There are four opinions about whether a get that was not written li’shma disqualifies the woman from being married to a kohen. The debate is about which cases of li’shma, if any, would disqualify and which would not. Why? Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion is consistent with his opinion regarding the distribution of inheritance property. Why was it necessary for him to teach both cases if theoretically, one could have learned from one case to the other? Rav Hoshaya asked a question about using retroactive designation (breira) for writing a get li’shma. Rav Yehuda answered him from our Mishna that laws of retroactive designation do not work. Rav Hoshaya questioned this answer from a Mishna in Pesachim where rules of retroactive designation seem to work. However, Rav Yehuda explains that the Pesachim case has nothing to do with the rules of breira. Abaye questions the whole discussion between Rav Hoshaya and Rav Yehuda as the cases are very different as some relate to a later decision made by the person himself, as opposed to others which are dependent on some other person and shouldn’t laws of breira be different in each of those types of cases? Rava disagrees and thinks there would be no reason to distinguish. Still, Rav Hamnuna tries to prove him wrong as both Rav Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon hold that breira does not apply in a case where the decision is made by the owner, as can be proven from the case of wine from which tithes weren’t taken, but does apply in cases where the decision was based on someone else.
Gittin 25
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This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Joseph Cohen, Yosef ben Moshe HaCohen, z”l. “He was hard working, loved to sing, esp. as a chazan, and was very dedicated to his family and community.”
Gittin 25
קָטָן וְאַנְפִּילְיָא – פְּסוּלוֹת וְאֵין פּוֹסְלוֹת.
However, if the yavam was a minor, or if the yevama performed ḥalitza while he was wearing a soft shoe made of cloth [anpileya] and not the shoe used for ḥalitza, then these acts of ḥalitza are invalid, and in these cases they do not disqualify her from entering into levirate marriage.
זְעֵירִי אָמַר: כּוּלָּן אֵין פּוֹסְלִין, חוּץ מִן הָאַחֲרוֹן.
The Gemara quotes another opinion with regard to the question of which of the bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna would disqualify the woman from marrying a priest. Ze’eiri says: Reception of any of the bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna does not disqualify the woman from marrying a priest except in the final case, where the husband instructed the scribe to write a bill of divorce for one of his wives and explained that he would later decide which wife would be given the bill of divorce.
וְכֵן אָמַר רַב אַסִּי: כּוּלָּן אֵין פּוֹסְלִין, חוּץ מִן הָאַחֲרוֹן. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אַף אַחֲרוֹן נָמֵי אֵינוֹ פּוֹסֵל.
And similarly, Rav Asi says: Reception of any of the bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna does not disqualify the woman from marrying a priest except in the final case. But Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even in the final case, that bill of divorce does not disqualify her from marrying a priest as well, as even that bill of divorce is not a bill of divorce at all. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, there is no concern that retroactive clarification will determine that the bill of divorce was written for the sake of the woman who received it, while the amora’im who hold that the woman is disqualified from marrying a priest in the final case of the mishna regard the efficacy of retroactive clarification to be uncertain.
וְאַזְדָּא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְטַעְמֵיהּ – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָאַחִין שֶׁחָלְקוּ – לָקוֹחוֹת הֵן, וּמַחְזִירִין זֶה לָזֶה בַּיּוֹבֵל.
The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his own line of reasoning. As Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Brothers who divided property they received as an inheritance are considered purchasers from each other, and as purchasers of land they must return the portions to each other in the Jubilee Year. In the Jubilee Year, all land that had been purchased since the previous Jubilee Year reverts to the possession of the original owner. In this case, the land the brothers inherited from their father reverts to their joint ownership. Evidently, when they divided the land, this is not viewed as if it is retroactively clarified who inherited which portion from their father.
וּצְרִיכָא; דְּאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּאֵין בְּרֵירָה, מִשּׁוּם דְּבָעֵינַן ״לַהּ״– לִשְׁמָהּ; אֲבָל הָתָם, מֶכֶר – הוּא דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא לִיהְדַּר בְּיוֹבֵל, אֲבָל יְרוּשָּׁה וּמַתָּנָה – לָא.
