Bava Kamma 93
״הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי שֹׁלֵחַ מַלְאָךְ לְפָנֶיךָ, לִשְׁמָרְךָ בַּדָּרֶךְ״.
“Behold, I send an angel before you, to keep you by the way” (Exodus 23:20), indicating that an angel was sent in place of God to guard the Jewish people.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַבָּה בַּר מָרִי, מְנָא הָא מִילְּתָא דְּאָמְרִי אִינָשֵׁי: בָּתַר מָרֵי נִיכְסֵי – צִיבֵי מְשֹׁךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְגַם לְלוֹט הַהֹלֵךְ אֶת אַבְרָם הָיָה צֹאן וּבָקָר וְאֹהָלִים״.
Rava said to Rabba bar Mari: From where is this matter derived whereby people say: Drag wood after a property owner. In other words, help out a wealthy man even in a small way, as this may lead to your benefiting from him. Rabba bar Mari said to him that the source is as it is written: “And Lot also, who went with Abram, had flocks, and herds, and tents” (Genesis 13:5).
אָמַר רַב חָנָן: הַמּוֹסֵר דִּין עַל חֲבֵירוֹ – הוּא נֶעֱנָשׁ תְּחִילָּה. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַתֹּאמֶר שָׂרַי אֶל אַבְרָם: חֲמָסִי עָלֶיךָ״, וּכְתִיב: ״וַיָּבֹא אַבְרָהָם לִסְפֹּד לְשָׂרָה וְלִבְכֹּתָהּ״. וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי דְּאִית לֵיהּ דִּינָא בְּאַרְעָא.
§ In connection with the incident of Abraham and Abimelech mentioned in the mishna, the Gemara quotes a related statement. Rabbi Ḥanan says: One who passes the judgment of another to Heaven is punished first, as it is stated: “And Sarai said to Abram: My wrong be upon you, I gave my handmaid into your bosom; and when she saw that she had conceived, I was despised in her eyes: The Lord judge between me and you” (Genesis 16:5). Sarai stated that God should judge Abram for his actions. And it is written: “And Abraham came to mourn for Sarah, and to weep for her” (Genesis 23:2), as Sarah died first. The Gemara comments: And this matter applies only in a situation where he has someone to do judgment for him on earth and has no need to appeal to the heavenly court.
אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: אוֹי לוֹ לַצּוֹעֵק יוֹתֵר מִן הַנִּצְעָק. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: אֶחָד הַצּוֹעֵק וְאֶחָד הַנִּצְעָק בַּמַּשְׁמָע, אֶלָּא שֶׁמְּמַהֲרִין לַצּוֹעֵק יוֹתֵר מִן הַנִּצְעָק.
Concerning this, Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Woe to he who cries out to Heaven more than the one about whom he is crying out. The Gemara comments: This concept is also taught in a baraita: Both the one who cries out and the one about whom he is crying out are included in the verse discussing the cries of an orphan who is mistreated: “If you afflict them, for if they cry at all to Me, I will surely hear their cry. My wrath shall wax hot, and I will kill you with the sword” (Exodus 22:22–23). But they are quicker to punish the one who cries out than the one about whom he is crying out, as in the incident with Sarai.
וְאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: לְעוֹלָם אַל תְּהִי קִלְלַת הֶדְיוֹט קַלָּה בְּעֵינֶיךָ. שֶׁהֲרֵי אֲבִימֶלֶךְ קִלֵּל אֶת שָׂרָה, וְנִתְקַיֵּים בְּזַרְעָהּ. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הִנֵּה הוּא לָךְ כְּסוּת עֵינַיִם״ – אָמַר לָהּ: הוֹאִיל וְכִסִּית מִמֶּנִּי וְלֹא גִּילִּית שֶׁהוּא אִישֵׁךְ, וְגָרַמְתְּ לִי הַצַּעַר הַזֶּה, יְהִי רָצוֹן שֶׁיְּהוּ לָךְ בָּנִים כְּסוּיֵי עֵינַיִם. וְנִתְקַיֵּים בְּזַרְעָהּ – דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיְהִי כִּי זָקֵן יִצְחָק, וַתִּכְהֶיןָ עֵינָיו מֵרְאֹת״.
