Yevamot 120

לאנסובי לצרה מקמי דידה אי אמרת צרה מעידה לחברתה אף על גב דלא אינסיב מנסבינן לה לצרה אי אמרת משום דהיא לא מקלקלא נפשה אינסיב מנסבינן לה לצרה אי לא אינסיב לא מנסבינן לה

The Gemara responds that Rabbi Elazar’s reasoning could make a practical difference with regard to allowing the rival wife to marry before the woman herself, i.e., the woman who testified that her husband died, remarries. If you say that according to Rabbi Elazar, one rival wife may testify for another, then although the woman who testified that her husband died has not married, we allow her rival wife to marry. Since the woman’s report is deemed credible with regard to herself, it is also deemed credible with regard to her rival wife. However, if you say that Rabbi Elazar’s reasoning is due to the presumption that she would not cause herself injury, then if she has actually married we may allow her rival wife to marry, but if she has not married, we may not allow her rival wife to marry, in case she lied in order to cause harm to her rival wife.

מאי תא שמע רבי אלעזר אומר הואיל והותרו ליבמין הותרו לכל אדם אי אמרת בשלמא דהיא לא מקלקלא נפשה היינו דכי אינסיב מנסבינן לה

What is the basis of Rabbi Elazar’s ruling? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution based upon the wording of the baraita itself: Rabbi Elazar says: Since they were permitted to marry the brothers-in-law, they are now permitted to marry any man. Granted, if you say that his reason is because she would not cause herself injury, this is the reason that if she has actually married, as in this case, where each woman entered into levirate marriage, we may allow her rival wife to marry.

אלא אי אמרת משום דצרה מעידה לחברתה אף על גב דלא אינסיב נמי אלא שמע מינה טעמא דרבי אלעזר משום דאינסיב הוא ולא מקלקלא נפשה

But if you say the reason is because one rival wife may testify for another, then although she herself has not married, it should still be permitted for her rival wife to marry, and it would be unnecessary for Rabbi Elazar to state his opinion in a case where the women had already entered into levirate marriage. Rather, conclude from this that Rabbi Elazar’s reason is because she has already married, and she would not cause herself injury by marrying if her original husband had not died.

רבי אלעזר לדבריהם קאמר להו לדידי צרה מעידה לחברתה ואף על גב דלא אינסיב מנסבינן לה אלא לדידכו אודו לי מיהת דהיכא דאינסיב מנסבינן לה משום דהיא לא מקלקלא נפשה ורבנן תמות נפשי עם פלשתים הוא דקעבדה

The Gemara rejects that and suggests that Rabbi Elazar stated his opinion to the Rabbis in accordance with their own statement, as follows: According to my own opinion, one rival wife may testify for another, and although she, herself, has not married, nevertheless we may allow her rival wife to marry. But even according to your own opinion, admit, in any event, that where she has actually married we may allow her rival wife to marry because she would not cause injury to herself. But the Rabbis, rejecting this, say that she acts upon the premise: “Let me die with the Philistines” (Judges 16:30), i.e., a woman may even harm herself by remarrying while her original husband is still alive, in order to harm her rival wife by causing her to remarry as well.

תא שמע האשה שהלכה היא ובעלה למדינת הים ובאה ואמרה מת בעלי תנשא ותטול כתובתה וצרתה אסורה רבי אלעזר אומר הואיל והותרה היא הותרה נמי צרתה אימא הואיל והותרה ונשאת

The Gemara suggests another solution. Come and hear the following baraita: In the case of a woman who went with her husband to a country overseas, and who later came and said: My husband died, she is permitted to marry and collect the widow’s compensation from her marriage contract, but her rival wife is prohibited from doing so. Rabbi Elazar says: Since she is permitted to marry, her rival wife is also permitted. This indicates that Rabbi Elazar holds that the rival wife is permitted to marry because the wife who testified that her husband has died is permitted to do so, even if the latter has not actually remarried yet. The Gemara rejects this proof: Say that Rabbi Elazar means: Since she was permitted and has married.

וליחוש דלמא בגיטא אתאי והאי דקאמרה הכי לקלקלא לצרה היא מיכוונה

The Gemara asks: If Rabbi Elazar’s reason is that she would not cause herself injury, how can her rival wife be permitted to marry? Let us be concerned that perhaps she, i.e., the woman who claimed that the husband was dead, came with a bill of divorce and is therefore permitted to remarry though the husband is alive. And the fact that she says this, i.e., that her husband is dead, is intended only to injure her rival wife, who will remarry, thinking that the husband is dead, and will suffer the severe consequences of adultery.