And it is necessary for Rabbi Yoḥanan to state that there is no retroactive clarification both with regard to inheritance and with regard to a bill of divorce, as, if it were stated only with regard to this case, that of a bill of divorce, then one could say that with regard to this Rabbi Yoḥanan said that there is no retroactive clarification because we require that the bill of divorce be written in accordance with the verse: “He writes for her” (Deuteronomy 24:3), i.e., for her sake; but there, in the case of inheritance, one could say: It is only in the case of a sale that the Merciful One states that it will be returned in the Jubilee Year, but an inheritance and a gift will not be returned.
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן שָׂדֶה, מִשּׁוּם דִּלְחוּמְרָא; אִי נָמֵי, כַּתְּחִילָּה; אֲבָל הָכָא – אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.
And if he had taught us that there is no retroactive clarification only with regard to the inheritance of a field, then one could say that this is due to the fact that he holds that they must redistribute the property only as a stringency, but he would hold that in this case one must also be stringent and be concerned that it is a divorce. Alternatively, perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling was not because there is no retroactive clarification but because the halakha of the Jubilee Year requires that all land be returned to its state as it was initially, when the land had been divided among the tribes; but here, with regard to a bill of divorce, say that this consideration is not relevant, and there is retroactive clarification. Therefore, it is necessary for Rabbi Yoḥanan to rule that there is no retroactive clarification in each case separately.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא מֵרַב יְהוּדָה: אָמַר לְלַבְלָר: ״כְּתוֹב לְאֵיזוֹ שֶׁתֵּצֵא בַּפֶּתַח תְּחִילָּה״, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, תְּנֵיתוּהָ: יָתֵר מִיכֵּן, אָמַר לְלַבְלָר ״כְּתוֹב לְאֵיזוֹ שֶׁאֶרְצֶה אֲגָרֵשׁ״ – פָּסוּל לְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ, אַלְמָא אֵין בְּרֵירָה!
§ The Gemara continues its discussion of the final case of the mishna. Rav Hoshaya asked of Rav Yehuda: If a husband said to a scribe: Write a bill of divorce for whichever of my wives emerges from the entrance first, what is the halakha? Rav Yehuda said to him: You learned it already in the mishna: Moreover, even if he said to the scribe: Write a bill of divorce for whichever one of them that I will want and I will divorce her with it, it is unfit for him to divorce either wife with it. Apparently, there is no retroactive clarification.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ, הָאוֹמֵר לְבָנָיו: ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַפֶּסַח עַל מִי שֶׁיַּעֲלֶה מִכֶּם רִאשׁוֹן לִירוּשָׁלַיִם״; כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּכְנַס רִאשׁוֹן רֹאשׁוֹ וְרוּבּוֹ – זָכָה בְּחֶלְקוֹ, וּמְזַכֶּה אֶת אֶחָיו עִמּוֹ.
Rav Hoshaya raised an objection to Rav Yehuda’s answer based on a mishna (Pesaḥim 89a): In the case of one who says to his children: I am slaughtering the Paschal offering on behalf of whichever of you goes up first to Jerusalem, once the first of the children has entered with his head and the majority of his body into Jerusalem, he has acquired his portion and acquires the portions of his brothers together with him on their behalf. This mishna indicates that there is retroactive clarification, as it becomes clear retroactively that the father slaughtered the Paschal offering on behalf of this son.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הוֹשַׁעְיָא בְּרִי, מָה עִנְיַן פְּסָחִים אֵצֶל גִּיטִּין? הָא אִתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כְּדֵי לְזָרְזָן בְּמִצְוֹת!
Rav Yehuda said to him: Hoshaya, my son, what do Paschal offerings have to do with bills of divorce? Wasn’t it stated concerning this mishna that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The mishna is not based on retroactive clarification; rather, the father included all his children in his Paschal offering from the outset. He created this competition only in order to galvanize them, so that they would be expeditious in their fulfillment of mitzvot.
דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי: כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּכְנַס רִאשׁוֹן רֹאשׁוֹ וְרוּבּוֹ – זָכָה בְּחֶלְקוֹ, וּמְזַכֶּה אֶת אֶחָיו עִמּוֹ. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא דְּאַמְנִינְהוּ מֵעִיקָּרָא – שַׁפִּיר; אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ דְּלָא אַמְנִינְהוּ, לְאַחַר שְׁחִיטָה מִי קָמִיתְמְנוּ?! וְהָתְנַן: נִמְנִין, וּמוֹשְׁכִין יְדֵיהֶן מִמֶּנּוּ, עַד שֶׁיִּשָּׁחֵט!
