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Today's Daf Yomi

November 10, 2014 | 讬状讝 讘诪专讞砖讜讜谉 转砖注状讛

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 37

讘讗讜专转讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讻讬 讜讘爪驻专讗 讛讚专 讘讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖专讬转讜 讬讛讗 专注讜讗 讚转砖转专讜 讗祝 转专讘讗

In the evening Rava stated this ruling in accordance with the way you cited him, but in the morning he retracted his opinion and ruled as I cited him. Rav Mesharshiyya said to him: Do you really permit her to marry without 岣litza? He added sarcastically: May it be God鈥檚 will that you will even permit forbidden fats [tarba] as well. In Rav Mesharshiyya鈥檚 opinion, the prohibition against the widow remarrying without 岣litza was as obvious as the prohibition of forbidden fats.

讛讻讗 讙讘讬 诪注讜讘专转 讞讘讬专讜 讜诪讬谞拽转 讞讘讬专讜 讛谞砖讜讗讛 诇讻讛谉 诪讗讬 诪讬 注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉 转拽谞转讗 诇讻讛谉 讗讜 诇讗

After citing this dispute, Rav Ashi said to Rav Hoshaya, son of Rav Idi: According to Rava鈥檚 citation of Rav, when a woman is married to a priest, the Sages were more lenient in order to allow the couple to remain married. Here, with regard to a woman who is pregnant with the child of another man or a woman who is nursing the child of another man, who is married to a priest, what is the halakha? Did the Sages enact an ordinance for the benefit of a priest and say that it is sufficient for him to separate from his wife and he does not need to divorce her, or not?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 讘砖诇诪讗 讛转诐 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬讻讗 专讘谞谉 讚驻诇讬讙讬 注诇讬讛 讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 砖讛讗 讜诇讚 诪注诇讬讗 讛讜讬 讙讘讬 讗砖转 讻讛谉 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 注讘讚讬谞谉 讻专讘谞谉

He said to him: How can these cases be compared? Granted, there, in the case where the offspring died during its first thirty days of life, since there are the Rabbis who disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concerning it, as they say that although the offspring did not survive for thirty days it is nevertheless considered a full-fledged, i.e., viable, offspring, therefore, with regard to the wife of a priest, since it is not possible for her to perform 岣litza and remain permitted to her husband, we will be lenient and act in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讻诪讗谉 谞注讘讬讚 讗讬 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讗 讗诪专 讬讜爪讬讗 讜诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 注讜诇诪讬转 讜讗讬 讻专讘谞谉 讛讗诪专讬 讘讙讟

However, here, in the case of a woman who is pregnant with or nursing the child of another man, in accordance with whose opinion should we act? If we act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it will be of no benefit to the priest because Rabbi Meir said even with regard to the wife of an Israelite that he must divorce her and may never take her back. And if we act in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, it will also be of no benefit to the priest because they say he must send her out with a bill of divorce and only remarry her at a later point. Since there is no opinion that does not require a bill of divorce to be given, there is no possibility to be lenient in this case by not requiring a bill of divorce to be given.

讗讬转诪专 拽讚砖讛 讘转讜讱 砖诇砖讛 讜讘专讞 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讜专驻专诐 讞讚 讗诪专 诪砖诪转讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讜讞讚 讗诪专 注讬专讜拽讬讛 诪住转讬讬讛 讛讜讛 注讜讘讚讗 讜讗诪专 诇讛讜 专驻专诐 注讬专讜拽讬讛 诪住转讬讬讛

A pregnancy is generally noticeable only after three months have passed. Therefore, during the first three months after a woman is divorced or widowed, she may not remarry due to the possibility that she is pregnant. The Sages decreed that even betrothing her during that time is prohibited, lest one also marry her (see 41a). Concerning this, an amoraic dispute was stated: In a case in which a man betrothed a woman during the three months following her divorce or her husband鈥檚 death, and then he fled, Rav A岣 and Rafram disagree over what should be done. One said: We excommunicate him for violating the prohibition. And the other one said: His flight is sufficient for him, since it proves that he does not intend to marry her until it is determined that she is not pregnant. Therefore, there is no need to penalize him further. The Gemara relates: There was an incident like that, and Rafram said to those who asked what to do: His flight is sufficient for him.

住驻拽 讘谉 转砖注 讜讻讜壮 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 诇讬诪讗 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 讜专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 诇转砖注讛 讬诇讚谉

搂 The mishna states that if a yevama consummated the levirate marriage and gave birth seven months later, there is an uncertainty whether the child is nine months old, counting from conception, and is the offspring of the first husband, i.e., the deceased brother, or whether the child is only seven months old and is the offspring of the second husband. If it is the child of the first husband, then there was never any obligation of levirate marriage, and the supposed consummation was in fact forbidden by penalty of karet. Due to that possibility, both the man and the woman are obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty. Rava said to Rav Na岣an: How can they bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty? Let us say: Follow the majority of women, and since the majority of women give birth after nine months, it should be presumed that the child is the offspring of the deceased brother. Accordingly, the couple would be obligated to bring a certain sin-offering, not a guilt-offering for uncertainty.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 谞砖讬 讚讬讚谉 诇砖讘注讛 讬诇讚谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 谞砖讬 讚讬讚讻讜 讛讜讜 专讜讘讗 讚注诇诪讗

Rav Na岣an said to him: The women of our family regularly give birth after seven months. Therefore, how can you presume that this woman gave birth after nine months? Rava said to him: Do the women of your family constitute the majority of the women of the world? Ultimately, the majority of women give birth after nine months, and one should therefore presume accordingly in a case of uncertainty.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 拽讗诪讬谞讗 专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 讬诇讚谉 诇转砖注讛 讜诪讬注讜讟 诇砖讘注讛 讜讻诇 讛讬讜诇讚转 诇转砖注讛 注讜讘专讛 谞讬讻专 诇砖诇讬砖 讬诪讬讛 讜讝讜 讛讜讗讬诇 讜诇讗 讛讜讻专 注讜讘专讛 诇砖诇讬砖 讬诪讬讛 讗讬转专注 诇讬讛 专讜讘讗

Rav Na岣an said to him: This is what I am saying: Although it is true that the majority of women give birth after nine months and only a minority give birth after seven, still, in the case of every woman who gives birth after nine months, her fetus is already recognizable after a third of her days, i.e., in the third month of her pregnancy. Accordingly, in the case of this woman, since her fetus was not recognizable after a third of her days, as were it already recognizable at that point then it would be obvious that the child was the offspring of the first husband, therefore, the ability to presume she is like the majority of women is compromised, and the uncertainty as to who the father of the child is remains. Consequently, the yavam and yevama should each bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty.

讗讬 讻诇 讛讬讜诇讚转 诇转砖注讛 注讜讘专讛 谞讬讻专 诇砖诇讬砖 讬诪讬讛 讛讗 诪讚诇讗 讛讜讻专 诇砖诇讬砖 讬诪讬讛 注讜讘专讛 讜讚讗讬 讘专 砖讘注讛 诇讘转专讗讛 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 专讜讘 讛讬讜诇讚转 诇转砖注讛 注讜讘专讛 谞讬讻专 诇砖诇讬砖 讬诪讬讛 讜讛讗讬 诪讚诇讗 讛讜讻专 诇砖诇讬砖 讬诪讬讛 讗讬转专注 诇讬讛 专讜讘讗

The Gemara asks: If it is true that in the case of every woman who gives birth after nine months, her fetus is already recognizable after a third of her days, then with regard to this woman, from the fact that her fetus was not recognized after a third of her days, it follows that her fetus was certainly only seven months old and is the offspring of the latter husband, i.e., the yavam. If so, it is clear the yavam is father of the child and there should be no need to bring an offering at all. Rather, one must emend Rav Na岣an鈥檚 words and say: In the majority of cases, with regard to a woman who gives birth after nine months, her fetus is already recognizable after a third of her days, and with regard to this woman, from the fact that her fetus was not recognized after the a third of her days, the ability to presume she is like the majority of women is compromised.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 专讗砖讜谉 专讗讜讬 诇讛讬讜转 讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 讜砖谞讬 诪诪讝专 诪住驻拽 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 诪住驻拽

搂 The mishna states that the child of the yevama has unflawed lineage since regardless of whether it is the offspring of the deceased husband or the yavam, there was no transgression involved in its conception. With regard to this case, the Sages taught in a baraita: The first child is even fit to become a High Priest. However, since it is possible that the child is the offspring of the deceased husband, in which case the widow remains forbidden to the yavam as his brother鈥檚 wife, if she has a second child with her yavam then that child is a mamzer due to an uncertainty with regard to his status. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov says: One is not rendered a mamzer due to uncertainty.

