Gittin 42

Gittin 42

בְּעֶבֶד שֶׁל שְׁנֵי שׁוּתָּפִין, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.

The mishna is referring to a slave belonging to two partners, and in that case everyone agrees that each one of them can emancipate his portion of the slave. Consequently, there could be a half-slave half-freeman even according to Rav Yosef’s understanding of the opinion of the Rabbis.

אָמַר רַבָּה: מַחֲלוֹקֶת – בְּשֶׁשִּׁיחְרֵר חֶצְיוֹ וְהִנִּיחַ חֶצְיוֹ; אֲבָל שִׁיחְרֵר חֶצְיוֹ, וּמָכַר חֶצְיוֹ אוֹ נָתַן בְּמַתָּנָה חֶצְיוֹ, כֵּיוָן דְּקָנָפֵיק מִינֵּיהּ כּוּלֵּיהּ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל קָנָה.

§ The Gemara discusses another dispute with regard to one who emancipates half of his slave. Rabba said: The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis concerning whether the slave can be half-emancipated applies only when the master freed half of him and left the other half of him unaffected. However, if he freed half of him and sold the other half of him, or gave the other half of him as a gift to someone else, then, since the slave left him entirely, as the original master no longer owns any portion of the slave, everyone agrees that the slave has acquired half of his freedom.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וּבְכוּלּוֹ – לָא פְּלִיגִי?! וְהָתָנֵי חֲדָא: הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לִשְׁנֵי עֲבָדָיו – קָנוּ וּמְשַׁחְרְרִין זֶה אֶת זֶה. וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ, הָאוֹמֵר: ״כׇּל נְכָסַי נְתוּנִין לִפְלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי עֲבָדַיי״ – אַף עַצְמָם לֹא קָנוּ.

Abaye said to him: And do they not disagree with regard to a case where he is released entirely? But it is taught in one baraita: In the case of one who writes his property to his two slaves, i.e., gives it to them via a document, they acquired the property and they free each other, because each one has ownership over half of the other slave. And it was taught in another baraita that in the case of one who says: All of my property is given to so-and-so and so-and-so my slaves, they did not acquire even themselves, and all the more so they did not acquire the property. Seemingly, the two baraitot contradict each other.

מַאי, לָאו הָא רַבִּי, וְהָא רַבָּנַן?!

Abaye continues his question: What, is it not that the way to reconcile the baraitot is to say that this, the first baraita, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, that emancipation can take effect with regard to half a slave? And that, the second baraita, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that even when the master retains no hold on the slave, a slave cannot be partially released?

לָא, אִידִי וְאִידִי רַבָּנַן; הָא דְּאָמַר כּוּלּוֹ, הָא דְּאָמַר חֲצִי חֲצִי.

The Gemara offers a different reconciliation: No, both this and that baraita are in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. This first baraita is discussing a case where one said that he is giving all of his property to each one of the slaves. Since he gave everything to both of them, they each acquire the property, including each other, emancipate each other, and divide the property between them. That second baraita is discussing a case where one said that he is giving half of his property to one slave and half of it to the other, so neither is fully emancipated.

וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וְאִם אָמַר חֲצִי חֲצִי – לֹא קָנוּ, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא דְּאָמַר כּוּלּוֹ! פָּרוֹשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ – אַף עַצְמָן לֹא קָנוּ, כֵּיצַד? כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר חֲצִי חֲצִי.

The Gemara challenges this explanation: But from the fact that the latter clause of the second baraita teaches: But if he said that he is giving half of his property to one slave and half of it to the other, they did not acquire the property, it may be inferred that the first clause is discussing a case where he said that he is giving all of his property to each one of them, and yet they do not acquire the property. The Gemara answers: There are not two separate cases in the baraita. Rather, the second clause is explaining the first clause of the baraita, as follows: They did not acquire even themselves. How so? For example, this is the halakha in a case where the master said that he is giving half of his property to one slave and half of it to the other.

הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ רֵישָׁא דְּאָמַר כּוּלּוֹ – הַשְׁתָּא אָמַר כּוּלּוֹ לֹא קָנוּ, אָמַר חֲצִי חֲצִי מִיבַּעְיָא?!

The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to say this, for if it enters your mind to say that the first clause of the baraita is discussing a case where he said that he gives all of his property to his slaves, and yet they do not acquire it, then the latter clause is unnecessary. Now that the mishna taught that if one said that he gives all of the property to his two slaves, then each slave did not acquire himself, is it necessary to state in the second clause that this is true when one gives half of his property to one slave and half of it to the other?

אִי מִשּׁוּם הָא לָא אִירְיָא – תְּנָא סֵיפָא לְגַלּוֹיֵי רֵישָׁא, שֶׁלֹּא תֹּאמַר: רֵישָׁא דְּאָמַר חֲצִי חֲצִי, אֲבָל אָמַר כּוּלּוֹ קָנוּ; תְּנָא סֵיפָא דְּאָמַר חֲצִי חֲצִי, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא דְּאָמַר כּוּלּוֹ – וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי לֹא קָנוּ.

The Gemara answers: If it is due to that reason, there is no conclusive argument. One could say that the tanna taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause, so that you do not say: The first clause is discussing only a case where one said that he gives half of his property to one slave and half to the other, but if one said that he gives all of it to both of them, then they did acquire the property. Therefore, the tanna taught the latter clause, where it explicitly discusses a case where he said that he gives half to one and half to the other, and by inference it is clear that the first clause must be discussing a case where he said that he gives all of it to both of them, and even so they did not acquire the property.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בִּשְׁטָר אֶחָד, כָּאן בִּשְׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת.

And if you wish, say instead that it is not difficult. It is possible to reconcile the two baraitot differently: Here, in the second baraita, where they did not acquire the property, this is a case where the master wrote everything in one document. The reason the slaves do not acquire themselves is that it is not possible to emancipate two slaves with one document. There, in the first baraita, which rules that they did acquire the property, the case is one where the master wrote the transfer of property in two documents.

בִּשְׁטָר אֶחָד, מַאי אִירְיָא חֲצִי חֲצִי? אֲפִילּוּ אָמַר כּוּלּוֹ נָמֵי לֹא קָנוּ! הָכִי נָמֵי קָאָמַר: אַף עַצְמָן לֹא קָנוּ, בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – בִּשְׁטָר אֶחָד, אֲבָל בִּשְׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת – קָנוּ; וְאִם אָמַר חֲצִי חֲצִי – אַף בִּשְׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת נָמֵי לָא קָנוּ.

The Gemara asks: If the second baraita is referring to a case where he wrote everything in one document, why specifically mention that the slaves do not acquire themselves when he gave half to one and half to the other? Even if he said all of it as well, they did not acquire the property, as was taught explicitly in the beginning of the baraita. The Gemara answers: That is also what the tanna is saying: They did not acquire even themselves. In what case is this statement said? In a case where the master wrote everything in one document. But if he wrote it in two documents, they acquired the property. And if the master said that he gives half to one and half to the other, then even if he wrote it in two documents they also did not acquire the property.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא – כָּאן בְּבַת אַחַת, כָּאן בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה.

And if you wish, say instead that it is not difficult, and it is possible to reconcile the two baraitot differently: Here, the first baraita, where they did acquire the property, is referring to a case where he gave them the documents simultaneously. There, the second baraita, where they did not acquire, the property is referring to a case where he gave them the documents sequentially.

בִּשְׁלָמָא בָּתְרָא לָא קָנֵי, דְּהָא קָנֵי לֵיהּ קַמָּא; אֶלָּא קַמָּא, לִיקְנֵי נַפְשֵׁיהּ וְלִקְנְיֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ! אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִּדְשַׁנִּינַן מֵעִיקָּרָא.