The Gemara comments that according to the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan, the language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Once the first of the children has entered with his head and the majority of his body into Jerusalem, he has acquired his portion and acquires the portions of his brothers together with him on their behalf. Granted, if you say that the father registered them initially, before slaughtering the Paschal offering, the ruling is well understood. But if you say that he did not register them initially, can they then be registered after the slaughter of the Paschal offering? Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pesaḥim 89a): People may be registered and withdraw themselves from being registered for a Paschal offering until it is slaughtered, but not after? Clearly, then, the children must have already been registered before the father said his statement.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: מַעֲשֶׂה, וְקָדְמוּ בָּנוֹת לַבָּנִים, וְנִמְצְאוּ בָּנוֹת זְרִיזוֹת וּבָנִים שְׁפָלִים.
That the competition was meant only to galvanize his children to be expeditious in their fulfillment of mitzvot is also taught in a baraita that records this type of competition: There was an incident such as this, and the daughters preceded the sons. And the daughters were found to have demonstrated that they were enthusiastic, whereas the sons were found to have demonstrated that they were lazy. The baraita is critical of the sons but does not say that they did not partake of the Paschal offering. Evidently the father slaughtered the offering for them as well.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: קָא בָּעֵי מִינֵּיהּ תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים, וְקָא פָשֵׁיט לֵיהּ תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ, וַהֲדַר מוֹתֵיב לֵיהּ תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים!
Questioning Rav Yehuda’s original answer to Rav Hoshaya, Abaye said: He asks him about a case where one makes the clarification dependent on the decision of others, but he resolves it based on a case where the husband makes the clarification dependent on his own decision. Rav Hoshaya asked about a bill of divorce written for whichever wife exits first, which depends on someone other than the husband, and Rav Yehuda resolved the question based on the mishna where the husband reserved the right to decide which wife he will divorce with the bill of divorce, which depends on his own decision. And then Rav Hoshaya raised an objection to him based on the mishna concerning the Paschal offering, where one makes the clarification dependent on the decision of others.
אָמַר רָבָא: מַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא, דְּמַאן דְּאִית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה – לָא שְׁנָא תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ וְלָא שְׁנָא תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים, אִית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה, וּמַאן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה – לָא שְׁנָא תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ וְלָא שְׁנָא תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים, לֵית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה!
Rava said: What is the difficulty here? Perhaps it is so that for the one who accepts the principle of retroactive clarification, it is no different if one makes it dependent on his own decision, and it is no different if one makes it dependent on the decision of others. In either case, he accepts the principle of retroactive clarification. And according to the one who does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, it is no different if one makes it dependent on his own decision, and it is no different if one makes it dependent on the decision of others. In either case, he does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא לְרָבָא: וְהָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּתוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ לֵית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה, וְתוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים אִית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה!
Rav Mesharshiyya said to Rava: The issue of retroactive clarification is contingent upon the question of on whom the outcome is dependent. But isn’t there the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who in a case where one makes it dependent on his own decision, he does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, but when one makes it dependent on the decision of others, he accepts the principle of retroactive clarification?
תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ לֵית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה – דְּתַנְיָא: הַלּוֹקֵחַ יַיִן מִבֵּין הַכּוּתִים, אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵי לוּגִּין שֶׁאֲנִי עָתִיד לְהַפְרִישׁ – הֲרֵי הֵן תְּרוּמָה; עֲשָׂרָה מַעֲשֵׂר רִאשׁוֹן; תִּשְׁעָה מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי;
The Gemara elaborates: When one makes it dependent on his own decision, Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, as it is taught in the Tosefta (Demai 8:7): In the case of one who purchases wine from among the Samaritans, about whom it is assumed that they did not separate teruma and tithes, and he is not in a position to now separate teruma, he acts as follows: If there are, for example, one hundred log of wine in the barrels, he says: Two log that I will separate in the future are teruma, as the mandated average measure of teruma is one-fiftieth; ten log are first tithe; and one-tenth of the remainder, which is approximately nine log, are second tithe.