The Gemara provides another lesson from the story of Abraham and Abimelech. And Rabbi Yitzḥak says: The curse of an ordinary person should never be regarded as light in your eyes, for Abimelech cursed Sarah and it was fulfilled in her descendant. The curse on Sarah is as it is stated: “Behold, it is to you a covering of the eyes” (Genesis 20:16), meaning that he said to her: Since you concealed your status from me and you did not reveal that Abraham is your husband, and you caused me this suffering, may it be God’s will that you should have children with covered eyes. And this curse was fulfilled in her descendant, as it is written: “And it came to pass, that when Isaac was old, and his eyes were dim, so that he could not see” (Genesis 27:1).
אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: לְעוֹלָם יְהֵא אָדָם מִן הַנִּרְדָּפִין, וְלֹא מִן הָרוֹדְפִין. שֶׁאֵין לְךָ נִרְדׇּף בָּעוֹפוֹת יוֹתֵר מִתּוֹרִים וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה, וְהִכְשִׁירָן הַכָּתוּב לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ.
Rabbi Abbahu says: A person should always be among those who are pursued and not among the pursuers. One can prove that this is so, as none among birds are pursued more than doves and pigeons, as all predators hunt them, and from all birds the verse deemed them fit to be sacrificed on the altar.
הָאוֹמֵר ״סַמֵּא אֶת עֵינִי״ כּוּ׳. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַסִּי בַּר חָמָא לְרָבָא: מַאי שְׁנָא רֵישָׁא, וּמַאי שְׁנָא סֵיפָא?
§ The mishna teaches: With regard to one who says to another: Blind my eye, or: Cut off my hand, or: Break my leg, and he does so, the latter is liable to pay for the damage, even if the injured party explicitly instructed him to do so on the condition that he will be exempt from payment. But if one instructs another to damage his property on the condition that he will be exempt from payment, he is exempt. Rav Asi bar Ḥama said to Rava: What is different in the first clause and what is different in the latter clause?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רֵישָׁא – לְפִי שֶׁאֵין אָדָם מוֹחֵל עַל רָאשֵׁי אֵבָרִים.
Rava said to him: In the case of the first clause he is liable, despite the fact that he was instructed to carry out the injury on the condition that he would be exempt, because a person does not forgo compensation for damage to his extremities such as his eyes, hands, and feet, mentioned in the mishna (92a). Consequently, when he told the assailant that he would be exempt, the presumption is that he was not sincere.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְכִי אָדָם מוֹחֵל עַל צַעֲרוֹ?! דְּתַנְיָא: ״הַכֵּנִי, פְּצָעֵנִי, עַל מְנָת לִפְטוֹר״ – פָּטוּר! אִישְׁתִּיק.
Rav Asi bar Ḥama said to him: But does a person forgo compensation for his pain when he doesn’t lose a limb? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who said to another: Strike me, or wound me, on the condition that you will be exempt from payment, he is exempt. According to Rava’s reasoning, he should be liable in this case as well, as the presumption should be that he was not sincere. Rava was silent, as he did not have a response.
אָמַר: מִידֵּי שְׁמִיעַ לָךְ בְּהָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, הָכִי אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מִשּׁוּם פְּגַם מִשְׁפָּחָה.
Rava said to him: Have you heard anything with regard to this matter? Rav Asi bar Ḥama said to him that this is what Rav Sheshet said: It is because loss of a limb may result in a family flaw, i.e., it may cause harm to the family name. One who loses a limb not only suffers pain; his family suffers as well. He is not in a position to forgive the assailant for the harm caused to his family, but he may forgo compensation for his own pain. Consequently, if he instructed another merely to injure him, without causing loss of limb, on condition that the assailant will be exempt from payment, the assailant will be exempt.