אי דאינסיב לישראל הכי נמי הכא במאי עסקינן דאינסיב לכהן

The Gemara then validates this concern. If she actually married an Israelite, which is permitted for a divorced woman, then indeed one must consider the possibility that she is actually divorced and not widowed, and the rival wife is not permitted to marry. However, here we are dealing with a case where she married a priest, who is prohibited from marrying a divorced woman, and therefore she must actually be a widow, as she would not damage herself by entering into a forbidden marriage.

מתני׳ אין מעידין אלא על פרצוף פנים עם החוטם אף על פי שיש סימנין בגופו ובכליו אין מעידין אלא עד שתצא נפשו ואפילו ראוהו מגוייד וצלוב והחיה אוכלת בו אין מעידין אלא עד שלשה ימים

MISHNA: One may testify that a man died only if he can testify about seeing the countenance [partzuf ] of the face with the nose, as this allows one to identify the individual with certainty. Although there are distinguishing marks [simanim] on his body and his personal belongings, which appear to indicate his identity, one may not rely on these as identification. Furthermore, one may not testify that a person died until his soul actually departs. And even if one saw him cut open and severely wounded, or crucified, or with a wild animal eating parts of him, he may not testify that he died. Additionally, one may testify to someone’s death only when the body was witnessed up to three days following death and not after that, since the appearance may change due to decomposition.

רבי יהודה בן בבא אומר לא כל האדם ולא כל המקום ולא כל השעות שוין

Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava says: One cannot establish general guidelines for this matter because not every person, nor every place, nor every hour is identical. Decomposition is not uniform. It occurs at different rates in different situations.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן פדחת ולא פרצוף פנים פרצוף פנים ולא פדחת אין מעידין עד שיהו שניהם עם החוטם אמר אביי ואיתימא רב כהנא מאי קרא הכרת פניהם ענתה בם

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: If the witnesses saw his forehead but not the countenance of the face, or if they saw the countenance of the face but not his forehead, they may not testify that it is he, until they see both of them with the nose. Abaye said, and some say it was Rav Kahana who said: What is the verse from which it is derived that one may testify that a man died only if one sees his face? The verse is: “The show of their face does witness against them” (Isaiah 3:9), which indicates that one clearly recognizes another only upon seeing his face.

אבא בר מרתא דהוא אבא בר מניומי הוה מסקי ביה דבי רישא גלותא זוזי אייתי קירא דבק בבלייתא דבק באפותיה חלף קמייהו ולא בשקרוה

The Gemara relates that Abba bar Marta, who is also known as Abba bar Minyumi, had been loaned money by members of the Exilarch’s house. Since he did not want to be seen by these violent people, he brought wax [kira], stuck it to a strip of worn-out fabric, and stuck all of that to his forehead in order to alter his appearance. He passed before them and they did not recognize him [beshakru]. This shows how much a person’s face changes when the appearance of his forehead is altered.

אף על פי שיש סימנין וכו׳ למימרא דסימנין לאו דאורייתא

§ We learned in the mishna that, although there are distinguishing marks on a dead person’s body and clothing, one may not rely on these as identification. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that distinguishing marks are not recognized as valid identification by Torah law, and while a rabbinic ordinance allows one to rely upon them to remedy certain situations, for testimony about a person’s death, the Sages require the stringencies of Torah law?

ורמינהי מצאו קשור בכיס ובארנקי ובטבעת או שנמצא בין כליו אפילו לזמן מרובה כשר

But the Gemara raises a contradiction, based upon the following baraita: If an agent charged with delivering a bill of divorce to a woman lost it, and then he found it tied to a purse, or a money bag [arnekei], or a ring, or if it was found among his personal belongings, even after a long time, it is valid, i.e., one may rely upon the distinguishing marks on these objects to positively identify the document, and the agent may then deliver it to the woman. This indicates that distinguishing marks are sufficient to identify an object even by Torah law.

אמר אביי לא קשיא הא רבי אליעזר בן מהבאי הא רבנן דתניא אין מעידין על השומא רבי אליעזר בן מהבאי אומר מעידין מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר סימנין דאורייתא ומר סבר סימנין דרבנן

Abaye said: This is not difficult. That baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai, while this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis; as it is taught in a baraita: One may not testify about a person’s identity based upon the position of a mole on his body. Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai says: One may testify based on a mole. What, is it not about this issue that they disagree: One Sage, Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai, holds that distinguishing marks are recognized as valid identification by Torah law, and one Sage, the anonymous first tanna, representing the majority of the Rabbis, holds that distinguishing marks are recognized as a means of identification only by rabbinic law and are therefore insufficient to permit a Torah prohibition?