The Gemara questions this explanation: Granted, if the master gave the documents sequentially, the last slave did not acquire, for the first slave had already acquired him, as the second slave was among the possessions transferred via the first document. However, the first slave should acquire himself and should also acquire the other slave, as he was given all of the property in one document. Due to this objection, the Gemara concludes: Rather, it is clear as we initially answered, and in any case it is referring to when he gave both documents simultaneously.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּקָא קָרֵי לְהוּ ״עֲבָדַיי״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַפְרָם לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְדִלְמָא ״עֲבָדַיי״ – שֶׁהָיוּ כְּבָר!

Rav Ashi said: The contradiction between the baraitot can be resolved by noting that it is different there, in the second baraita, because the master calls them: My slaves. By writing: All of my property is given to so-and-so and so-and-so my slaves, he indicates that he does not intend to free them. Rafram said to Rav Ashi: But perhaps when he says: My slaves, he is referring to those who were his slaves in the past.

מִי לָא תְּנַן: הַכּוֹתֵב כׇּל נְכָסָיו לְעַבְדּוֹ – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת; שִׁיֵּיר קַרְקַע כָּל שֶׁהוּא – לֹא יָצָא לְחֵירוּת. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם הוּא בֶּן חוֹרִין, עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״כׇּל נְכָסַי נְתוּנִין לִפְלוֹנִי עַבְדִּי, חוּץ מֵאֶחָד מֵרִבּוֹא שֶׁבָּהֶן״.

Rafram attempts to prove that the expression my slaves can be used in this manner. Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pe’a 3:8): In the case of one who writes all of his property to his slave, i.e., gives it to him via a document, the slave has been emancipated. But if he reserved for himself even any amount of land, then he has not been emancipated. Rabbi Shimon says: Actually, the slave is a freeman until the master says the following: All of my property is given to so-and-so my slave except for one ten-thousandth of it, as in that case it is possible that the master meant to include the slave in the portion that he is not giving.

טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר [״חוּץ מֵאֶחָד מֵרִבּוֹא שֶׁבָּהֶן״], הָא לָא אָמַר הָכִי – קָנֵי; אַמַּאי? וְהָא ״עֶבֶד״ קָא קָרֵי לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא ״עַבְדִּי״ שֶׁהָיָה כְּבָר, הָכָא נָמֵי ״עֲבָדַיי״ שֶׁהָיוּ כְּבָר.

Rafram continues his proof: The reason the slave is not emancipated is specifically because the master said: Except for one ten-thousandth of it. But if he did not say this, then the slave acquires the property. Rafram asks: According to your reasoning, why does he acquire the property? Didn’t he call him a slave? Rather, it must be that when he called him: My slave, he meant that he was his slave in the past. Here also, when he said: My slaves, he meant: Those who were my slaves in the past. Therefore, Rav Ashi’s attempt to resolve the contradiction between the baraitot cannot be accepted.

נְגָחוֹ שׁוֹר; יוֹם שֶׁל רַבּוֹ – לְרַבּוֹ, יוֹם שֶׁל עַצְמוֹ – לְעַצְמוֹ. אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה – יוֹם שֶׁל רַבּוֹ יִשָּׂא שִׁפְחָה, יוֹם שֶׁל עַצְמוֹ יִשָּׂא בַּת חוֹרִין! אִיסּוּרָא לָא קָאָמְרִינַן.

§ If a half-slave half-freeman, who works for himself and his master on alternating days, was gored by an ox and damaged, then, if he was gored on the day of his master, the reimbursement for the damage caused is paid to his master. If it was on his own day, it is paid to the slave himself. The Gemara asks: However, if that is so, if he is viewed as entering and leaving a state of slavery each day, then on the day of his master he should be able to marry a maidservant and on his own day he should be able to marry a free woman. However, the mishna states that he cannot marry anyone. The Gemara answers: We are not saying that he is viewed as entering and leaving a state of slavery each day with regard to prohibitions.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הֵמִית מִי שֶׁחֶצְיוֹ עֶבֶד וְחֶצְיוֹ בֶּן חוֹרִין – נוֹתֵן חֲצִי קְנָס לְרַבּוֹ,