诪讗讬 拽讗诪专 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 专讗砖讜谉 专讗讜讬 诇讛讬讜转 讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 讜砖谞讬 住驻拽 诪诪讝专 讜讗住讜专 讘诪诪讝专转 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 住驻拽 诪诪讝专 讗诇讗 讜讚讗讬 诪诪讝专 讜诪讜转专 讘诪诪讝专转

The meaning of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov鈥檚 statement and how he differs from the first tanna is unclear. The Gemara clarifies: What is the baraita saying? Abaye said: This is what it is saying: The first child is even fit to become a High Priest. And if she has a second child, his status as a mamzer is uncertain and therefore he is both prohibited from marrying an Israelite woman of unflawed lineage, since he might actually be a mamzer, and he is also prohibited from marrying a mamzeret, since he might not be a mamzer. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov says: He is not treated like one whose status as a mamzer is uncertain; rather, due to the uncertainty concerning his status he is treated like one who is definitely a mamzer, and he is permitted to marry a mamzeret. In other words, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov holds that even one whose status as a mamzer is uncertain is permitted to marry one who is definitely a mamzeret.

专讘讗 讗诪专 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 专讗砖讜谉 专讗讜讬 诇讛讬讜转 讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 讜砖谞讬 诪诪讝专 讜讚讗讬 诪住驻拽 讜诪讜转专 讘诪诪讝专转 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讜讚讗讬 诪诪讝专 诪住驻拽 讗诇讗 住驻拽 诪诪讝专 讜讗住讜专 讘诪诪讝专转

Rava said: This is what the baraita is saying: The first child is even fit to become a High Priest. And if she has a second child, he is treated as though he is definitely a mamzer due to the uncertainty concerning his status, and therefore he is permitted to marry a mamzeret, i.e., this tanna holds that even one whose status as a mamzer is uncertain is permitted to marry one who is definitely a mamzeret. And Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov says: He is not treated as though he is definitely a mamzer due to an uncertainty concerning his status; rather, his status as a mamzer is uncertain and he is treated accordingly, and therefore he is both prohibited from marrying an Israelite woman of unflawed lineage since he might be a mamzer, and he is also prohibited from marrying a mamzeret since he might not be a mamzer.

讜拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘讚专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讜讚讗谉 讘讜讚讗谉 诪讜转专 讜讚讗谉 讘住驻拽谉 讜住驻拽谉 讘讜讚讗谉 讜住驻拽谉 讘住驻拽谉 讗住讜专

The Gemara explains: And Abaye and Rava disagree with regard to whether the halakha is decided in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As we learned in a mishna (Kiddushin 74a): With regard to the prohibition against marrying people with certain types of flawed lineage, Rabbi Elazar said: The marriage of those people whose flawed lineage status is certain to those whose status is certain is permitted, but the marriage of those whose status is certain to those whose status is uncertain, and the marriage of those whose status is uncertain to those whose status is certain, and even the marriage of those whose status is uncertain to those whose status is uncertain, is prohibited.

讜讗诇讜 讛谉 住驻拽谉 砖转讜拽讬 讜讗住讜驻讬 讜讻讜转讬

The mishna concludes: And these are those who are considered to have an uncertain status: A child of unknown paternity [shetuki], although his mother鈥檚 identity is known; and a foundling who was found abandoned in the streets; and a Samaritan [Kuti], who is possibly a mamzer since the Samaritans do not accept and abide by the halakhot of marriage.

讜讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讻讬 讗诪专讬转讛 拽诪讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 诇讬 讛诇诇 砖谞讛 注砖专讛 讬讜讞住讬谉 注诇讜 诪讘讘诇 讻讛谞讬 诇讜讬讬 讜讬砖专讗诇讬 讞诇诇讬 讙讬专讬 讞专讜专讬 诪诪讝专讬 谞转讬谞讬 砖转讜拽讬 讜讗住讜驻讬 讜讻讜诇谉 诪讜转专讬谉 诇讘讗 讝讛 讘讝讛

And with regard to this mishna Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. But when I said this halakha of Rav鈥檚 in the presence of Shmuel, he said to me: Hillel taught in a baraita that ten categories of lineage came up from Babylon to Eretz Yisrael: Priests; Levites; and Israelites; priests disqualified due to flawed lineage [岣lallim]; converts; freed slaves; mamzerim; Gibeonites; shetukei; and foundlings. And it is permitted for all men and women in these categories to marry one another, i.e., the list is arranged such that the marriage between people in any two categories that are adjacent to one another is permitted. This is possible only if one assumes that it is permitted for one whose flawed lineage status is uncertain to marry one whose flawed lineage status is certain.

讜讗转 讗诪专转 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专

After citing the baraita taught by Hillel, which assumes that it is permitted for one whose flawed lineage status is uncertain to marry one whose flawed lineage status is certain, Shmuel concluded: The halakha is certainly decided in accordance with the opinion of Hillel, and yet you, Rabbi Yehuda, said the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, which states that a marriage between two people whose flawed lineage status is uncertain is prohibited; your ruling is incorrect.

讗讘讬讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻讛诇诇 讜诪讜拽讬 诇讛 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗诇讬讘讗 讚讛诇讻转讗 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 转拽砖讬 讛诇讻转讗 讗讛诇讻转讗

The Gemara proceeds to explain the dispute between Abaye and Rava: Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who said that the halakha is decided in accordance with the opinion of Hillel that it is permitted for one whose flawed lineage status is uncertain to marry one whose flawed lineage status is certain. Therefore, Abaye establishes that opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov to be in accordance with this halakha, in order that there should not be a contradiction between one halakha, i.e., that the halakha is always decided in accordance with the opinion of Hillel, and another halakha, i.e., that the halakha is always decided in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov.

专讘讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘 讚讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讜诪讜拽讬 诇讛 诇讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗诇讬讘讗 讚讛诇讻转讗 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 转拽砖讬

Rava, however, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav, who said: The halakha is decided in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar that the marriage of those whose status is certain to those whose status is uncertain is prohibited. Therefore, Rava establishes that opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov to be in accordance with this halakha, so that there should not be a contradiction between

讛诇讻转讗 讗讛诇讻转讗

one halakha, i.e., that the halakha in this case is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and another halakha, i.e., that the halakha is always decided in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚讻诇 住驻讬拽讗 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讻讜讚讗讬 诪砖讜讬 诇讬讛

Abaye said: From where do I say that concerning anyone whose status as a mamzer is uncertain, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov they are treated equivalently to one who is definitely a mamzer?

讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 讛专讬 砖讘讗 注诇 谞砖讬诐 讛专讘讛 讜讗讬谉 讬讜讚注 注诇 讗讬讝讛讜 诪讛谉 讘讗 讜讻谉 讛讬讗 砖讘讗讜 注诇讬讛 讗谞砖讬诐 讛专讘讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讬讜讚注转 诪讗讬讝讛 诪讛谉 拽讘诇讛 谞诪爪讗 讗讘 谞讜砖讗 讗转 讘转讜 讜讗讞 谞讜砖讗 讗转 讗讞讜转讜 讜谞转诪诇讗 讻诇 讛注讜诇诐 讻讜诇讜 诪诪讝专讬谉 讜注诇 讝讛 谞讗诪专 讜诪诇讗讛 讛讗专抓 讝诪讛

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov says: With regard to one who engaged in intercourse with and impregnated many women, but he does not know with which women he had intercourse, and similarly, with regard to a woman, if many men had intercourse with her and she became pregnant, but she does not know from which man she received the seed that caused her to become pregnant, since the identities of the parents of those children are not known, it could emerge that a father marries his daughter, and a brother marries his sister. And in this way, the entire world could become filled with mamzerim. And concerning this, it is stated: 鈥淎nd lest the land become full of lewdness鈥 (Leviticus 19:29). Abaye demonstrates his claim from the fact that even though it is not certain that the children in this situation are mamzerim, nevertheless, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov labels them as mamzerim and not as those whose status as a mamzer is uncertain.

讜专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讱 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讝讜 诪讛 讛讬讗

And Rava could have said to you: This is what the verse is saying: The word 鈥渓ewdness [zima]鈥 can be understood as an acronym of the words: Zo ma hi, meaning: What is this. It is plausible to say that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov鈥檚 citation of this verse indicates that he regards their status to be uncertain.

讬转专 注诇 讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 诇讗 讬砖讗 讗讚诐 讗砖讛 讘诪讚讬谞讛 讝讜 讜讬诇讱 讜讬砖讗 讗砖讛 讘诪讚讬谞讛 讗讞专转 砖诪讗 讬讝讚讜讜讙讜 讝讛 诇讝讛 讜谞诪爪讗 讗讞 谞讜砖讗 讗转 讗讞讜转讜

The Gemara cites the continuation of the baraita: Furthermore, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov said that even in marriage, one should be careful not to create a situation that could lead to the birth of mamzerim. Therefore, a man should not marry a woman in this country and then go and marry another woman in a different country, lest a son from one marriage and a daughter from the other, unaware that they are both children of the same father, unite with one another, and it could emerge that a brother marries his sister, the children of whom would be mamzerim.

