Yevamot 17

זו חדייב נהר גוזן זו גינזק וערי מדי זו חמדן וחברותיה ואמרי לה זו ניהר וחברותיה חברותיה מאן אמר שמואל כרך מושכי חידקי ודומקיא אמר רבי יוחנן וכולן לפסול

this is Ḥadyab. The river of Gozan; this is Ginzak. And the cities of the Medes; this is Ḥamadan and its surroundings. And some say: This is Nihar and its surroundings. The Gemara asks: Which are its surroundings? Shmuel said: Kerakh, Mushkhei, Ḥidkei, and Domakya are the surroundings of Ḥamadan. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And all of them are for disqualification. In other words, if someone from one of these places wishes to convert, there is concern that he might be a descendant of a Jew and therefore a mamzer. Consequently, they all are disqualified.

כי אמריתה קמיה דשמואל אמר לי בנך הבא מן ישראלית קרוי בנך ואין בנך הבא מן הגויה קרוי בנך אלא בנה

Rav Yehuda continued his recounting: When I said this halakha, that there is a concern about the betrothal of gentiles nowadays, before Shmuel, he said to me: One need not worry about this, as your son from a Jewish woman is called your son, i.e., he inherits his lineage from you, and your son from a gentile woman is not called your son, but rather her son. Consequently, all children born to Jews from gentile women are not considered Jews, as their lineage is determined by their gentile mothers.

והאיכא בנות ואמר רבינא שמע מינה בן בתך הבא מן הגוי קרוי בנך גמירי דבנתא דההוא דרא איצטרויי אצטרו

The Gemara asks: Aren’t there Jewish girls who were captured by gentiles, whose children are considered to be Jews? And Ravina said: Learn from this that the son of your daughter from a gentile is called your son. If so, the descendants of Jewish women captured by gentiles would indeed be Jews. The Gemara answers: This is no concern, as it is learned as a tradition that the girls from the ten tribes of that generation became barren and did not give birth to any offspring, whereas some of the exiled men of the ten tribes married gentile women. Consequently, all of the children born there were gentiles.

איכא דאמרי כי אמריתה קמיה דשמואל אמר לי לא זזו משם עד שעשאום גוים גמורים שנאמר בה׳ בגדו כי בנים זרים ילדו

There are those who say that Rav Yehuda actually related the following: When I said this halakha before Shmuel, he said to me: They did not move from there, the place where they deliberated on this matter, until they rendered all of them, including those who intermingled with the ten tribes in different locations, full-fledged gentiles. Consequently, there is no concern that their betrothals might be of any effect, as it is stated: “They have dealt treacherously against the Lord, for they have begotten strange children” (Hosea 5:7).

יתיב רב יוסף אחוריה דרב כהנא ויתיב רב כהנא קמיה דרב יהודה ויתיב וקאמר עתידין ישראל דעבדי יומא טבא כי חרבי תרמוד והא חריב ההיא תמוד הואי רב אשי אמר היינו תרמוד היינו תמוד אכפולי הוא דמכפל חריב מהאי גיסא אותיב מהאי גיסא ואי חריב מהאי גיסא אותיב מהאי גיסא

§ The Gemara relates: Rav Yosef sat behind Rav Kahana, and Rav Kahana sat before Rav Yehuda, and he sat and he said this tradition: In the future, the Jews will establish a Festival day when Tarmod is destroyed. The Gemara asks: But it has already been destroyed. The Gemara answers: That place that was destroyed was Tamud, not Tarmod. Rav Ashi said: Tarmod is the same as Tamud. However, the city is doubled. In other words, when it is destroyed from this side it is settled on that side, and when it is destroyed from that side it is settled on this side. Consequently, it has not yet been entirely destroyed.

יתיב רב המנונא קמיה דעולא וקא הוי בשמעתא אמר מה גברא ומה גברא אי לאו דהרפניא מאתיה אכסיף אמר ליה כסף גלגלתא להיכא יהבת אמר ליה לפום נהרא אמר ליה אם כן מפום נהרא את

The Gemara relates: Rav Hamnuna sat before Ulla and was engaged in the study of halakha. Ulla said about him: What a man; what a man. In other words: What a great man this Rav Hamnuna is. If only Harpanya were not his city, as the inhabitants of that place are all of flawed lineage, which indicates that the lineage of Rav Hamnuna is likewise impaired. Rav Hamnuna was ashamed. Ulla said to him: Where do you give the money for payment of the poll tax? He said to him: I pay it to the city of Pum Nahara, as my city is subject to taxation by that city. He said to him: If so, you are from Pum Nahara, not Harpanya, and your lineage is evidently not flawed.