וּמֵיחֵל וְשׁוֹתֶה מִיָּד, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹסְרִין.
And he deconsecrates the second tithe that he will separate in the future, transferring its sanctity to money, and he may drink the wine immediately, relying on the separation that he will perform later, which will clarify retroactively which log he designated for the tithes and for teruma. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. However, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon prohibit this practice, as they hold that in this case there is no retroactive clarification. It is therefore evident that according to Rabbi Yehuda, there is no retroactive clarification where one makes the clarification dependent on his own decision.
תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים אִית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה – דִּתְנַן: מָה הִיא בְּאוֹתָן הַיָּמִים?
By contrast, in a case where one makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, Rabbi Yehuda accepts the principle of retroactive clarification, as we learned in a mishna (73a): In a case where an ill husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die due to this illness, if he dies, the bill of divorce takes effect from the time of his statement. The mishna asks: What is the halakhic status of the wife in those days between when the bill of divorce was given but before the husband died?
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי הִיא כְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ לְכׇל דְּבָרֶיהָ, וּלְכִי מָיֵית הָוֵי גִּיטָּא.
Rabbi Yehuda says: She is like a married woman with regard to all of her matters, and she remains forbidden to other men; and when he will die, it is a bill of divorce. Death is equivalent to a matter that is dependent on the decision of others. Since Rabbi Yehuda agrees that the bill of divorce takes effect retroactively, as it cannot take effect after the death of the husband, he evidently holds that there is retroactive clarification where one makes the clarification dependent on the decision of others.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא לְרָבָא: הָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּתוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ לֵית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה, וְתוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים אִית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה!
Furthermore, Rav Mesharshiyya said to Rava: But isn’t there Rabbi Shimon, who, in a case where one makes the outcome dependent on his own decision, does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, but when one makes it dependent on the decision of others, he accepts the principle of retroactive clarification?
תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ לֵית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה – הָא דַּאֲמַרַן. תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים אִית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה – דְּתַנְיָא: ״הֲרֵינִי בּוֹעֲלִיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּרְצֶה אַבָּא״; אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא רָצָה הָאָב – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: רָצָה הָאָב – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת,
The Gemara elaborates: When one makes the outcome dependent on his own decision, Rabbi Shimon does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification. This is understood from that which we said in the case of wine purchased from Samaritans. When one makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, Rabbi Shimon accepts the principle of retroactive clarification, as it is taught in a baraita in the Tosefta (Kiddushin 3:7): If a man said to a woman: I am engaging in sexual intercourse with you for the purpose of betrothal on the condition that my father will desire our betrothal, and then he married her without specification, then even if the father did not desire it she is nevertheless betrothed through this act of intercourse. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If the father desires it, she is betrothed,
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I began to learn this cycle of Daf Yomi after my husband passed away 2 1/2 years ago. It seemed a good way to connect to him. Even though I don’t know whether he would have encouraged women learning Gemara, it would have opened wonderful conversations. It also gives me more depth for understanding my frum children and grandchildren. Thank you Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle Farber!!
Tzur Hadassah, Israel
When I started studying Hebrew at Brown University’s Hillel, I had no idea that almost 38 years later, I’m doing Daf Yomi. My Shabbat haburah is led by Rabbanit Leah Sarna. The women are a hoot. I’m tracking the completion of each tractate by reading Ilana Kurshan’s memoir, If All the Seas Were Ink.
Pennsylvania, United States
After experiences over the years of asking to join gemara shiurim for men and either being refused by the maggid shiur or being the only women there, sometimes behind a mechitza, I found out about Hadran sometime during the tail end of Masechet Shabbat, I think. Life has been much better since then.
London, United Kingdom
Margo
I started my Talmud journey in 7th grade at Akiba Jewish Day School in Chicago. I started my Daf Yomi journey after hearing Erica Brown speak at the Hadran Siyum about marking the passage of time through Daf Yomi.
Carolyn
I started my Talmud journey post-college in NY with a few classes. I started my Daf Yomi journey after the Hadran Siyum, which inspired both my son and myself.