讗讬谞讬 讜讛讗 专讘 讻讬 讗讬拽诇注 诇讚专讚砖讬专 [诪讻专讬讝] 讜讗诪专 诪讗谉 讛讜讬讗 诇讬讜诪讗 讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻讬 讗讬拽诇注 诇砖讻谞爪讬讘 [诪讻专讬讝] 讜讗诪专 诪讗谉 讛讜讬讗 诇讬讜诪讗

The Gemara asks: Is that so; is there really such a prohibition? But didn鈥檛 Rav, when he happened to come to Dardeshir, make a public announcement saying: Which woman will be my wife for the day, i.e., for the duration of his visit? Since his wife did not accompany him to Dardeshir, he wished to be married to another woman while he was there, in order to avoid a situation that could lead him to having forbidden thoughts. And also Rav Na岣an, when he happened to come to Shakhnetziv, made a public announcement saying: Which woman will be my wife for the day? It would appear, from the fact that both Sages married wives in two different places, that there is no prohibition in doing so.

砖讗谞讬 专讘谞谉 讚驻拽讬注 砖诪讬讬讛讜

The Gemara rejects the proof: Sages are different, as their names are renowned, and therefore their children are always identified by their connection to their father. Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov鈥檚 concern does not apply to them.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘讗 转讘注讜讛 诇讬谞砖讗 讜谞转驻讬讬住讛 爪专讬讻讛 诇讬砖讘 砖讘注讛 谞拽讬讬诐

The Gemara examines Rav and Rav Na岣an鈥檚 actions: But didn鈥檛 Rava say: With regard to a woman who had an offer of marriage and accepted, the emotional excitement may have caused her to have a flow of menstrual blood, which would making her ritually impure and prohibit her from engaging in intercourse. Even if she was unaware of any flow, she must consider the possibility that it occurred. To purify herself, she needs to wait seven consecutive days that are clean from any flow of menstrual blood and then immerse in a ritual bath. Only then may she marry. If so, how could Rav and Rav Na岣an marry women on the day they arrived?

专讘谞谉 砖诇讜讞讬讬讛讜 讛讜讜 诪砖讚专讬 讜诪讜讚注讬 诇讛讜 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇专讘谞谉 讬讞讜讚讬 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讬讞讚讬 诇讛讜 讚讗诪专 诪专 讗讬谞讜 讚讜诪讛 诪讬 砖讬砖 诇讜 驻转 讘住诇讜 诇诪讬 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 驻转 讘住诇讜

The Gemara explains: These Sages would send messengers seven days ahead of their arrival and they would inform the women of the Sage鈥檚 arrival. In this way, the woman who agreed to marry the Sage would have time to count the seven clean days. And if you wish, say that the Sages鈥 intentions were merely to be in seclusion [meya岣di] with the woman but not to engage in intercourse with her. Therefore, it was permitted to marry her even if she became ritually impure. Being in seclusion with a woman was sufficient to help the Sages avoid any forbidden thoughts, as the Master said: One who has bread in his basket is incomparable to one who does not have bread in his basket, i.e., just as the knowledge that food is readily available is sufficient to psychologically alleviate one鈥檚 feelings of hunger, so too, the knowledge that one鈥檚 sexual desires could be met lessens the strength of the desire itself.

转谞讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讬砖讗 讗讚诐 讗砖转讜 讜讚注转讜 诇讙专砖讛 诪砖讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 讗诇 转讞专砖 注诇 专注讱 专注讛 讜讛讜讗 讬讜砖讘 诇讘讟讞 讗转讱

The Gemara cites an additional statement of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov: It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov says: A man should not marry his wife when at the same time his intention is to divorce her, because it is stated: 鈥淒o not devise evil against your neighbor, as he dwells securely with you鈥 (Proverbs 3:29). It is wrong for one to intend to undermine the feelings of security that another has with him.

住驻拽 讜讬讘诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讞诇讜拽 讘谞讻住讬 诪讬转谞讗

搂 The mishna raises a case in which a yavam consummated the levirate marriage with his yevama and seven months later she gave birth. With respect to that child, there is an uncertainty whether he is the child of the deceased brother or whether he is the child of the yavam. The Gemara discusses the ramifications of this uncertainty in a dispute concerning inheritance. The case concerns one whose identity as the son of the deceased is uncertain, and a yavam who consummated the levirate marriage with the yevama, who both came to divide up the possessions of the deceased brother and each one claims to be the sole heir.

住驻拽 讗诪专 讗谞讗 讘专 诪讬转谞讗 讛讜讗 讜谞讻住讬 讚讬讚讬 讛讜讗 讜讬讘诐 讗诪专 讗转 讘专讗讬 讚讬讚讬 讗转 讜诇讬转 诇讱 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 讘谞讻住讬 讛讜讬 诪诪讜谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘住驻拽 讜诪诪讜谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘住驻拽 讞讜诇拽讬谉

The one of uncertain descent said: I am the son of the deceased, and therefore, as the only heir, his possessions are mine. And the yavam said to him: You are my son, and you have absolutely no rights to the possessions; rather, by virtue of the fact that I consummated the levirate marriage with the widow of the deceased, I should inherit him. The Gemara rules on this case: This is a case of property of uncertain ownership, as there is no way to determine who is the rightful heir, and the halakha is that property of uncertain ownership the claimants divide up between them.

住驻拽 讜讘谞讬 讬讘诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讞诇讜拽 讘谞讻住讬 诪讬转谞讗 住驻拽 讗诪专 讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讘专 诪讬转谞讗 讛讜讗 讜谞讻住讬 讚讬讚讬 讛讜讗 讘谞讬 讬讘诐 讗诪专讬 讗转 讗讞讬谞讜 讗转 讜诪谞转讗 讛讜讗 讚讗讬转 诇讱 讘讛讚谉

The Gemara brings another case, that of one concerning whom there is uncertainty whether he is the son of the deceased or of the yavam and the sons of the yavam, who consummated the levirate marriage with the yevama and has since died, who came to divide up the possessions of the deceased, and each one makes claim to the inheritance. The one of uncertain descent said: That man, referring to himself, is the son of the deceased, and therefore, as his sole heir, his possessions are mine. And the sons of the yavam said to him: You are our brother, and our uncle, the deceased, was not survived by any offspring and so by virtue of our father鈥檚 levirate marriage he inherited our uncle鈥檚 possessions, and now that our father has died and we are dividing up his possessions you have a right to inherit only a portion of the inheritance together with us.

住讘讜专 专讘谞谉 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 诇诪讬诪专 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讛讬讗 讚转谞谉 讛讜讗 讗讬谞讜 讬讜专砖 讗讜转诐 讜讛诐 讬讜专砖讬谉 讗讜转讜

The Rabbis who studied before Rav Mesharshiyya thought to say: This case is analogous to a case in a mishna, as we learned a similar case in a mishna (100a) in which a woman gave birth shortly after remarrying and there is uncertainty whether the child鈥檚 father is the first or second husband. The mishna considers a case in which the husbands died and were each survived by a set of sons: If a son from either set died, the other sons of that set will inherit from him because as brothers they have an uncontested claim to the inheritance. However, he, the son of uncertain descent, does not inherit from them because his claim as a brother is uncertain and is therefore not powerful enough to allow him to take part of the inheritance from the other sons. However, if the son of uncertain descent died, they, the sons of both husbands, will jointly inherit from him. The claims of each set of sons to be his brothers are equally uncertain; therefore, since there is no one who has a definite claim to his inheritance, his possessions are split between them.

讜讛讻讗 讗讬驻讻讗 讛转诐 讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 讗讬讬转讬 专讗讬讛 讜砖拽讜诇

The Rabbis qualify their comparison of the cases: But here, the positions are in reverse, as follows: There, in the case of the mishna, when one of the sons dies, they, the other sons of that set, can say to him, the son of uncertain descent: Bring proof that you are actually a son of our father and only then can you take a portion. Since he cannot prove this, he will not receive any of the inheritance.

讛讻讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗讬讬转讜 专讗讬讛 讜砖拽讜诇讜

However, here, in the case where the son of uncertain descent is in dispute with the sons of the yavam, he, the son of uncertain descent, can say to them: Bring proof that I am not the son of the deceased, and only then can you take a portion together with me. The Rabbis claim that the principle in both cases is identical: When one party has an uncontested claim to the inheritance, and another party advances a claim to receive part of the inheritance that is based on an uncertainty, the uncertain claim is not accepted. In the mishna鈥檚 case, it is the son of uncertain descent who has an uncertain claim. The Rabbis suggest that the reverse is true in the Gemara鈥檚 case: The son of uncertain decent has an uncontested claim to the inheritance because whether he is the son of the first or second husband, he certainly has a right to some inheritance. It is the sons of the yavam who have an uncertain claim because they have a right to the inheritance only if the son of uncertain decent is actually their brother.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讗讬谞讛讜 讜讚讗讬 讜讗讬讛讜 住驻拽 讛讻讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 住驻拽

Rav Mesharshiyya said to them: Is the case in the mishna really comparable? There, in the mishna鈥檚 case, when one of the sons dies, they, the other sons in that set, have a definite claim to the inheritance, since their claim is based on the fact that they are the dead son鈥檚 brothers, which is certainly true, and he, the son of uncertain descent, only has an uncertain claim. However, here, each party has only an uncertain claim. Although the son of uncertain descent claims that ultimately, whatever the nature of his relationship with the deceased is, he should have the right to inherit, nevertheless, since it is not actually known what that relationship is, his claim in reality is merely a composite of uncertain claims.