מאי הרפניא אמר רבי זירא הר שהכל פונין בו במתניתא תנא כל שאין מכיר משפחתו ושבטו נפנה לשם אמר רבא והיא עמוקה משאול שנאמר מיד שאול אפדם ממות אגאלם ואילו פסול דידהו לית להו תקנתא

§ The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the name Harpanya? Rabbi Zeira said: It means the mountain to which all turn [har shehakol ponin bo]. In other words, it is the destination for all those who could not find wives anywhere else, as most of its population is of flawed lineage. It is taught in a baraita: All those who do not know their family or tribe turn there. Rava said: This type of flaw is appalling and is deeper than the netherworld, as is stated: “Shall I ransom them from the power of the netherworld? Shall I redeem them from death?” (Hosea 13:14). This verse indicates that it is possible to be ransomed and released from the netherworld, whereas their disqualification cannot be rectified.

פסולי דהרפניא משום פסולי דמישון ופסולי דמישון משום פסולי דתרמוד פסולי דתרמוד משום עבדי שלמה

The Gemara comments: Those who are disqualified from Harpanya are unfit due to the disqualification of the inhabitants of nearby Meishon, who were unfit and intermarried with the residents of Harpanya. Those disqualified from Meishon are unfit due to those disqualified from Tarmod, and those disqualified from Tarmod are disqualified due to the servants of Solomon.

והיינו דאמרי אינשי קבא רבא וקבא זוטא מיגנדר ואזיל לשאול ומשאול לתרמוד ומתרמוד למישן וממישן להרפניא

The Gemara comments: And this explains the folk saying that people say in this regard: A large ephah and a small ephah, which are both inaccurate utensils that may not be used for measuring, roll onward to the netherworld, and from the netherworld to Tarmod, and from Tarmod to Meishon, and from Meishon to Harpanya. The same idea expressed by the Sages with regard to the disqualification of lineage was also incorporated into a well-known adage among commoners.

הדרן עלך חמש עשרה נשים

מתני׳ כיצד אשת אחיו שלא היה בעולמו שני אחים ומת אחד מהן ונולד להן אח ואחר כך ייבם השני את אשת אחיו ומת הראשונה יוצאה משום אשת אחיו שלא היה בעולמו והשניה משום צרתה

MISHNA: Each of the women enumerated in the first chapter causes exemption from levirate marriage and ḥalitza for her rival wives. This is due to the close family relationship she has with her brother-in-law, making her forbidden to him. The single exception is the case explained in this mishna. What is the case of the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist? For example: If there were two brothers, and one of them died childless, and subsequently a brother of theirs was born, after which the second brother, the elder, took his deceased brother’s wife in levirate marriage, and then died as well. Consequently, two women require levirate marriage: The widow of the first brother who had been taken in levirate marriage by the second brother, and the widow of the second brother, the first widow’s rival wife. The first widow, who had been the wife of the first brother to die, goes out without any obligation to be taken in levirate marriage by the youngest brother who was born later, since she is the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. The first deceased brother never lived at the same time as the newly born brother. The second widow, who had been married to the second brother, is exempt due to her rival wife.

עשה בה מאמר ומת שניה חולצת ולא מתייבמת

The mishna discusses an additional situation: If the second brother had performed only levirate betrothal with her, meaning that he had not yet consummated the marriage, and then died, both the wife betrothed by a levirate betrothal to the second brother and the wife of the second brother fall before the youngest brother born after the death of the first brother. In that case, the first wife certainly goes out and is exempt from both ḥalitza and levirate marriage, since she is to him the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. The second, however, was never effectively the rival wife of the first brother’s wife, as the first brother’s wife had only been betrothed by levirate betrothal and was not fully married to the second brother. Therefore, she performs ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage.