אמר רבא דכולי עלמא סימנין דאורייתא הכא בשומא מצויה בבן גילו קמיפלגי מר סבר שומא מצויה בבן גילו ומר סבר אינה מצויה בבן גילו

Rava said: It is possible that everyone agrees that distinguishing marks are recognized as valid identification by Torah law, and here they are disagreeing about whether such a mole is commonly found on his peer, i.e., anyone very similar to him, which would undermine its usefulness as a means of identification. One Sage, the anonymous first tanna, holds that such a mole is commonly found on his peer and therefore is not sufficient for identification. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai, holds that it is not commonly found on his peer and is therefore an unambiguous distinguishing mark sufficient for identification.

ואיכא דאמרי הכא בשומא העשויה להשתנות לאחר מיתה קמיפלגי מר סבר עשויה להשתנות לאחר מיתה ומר סבר אינה עשויה להשתנות לאחר מיתה

And there are those who say otherwise: Here they are disagreeing about whether a mole is likely to change in appearance and size after death. One Sage, the anonymous first tanna, holds that it is likely to change after death. It is insufficient for identification because it may have looked different when the person was alive. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai, holds that it is not likely to change after death and is reliable for identification. This marks the end of one version of the discussion about this issue.

ואיכא דאמרי אמר רבא דכולי עלמא סימנין דרבנן והכא בשומא

And there are those who say that Rava said: Everyone agrees that distinguishing marks are relied upon by rabbinic law. However, this is referring to ordinary distinguishing marks. Marks that are exceptionally unusual may be relied upon even according to Torah law. And here, in the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai, it is about whether a mole

סימן מובהק קא מיפלגי מר סבר סימן מובהק ומר סבר לאו סימן מובהק

is an unambiguous distinguishing mark that they disagree. One Sage, Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai, holds that a mole is an unambiguous distinguishing mark and may be relied upon by Torah law. Consequently, if a man’s corpse was identified in this manner, his wife may remarry. And one Sage, the anonymous first tanna, holds that a mole is not an unambiguous distinguishing mark.

ולהך לישנא דאמר רבא סימנין דאורייתא הא קתני אף על פי שיש סימנין בגופו ובכליו

The Gemara asks: According to the first version, that Rava said that distinguishing marks are recognized as valid identification by Torah law, there is a question: Isn’t it taught in the mishna: Although there are distinguishing marks on his body and his personal belongings, one may not rely on these as identification, implying that distinguishing marks are not valid identification by Torah law?

גופו דארוך וגוץ כליו דחיישינן לשאלה ואי חיישינן לשאלה חמור בסימני אוכף היכי מהדרינן

The Gemara answers: The mishna’s intent is that ordinary distinguishing marks on one’s body, which constitute only weak evidence to a person’s identity, e.g., that he was tall or short, are not valid identification. Additionally, one cannot rely upon distinguishing marks on his personal belongings, as we are concerned about borrowing, i.e., perhaps the deceased had borrowed the clothes he was wearing from someone else. The Gemara asks: But if we are concerned about borrowing, then, with regard to returning lost property, how can we return a donkey based solely upon distinguishing marks on the saddle? Why don’t we consider the possibility that the saddle was borrowed?

לא שיילי אינשי אוכפא דמסקיב ליה לחמרא מצאו קשור בכיס ובארנקי ובטבעת היכי מהדרינן

The Gemara answers: People do not normally borrow a saddle because it bruises the donkey, as the saddle must fit exactly to the donkey’s measurements. The Gemara raises further objections based upon the baraita cited earlier: If he found the lost bill of divorce tied to a purse, or a money bag, or a ring, he may rely upon the distinguishing marks on those items and deliver the bill of divorce to the woman. But how can we return it and not be concerned that these belongings may have been lent to someone else whose bill of divorce is tied to them?

טבעת חייש לזיופי כיס וארנקי מנחשי אינשי ולא מושלי ואיבעית אימא כליו בחיורי וסומקי

The Gemara answers: The case of the ring is referring to a signet ring, which one does not lend, because he is concerned about forgery, i.e., that the borrower might use it to forge his consent on documents without his knowledge. With regard to a purse or a money bag, people consider it a bad omen to lend them out and do not lend them to others. And if you wish, say that the reason not to permit a woman to remarry and not to accept that her husband is dead based upon the distinguishing marks found on his personal belongings is that the distinguishing marks referred to are only general ones, e.g., he wore white or red clothing, but they are not unambiguous distinguishing marks.

ואפילו ראוהו מגוייד וכו׳ למימרא דמגוייד חיי ורמינהי אדם אינו מטמא עד שתצא נפשו אפילו מגוייד ואפילו גוסס טמויי לא מטמא הא מיחייא לא חיי

§ We learned in the mishna: And even if one saw him cut open [meguyyad] and severely wounded, one may not testify that he died. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that a person who is cut open is fit to live for much time afterward? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what was taught in a mishna (Oholot 1:6): A dead person renders other people and objects impure only when his soul actually departs, even if he is cut open and severely wounded, and even if he is clearly dying. From this we may deduce that he does not yet render others ritually impure, as he still has some life in him, but he is not fit to live for much time afterward.