讗诇讗 讗讬 讚诪讬讗 诇诪转谞讬转讬谉 [诇讛讗] 讚诪讬讗 诇住驻拽 讜讘谞讬 讬讘诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讞诇讜拽 讘谞讻住讬 讬讘诐 讙讜驻讬讛 讚讛转诐 讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 讗讬讬转讬 专讗讬讛 讚讗讞讜谞讗 讗转 讜砖拽讜诇

Having rejected the analogy offered by the Rabbis, Rav Mesharshiyya offers his own analogy to the case in the mishna that the Rabbis cited: Rather, if there is a case that is analogous to the case in the mishna, then it is to this following case that it is analogous: It is comparable to a case in which following the levirate marriage a son was born, and there is uncertainty whether he is the son of the deceased or of the yavam, and that son of uncertain descent and the sons of the yavam come to divide up the possessions of the yavam himself. As there, those who are unquestionably the sons of the yavam have a definite claim; therefore, they can say to him, the son of uncertain descent: Bring proof that you are actually our brother and only then can you take a portion. Since he cannot prove this, he will not receive any of the inheritance.

住驻拽 讜讘谞讬 讬讘诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讞诇讜拽 讘谞讻住讬 讬讘诐 诇讘转专 讚驻诇讙 讬讘诐 讘谞讻住讬 诪讬转谞讗

The Gemara brings yet another case, that of one concerning whom there is an uncertainty whether he is the son of the deceased or of the yavam and the sons of the yavam, i.e., the sons of the man who consummated the levirate marriage with the yevama and has since died, who came to divide up the possessions of the yavam after the yavam had already divided up the possessions of the deceased brother between himself and the son of uncertain descent, as per the Gemara鈥檚 ruling in the first case above.

讘谞讬 讬讘诐 讗诪专讬 讗讬讬转讬 专讗讬讛 讚讗讞讜谞讗 讗转 讜砖拽讜诇 讗诪专 诇讛讜 住驻拽 诪讛 谞驻砖讬讬讻讜 讗讬 讗讞讜讻讜谉 讗谞讗 讛讘讜 诇讬 诪谞转讗 讘讛讚讬讬讻讜 讜讗讬 讘专 诪讬转谞讗 讗谞讗 讛讘讜 诇讬 驻诇讙讗 讚驻诇讙 讗讘讜讻讜谉 讘讛讚讗讬

The yavam then died and his sons and the son of uncertain descent each made a claim to the inheritance: The sons of the yavam say to the son of uncertain descent: Bring proof that you are our brother, and only then can you take a portion. The son of uncertain descent said to them: Whichever way you look at it, I should receive a portion of the inheritance. If you assume that I am your brother, then give me a portion of the inheritance together with all of you, and if you assume that I am the son of the deceased, then give me the half of the possessions that your father took when he divided up the possessions with me upon the deceased鈥檚 death, because if you assume I am his son, then I am his sole heir and your father never had any rights to his possessions.

专讘讬 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 拽诐 讚讬谞讗 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讗诪专 讛讚专 讚讬谞讗

The son of uncertain descent鈥檚 claim assumes that the original verdict to divide up the possessions of the deceased between the two sides may be reexamined in light of later developments. This assumption, however, is subject to a dispute: Rabbi Abba said that Rav said: The original verdict stands, i.e., the original division of the deceased鈥檚 possessions is considered a closed matter, and the new dispute concerning the possessions of the yavam is considered independently of it. Accordingly, the son of uncertain descent鈥檚 claim cannot succeed, and so he receives no portion of the inheritance of the yavam. Rabbi Yirmeya said: The original verdict is reconsidered in light of the new circumstances, and therefore in this case the son of uncertain descent can put forward his undeniable claim to some of the possessions of the yavam based on the original uncertainties that existed with regard to the division of the deceased鈥檚 possessions.

诇讬诪讗 讘驻诇讜讙转讗 讚讗讚诪讜谉 讜专讘谞谉 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚转谞谉 诪讬 砖讛诇讱 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讗讘讚讛 诇讜 讚专讱 砖讚讛讜 讗讚诪讜谉 讗诪专 讬诇讱 讘拽爪专讛 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬拽讞 诇讜 讚专讱 讘诪讗讛 诪谞讛 讗讜 讬驻专讞 讘讗讜讬专

Let us say that Rabbi Abba and Rabbi Yirmeya disagree over the dispute between Admon and the Rabbis. As we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 109b): With regard to one who owns a field and has the rights to a path that passes through land belonging to another, and he traveled to a country overseas, and when he returned the path to his field was lost, i.e., he forgot where the path was located, Admon says: He may go only on the shortest path to his field, as although it is not known where the path is, he definitely did have a path, and therefore at the very least he has a right to the shortest path. The Rabbis say: He must either purchase for himself a new path for whatever price is asked, even if it is one hundred dinars, or he will have to fly through the air to reach his field, i.e., as long as he cannot prove where the original path was, he has no rights to any other path.

讜讛讜讬谞谉 讘讛 诇专讘谞谉 砖驻讬专 拽讗诪专 讗讚诪讜谉 讜讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讛拽讬驻讜讛 讗专讘注讛 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 诪讗专讘注 专讜讞讜转

And we discussed the mishna and thereby established the parameters of the dispute as follows: It is difficult for the Rabbis because Admon is saying well, i.e., the logic of his opinion would seem to be compelling. And in defense of the Rabbis鈥 opinion, Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: With what are we dealing here? It is with a case where his field was surrounded by four individuals who owned the land on each of its four sides. Therefore, he cannot demand a path from any one of the surrounding owners, since each one can deflect his claim by suggesting that the path might have passed through one of the other owners鈥 land.

讗讬 讛讻讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讗讚诪讜谉 讜讗诪专 专讘讗 讘讗专讘注讛 讚讗转讜 诪讻讞 讗专讘注讛 讜讗专讘注讛 讚讗转讜 诪讻讞 讞讚 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚诪爪讜 诪讚讞讬 诇讬讛

However, this creates a further difficulty: If so, that the surrounding land is owned by different people, what is Admon鈥檚 rationale for ruling that the owner of the field has a claim to the shortest path? And in order to justify Admon鈥檚 opinion, Rava said: With regard to a case in which there are four current owners who came to own their land on the basis of purchase from four previous owners, i.e., each of the current owners acquired their land from a different previous owner, and also in a case in which there are four current owners who came to own their land on the basis of purchase from one previous owner who originally owned all four pieces of land, everyone agrees that the current owners are able to deflect him and his claim to a path.

讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讞讚 讚讗转讬 诪讻讞 讗专讘注讛 讗讚诪讜谉 住讘专 诪爪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐 讚专讻讬 讙讘讱 讛讜讗 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 砖转拽转 砖转拽转 讜讗讬 诇讗 诪讛讚专谞讗 砖讟专讗 诇诪专讬讬讛讜 讜诇讗 诪爪讬转 诇讗砖转注讜讬讬 讚讬谞讗 讘讛讚讬讬讛讜

When they disagree, it is in a case in which there is only one current owner of all four pieces of land, who came to own his land on the basis of purchase from four previous owners. Admon holds that the owner of the field can say to the current owner of the surrounding land: Whichever way you construe the case, my path to my field is somewhere with you in the surrounding land. And the Rabbis hold that the owner of the surrounding land can deflect this claim because he can say to him: If you do not press your claim and are silent, then be silent, and I will sell you a path at a reasonable price. But if not, and you insist on pressing your claim, then I will return the bills of purchase of the land to their previous owners, and then you will not be able to successfully engage in a legal dispute with them, as each one could claim that the path went through one of the other pieces of land not owned by them.

诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讚讗诪专 讻专讘谞谉

Having established the parameters of the dispute, the Gemara suggests: Let us say that the statement of Rabbi Abba, who said that the original verdict stands, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. When the owner of the field forgot where his path was located, the surrounding land was owned by four different owners, and therefore at that time the verdict was that he had no ability to successfully claim his path. The Rabbis apparently assume that that verdict stands, and therefore the field owner is considered to have lost any rights to the path. Consequently, even if the surrounding pieces of land are later purchased by a single person, the owner of the field cannot make a claim for his path.

讜专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讚讗诪专 讻讗讚诪讜谉

The Gemara continues: And the statement of Rabbi Yirmeya, who said that the original verdict is repealed, is in accordance with the opinion of Admon. Admon apparently assumes that although the original verdict was that the field owner has no ability to successfully claim his path, nevertheless, that does not mean he loses his rights to the path. Rather, once the situation changes and the surrounding pieces of land are purchased by a single person, the original uncertainty is revived to allow him to make a claim for at least the shortest path to his field.