Merion Station, USA
Beit Shemesh, Israel
In January 2020 on a Shabbaton to Baltimore I heard about the new cycle of Daf Yomi after the siyum celebration in NYC stadium. I started to read “ a daily dose of Talmud “ and really enjoyed it . It led me to google “ do Orthodox women study Talmud? “ and found HADRAN! Since then I listen to the podcast every morning, participate in classes and siyum. I love to learn, this is amazing! Thank you
Atlanta, United States
I never thought I’d be able to do Daf Yomi till I saw the video of Hadran’s Siyum HaShas. Now, 2 years later, I’m about to participate in Siyum Seder Mo’ed with my Hadran community. It has been an incredible privilege to learn with Rabbanit Michelle and to get to know so many caring, talented and knowledgeable women. I look forward with great anticipation and excitement to learning Seder Nashim.
Karmiel, Israel
After enthusing to my friend Ruth Kahan about how much I had enjoyed remote Jewish learning during the earlier part of the pandemic, she challenged me to join her in learning the daf yomi cycle. I had always wanted to do daf yomi but now had no excuse. The beginning was particularly hard as I had never studied Talmud but has become easier, as I have gained some familiarity with it.
Brookline, United States
I attended the Siyum so that I could tell my granddaughter that I had been there. Then I decided to listen on Spotify and after the siyum of Brachot, Covid and zoom began. It gave structure to my day. I learn with people from all over the world who are now my friends – yet most of us have never met. I can’t imagine life without it. Thank you Rabbanit Michelle.
Raanana, Israel
Ontario, Canada
After all the hype on the 2020 siyum I became inspired by a friend to begin learning as the new cycle began.with no background in studying Talmud it was a bit daunting in the beginning. my husband began at the same time so we decided to study on shabbat together. The reaction from my 3 daughters has been fantastic. They are very proud. It’s been a great challenge for my brain which is so healthy!
Modi’in, Israel
Jerusalem, Israel
Philadelphia, United States
I learned daf more off than on 40 years ago. At the beginning of the current cycle, I decided to commit to learning daf regularly. Having Rabanit Michelle available as a learning partner has been amazing. Sometimes I learn with Hadran, sometimes with my husband, and sometimes on my own. It’s been fun to be part of an extended learning community.
Honolulu, Hawaii, United States
Phoenix, Arizona, United States
Mamaroneck, NY, United States
I read Ilana Kurshan’s “If All the Seas Were Ink” which inspired me. Then the Women’s Siyum in Jerusalem in 2020 convinced me, I knew I had to join! I have loved it- it’s been a constant in my life daily, many of the sugiyot connect to our lives. My family and friends all are so supportive. It’s incredible being part of this community and love how diverse it is! I am so excited to learn more!
Jerusalem, Israel
Gittin 25
קָטָן וְאַנְפִּילְיָא – פְּסוּלוֹת וְאֵין פּוֹסְלוֹת.
However, if the yavam was a minor, or if the yevama performed ḥalitza while he was wearing a soft shoe made of cloth [anpileya] and not the shoe used for ḥalitza, then these acts of ḥalitza are invalid, and in these cases they do not disqualify her from entering into levirate marriage.
זְעֵירִי אָמַר: כּוּלָּן אֵין פּוֹסְלִין, חוּץ מִן הָאַחֲרוֹן.
The Gemara quotes another opinion with regard to the question of which of the bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna would disqualify the woman from marrying a priest. Ze’eiri says: Reception of any of the bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna does not disqualify the woman from marrying a priest except in the final case, where the husband instructed the scribe to write a bill of divorce for one of his wives and explained that he would later decide which wife would be given the bill of divorce.
וְכֵן אָמַר רַב אַסִּי: כּוּלָּן אֵין פּוֹסְלִין, חוּץ מִן הָאַחֲרוֹן. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אַף אַחֲרוֹן נָמֵי אֵינוֹ פּוֹסֵל.
And similarly, Rav Asi says: Reception of any of the bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna does not disqualify the woman from marrying a priest except in the final case. But Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even in the final case, that bill of divorce does not disqualify her from marrying a priest as well, as even that bill of divorce is not a bill of divorce at all. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, there is no concern that retroactive clarification will determine that the bill of divorce was written for the sake of the woman who received it, while the amora’im who hold that the woman is disqualified from marrying a priest in the final case of the mishna regard the efficacy of retroactive clarification to be uncertain.