גמ׳ אמר רב נחמן מאן דתני ראשונה לא משתבש מאן דתני שניה לא משתבש מאן דתני

GEMARA: Rav Naḥman said: He who taught the version of the mishna which reads: The first widow goes out, is not mistaken in his version, and he who taught a variant version of the mishna which reads: The second widow goes out, is not mistaken either, since it is possible to understand the mishna both ways. Both versions of the text can refer to the same woman, i.e., the wife of the first brother, by different titles. The Gemara explains that he who taught:

ראשונה לא משתבש מאי ראשונה ראשונה לנפילה ומאן דתני שניה לא משתבש מאי שניה שניה לנשואין מי לא עסקינן דיבם ואחר כך כנס אלא מאי שניה שניה בנשואין

The first, is not mistaken, as what is the meaning of first? It means the first to fall before her yavam for levirate marriage. And he who taught referring to her as the second is not mistaken either, as what is the meaning of second? It means the second to enter marriage. Since the second deceased brother was already married to one woman, this yevama whom he took in levirate marriage was his second wife. The Gemara wonders: Is this the necessary order of events? Are we not also dealing with a scenario in which the second brother took the wife of the first brother in levirate marriage and then later took another wife? Would such a situation not merit the same ruling? Rather, what is the meaning of calling the wife of the first brother the second? It means she who had been married for a second time. She had already been married twice, whereas the wife of the second brother had been married only once.

אשת אחיו שלא היה בעולמו היכא כתיבא אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אמר קרא כי ישבו אחים יחדו שהיתה להם ישיבה אחת בעולם פרט לאשת אחיו שלא היה בעולמו יחדו מיוחדים בנחלה פרט לאחיו מן האם

§ The Gemara turns from a review of the language used in the mishna to a discussion of the halakhot of a wife of a brother with whom one did not coexist. Where is it written that the mitzva of levirate marriage does not apply in the case of the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The verse states “If brothers dwell together and one of them dies” (Deuteronomy 25:5), meaning that they had a common dwelling together in the world. This excludes the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. Furthermore, it is derived: “Together” means that they were united together in an inheritance; i.e., they are united in that they inherit together. In other words, since property is inherited by sons from their father, it can be inferred that the verse is speaking specifically of brothers from the same father. This excludes his maternal half brother, with whom he is not united by inheritance, since only brothers who share the same father inherit from each other.

רבה אמר אחין מן האב יליף אחוה אחוה מבני יעקב מה להלן מן האב ולא מן האם אף כאן מן האב ולא מן האם

Rabba said: One learns the ruling that levirate marriage applies only to brothers from the same father by the verbal analogy between the term brotherhood used in the context of levirate marriage and the term brotherhood from the children of Jacob. Just as there, with regard to the children of Jacob, they are all brothers from the father and not from the mother, since they were from four different mothers, so too, here, in the case of levirate marriage, it is referring specifically to brothers from the father and not from the mother.

ולילף אחוה אחוה מעריות דנין אחים מאחים ואין דנין אחים מאחיך

The Gemara raises an objection: Why should we learn from the children of Jacob? Let it derive the meaning of the term brotherhood by verbal analogy to the term brotherhood from the verses discussing those with whom relations are forbidden. In the halakhot of forbidden relations, both paternal and maternal half brothers are considered brothers, and are thereby subject to such prohibitions as those against relations with a brother’s wife. The Gemara answers: The first analogy is preferable, as we infer “brothers” from “brothers.” The word “brothers” is stated both with regard to the children of Jacob and with regard to the halakhot of levirate marriage, whereas with regard to forbidden relations it says “your brother,” and one cannot make an inference to “brothers” from “your brother.”

מאי נפקא מינה הא תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל ושב הכהן ובא הכהן זו היא שיבה זו היא ביאה הני מילי היכא דליכא מידי דדמי ליה אבל היכא דאיכא מידי דדמי ליה מדדמי ליה ילפינן

The Gemara objects: What difference does it make if there is a minor difference between the words being compared? As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a verbal analogy with regard to leprosy of houses between the verse “and the priest shall return [veshav]” (Leviticus 14:39) and the verse “and the priest shall come [uva]” (Leviticus 14:44), from which it is derived that this is the halakha with regard to returning, i.e., it is after seven days, and this is the same halakha with regard to coming, that it is after seven days. Consequently, a less pronounced difference of one letter between the Hebrew words for “brothers” and “your brother” should certainly not prevent the teaching of a verbal analogy. The Gemara responds: This applies when nothing else was more similar, but where there is something similar we infer from that which is more similar. In such situations, it is preferable to learn from the word that bears greater similarity.