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讗谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讻讗讚诪讜谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 讗讚诪讜谉 讛转诐 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪诪讛 谞驻砖讱

The Gemara rejects the comparison: Rabbi Abba could have said to you: When I stated my ruling, it was even in accordance with the opinion of Admon. Admon states his ruling only there, in the case of the lost path, because the field owner said to the owner of the surrounding land: Whichever way you look at it,

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot 37

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Yevamot 37

讘讗讜专转讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讻讬 讜讘爪驻专讗 讛讚专 讘讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖专讬转讜 讬讛讗 专注讜讗 讚转砖转专讜 讗祝 转专讘讗

In the evening Rava stated this ruling in accordance with the way you cited him, but in the morning he retracted his opinion and ruled as I cited him. Rav Mesharshiyya said to him: Do you really permit her to marry without 岣litza? He added sarcastically: May it be God鈥檚 will that you will even permit forbidden fats [tarba] as well. In Rav Mesharshiyya鈥檚 opinion, the prohibition against the widow remarrying without 岣litza was as obvious as the prohibition of forbidden fats.

讛讻讗 讙讘讬 诪注讜讘专转 讞讘讬专讜 讜诪讬谞拽转 讞讘讬专讜 讛谞砖讜讗讛 诇讻讛谉 诪讗讬 诪讬 注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉 转拽谞转讗 诇讻讛谉 讗讜 诇讗

After citing this dispute, Rav Ashi said to Rav Hoshaya, son of Rav Idi: According to Rava鈥檚 citation of Rav, when a woman is married to a priest, the Sages were more lenient in order to allow the couple to remain married. Here, with regard to a woman who is pregnant with the child of another man or a woman who is nursing the child of another man, who is married to a priest, what is the halakha? Did the Sages enact an ordinance for the benefit of a priest and say that it is sufficient for him to separate from his wife and he does not need to divorce her, or not?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 讘砖诇诪讗 讛转诐 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬讻讗 专讘谞谉 讚驻诇讬讙讬 注诇讬讛 讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 砖讛讗 讜诇讚 诪注诇讬讗 讛讜讬 讙讘讬 讗砖转 讻讛谉 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 注讘讚讬谞谉 讻专讘谞谉

He said to him: How can these cases be compared? Granted, there, in the case where the offspring died during its first thirty days of life, since there are the Rabbis who disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concerning it, as they say that although the offspring did not survive for thirty days it is nevertheless considered a full-fledged, i.e., viable, offspring, therefore, with regard to the wife of a priest, since it is not possible for her to perform 岣litza and remain permitted to her husband, we will be lenient and act in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讻诪讗谉 谞注讘讬讚 讗讬 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讗 讗诪专 讬讜爪讬讗 讜诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 注讜诇诪讬转 讜讗讬 讻专讘谞谉 讛讗诪专讬 讘讙讟

However, here, in the case of a woman who is pregnant with or nursing the child of another man, in accordance with whose opinion should we act? If we act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it will be of no benefit to the priest because Rabbi Meir said even with regard to the wife of an Israelite that he must divorce her and may never take her back. And if we act in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, it will also be of no benefit to the priest because they say he must send her out with a bill of divorce and only remarry her at a later point. Since there is no opinion that does not require a bill of divorce to be given, there is no possibility to be lenient in this case by not requiring a bill of divorce to be given.

讗讬转诪专 拽讚砖讛 讘转讜讱 砖诇砖讛 讜讘专讞 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讜专驻专诐 讞讚 讗诪专 诪砖诪转讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讜讞讚 讗诪专 注讬专讜拽讬讛 诪住转讬讬讛 讛讜讛 注讜讘讚讗 讜讗诪专 诇讛讜 专驻专诐 注讬专讜拽讬讛 诪住转讬讬讛

A pregnancy is generally noticeable only after three months have passed. Therefore, during the first three months after a woman is divorced or widowed, she may not remarry due to the possibility that she is pregnant. The Sages decreed that even betrothing her during that time is prohibited, lest one also marry her (see 41a). Concerning this, an amoraic dispute was stated: In a case in which a man betrothed a woman during the three months following her divorce or her husband鈥檚 death, and then he fled, Rav A岣 and Rafram disagree over what should be done. One said: We excommunicate him for violating the prohibition. And the other one said: His flight is sufficient for him, since it proves that he does not intend to marry her until it is determined that she is not pregnant. Therefore, there is no need to penalize him further. The Gemara relates: There was an incident like that, and Rafram said to those who asked what to do: His flight is sufficient for him.

住驻拽 讘谉 转砖注 讜讻讜壮 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 诇讬诪讗 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 讜专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 诇转砖注讛 讬诇讚谉

搂 The mishna states that if a yevama consummated the levirate marriage and gave birth seven months later, there is an uncertainty whether the child is nine months old, counting from conception, and is the offspring of the first husband, i.e., the deceased brother, or whether the child is only seven months old and is the offspring of the second husband. If it is the child of the first husband, then there was never any obligation of levirate marriage, and the supposed consummation was in fact forbidden by penalty of karet. Due to that possibility, both the man and the woman are obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty. Rava said to Rav Na岣an: How can they bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty? Let us say: Follow the majority of women, and since the majority of women give birth after nine months, it should be presumed that the child is the offspring of the deceased brother. Accordingly, the couple would be obligated to bring a certain sin-offering, not a guilt-offering for uncertainty.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 谞砖讬 讚讬讚谉 诇砖讘注讛 讬诇讚谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 谞砖讬 讚讬讚讻讜 讛讜讜 专讜讘讗 讚注诇诪讗

Rav Na岣an said to him: The women of our family regularly give birth after seven months. Therefore, how can you presume that this woman gave birth after nine months? Rava said to him: Do the women of your family constitute the majority of the women of the world? Ultimately, the majority of women give birth after nine months, and one should therefore presume accordingly in a case of uncertainty.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 拽讗诪讬谞讗 专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 讬诇讚谉 诇转砖注讛 讜诪讬注讜讟 诇砖讘注讛 讜讻诇 讛讬讜诇讚转 诇转砖注讛 注讜讘专讛 谞讬讻专 诇砖诇讬砖 讬诪讬讛 讜讝讜 讛讜讗讬诇 讜诇讗 讛讜讻专 注讜讘专讛 诇砖诇讬砖 讬诪讬讛 讗讬转专注 诇讬讛 专讜讘讗

Rav Na岣an said to him: This is what I am saying: Although it is true that the majority of women give birth after nine months and only a minority give birth after seven, still, in the case of every woman who gives birth after nine months, her fetus is already recognizable after a third of her days, i.e., in the third month of her pregnancy. Accordingly, in the case of this woman, since her fetus was not recognizable after a third of her days, as were it already recognizable at that point then it would be obvious that the child was the offspring of the first husband, therefore, the ability to presume she is like the majority of women is compromised, and the uncertainty as to who the father of the child is remains. Consequently, the yavam and yevama should each bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty.

讗讬 讻诇 讛讬讜诇讚转 诇转砖注讛 注讜讘专讛 谞讬讻专 诇砖诇讬砖 讬诪讬讛 讛讗 诪讚诇讗 讛讜讻专 诇砖诇讬砖 讬诪讬讛 注讜讘专讛 讜讚讗讬 讘专 砖讘注讛 诇讘转专讗讛 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 专讜讘 讛讬讜诇讚转 诇转砖注讛 注讜讘专讛 谞讬讻专 诇砖诇讬砖 讬诪讬讛 讜讛讗讬 诪讚诇讗 讛讜讻专 诇砖诇讬砖 讬诪讬讛 讗讬转专注 诇讬讛 专讜讘讗

The Gemara asks: If it is true that in the case of every woman who gives birth after nine months, her fetus is already recognizable after a third of her days, then with regard to this woman, from the fact that her fetus was not recognized after a third of her days, it follows that her fetus was certainly only seven months old and is the offspring of the latter husband, i.e., the yavam. If so, it is clear the yavam is father of the child and there should be no need to bring an offering at all. Rather, one must emend Rav Na岣an鈥檚 words and say: In the majority of cases, with regard to a woman who gives birth after nine months, her fetus is already recognizable after a third of her days, and with regard to this woman, from the fact that her fetus was not recognized after the a third of her days, the ability to presume she is like the majority of women is compromised.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 专讗砖讜谉 专讗讜讬 诇讛讬讜转 讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 讜砖谞讬 诪诪讝专 诪住驻拽 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 诪住驻拽

搂 The mishna states that the child of the yevama has unflawed lineage since regardless of whether it is the offspring of the deceased husband or the yavam, there was no transgression involved in its conception. With regard to this case, the Sages taught in a baraita: The first child is even fit to become a High Priest. However, since it is possible that the child is the offspring of the deceased husband, in which case the widow remains forbidden to the yavam as his brother鈥檚 wife, if she has a second child with her yavam then that child is a mamzer due to an uncertainty with regard to his status. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov says: One is not rendered a mamzer due to uncertainty.