וְאַזְדָּא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְטַעְמֵיהּ – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָאַחִין שֶׁחָלְקוּ – לָקוֹחוֹת הֵן, וּמַחְזִירִין זֶה לָזֶה בַּיּוֹבֵל.
The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his own line of reasoning. As Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Brothers who divided property they received as an inheritance are considered purchasers from each other, and as purchasers of land they must return the portions to each other in the Jubilee Year. In the Jubilee Year, all land that had been purchased since the previous Jubilee Year reverts to the possession of the original owner. In this case, the land the brothers inherited from their father reverts to their joint ownership. Evidently, when they divided the land, this is not viewed as if it is retroactively clarified who inherited which portion from their father.
וּצְרִיכָא; דְּאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּאֵין בְּרֵירָה, מִשּׁוּם דְּבָעֵינַן ״לַהּ״– לִשְׁמָהּ; אֲבָל הָתָם, מֶכֶר – הוּא דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא לִיהְדַּר בְּיוֹבֵל, אֲבָל יְרוּשָּׁה וּמַתָּנָה – לָא.
And it is necessary for Rabbi Yoḥanan to state that there is no retroactive clarification both with regard to inheritance and with regard to a bill of divorce, as, if it were stated only with regard to this case, that of a bill of divorce, then one could say that with regard to this Rabbi Yoḥanan said that there is no retroactive clarification because we require that the bill of divorce be written in accordance with the verse: “He writes for her” (Deuteronomy 24:3), i.e., for her sake; but there, in the case of inheritance, one could say: It is only in the case of a sale that the Merciful One states that it will be returned in the Jubilee Year, but an inheritance and a gift will not be returned.
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן שָׂדֶה, מִשּׁוּם דִּלְחוּמְרָא; אִי נָמֵי, כַּתְּחִילָּה; אֲבָל הָכָא – אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.
And if he had taught us that there is no retroactive clarification only with regard to the inheritance of a field, then one could say that this is due to the fact that he holds that they must redistribute the property only as a stringency, but he would hold that in this case one must also be stringent and be concerned that it is a divorce. Alternatively, perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling was not because there is no retroactive clarification but because the halakha of the Jubilee Year requires that all land be returned to its state as it was initially, when the land had been divided among the tribes; but here, with regard to a bill of divorce, say that this consideration is not relevant, and there is retroactive clarification. Therefore, it is necessary for Rabbi Yoḥanan to rule that there is no retroactive clarification in each case separately.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא מֵרַב יְהוּדָה: אָמַר לְלַבְלָר: ״כְּתוֹב לְאֵיזוֹ שֶׁתֵּצֵא בַּפֶּתַח תְּחִילָּה״, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, תְּנֵיתוּהָ: יָתֵר מִיכֵּן, אָמַר לְלַבְלָר ״כְּתוֹב לְאֵיזוֹ שֶׁאֶרְצֶה אֲגָרֵשׁ״ – פָּסוּל לְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ, אַלְמָא אֵין בְּרֵירָה!
§ The Gemara continues its discussion of the final case of the mishna. Rav Hoshaya asked of Rav Yehuda: If a husband said to a scribe: Write a bill of divorce for whichever of my wives emerges from the entrance first, what is the halakha? Rav Yehuda said to him: You learned it already in the mishna: Moreover, even if he said to the scribe: Write a bill of divorce for whichever one of them that I will want and I will divorce her with it, it is unfit for him to divorce either wife with it. Apparently, there is no retroactive clarification.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ, הָאוֹמֵר לְבָנָיו: ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַפֶּסַח עַל מִי שֶׁיַּעֲלֶה מִכֶּם רִאשׁוֹן לִירוּשָׁלַיִם״; כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּכְנַס רִאשׁוֹן רֹאשׁוֹ וְרוּבּוֹ – זָכָה בְּחֶלְקוֹ, וּמְזַכֶּה אֶת אֶחָיו עִמּוֹ.