אִיתְּמַר, רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא אָמַר: מִשּׁוּם פְּגַם מִשְׁפָּחָה. רָבָא אָמַר: מִשּׁוּם שֶׁאֵין אָדָם מוֹחֵל עַל רָאשֵׁי אֵבָרִים שֶׁלּוֹ.
It was stated that the amora’im disagreed concerning the explanation for the ruling of the first clause of the mishna. Rabbi Oshaya says: It is because loss of a limb may result in a family flaw. Rava says: It is because a person does not forgo compensation for damage to his extremities.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: יֵשׁ ״הֵן״ שֶׁהוּא כְּ״לָאו״, וְיֵשׁ ״לָאו״ שֶׁהוּא כְּ״הֵן״.
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is a yes that, based on other factors, is like a no and is not viewed as giving consent. And conversely, there is a no that, based on other factors, is like a yes, and although one said no it is as though he gave consent. In this case as well, where he said: On condition to be exempt, he was not sincere.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: ״הַכֵּנִי, פְּצָעֵנִי״, ״עַל מְנָת לִפְטוֹר?״ וְאָמַר לוֹ ״הֵן״ – הֲרֵי יֵשׁ ״הֵן״ שֶׁהוּא כְּ״לָאו״. ״קְרַע אֶת כְּסוּתִי״, ״עַל מְנָת לִפְטוֹר?״ וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״לָאו״ – הֲרֵי ״לָאו״ שֶׁהוּא כְּ״הֵן״.
The Gemara comments that this is also taught in a baraita. With regard to one who said to another: Strike me, or wound me; and the other asks: Is this on the condition that I will be exempt from payment? And the first one said to him, in the tone of a question: Yes, this is an example of the principle: There is a yes that is like a no. It is as if the victim asked: Even if I give you permission to do it, do you think that I would forgo the compensation? By contrast, if one said: Tear my garment, and the other asks: Is this on the condition that I will be exempt from payment? And he said to him, in the tone of a question: No, this is an example of a no that is like a yes, since he meant to say that if he did not want to exempt him from payment he would not ask him to do it.
״שַׁבֵּר אֶת כַּדִּי״, ״קְרַע אֶת כְּסוּתִי״ – חַיָּיב. וּרְמִינְהִי: ״לִשְׁמוֹר״ – וְלֹא לְאַבֵּד, ״לִשְׁמוֹר״ – וְלֹא לִקְרוֹעַ, ״לִשְׁמוֹר״ – וְלֹא לְחַלֵּק לַעֲנִיִּים!
§ The mishna teaches that if one instructed another: Break my jug, or: Tear my garment, and the other did so, he is liable to pay for the damage. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: The verses state with regard to bailees: “If a man delivers to his neighbor money or vessels to safeguard” (Exodus 22:6), and: “If a man delivers to his neighbor an ass, or an ox, or a sheep, or any beast, to safeguard” (Exodus 22:9). The Sages derived from these verses that the bailee is liable if the item was given to him to safeguard, but not where it was given to him to destroy; if it was given to him to safeguard, but not where it was given to him to tear; if it was given to him to safeguard, but not where it was given to him to distribute to the poor. This indicates that a bailee is not liable for damage to an item if he was told to tear it, even if the owner did not state that it is on condition to be exempt.
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא; הָא דַּאֲתַי לִידֵיהּ, הָא דְּלָא אֲתַי לִידֵיהּ.
Rav Huna said: This is not difficult, as this mishna that obligates him to pay for the damage is dealing with a case where it came into his possession, and he was responsible for it before the owner instructed him to tear it. Therefore, even if he was instructed to tear it, he is liable. And that baraita, which exempts him from paying, is discussing a case where it did not come into his possession, but he simply tore it.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבָּה: ״לִשְׁמוֹר״ – דַּאֲתַי לִידֵיהּ מַשְׁמַע!