ולילף אחוה אחוה מלוט דכתיב כי אנשים אחים אנחנו מסתברא מבני יעקב הוה ליה למילף משום דמפני מדהוה ליה למכתב שנים עשר עבדיך בני אבינו וכתיב אחים שמע מינה לאפנויי

The Gemara objects on another count: Let the halakha derive the meaning of the term brotherhood from the term brotherhood from Lot, as it is written that Abraham said to Lot: “For we are brothers” (Genesis 13:8). From here one could conclude that the word brothers means relatives and not necessarily brothers. The Gemara rejects this: It is more reasonable to derive from the children of Jacob, due to the fact that the word “brothers” is free in its context and is therefore available to be used in a verbal analogy: Since it could have written: We your servants are twelve children of our father, but instead it writes: “Twelve brothers, the children of one man” (Genesis 42:13), learn from here that this comes to render the word “brothers” free so that it may be allocated to another matter, i.e., the definition of brothers.

ואיצטריך למכתב אחים ואיצטריך למכתב יחדו דאי כתב רחמנא אחים הוה אמינא לילף אחוה אחוה מלוט וכי תימא לא מפני לאיי אפנויי מפני מדהוה ליה למכתב רעים וכתיב אחים שמע מינה לאפנויי כתב רחמנא יחדו המיוחדים בנחלה

The Gemara comments: And although Rav Yehuda and Rabba learned the same ruling from two different passages, according to both it was necessary to write “brothers” and it was necessary to write “together” in the verses discussing levirate marriage, as, if the Merciful One had written only “brothers,” I would say that one should infer the meaning of the term “brothers” from the term “brothers” from Lot. And if you would say it is not free there in the same way that the word “brothers” is free in the passage concerning the children of Jacob, this is not so; in fact, it is free. With regard to Lot it could have written: Friends, as they were not actual brothers but relatives, and yet “brothers” is written. One might learn from here that this is free to be allocated elsewhere and teach that such relatives are called brothers even for levirate marriage. Therefore, the Torah wrote “together” to teach that this applies specifically to those brothers who are united in an inheritance.

ואי כתב רחמנא יחדו הוה אמינא דמייחדי באבא ובאמא צריכא

And if the Merciful One had written “together” alone and not added “brothers,” I would say that they must have both the same father and mother together, and that otherwise the mitzva of levirate marriage would not apply. Therefore, “brothers” is written to compare this to the children of Jacob, who were brothers from the same father but not the same mother. It is for this reason, then, that it is necessary to write both.

והא מהיכא תיתי יבום בנחלה תלא רחמנא ונחלה מן האב ולא מן האם היא איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל וחידוש הוא דקמשתרי ערוה גביה אימא עד דמייחדי באבא ובאמא צריכא

The Gemara asks about the last supposition: But from where would it be derived that perhaps levirate marriage would apply only if they are full brothers, sharing both a father and mother? Why should one assume that maternal brotherhood is also of import here? Doesn’t the Merciful One make levirate marriage dependent upon inheritance? The Torah states that the yavam who performs the levirate marriage will establish the name of his deceased brother, meaning that he inherits from him, and inheritance comes from the father and not from the mother. Nevertheless, this was necessary, as it could enter your mind to say that since this halakha of levirate marriage is a novelty in that a woman who was a forbidden relation to him as a brother’s wife is now rendered permitted, say that this permissibility will be limited only to cases of brothers with the same father and same mother together. It is due to this possibility that the verbal analogy to the brothers who were the children of Jacob is necessary.

אמר רב הונא אמר רב שומרת יבם שמתה מותר באמה אלמא קסבר אין זיקה ולימא הלכה כדברי האומר אין זיקה

§ Rav Huna said that Rav said: In the case of a widow whose husband had died childless and who is waiting for her yavam to perform levirate marriage or set her free with ḥalitza, who then died before her yavam could take her in levirate marriage, the yavam is permitted to marry her mother. The levirate obligation does not create a familial relation between them. Apparently, Rav Huna says that Rav holds that the levirate bond [zikka] is not substantial. In other words, the bond formed between the yevama and her yavam requiring levirate marriage does not create a halakhic connection between the two. The Gemara asks: Then let him say explicitly: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of he who says that the levirate bond is not substantial, as this issue is in fact a matter of dispute between tanna’im. Why did he not simply conclude that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the tanna who held that the levirate bond is not substantial?

