讬讗 讜讘注诇讛 讜讬讘诪讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讗诪专讛 诪转 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讬讘诪讬 讬讘诪讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘注诇讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转 砖讗讬谉 讛讗砖讛 谞讗诪谞转 诇讜诪专 诪转 讬讘诪讬 砖转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 诪转讛 讗讞讜转讛 砖转讻谞住 诇讘讬转讜 讜讗讬谉 讛讗讬砖 谞讗诪谉 诇讜诪专 诪转 讗讞讬 砖讬讬讘诐 讗砖转讜 讜诇讗 诪转讛 讗砖转讜 砖讬砖讗 讗讞讜转讛

However, if she went, she and her husband and her yavam, overseas, and upon her return she said: My husband died and afterward my yavam died, or: My yavam died and afterward my husband died, she is not deemed credible, as a woman is not deemed credible if she says: My yavam died, in order that she may marry another man. And she is not deemed credible if she says that her sister died, in order that she may enter the house of her sister鈥檚 husband. And a man is not deemed credible if he says: My brother died, so that he may enter into levirate marriage with his brother鈥檚 wife, and he is not deemed credible when he says that his wife died, in order that he may marry his wife鈥檚 sister. The Sages accepted impaired testimony of this kind only when there was a concern about creating a situation of a deserted wife.

讙诪壮 讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛诪讝讻讛 讙讟 诇讗砖转讜 讘诪拽讜诐 讬讘诐 诪讛讜 讻讬讜谉 讚住谞讬讗 诇讬讛 讝讻讜转 讛讜讗 诇讛 讜讝讻讬谉 诇讗讚诐 砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬讜 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讝讬诪谞讬谉 讚专讞诪讗 诇讬讛 讞讜讘 讛讜讗 诇讛 讜讗讬谉 讞讘讬谉 诇讗讚诐 砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬讜

GEMARA: Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: In the case of a man who confers possession of a bill of divorce to his wife, i.e., he appoints an agent to take the bill of divorce to his wife, when she has a potential yavam, what is the halakha if her husband dies before she is divorced? One might say that since she hates her yavam, receiving the bill of divorce is for her benefit, as this act renders her prohibited to him, and it is a principle that one may act in a person鈥檚 interest in his absence. If so, as soon as the husband gives the bill of divorce to the agent she is divorced. Or perhaps, since she sometimes loves her yavam, this bill of divorce is to her disadvantage, and one may not act against a person鈥檚 interest in his absence. Consequently, she is not divorced until the bill of divorce reaches her possession.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬谞讗 讜讞讜砖砖讬谉 诇讚讘专讬讛 讜讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

Rav Na岣an said to Rava that we learned an answer to this dilemma in the mishna And we are concerned about her statement, and she must perform 岣litza and she does not enter into levirate marriage. The mishna states that the court gives her statement some credence in either case, both when her testimony would exempt her from levirate marriage and when it would allow her to marry her yavam. This indicates that levirate marriage is considered neither in her interest nor a disadvantage for her. Rather, its classification is uncertain.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘讗 讛诪讝讻讛 讙讟 诇讗砖转讜 讘诪拽讜诐 拽讟讟讛 诪讛讜 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬转 诇讛 拽讟讟讛 讘讛讚讬讛 讝讻讜转 讛讜讗 诇讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 谞讬讞讗 讚讙讜驻讗 注讚讬祝 诇讛 转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讟讘 诇诪讬转讘 讟谉 讚讜 诪诇诪讬转讘 讗专诪诇讜

Ravina said to Rava: With regard to one who confers possession of a bill of divorce to his wife through an agent in a situation when there was a quarrel between them, what is the halakha? The Gemara explains both sides of the question: Since she has a quarrel with him, the bill of divorce might be considered for her benefit. Or perhaps, her physical comfort is preferable to her, as she prefers to remain married despite the quarrel between her and her husband. Come and hear a resolution, as Reish Lakish said: There is a popular idiom among women: It is better to sit as two [tan du] than to sit lonely as a widow, i.e., a woman prefers the companionship of any husband over being alone.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讚砖讜诪砖诪谞讗 讙讘专讗 讻讜专住讬讛 讘讬 讞专转讗 专诪讜 诇讛 专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 讚谞驻爪讗 讙讘专讗 转讬拽专讬 讘住讬驻讬 讘讘讗 讜转讬转讬讘

Abaye said a similar popular expression: One whose husband is small as an ant, she places her seat among the noblewomen, as she considers herself important merely by virtue of being married. Rav Pappa said a different maxim: One whose husband is a wool comber [naftza], a lowly occupation, she calls him to sit with her at the entrance to the house, to display herself as a married woman.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗讜诪专 讚拽讜诇住讗 讙讘专讗 诇讗 讘注讬讗 讟诇驻讞讬 诇拽讬讚专讗 转谞讗 讜讻讜诇谉 诪讝谞讜转 讜转讜诇讜转 讘讘注诇讬讛谉

Similarly, Rav Ashi says: One whose husband sells cabbage heads [kulsa] does not require lentils for her pot. She is so happy she is married that she does not mind even if he does not provide her with food. The Gemara comments: A Sage taught: And all of these women who appear so satisfied with their marriage, they all commit adultery and attribute the children to their husbands. This is another reason why they are so keen to be married. This shows that even when there are quarrels between a couple, the wife still prefers the status of a married woman, and therefore the bill of divorce is not considered in her interest.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讛讗砖讛 砖诇讜诐

 

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