Rabba said to Rav Huna: But the phrase in the verse “to safeguard,” which obligates a bailee, indicates that it came into his possession already, and this is the case of the baraita that rules he is exempt.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבָּה: הָא וְהָא דַּאֲתָא לִידֵיהּ, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא; הָא דַּאֲתָא לִידֵיהּ בְּתוֹרַת שְׁמִירָה, הָא דַּאֲתָא לִידֵיהּ בְּתוֹרַת קְרִיעָה.
Rather, Rabba said: This and that are discussing a case where it came into his possession, and it is not difficult. This mishna is discussing a case where it came into his possession as an item given for safeguarding, and he is exempt if the owner stated explicitly that this will be the case, and that baraita is discussing a case where it came into his possession as an item given for tearing.
הָהוּא אַרְנְקָא דִצְדָקָה דַּאֲתַי לְפוּמְבְּדִיתָא, אַפְקְדַהּ רַב יוֹסֵף גַּבֵּי הָהוּא גַּבְרָא. פְּשַׁע בַּהּ, אֲתוֹ גַּנָּבֵי גַּנְבוּהָ. חַיְּיבֵיהּ רַב יוֹסֵף. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי, וְהָתַנְיָא: ״לִשְׁמוֹר״ – וְלֹא לְחַלֵּק לַעֲנִיִּים!
The Gemara relates: There was a certain purse full of charity money that came to the city of Pumbedita. Rav Yosef deposited it with a certain man. That man was negligent in safeguarding it and thieves came and stole it. Rav Yosef deemed the bailee liable to pay compensation. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: To safeguard, but not where it was given to him to distribute to the poor? This seems to teach that with regard to money that is distributed to the poor, there is no halakha of safeguarding.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עַנְיֵי דְפוּמְבְּדִיתָא מִיקָּץ קִיץ לְהוּ, וְ״לִשְׁמוֹר״ הוּא.
Rav Yosef said to him: The poor of Pumbedita have an amount that is set for them to receive. Each poor person already had a specific sum designated for him, and accordingly is in the category of: To safeguard. Therefore, he is liable.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַחוֹבֵל
MISHNA: In the case of one who robs another of wood and fashions it into vessels, or one who robs another of wool and fashions it into garments, he pays the robbery victim according to the value of the goods at the time of the robbery, but he need not return the vessels or garments. He has acquired the stolen items because they had undergone a change.
מַתְנִי׳ הַגּוֹזֵל עֵצִים וַעֲשָׂאָן כֵּלִים, צֶמֶר וַעֲשָׂאָן בְּגָדִים – מְשַׁלֵּם כִּשְׁעַת הַגְּזֵלָה.
If one robbed another of a pregnant cow and it then gave birth while in his possession, or if one robbed another of a ewe that was laden with wool and the robber then sheared it, the robber pays the value of a cow that is ready to give birth or the value of a ewe that is ready to be shorn. He pays the value of the animal at the time of the robbery, and the calf or the wool remains his.
גָּזַל פָּרָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת – וְיָלְדָה, רָחֵל טְעוּנָה – וּגְזָזָהּ; מְשַׁלֵּם דְּמֵי פָרָה הָעוֹמֶדֶת לֵילֵד, וּדְמֵי רָחֵל הָעוֹמֶדֶת לִיגָּזֵז.
If one robbed another of a cow, and it became pregnant in his possession, and it then gave birth; or if one robbed another of a ewe, and it became laden with wool in his possession, and he then sheared it, then the robber pays according to the value of the animal at the time of the robbery. This is the principle: All robbers pay according to the value of the stolen item at the time of the robbery.
גָּזַל פָּרָה – וְנִתְעַבְּרָה אֶצְלוֹ וְיָלְדָה, רָחֵל – וְנִטְעֲנָה אֶצְלוֹ וּגְזָזָהּ; מְשַׁלֵּם כִּשְׁעַת הַגְּזֵלָה. זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל הַגַּזְלָנִים מְשַׁלְּמִין כִּשְׁעַת הַגְּזֵלָה.