אי הוה אמר הכי הוה אמינא הני מילי בתרי אבל בחד יש זיקה

The Gemara answers: If he had said that, I would say: This statement that the levirate bond is not substantial applies only in reference to two brothers, each of whom has the possibility to take her in levirate marriage. In such cases the levirate bond between either one of the brothers and the yevama is not absolute, as it is always possible for the other brother to marry her instead. But in cases of one brother, then since the obligation to the yevama is exclusively his, I would say that the levirate bond is substantial.

ולימא הלכה כדברי האומר אין זיקה אפילו בחד אי אמר הכי הוה אמינא אפילו מחיים קמשמע לן לאחר מיתה אין מחיים לא משום דאסור לבטל מצות יבמין

The Gemara asks: Then let him say: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the one who says that the levirate bond is not substantial, even in the case of one brother. The Gemara answers: If he had said that, I would say: Even if his yevama were alive and required levirate marriage with him, he would be allowed to take her mother in marriage. Therefore, this comes to teach us that after death, yes, he is permitted to marry her mother; but while she is alive, he is not. Why not? This is because it is prohibited to nullify the mitzva of levirate marriage. Were he to marry her mother, he would no longer be able to take the daughter in levirate marriage because his wife’s daughter is forbidden to him. As a result of his marriage, he would cancel the mitzva of levirate marriage so that it could no longer apply to him.

תנן יבמתו שמתה מותר באחותה באחותה אין באמה לא

The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Rav Huna: We learned in a mishna (49a): If his yevama dies, he is permitted to marry her sister. A precise reading of this phrase leads to the implication that with regard to her sister, yes, it is permitted, as even if it had been his wife who had died he would be permitted to marry her sister. But with regard to her mother, no, it is not permitted.

הוא הדין דאפילו באמה ואיידי דתנא רישא אשתו שמתה מותר באחותה באחותה אין אבל באמה לא דהויא לה איסורא דאורייתא תנא נמי סיפא מותר באחותה

The Gemara rejects this: No evidence can be derived from here, as it is possible to say that the same is true even for her mother, that she too is permitted. But since it taught in the first clause of this mishna: If his wife dies he is permitted to take her sister, and there the language is precise and implies: Her sister, yes, but her mother, no, as she is forbidden by Torah law because it is prohibited for a man to marry both a woman and her daughter even after one of them dies, therefore he used the same language when he taught the latter clause of the same mishna that he is permitted to take her sister. However, in the latter clause it is not an exact reading, and in actuality one is allowed to marry any of her relatives. This completes the Gemara’s explanation of Rav Huna’s opinion.

ורב יהודה אמר שומרת יבם שמתה אסור באמה אלמא קסבר יש זיקה ולימא הלכה כדברי האומר יש זיקה

And Rav Yehuda said: In the case of a widow who dies while waiting for her brother-in-law to perform ḥalitza or levirate marriage, he is prohibited from marrying her mother. The Gemara comments: Apparently Rav Yehuda holds that the levirate bond is substantial; this would mean that the attachment between the yevama and the yavam is like that of marriage and that the yavam is therefore prohibited from marrying her relatives. But it must be asked: Why does Rav Yehuda say it in such a way? Let him say: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the one who says that the levirate bond is substantial.

אי הוה אמר הכי הוה אמינא הני מילי בחד אבל בתרי אין זיקה והא כי פליגי בתרי פליגי אלא אי אמר הכי

The Gemara responds: If he would have said that, I would say that with regard to the levirate bond, this applies in the case of one brother, but if there were two brothers then the levirate bond is not substantial. The Gemara objects: But when the tanna’im disagree, they disagree in a case of two brothers, so how could one think that Rav Yehuda is speaking only in the case of a single brother? Rather, one must say: If he were to say that the conclusive halakhic ruling is that the bond is substantial,