אמר אביי לא קשיא הא רבי שמעון בן אלעזר הא רבנן דתניא מעידין על המגוייד ואין מעידין על הצלוב רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר אף על המגוייד אין מעידין מפני שיכול לכוות ולחיות

Abaye said: The contradiction raised is not difficult: This mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, while that mishna from tractate Oholot is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as it is taught in a baraita: One may testify about the death of a person who is cut open, but one may not testify about a crucified person. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Even concerning a person who is cut open, one may not testify that he is dead because his wound can be scorched, and this cauterization of the wound may stop the flow of blood and allow him to survive.

ומי מצית לאוקומי כרבי שמעון בן אלעזר והא קתני סיפא מעשה בעסיא באחד ששילשלוהו לים ולא עלתה בידם אלא רגלו ואמרו חכמים מן הארכובה ולמעלה תנשא מן הארכובה ולמטה לא תנשא

The Gemara challenges this: But can you establish the mishna to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar? Isn’t it taught in the latter clause (121a): An incident occurred in Asya in which they lowered a certain man into the sea on a rope, and when they pulled the rope back to land only his leg came up in their hands. They were not certain whether he was alive or dead. The Sages said: If his leg was cut from the knee and above, his wife may marry, as he would not survive such a wound; if his leg was cut only from the knee and below, she may not marry. This indicates that someone cut open in the first manner is assumed to be dead. If this follows Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar’s opinion, why doesn’t it say that there is a concern that he might be alive even if the leg was cut from the knee and above?

שאני מיא דמרזו מכה

The Gemara answers: Water is different, as it aggravates the wound. Since he was in the water, it can be assumed that such a wound will certainly lead to death.

והאמר רבה בר בר חנה לדידי חזי לי ההוא טייעא דשקיל ספסירא וגיידיה לגמליה ולא אפסיקתיה לנערותיה אמר אביי ההיא כחישא הויא

The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥanna say: I myself saw an Arab who took his sword [safseira] and cut open his camel, and the camel died so quickly that it could not even cease its braying before it died? This indicates that a living being that is cut open has no chance of surviving. Abaye said: That camel was emaciated and weak, causing it to die immediately, but a normal camel would not have died so quickly.

רבא אמר בסכין מלובנת ודברי הכל

Rava said a different resolution to the apparent contradiction between the mishna here and the mishna in tractate Oholot: The mishna here is referring to a case where the man was cut open with a white-hot knife, and everyone agrees that one may not testify to the death of a person wounded in such a manner, as the wound would close due to the heat.

והחיה אוכלת וכו׳ אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל לא שנו אלא ממקום שאין נפשו יוצאה אבל ממקום שנפשו יוצאה מעידין

§ It was taught in the mishna: Or even if one saw that a wild animal was eating parts of him, one may not testify that he died. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: They taught this only where the animal was eating from a place on his body that does not cause his soul to depart, i.e., does not inevitably lead to death, such as his hand or foot. But if the animal was eating from a place on his body that does cause his soul to depart, one may testify to his death.

ואמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל שחט בו שנים או רוב שנים וברח מעידין

And Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: If someone cut a man’s two passageways, the trachea and the esophagus, or most of the way through the two passageways, and the maimed person fled, one may testify to his death.

איני והאמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל שחט בו שנים או רוב שנים ורמז ואמר כתבו גט לאשתי הרי אלו יכתבו ויתנו חי הוא וסופו למות

The Gemara challenges that conclusion: Is that so? But didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Shmuel said: If someone cut a man’s two passageways, or most of the way through the two passageways, and the maimed person gestured and thereby communicated: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, then these onlookers should write it and deliver it to her. Since only a living person may give a bill of divorce, this indicates that the maimed man is considered alive. The Gemara answers: He is still alive at the moment, but he will eventually die from the wound. Consequently, he may appoint an agent to deliver a bill of divorce to his wife, but after a while one may testify that he is dead.

אלא מעתה יהא גולה על ידו אלמה תניא שחט שנים או רוב שנים הרי זה אינו גולה הא איתמר עלה אמר רב הושעיא חיישינן שמא הרוח בלבלתו אי נמי שמא איהו

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that such a wound is definitely fatal, one who unintentionally wounds another in this manner should be exiled on his account, in accordance with the halakha of one who unintentionally kills another. Why is it taught in a baraita: If one unintentionally cut the two passageways of another person, or most of the thickness of the two, he is not exiled? The Gemara answers: But it was stated with regard to that baraita that Rav Hoshaya said: We are concerned that perhaps the wind aggravated his condition and actually caused his death, in which case the perpetrator is not culpable for the death and should not be exiled. Alternatively, perhaps he, the maimed person,