Come and hear a proof with regard to this issue: When a Canaanite slave is killed by an ox, in addition to the ox being put to death, the owner of the ox pays a fixed penalty of thirty shekels to the slave’s owner. If a freeman is killed by an ox, in addition to the ox being put to death, the freeman’s value is paid to his heirs. If an ox killed a half-slave half-freeman, then the owner of the ox gives half of a penalty, i.e., fifteen shekels, to his master

וַחֲצִי כוֹפֶר לְיוֹרְשָׁיו. אַמַּאי? הָכִי נָמֵי לֵימָא: יוֹם שֶׁל רַבּוֹ – לְרַבּוֹ, יוֹם שֶׁל עַצְמוֹ – לְעַצְמוֹ! שָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּקָא כָלְיָא קַרְנָא.

and half of a ransom, i.e., half of the value of the deceased, to his heirs. According to what was stated earlier, why is this the halakha? So too, in this case let us say: If the ox killed him on the day of his master, then the full penalty of thirty shekels is paid to his master, but if it killed him on his own day, then the full ransom is paid to the slave himself, i.e., his heirs. The Gemara answers: This is different, for the principal is consumed. Since the slave is dead, even if the goring occurred on a day that he was working for himself, there is a permanent loss to the master, who is therefore entitled to be paid half of a penalty.

וְאֶלָּא הֵיכִי דָּמֵי דְּלָא קָא כָלְיָא קַרְנָא? כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִכָּהוּ עַל יָדוֹ, וְצָמְתָה יָדוֹ וְסוֹפָהּ לַחֲזוֹר.

The Gemara asks: Rather, what are the circumstances when the principal is not consumed and the reimbursement is paid based on the day on which the ox gored the slave? The Gemara explains: It is a case where an ox struck him on his hand and his hand withered, but it will eventually return and heal. In this case, there is no permanent loss.

הָנִיחָא לְאַבָּיֵי, דְּאָמַר: נוֹתֵן לוֹ שֶׁבֶת גְּדוֹלָה, וְשֶׁבֶת קְטַנָּה – שַׁפִּיר.

The Gemara challenges: This works out well according to the opinion of Abaye, who says: If one injures another and the injury causes him temporary paralysis, then he gives him the value of the major loss of livelihood, i.e., the decrease in his value, as measured by his price on the slave market, due to his temporary paralysis. And he also gives him the value of the minor loss of livelihood, i.e., the actual wages he lost during the time he was injured. This works out well, as in this case, the owner of the ox would have to pay the major loss of livelihood.

אֶלָּא לְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר: אֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן לוֹ אֶלָּא שִׁבְתּוֹ שֶׁבְּכׇל יוֹם וָיוֹם; הַאי – שׁוֹר הוּא, וְשׁוֹר אֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם אֶלָּא נֶזֶק!

However, according to the opinion of Rava, who says: He gives him only the value of his loss of livelihood for each and every day but does not have to pay for the decrease in his value because the slave will be healed and will return to his previous value, this case is one of an ox that injured the half-slave half-freeman. And an ox, i.e., the owner of an ox, pays only damage, as measured by his price on the slave market, but he does not pay for loss of livelihood at all. How then does Rava explain this case?

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כְּשֶׁהִכָּהוּ אָדָם. וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: מֵימְרָא הִיא, וּמֵימְרָא לְרָבָא לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.

The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that this is referring to a case where the slave was struck by a person, not an ox, so that the one who struck him must pay for the loss of livelihood. And if you wish, say instead: This halakha is merely a statement of an amora, and Rava is not bound to hold in accordance with a statement of an amora.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מְעוּכָּב גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר, יֵשׁ לוֹ קְנָס אוֹ אֵין לוֹ קְנָס?

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a slave is detained in his master’s possession only due to not having received a bill of manumission, but he is no longer obligated to perform labor for his master, e.g., in a case where his master declared him to be ownerless, does he render liable one whose ox kills him to pay the penalty of thirty shekels to his master, or does he not render one liable to pay the penalty?