Rav Hoshaya raised an objection to Rav Yehuda’s answer based on a mishna (Pesaḥim 89a): In the case of one who says to his children: I am slaughtering the Paschal offering on behalf of whichever of you goes up first to Jerusalem, once the first of the children has entered with his head and the majority of his body into Jerusalem, he has acquired his portion and acquires the portions of his brothers together with him on their behalf. This mishna indicates that there is retroactive clarification, as it becomes clear retroactively that the father slaughtered the Paschal offering on behalf of this son.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הוֹשַׁעְיָא בְּרִי, מָה עִנְיַן פְּסָחִים אֵצֶל גִּיטִּין? הָא אִתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כְּדֵי לְזָרְזָן בְּמִצְוֹת!
Rav Yehuda said to him: Hoshaya, my son, what do Paschal offerings have to do with bills of divorce? Wasn’t it stated concerning this mishna that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The mishna is not based on retroactive clarification; rather, the father included all his children in his Paschal offering from the outset. He created this competition only in order to galvanize them, so that they would be expeditious in their fulfillment of mitzvot.
דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי: כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּכְנַס רִאשׁוֹן רֹאשׁוֹ וְרוּבּוֹ – זָכָה בְּחֶלְקוֹ, וּמְזַכֶּה אֶת אֶחָיו עִמּוֹ. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא דְּאַמְנִינְהוּ מֵעִיקָּרָא – שַׁפִּיר; אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ דְּלָא אַמְנִינְהוּ, לְאַחַר שְׁחִיטָה מִי קָמִיתְמְנוּ?! וְהָתְנַן: נִמְנִין, וּמוֹשְׁכִין יְדֵיהֶן מִמֶּנּוּ, עַד שֶׁיִּשָּׁחֵט!
The Gemara comments that according to the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan, the language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Once the first of the children has entered with his head and the majority of his body into Jerusalem, he has acquired his portion and acquires the portions of his brothers together with him on their behalf. Granted, if you say that the father registered them initially, before slaughtering the Paschal offering, the ruling is well understood. But if you say that he did not register them initially, can they then be registered after the slaughter of the Paschal offering? Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pesaḥim 89a): People may be registered and withdraw themselves from being registered for a Paschal offering until it is slaughtered, but not after? Clearly, then, the children must have already been registered before the father said his statement.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: מַעֲשֶׂה, וְקָדְמוּ בָּנוֹת לַבָּנִים, וְנִמְצְאוּ בָּנוֹת זְרִיזוֹת וּבָנִים שְׁפָלִים.
That the competition was meant only to galvanize his children to be expeditious in their fulfillment of mitzvot is also taught in a baraita that records this type of competition: There was an incident such as this, and the daughters preceded the sons. And the daughters were found to have demonstrated that they were enthusiastic, whereas the sons were found to have demonstrated that they were lazy. The baraita is critical of the sons but does not say that they did not partake of the Paschal offering. Evidently the father slaughtered the offering for them as well.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: קָא בָּעֵי מִינֵּיהּ תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים, וְקָא פָשֵׁיט לֵיהּ תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ, וַהֲדַר מוֹתֵיב לֵיהּ תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים!
Questioning Rav Yehuda’s original answer to Rav Hoshaya, Abaye said: He asks him about a case where one makes the clarification dependent on the decision of others, but he resolves it based on a case where the husband makes the clarification dependent on his own decision. Rav Hoshaya asked about a bill of divorce written for whichever wife exits first, which depends on someone other than the husband, and Rav Yehuda resolved the question based on the mishna where the husband reserved the right to decide which wife he will divorce with the bill of divorce, which depends on his own decision. And then Rav Hoshaya raised an objection to him based on the mishna concerning the Paschal offering, where one makes the clarification dependent on the decision of others.
אָמַר רָבָא: מַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא, דְּמַאן דְּאִית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה – לָא שְׁנָא תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ וְלָא שְׁנָא תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים, אִית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה, וּמַאן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה – לָא שְׁנָא תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ וְלָא שְׁנָא תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים, לֵית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה!
Rava said: What is the difficulty here? Perhaps it is so that for the one who accepts the principle of retroactive clarification, it is no different if one makes it dependent on his own decision, and it is no different if one makes it dependent on the decision of others. In either case, he accepts the principle of retroactive clarification. And according to the one who does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, it is no different if one makes it dependent on his own decision, and it is no different if one makes it dependent on the decision of others. In either case, he does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא לְרָבָא: וְהָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּתוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ לֵית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה, וְתוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים אִית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה!