GEMARA: The Sages say: It can be inferred from the mishna that if one robbed another of wood and fashioned it into vessels, yes, the robber acquires the wood due to the change. If he merely sanded it, no, the robber does not acquire it, as this is not a significant change. Similarly, if one robbed another of wool and fashioned it into garments, yes, he has acquired the wool due to the change. If he merely washed it, no, he has not acquired it.
גְּמָ׳ אָמְרִי: עֵצִים וַעֲשָׂאָן כֵּלִים – אִין, שִׁיפָּן – לָא; צֶמֶר וַעֲשָׂאָן בְּגָדִים – אִין, לִיבְּנָן – לָא.
And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: If one robbed another of wood and sanded it, or stones and smoothed them, or wool and washed it, or flax and cleaned it, he pays according to the value of the stolen item at the time of the robbery. This baraita teaches that even a change such as sanding wood is regarded as a significant change.
וּרְמִינְהִי: גָּזַל עֵצִים וְשִׁיפָּן, אֲבָנִים וְסִיתְּתָן, צֶמֶר (וְלִיבְּנָן) [וְלִיבְּנוֹ], פִּשְׁתָּן וְנִקָּהוּ – מְשַׁלֵּם כִּשְׁעַת הַגְּזֵלָה.
Abaye said: This does not contradict the mishna. The tanna of our mishna teaches the halakha with regard to a change deemed significant by rabbinic law, which is not deemed significant by Torah law, as it is reversible. And all the more so, if the robber effects a change deemed significant by Torah law, i.e., an irreversible change, he acquires the stolen item due to the change.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: תַּנָּא דִּידַן קָתָנֵי שִׁינּוּי דְּרַבָּנַן – דְּהָדַר, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן שִׁינּוּי דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא;
The Gemara explains: Accordingly, it must be that the case in the mishna, where the change is reversible, where one robbed another of wood and fashioned it into vessels, is stated with regard to one who robbed another of sanded wood. And what are they? Boards that the robber used to construct a vessel, which is a change in which the item can revert to its original state, as, if the robber desires, he can disassemble them. Similarly, the case of one who robbed another of wool and fashioned it into garments refers to wool that was already spun, as fashioning them into garments is a change in which the item can revert to its original state, as, if the robber desires, he can unravel them. The mishna teaches that the robber acquires the stolen item by making these changes, and all the more so the robber acquires the stolen item through a change deemed significant by Torah law.
עֵצִים וַעֲשָׂאָן כֵּלִים – בְּעֵצִים מְשׁוּפִּין, וּמַאי נִינְהוּ? נְסָרִים; דְּשִׁינּוּי דְּהָדַר לִבְרִיָּיתֵיהּ הוּא – דְּאִי בָּעֵי מְשַׁלֵּיף לְהוּ. צֶמֶר וַעֲשָׂאָן בְּגָדִים – בְּצֶמֶר טָווּי; דְּשִׁינּוּי דַּהֲדַר לִבְרִיָּיתֵיהּ הוּא – דְּאִי בָּעֵי סָתַר לֵיהּ. וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן שִׁינּוּי דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.
Abaye continues his explanation: And the tanna of the baraita teaches the halakha with regard to a change deemed significant by Torah law, but he does not teach the halakha with regard to a change deemed significant by rabbinic law. It is possible that he maintains that the robber does not acquire the stolen item due to such a change.
וְתַנָּא בָּרָא – שִׁינּוּי דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא קָתָנֵי, וְשִׁינּוּי דְּרַבָּנַן לָא קָתָנֵי.