诪讗讬 拽讗诪专 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 专讗砖讜谉 专讗讜讬 诇讛讬讜转 讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 讜砖谞讬 住驻拽 诪诪讝专 讜讗住讜专 讘诪诪讝专转 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 住驻拽 诪诪讝专 讗诇讗 讜讚讗讬 诪诪讝专 讜诪讜转专 讘诪诪讝专转

The meaning of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov鈥檚 statement and how he differs from the first tanna is unclear. The Gemara clarifies: What is the baraita saying? Abaye said: This is what it is saying: The first child is even fit to become a High Priest. And if she has a second child, his status as a mamzer is uncertain and therefore he is both prohibited from marrying an Israelite woman of unflawed lineage, since he might actually be a mamzer, and he is also prohibited from marrying a mamzeret, since he might not be a mamzer. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov says: He is not treated like one whose status as a mamzer is uncertain; rather, due to the uncertainty concerning his status he is treated like one who is definitely a mamzer, and he is permitted to marry a mamzeret. In other words, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov holds that even one whose status as a mamzer is uncertain is permitted to marry one who is definitely a mamzeret.

专讘讗 讗诪专 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 专讗砖讜谉 专讗讜讬 诇讛讬讜转 讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 讜砖谞讬 诪诪讝专 讜讚讗讬 诪住驻拽 讜诪讜转专 讘诪诪讝专转 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讜讚讗讬 诪诪讝专 诪住驻拽 讗诇讗 住驻拽 诪诪讝专 讜讗住讜专 讘诪诪讝专转

Rava said: This is what the baraita is saying: The first child is even fit to become a High Priest. And if she has a second child, he is treated as though he is definitely a mamzer due to the uncertainty concerning his status, and therefore he is permitted to marry a mamzeret, i.e., this tanna holds that even one whose status as a mamzer is uncertain is permitted to marry one who is definitely a mamzeret. And Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov says: He is not treated as though he is definitely a mamzer due to an uncertainty concerning his status; rather, his status as a mamzer is uncertain and he is treated accordingly, and therefore he is both prohibited from marrying an Israelite woman of unflawed lineage since he might be a mamzer, and he is also prohibited from marrying a mamzeret since he might not be a mamzer.

讜拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘讚专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讜讚讗谉 讘讜讚讗谉 诪讜转专 讜讚讗谉 讘住驻拽谉 讜住驻拽谉 讘讜讚讗谉 讜住驻拽谉 讘住驻拽谉 讗住讜专

The Gemara explains: And Abaye and Rava disagree with regard to whether the halakha is decided in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As we learned in a mishna (Kiddushin 74a): With regard to the prohibition against marrying people with certain types of flawed lineage, Rabbi Elazar said: The marriage of those people whose flawed lineage status is certain to those whose status is certain is permitted, but the marriage of those whose status is certain to those whose status is uncertain, and the marriage of those whose status is uncertain to those whose status is certain, and even the marriage of those whose status is uncertain to those whose status is uncertain, is prohibited.

讜讗诇讜 讛谉 住驻拽谉 砖转讜拽讬 讜讗住讜驻讬 讜讻讜转讬

The mishna concludes: And these are those who are considered to have an uncertain status: A child of unknown paternity [shetuki], although his mother鈥檚 identity is known; and a foundling who was found abandoned in the streets; and a Samaritan [Kuti], who is possibly a mamzer since the Samaritans do not accept and abide by the halakhot of marriage.

讜讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讻讬 讗诪专讬转讛 拽诪讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 诇讬 讛诇诇 砖谞讛 注砖专讛 讬讜讞住讬谉 注诇讜 诪讘讘诇 讻讛谞讬 诇讜讬讬 讜讬砖专讗诇讬 讞诇诇讬 讙讬专讬 讞专讜专讬 诪诪讝专讬 谞转讬谞讬 砖转讜拽讬 讜讗住讜驻讬 讜讻讜诇谉 诪讜转专讬谉 诇讘讗 讝讛 讘讝讛

And with regard to this mishna Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. But when I said this halakha of Rav鈥檚 in the presence of Shmuel, he said to me: Hillel taught in a baraita that ten categories of lineage came up from Babylon to Eretz Yisrael: Priests; Levites; and Israelites; priests disqualified due to flawed lineage [岣lallim]; converts; freed slaves; mamzerim; Gibeonites; shetukei; and foundlings. And it is permitted for all men and women in these categories to marry one another, i.e., the list is arranged such that the marriage between people in any two categories that are adjacent to one another is permitted. This is possible only if one assumes that it is permitted for one whose flawed lineage status is uncertain to marry one whose flawed lineage status is certain.

讜讗转 讗诪专转 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专

After citing the baraita taught by Hillel, which assumes that it is permitted for one whose flawed lineage status is uncertain to marry one whose flawed lineage status is certain, Shmuel concluded: The halakha is certainly decided in accordance with the opinion of Hillel, and yet you, Rabbi Yehuda, said the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, which states that a marriage between two people whose flawed lineage status is uncertain is prohibited; your ruling is incorrect.

讗讘讬讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻讛诇诇 讜诪讜拽讬 诇讛 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗诇讬讘讗 讚讛诇讻转讗 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 转拽砖讬 讛诇讻转讗 讗讛诇讻转讗

The Gemara proceeds to explain the dispute between Abaye and Rava: Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who said that the halakha is decided in accordance with the opinion of Hillel that it is permitted for one whose flawed lineage status is uncertain to marry one whose flawed lineage status is certain. Therefore, Abaye establishes that opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov to be in accordance with this halakha, in order that there should not be a contradiction between one halakha, i.e., that the halakha is always decided in accordance with the opinion of Hillel, and another halakha, i.e., that the halakha is always decided in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov.

专讘讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘 讚讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讜诪讜拽讬 诇讛 诇讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗诇讬讘讗 讚讛诇讻转讗 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 转拽砖讬

Rava, however, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav, who said: The halakha is decided in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar that the marriage of those whose status is certain to those whose status is uncertain is prohibited. Therefore, Rava establishes that opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov to be in accordance with this halakha, so that there should not be a contradiction between

讛诇讻转讗 讗讛诇讻转讗

one halakha, i.e., that the halakha in this case is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and another halakha, i.e., that the halakha is always decided in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚讻诇 住驻讬拽讗 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讻讜讚讗讬 诪砖讜讬 诇讬讛

Abaye said: From where do I say that concerning anyone whose status as a mamzer is uncertain, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov they are treated equivalently to one who is definitely a mamzer?

讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 讛专讬 砖讘讗 注诇 谞砖讬诐 讛专讘讛 讜讗讬谉 讬讜讚注 注诇 讗讬讝讛讜 诪讛谉 讘讗 讜讻谉 讛讬讗 砖讘讗讜 注诇讬讛 讗谞砖讬诐 讛专讘讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讬讜讚注转 诪讗讬讝讛 诪讛谉 拽讘诇讛 谞诪爪讗 讗讘 谞讜砖讗 讗转 讘转讜 讜讗讞 谞讜砖讗 讗转 讗讞讜转讜 讜谞转诪诇讗 讻诇 讛注讜诇诐 讻讜诇讜 诪诪讝专讬谉 讜注诇 讝讛 谞讗诪专 讜诪诇讗讛 讛讗专抓 讝诪讛

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov says: With regard to one who engaged in intercourse with and impregnated many women, but he does not know with which women he had intercourse, and similarly, with regard to a woman, if many men had intercourse with her and she became pregnant, but she does not know from which man she received the seed that caused her to become pregnant, since the identities of the parents of those children are not known, it could emerge that a father marries his daughter, and a brother marries his sister. And in this way, the entire world could become filled with mamzerim. And concerning this, it is stated: 鈥淎nd lest the land become full of lewdness鈥 (Leviticus 19:29). Abaye demonstrates his claim from the fact that even though it is not certain that the children in this situation are mamzerim, nevertheless, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov labels them as mamzerim and not as those whose status as a mamzer is uncertain.

讜专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讱 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讝讜 诪讛 讛讬讗

And Rava could have said to you: This is what the verse is saying: The word 鈥渓ewdness [zima]鈥 can be understood as an acronym of the words: Zo ma hi, meaning: What is this. It is plausible to say that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov鈥檚 citation of this verse indicates that he regards their status to be uncertain.

讬转专 注诇 讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 诇讗 讬砖讗 讗讚诐 讗砖讛 讘诪讚讬谞讛 讝讜 讜讬诇讱 讜讬砖讗 讗砖讛 讘诪讚讬谞讛 讗讞专转 砖诪讗 讬讝讚讜讜讙讜 讝讛 诇讝讛 讜谞诪爪讗 讗讞 谞讜砖讗 讗转 讗讞讜转讜

The Gemara cites the continuation of the baraita: Furthermore, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov said that even in marriage, one should be careful not to create a situation that could lead to the birth of mamzerim. Therefore, a man should not marry a woman in this country and then go and marry another woman in a different country, lest a son from one marriage and a daughter from the other, unaware that they are both children of the same father, unite with one another, and it could emerge that a brother marries his sister, the children of whom would be mamzerim.