Rav Mesharshiyya said to Rava: The issue of retroactive clarification is contingent upon the question of on whom the outcome is dependent. But isn’t there the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who in a case where one makes it dependent on his own decision, he does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, but when one makes it dependent on the decision of others, he accepts the principle of retroactive clarification?
תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ לֵית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה – דְּתַנְיָא: הַלּוֹקֵחַ יַיִן מִבֵּין הַכּוּתִים, אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵי לוּגִּין שֶׁאֲנִי עָתִיד לְהַפְרִישׁ – הֲרֵי הֵן תְּרוּמָה; עֲשָׂרָה מַעֲשֵׂר רִאשׁוֹן; תִּשְׁעָה מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי;
The Gemara elaborates: When one makes it dependent on his own decision, Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, as it is taught in the Tosefta (Demai 8:7): In the case of one who purchases wine from among the Samaritans, about whom it is assumed that they did not separate teruma and tithes, and he is not in a position to now separate teruma, he acts as follows: If there are, for example, one hundred log of wine in the barrels, he says: Two log that I will separate in the future are teruma, as the mandated average measure of teruma is one-fiftieth; ten log are first tithe; and one-tenth of the remainder, which is approximately nine log, are second tithe.
וּמֵיחֵל וְשׁוֹתֶה מִיָּד, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹסְרִין.
And he deconsecrates the second tithe that he will separate in the future, transferring its sanctity to money, and he may drink the wine immediately, relying on the separation that he will perform later, which will clarify retroactively which log he designated for the tithes and for teruma. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. However, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon prohibit this practice, as they hold that in this case there is no retroactive clarification. It is therefore evident that according to Rabbi Yehuda, there is no retroactive clarification where one makes the clarification dependent on his own decision.
תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים אִית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה – דִּתְנַן: מָה הִיא בְּאוֹתָן הַיָּמִים?
By contrast, in a case where one makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, Rabbi Yehuda accepts the principle of retroactive clarification, as we learned in a mishna (73a): In a case where an ill husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die due to this illness, if he dies, the bill of divorce takes effect from the time of his statement. The mishna asks: What is the halakhic status of the wife in those days between when the bill of divorce was given but before the husband died?
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי הִיא כְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ לְכׇל דְּבָרֶיהָ, וּלְכִי מָיֵית הָוֵי גִּיטָּא.
Rabbi Yehuda says: She is like a married woman with regard to all of her matters, and she remains forbidden to other men; and when he will die, it is a bill of divorce. Death is equivalent to a matter that is dependent on the decision of others. Since Rabbi Yehuda agrees that the bill of divorce takes effect retroactively, as it cannot take effect after the death of the husband, he evidently holds that there is retroactive clarification where one makes the clarification dependent on the decision of others.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא לְרָבָא: הָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּתוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ לֵית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה, וְתוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים אִית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה!
Furthermore, Rav Mesharshiyya said to Rava: But isn’t there Rabbi Shimon, who, in a case where one makes the outcome dependent on his own decision, does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, but when one makes it dependent on the decision of others, he accepts the principle of retroactive clarification?
תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ לֵית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה – הָא דַּאֲמַרַן. תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים אִית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה – דְּתַנְיָא: ״הֲרֵינִי בּוֹעֲלִיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּרְצֶה אַבָּא״; אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא רָצָה הָאָב – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: רָצָה הָאָב – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת,
The Gemara elaborates: When one makes the outcome dependent on his own decision, Rabbi Shimon does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification. This is understood from that which we said in the case of wine purchased from Samaritans. When one makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, Rabbi Shimon accepts the principle of retroactive clarification, as it is taught in a baraita in the Tosefta (Kiddushin 3:7): If a man said to a woman: I am engaging in sexual intercourse with you for the purpose of betrothal on the condition that my father will desire our betrothal, and then he married her without specification, then even if the father did not desire it she is nevertheless betrothed through this act of intercourse. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If the father desires it, she is betrothed,