Rav Ashi stated another answer: The tanna of our mishna is also teaching the halakha with regard to a change deemed significant by Torah law. The case in the mishna of one who robbed another of wood and fashioned it into vessels is referring to one who constructed pestles [bukhanei], which is analogous to the case mentioned in the baraita where one sanded them, since a pestle is formed by trimming the wood in an irreversible manner. Similarly, the case in the mishna of one who robbed another of wool and fashioned it into garments is referring to one who fashioned the wool into pieces of felt [namtei], which is an irreversible change.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר, תַּנָּא דִּידַן נָמֵי שִׁינּוּי דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא קָתָנֵי: עֵצִים וַעֲשָׂאָן כֵּלִים – בּוּכָאנֵי, דְּהַיְינוּ שִׁיפָּן; צֶמֶר וַעֲשָׂאָן בְּגָדִים – נַמְטֵי, דְּהַיְינוּ שִׁינּוּי דְּלָא הָדַר.
The Gemara asks a question with regard to the baraita: But does washing effect a significant change, so that one who robs another of wool and washes it acquires the wool and pays its value at the time of robbery? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna that discusses the halakhot of the first of the sheared wool, which one must give to a priest (Ḥullin 135a): If the owner of the sheep did not manage to give the sheared wool to the priest before he dyed it, he is exempt from giving it to the priest, as the obligation is in effect only with regard to wool remaining in its original state. By contrast, if he washed it but did not dye it, he is obligated to give it to the priest. This indicates that washing does not effect a significant change.
וְלִיבּוּן מִי הָוֵי שִׁינּוּי? וּרְמִינְהִי: לֹא הִסְפִּיק לִיתְּנוֹ לוֹ עַד שֶׁצְּבָעוֹ – פָּטוּר. לִבְּנוֹ וְלֹא צְבָעוֹ – חַיָּיב!
Abaye said: It is not difficult. This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, whereas that mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the first of the sheared wool: If one sheared it, spun it, and wove it, the sheared wool does not combine with the wool from other sheep to constitute the minimum quantity of wool for which one is obligated to give the first of the sheared wool to the priest. If one washed it, then Rabbi Shimon says that it does not combine with the wool of other sheep, as washing effects a significant change, and the Rabbis say that it combines with the wool of other sheep, as washing does not effect a significant change. Their opinions correspond to the opinions in the baraita and mishna previously quoted.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לָא קַשְׁיָא; הָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, הָא רַבָּנַן. דְּתַנְיָא: גְּזָזוֹ, טְווֹאוֹ וַאֲרָגוֹ – אֵין מִצְטָרֵף. לִבְּנוֹ – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֵין מִצְטָרֵף, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מִצְטָרֵף.
Rava stated another answer: This and that, i.e., both the mishna and the baraita, are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and it is not difficult. This mishna is referring to a case where one untangled the strands of wool by hand before washing it. In this case, the washing is not fully effective, and does not effect a significant change. That baraita is referring to a case where one combed it before washing it. The washing is more effective and consequently effects a significant change.
רָבָא אָמַר: הָא וְהָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא; הָא דְּנַפְּצֵיהּ נַפּוֹצֵי, הָא דִּסַרְקֵיהּ סָרוֹקֵי.
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin stated another answer: This mishna is referring to a case where one merely whitened it, which is not a significant change. That baraita is referring to a case where one bleached it with sulfur, which is a significant change.
רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין אָמַר: הָא דְּחַוְּורֵיהּ חַוּוֹרֵי, הָא דְּכַבְרֵיהּ כַּבְרוֹיֵי.
Having demonstrated that, according to Rabbi Shimon, washing effects a significant change, the Gemara asks: Now that it can be said that, according to Rabbi Shimon, dye does not effect a significant change, as the Gemara will prove, can it be said that washing effects a significant change? As it is taught in a baraita: If he sheared sheep one by one and dyed the wool of each sheep before shearing the next sheep, or sheared them one by one and spun the wool, or sheared them one by one and wove the wool, then the wool sheared from the different sheep does not combine to constitute the minimum quantity of wool for which one is obligated to give the first of the sheared wool to the priest. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Even if he dyed it, it combines with the other wool. This indicates that, according to Rabbi Shimon, even dyeing the wool is not a significant change, so how could he maintain that washing it is?