讗讬谞讬 讜讛讗 专讘 讻讬 讗讬拽诇注 诇讚专讚砖讬专 [诪讻专讬讝] 讜讗诪专 诪讗谉 讛讜讬讗 诇讬讜诪讗 讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻讬 讗讬拽诇注 诇砖讻谞爪讬讘 [诪讻专讬讝] 讜讗诪专 诪讗谉 讛讜讬讗 诇讬讜诪讗

The Gemara asks: Is that so; is there really such a prohibition? But didn鈥檛 Rav, when he happened to come to Dardeshir, make a public announcement saying: Which woman will be my wife for the day, i.e., for the duration of his visit? Since his wife did not accompany him to Dardeshir, he wished to be married to another woman while he was there, in order to avoid a situation that could lead him to having forbidden thoughts. And also Rav Na岣an, when he happened to come to Shakhnetziv, made a public announcement saying: Which woman will be my wife for the day? It would appear, from the fact that both Sages married wives in two different places, that there is no prohibition in doing so.

砖讗谞讬 专讘谞谉 讚驻拽讬注 砖诪讬讬讛讜

The Gemara rejects the proof: Sages are different, as their names are renowned, and therefore their children are always identified by their connection to their father. Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov鈥檚 concern does not apply to them.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘讗 转讘注讜讛 诇讬谞砖讗 讜谞转驻讬讬住讛 爪专讬讻讛 诇讬砖讘 砖讘注讛 谞拽讬讬诐

The Gemara examines Rav and Rav Na岣an鈥檚 actions: But didn鈥檛 Rava say: With regard to a woman who had an offer of marriage and accepted, the emotional excitement may have caused her to have a flow of menstrual blood, which would making her ritually impure and prohibit her from engaging in intercourse. Even if she was unaware of any flow, she must consider the possibility that it occurred. To purify herself, she needs to wait seven consecutive days that are clean from any flow of menstrual blood and then immerse in a ritual bath. Only then may she marry. If so, how could Rav and Rav Na岣an marry women on the day they arrived?

专讘谞谉 砖诇讜讞讬讬讛讜 讛讜讜 诪砖讚专讬 讜诪讜讚注讬 诇讛讜 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇专讘谞谉 讬讞讜讚讬 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讬讞讚讬 诇讛讜 讚讗诪专 诪专 讗讬谞讜 讚讜诪讛 诪讬 砖讬砖 诇讜 驻转 讘住诇讜 诇诪讬 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 驻转 讘住诇讜

The Gemara explains: These Sages would send messengers seven days ahead of their arrival and they would inform the women of the Sage鈥檚 arrival. In this way, the woman who agreed to marry the Sage would have time to count the seven clean days. And if you wish, say that the Sages鈥 intentions were merely to be in seclusion [meya岣di] with the woman but not to engage in intercourse with her. Therefore, it was permitted to marry her even if she became ritually impure. Being in seclusion with a woman was sufficient to help the Sages avoid any forbidden thoughts, as the Master said: One who has bread in his basket is incomparable to one who does not have bread in his basket, i.e., just as the knowledge that food is readily available is sufficient to psychologically alleviate one鈥檚 feelings of hunger, so too, the knowledge that one鈥檚 sexual desires could be met lessens the strength of the desire itself.

转谞讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讬砖讗 讗讚诐 讗砖转讜 讜讚注转讜 诇讙专砖讛 诪砖讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 讗诇 转讞专砖 注诇 专注讱 专注讛 讜讛讜讗 讬讜砖讘 诇讘讟讞 讗转讱

The Gemara cites an additional statement of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov: It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov says: A man should not marry his wife when at the same time his intention is to divorce her, because it is stated: 鈥淒o not devise evil against your neighbor, as he dwells securely with you鈥 (Proverbs 3:29). It is wrong for one to intend to undermine the feelings of security that another has with him.

住驻拽 讜讬讘诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讞诇讜拽 讘谞讻住讬 诪讬转谞讗

搂 The mishna raises a case in which a yavam consummated the levirate marriage with his yevama and seven months later she gave birth. With respect to that child, there is an uncertainty whether he is the child of the deceased brother or whether he is the child of the yavam. The Gemara discusses the ramifications of this uncertainty in a dispute concerning inheritance. The case concerns one whose identity as the son of the deceased is uncertain, and a yavam who consummated the levirate marriage with the yevama, who both came to divide up the possessions of the deceased brother and each one claims to be the sole heir.

住驻拽 讗诪专 讗谞讗 讘专 诪讬转谞讗 讛讜讗 讜谞讻住讬 讚讬讚讬 讛讜讗 讜讬讘诐 讗诪专 讗转 讘专讗讬 讚讬讚讬 讗转 讜诇讬转 诇讱 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 讘谞讻住讬 讛讜讬 诪诪讜谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘住驻拽 讜诪诪讜谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘住驻拽 讞讜诇拽讬谉

The one of uncertain descent said: I am the son of the deceased, and therefore, as the only heir, his possessions are mine. And the yavam said to him: You are my son, and you have absolutely no rights to the possessions; rather, by virtue of the fact that I consummated the levirate marriage with the widow of the deceased, I should inherit him. The Gemara rules on this case: This is a case of property of uncertain ownership, as there is no way to determine who is the rightful heir, and the halakha is that property of uncertain ownership the claimants divide up between them.

住驻拽 讜讘谞讬 讬讘诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讞诇讜拽 讘谞讻住讬 诪讬转谞讗 住驻拽 讗诪专 讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讘专 诪讬转谞讗 讛讜讗 讜谞讻住讬 讚讬讚讬 讛讜讗 讘谞讬 讬讘诐 讗诪专讬 讗转 讗讞讬谞讜 讗转 讜诪谞转讗 讛讜讗 讚讗讬转 诇讱 讘讛讚谉

The Gemara brings another case, that of one concerning whom there is uncertainty whether he is the son of the deceased or of the yavam and the sons of the yavam, who consummated the levirate marriage with the yevama and has since died, who came to divide up the possessions of the deceased, and each one makes claim to the inheritance. The one of uncertain descent said: That man, referring to himself, is the son of the deceased, and therefore, as his sole heir, his possessions are mine. And the sons of the yavam said to him: You are our brother, and our uncle, the deceased, was not survived by any offspring and so by virtue of our father鈥檚 levirate marriage he inherited our uncle鈥檚 possessions, and now that our father has died and we are dividing up his possessions you have a right to inherit only a portion of the inheritance together with us.

住讘讜专 专讘谞谉 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 诇诪讬诪专 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讛讬讗 讚转谞谉 讛讜讗 讗讬谞讜 讬讜专砖 讗讜转诐 讜讛诐 讬讜专砖讬谉 讗讜转讜

The Rabbis who studied before Rav Mesharshiyya thought to say: This case is analogous to a case in a mishna, as we learned a similar case in a mishna (100a) in which a woman gave birth shortly after remarrying and there is uncertainty whether the child鈥檚 father is the first or second husband. The mishna considers a case in which the husbands died and were each survived by a set of sons: If a son from either set died, the other sons of that set will inherit from him because as brothers they have an uncontested claim to the inheritance. However, he, the son of uncertain descent, does not inherit from them because his claim as a brother is uncertain and is therefore not powerful enough to allow him to take part of the inheritance from the other sons. However, if the son of uncertain descent died, they, the sons of both husbands, will jointly inherit from him. The claims of each set of sons to be his brothers are equally uncertain; therefore, since there is no one who has a definite claim to his inheritance, his possessions are split between them.

讜讛讻讗 讗讬驻讻讗 讛转诐 讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 讗讬讬转讬 专讗讬讛 讜砖拽讜诇

The Rabbis qualify their comparison of the cases: But here, the positions are in reverse, as follows: There, in the case of the mishna, when one of the sons dies, they, the other sons of that set, can say to him, the son of uncertain descent: Bring proof that you are actually a son of our father and only then can you take a portion. Since he cannot prove this, he will not receive any of the inheritance.

讛讻讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗讬讬转讜 专讗讬讛 讜砖拽讜诇讜

However, here, in the case where the son of uncertain descent is in dispute with the sons of the yavam, he, the son of uncertain descent, can say to them: Bring proof that I am not the son of the deceased, and only then can you take a portion together with me. The Rabbis claim that the principle in both cases is identical: When one party has an uncontested claim to the inheritance, and another party advances a claim to receive part of the inheritance that is based on an uncertainty, the uncertain claim is not accepted. In the mishna鈥檚 case, it is the son of uncertain descent who has an uncertain claim. The Rabbis suggest that the reverse is true in the Gemara鈥檚 case: The son of uncertain decent has an uncontested claim to the inheritance because whether he is the son of the first or second husband, he certainly has a right to some inheritance. It is the sons of the yavam who have an uncertain claim because they have a right to the inheritance only if the son of uncertain decent is actually their brother.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讗讬谞讛讜 讜讚讗讬 讜讗讬讛讜 住驻拽 讛讻讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 住驻拽

Rav Mesharshiyya said to them: Is the case in the mishna really comparable? There, in the mishna鈥檚 case, when one of the sons dies, they, the other sons in that set, have a definite claim to the inheritance, since their claim is based on the fact that they are the dead son鈥檚 brothers, which is certainly true, and he, the son of uncertain descent, only has an uncertain claim. However, here, each party has only an uncertain claim. Although the son of uncertain descent claims that ultimately, whatever the nature of his relationship with the deceased is, he should have the right to inherit, nevertheless, since it is not actually known what that relationship is, his claim in reality is merely a composite of uncertain claims.

讗诇讗 讗讬 讚诪讬讗 诇诪转谞讬转讬谉 [诇讛讗] 讚诪讬讗 诇住驻拽 讜讘谞讬 讬讘诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讞诇讜拽 讘谞讻住讬 讬讘诐 讙讜驻讬讛 讚讛转诐 讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 讗讬讬转讬 专讗讬讛 讚讗讞讜谞讗 讗转 讜砖拽讜诇

Having rejected the analogy offered by the Rabbis, Rav Mesharshiyya offers his own analogy to the case in the mishna that the Rabbis cited: Rather, if there is a case that is analogous to the case in the mishna, then it is to this following case that it is analogous: It is comparable to a case in which following the levirate marriage a son was born, and there is uncertainty whether he is the son of the deceased or of the yavam, and that son of uncertain descent and the sons of the yavam come to divide up the possessions of the yavam himself. As there, those who are unquestionably the sons of the yavam have a definite claim; therefore, they can say to him, the son of uncertain descent: Bring proof that you are actually our brother and only then can you take a portion. Since he cannot prove this, he will not receive any of the inheritance.

住驻拽 讜讘谞讬 讬讘诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讞诇讜拽 讘谞讻住讬 讬讘诐 诇讘转专 讚驻诇讙 讬讘诐 讘谞讻住讬 诪讬转谞讗

The Gemara brings yet another case, that of one concerning whom there is an uncertainty whether he is the son of the deceased or of the yavam and the sons of the yavam, i.e., the sons of the man who consummated the levirate marriage with the yevama and has since died, who came to divide up the possessions of the yavam after the yavam had already divided up the possessions of the deceased brother between himself and the son of uncertain descent, as per the Gemara鈥檚 ruling in the first case above.

讘谞讬 讬讘诐 讗诪专讬 讗讬讬转讬 专讗讬讛 讚讗讞讜谞讗 讗转 讜砖拽讜诇 讗诪专 诇讛讜 住驻拽 诪讛 谞驻砖讬讬讻讜 讗讬 讗讞讜讻讜谉 讗谞讗 讛讘讜 诇讬 诪谞转讗 讘讛讚讬讬讻讜 讜讗讬 讘专 诪讬转谞讗 讗谞讗 讛讘讜 诇讬 驻诇讙讗 讚驻诇讙 讗讘讜讻讜谉 讘讛讚讗讬

The yavam then died and his sons and the son of uncertain descent each made a claim to the inheritance: The sons of the yavam say to the son of uncertain descent: Bring proof that you are our brother, and only then can you take a portion. The son of uncertain descent said to them: Whichever way you look at it, I should receive a portion of the inheritance. If you assume that I am your brother, then give me a portion of the inheritance together with all of you, and if you assume that I am the son of the deceased, then give me the half of the possessions that your father took when he divided up the possessions with me upon the deceased鈥檚 death, because if you assume I am his son, then I am his sole heir and your father never had any rights to his possessions.

专讘讬 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 拽诐 讚讬谞讗 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讗诪专 讛讚专 讚讬谞讗

The son of uncertain descent鈥檚 claim assumes that the original verdict to divide up the possessions of the deceased between the two sides may be reexamined in light of later developments. This assumption, however, is subject to a dispute: Rabbi Abba said that Rav said: The original verdict stands, i.e., the original division of the deceased鈥檚 possessions is considered a closed matter, and the new dispute concerning the possessions of the yavam is considered independently of it. Accordingly, the son of uncertain descent鈥檚 claim cannot succeed, and so he receives no portion of the inheritance of the yavam. Rabbi Yirmeya said: The original verdict is reconsidered in light of the new circumstances, and therefore in this case the son of uncertain descent can put forward his undeniable claim to some of the possessions of the yavam based on the original uncertainties that existed with regard to the division of the deceased鈥檚 possessions.

诇讬诪讗 讘驻诇讜讙转讗 讚讗讚诪讜谉 讜专讘谞谉 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚转谞谉 诪讬 砖讛诇讱 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讗讘讚讛 诇讜 讚专讱 砖讚讛讜 讗讚诪讜谉 讗诪专 讬诇讱 讘拽爪专讛 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬拽讞 诇讜 讚专讱 讘诪讗讛 诪谞讛 讗讜 讬驻专讞 讘讗讜讬专

Let us say that Rabbi Abba and Rabbi Yirmeya disagree over the dispute between Admon and the Rabbis. As we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 109b): With regard to one who owns a field and has the rights to a path that passes through land belonging to another, and he traveled to a country overseas, and when he returned the path to his field was lost, i.e., he forgot where the path was located, Admon says: He may go only on the shortest path to his field, as although it is not known where the path is, he definitely did have a path, and therefore at the very least he has a right to the shortest path. The Rabbis say: He must either purchase for himself a new path for whatever price is asked, even if it is one hundred dinars, or he will have to fly through the air to reach his field, i.e., as long as he cannot prove where the original path was, he has no rights to any other path.

讜讛讜讬谞谉 讘讛 诇专讘谞谉 砖驻讬专 拽讗诪专 讗讚诪讜谉 讜讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讛拽讬驻讜讛 讗专讘注讛 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 诪讗专讘注 专讜讞讜转

And we discussed the mishna and thereby established the parameters of the dispute as follows: It is difficult for the Rabbis because Admon is saying well, i.e., the logic of his opinion would seem to be compelling. And in defense of the Rabbis鈥 opinion, Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: With what are we dealing here? It is with a case where his field was surrounded by four individuals who owned the land on each of its four sides. Therefore, he cannot demand a path from any one of the surrounding owners, since each one can deflect his claim by suggesting that the path might have passed through one of the other owners鈥 land.

讗讬 讛讻讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讗讚诪讜谉 讜讗诪专 专讘讗 讘讗专讘注讛 讚讗转讜 诪讻讞 讗专讘注讛 讜讗专讘注讛 讚讗转讜 诪讻讞 讞讚 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚诪爪讜 诪讚讞讬 诇讬讛

However, this creates a further difficulty: If so, that the surrounding land is owned by different people, what is Admon鈥檚 rationale for ruling that the owner of the field has a claim to the shortest path? And in order to justify Admon鈥檚 opinion, Rava said: With regard to a case in which there are four current owners who came to own their land on the basis of purchase from four previous owners, i.e., each of the current owners acquired their land from a different previous owner, and also in a case in which there are four current owners who came to own their land on the basis of purchase from one previous owner who originally owned all four pieces of land, everyone agrees that the current owners are able to deflect him and his claim to a path.

讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讞讚 讚讗转讬 诪讻讞 讗专讘注讛 讗讚诪讜谉 住讘专 诪爪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐 讚专讻讬 讙讘讱 讛讜讗 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 砖转拽转 砖转拽转 讜讗讬 诇讗 诪讛讚专谞讗 砖讟专讗 诇诪专讬讬讛讜 讜诇讗 诪爪讬转 诇讗砖转注讜讬讬 讚讬谞讗 讘讛讚讬讬讛讜

When they disagree, it is in a case in which there is only one current owner of all four pieces of land, who came to own his land on the basis of purchase from four previous owners. Admon holds that the owner of the field can say to the current owner of the surrounding land: Whichever way you construe the case, my path to my field is somewhere with you in the surrounding land. And the Rabbis hold that the owner of the surrounding land can deflect this claim because he can say to him: If you do not press your claim and are silent, then be silent, and I will sell you a path at a reasonable price. But if not, and you insist on pressing your claim, then I will return the bills of purchase of the land to their previous owners, and then you will not be able to successfully engage in a legal dispute with them, as each one could claim that the path went through one of the other pieces of land not owned by them.

诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讚讗诪专 讻专讘谞谉

Having established the parameters of the dispute, the Gemara suggests: Let us say that the statement of Rabbi Abba, who said that the original verdict stands, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. When the owner of the field forgot where his path was located, the surrounding land was owned by four different owners, and therefore at that time the verdict was that he had no ability to successfully claim his path. The Rabbis apparently assume that that verdict stands, and therefore the field owner is considered to have lost any rights to the path. Consequently, even if the surrounding pieces of land are later purchased by a single person, the owner of the field cannot make a claim for his path.

讜专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讚讗诪专 讻讗讚诪讜谉

The Gemara continues: And the statement of Rabbi Yirmeya, who said that the original verdict is repealed, is in accordance with the opinion of Admon. Admon apparently assumes that although the original verdict was that the field owner has no ability to successfully claim his path, nevertheless, that does not mean he loses his rights to the path. Rather, once the situation changes and the surrounding pieces of land are purchased by a single person, the original uncertainty is revived to allow him to make a claim for at least the shortest path to his field.

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讗谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讻讗讚诪讜谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 讗讚诪讜谉 讛转诐 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪诪讛 谞驻砖讱

The Gemara rejects the comparison: Rabbi Abba could have said to you: When I stated my ruling, it was even in accordance with the opinion of Admon. Admon states his ruling only there, in the case of the lost path, because the field owner said to the owner of the surrounding land: Whichever way you look at it,

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