הַשְׁתָּא יֵשׁ לוֹמַר צֶבַע לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לָא הָוֵי שִׁינּוּי, לִיבּוּן הָוֵי שִׁינּוּי? דְּתַנְיָא: גָּזַז רִאשׁוֹן רִאשׁוֹן וּצְבָעוֹ, רִאשׁוֹן רִאשׁוֹן וּטְווֹאוֹ, רִאשׁוֹן רִאשׁוֹן וַאֲרָגוֹ – אֵין מִצְטָרֵף. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: צְבָעוֹ – מִצְטָרֵף.
Abaye said: This is not difficult. This statement, that washed wool does not combine with other wool, is the opinion of the Rabbis in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, while that statement, that even dyed wool combines with other wool, is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. There is a dispute as to what Rabbi Shimon rules with regard to this issue.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לָא קַשְׁיָא; הָא רַבָּנַן אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, הָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.
Rava said: Actually, the Rabbis do not disagree with Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, and they are also of the opinion that Rabbi Shimon holds that washing effects a significant change. And as for the apparent contradiction, dye is different and it does not effect a significant change, since one is able to remove it with soap [tzafon] and return the wool to its previous state. And when it is taught there, in the mishna cited above, that if one did not manage to give the sheared wool to the priest before he dyed it he is exempt, and this ruling was established in accordance with all opinions, it was not stated with regard to ordinary dye but with regard to indigo, which cannot be removed with soap and therefore effects a permanent and therefore significant change.
רָבָא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם לָא פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה, וְשָׁאנֵי צֶבַע – הוֹאִיל וְיָכוֹל לְהַעֲבִירוֹ עַל יְדֵי צָפוֹן. וְכִי קָתָנֵי הָתָם: לֹא הִסְפִּיק לִיתְּנוֹ לוֹ עַד שֶׁצְּבָעוֹ – פָּטוּר, וְאוֹקִימְנָא כְּדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל; בְּקָלָא אִילָן דְּלָא עָבַר.
§ Abaye said: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, and Beit Shammai, and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and Rabbi Yishmael all hold that despite a change, the changed item remains in its place, i.e., the changed item is still considered to have the status it had before the change. The Gemara proceeds to prove that each of these tanna’im holds this way: The opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda is that which we just said. He says that, according to Rabbi Shimon, even if the wool is dyed it still combines with the wool of other animals to constitute the minimum quantity of wool for which one is obligated to give the first of the sheared wool to the priest.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה, וּבֵית שַׁמַּאי, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר, וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – כּוּלְּהוּ סְבִירָא לְהוּ: שִׁינּוּי בִּמְקוֹמוֹ עוֹמֵד. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה – הָא דַּאֲמַרַן.
What is the source that indicates that Beit Shammai maintain that an item that undergoes a change is considered to have the same status that it had before the change? As it is taught in a baraita: If one gave a prostitute wheat as her payment, and she ground it and converted it into flour; or if he gave her olives, and she squeezed them and converted them into oil; or if he gave her grapes, and she squeezed them and converted them into wine; and if, in any of these cases, she subsequently consecrated the final product, it is taught in one baraita that it is prohibited to sacrifice them upon the altar as a meal-offering or libation, as the Torah states: “You shall not bring the hire of a harlot or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19). And it is taught in another baraita that it is permitted, as the Gemara will explain. And Rav Yosef says: It was taught by Guryon
בֵּית שַׁמַּאי מַאי הִיא? דְּתַנְיָא: נָתַן לָהּ חִטִּין בְּאֶתְנַנָּהּ, וַעֲשָׂאָן סוֹלֶת; זֵיתִים וַעֲשָׂאָן שֶׁמֶן; עֲנָבִים וַעֲשָׂאָן יַיִן – תָּנֵי חֲדָא: אָסוּר, וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: מוּתָּר. וְאָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף, תָּנֵי גּוּרְיוֹן