״כֶּסֶף שְׁלֹשִׁים שְׁקָלִים יִתֵּן לַאדוֹנָיו״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא – וְהַאי לָאו אָדוֹן הוּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא כֵּיוָן דִּמְחוּסָּר גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר, אָדוֹן קָרֵינָא בֵּיהּ?

The Gemara analyzes this question: The Merciful One states in the Torah: “He shall give thirty shekels of silver to his master” (Exodus 21:32), and this is not a master, as in practice the slave has already been declared ownerless. Or perhaps, since he is lacking a bill of manumission, he is still called a master.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הֵמִית מִי שֶׁחֶצְיוֹ עֶבֶד וְחֶצְיוֹ בֶּן חוֹרִין – נוֹתֵן חֲצִי קְנָס לְרַבּוֹ וַחֲצִי כוֹפֶר לְיוֹרְשָׁיו. מַאי, לָאו כְּמִשְׁנָה אַחֲרוֹנָה?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for this based on what is taught in a baraita: If an ox killed one who is a half-slave half-freeman, then the owner of the ox gives half of a penalty, i.e., fifteen shekels, to the slave’s master and half of a ransom, i.e., half of the value of the deceased, to his heirs. What, is the baraita not in accordance with the ultimate version of the mishna, after Beit Hillel conceded to Beit Shammai that the master is forced to emancipate the half-slave half-freeman, and he is merely lacking a bill of manumission? Despite this, the baraita states that the master receives the money of half of a penalty.

לֹא, כְּמִשְׁנָה רִאשׁוֹנָה.

The Gemara answers: No, this baraita is in accordance with the initial version of the mishna and in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, that the slave works for his master and himself on alternating days. He is still an actual slave, and that is why the master receives the sum of half of a penalty.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הִפִּיל אֶת שִׁינּוֹ וְסִימָא אֶת עֵינוֹ – יוֹצֵא בְּשִׁינּוֹ, וְנוֹתֵן דְּמֵי עֵינוֹ. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ יֵשׁ לוֹ קְנָס, וּקְנָס לְרַבּוֹ – הַשְׁתָּא חָבְלִי בֵּיהּ אַחֲרִינֵי יָהֲבִי לֵיהּ לְרַבֵּיהּ, חָבֵל בֵּיהּ רַבֵּיהּ גּוּפֵיהּ, יָהֵיב לֵיהּ לְדִידֵיהּ?!

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof based on what is taught in a baraita: If the master knocked out the slave’s tooth and then blinded his eye, then the slave is emancipated due to the loss of his tooth, as the verse states: “He shall let him go free for his tooth’s sake” (Exodus 21:27). And his master gives him reimbursement for the value of his eye, as though he were a freeman. And if you say that a slave that did not yet receive a bill of manumission does render one whose ox kills him liable to pay the penalty, and the penalty is paid to his master, then one could ask: Now if other people injure him, then they give the payment to his master; if his master himself injures him, then should he give the payment for the slave’s eye to him?

דִּלְמָא כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ – דְּתַנְיָא: בְּכוּלָּן, עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת, וְצָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר מֵרַבּוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: צָרִיךְ. רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: צָרִיךְ.

The Gemara answers: Perhaps this baraita is in accordance with the one who said that when a slave is emancipated because his master knocked out his tooth he does not need a bill of manumission and is automatically emancipated the moment his tooth is knocked out, as it is taught in a baraita: For all of them, for all twenty-four limbs about which the Sages said that a slave is emancipated if his master damages one of them, a slave is emancipated by means of them, and he requires a bill of manumission from his master; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Meir says: He does not require a bill of manumission. Rabbi Eliezer says: He requires it. Rabbi Tarfon says: He does not require it. Rabbi Akiva says: He requires it.

הַמַּכְרִיעִין לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים, אוֹמְרִים: נִרְאִים דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן – בְּשֵׁן וָעַיִן, הוֹאִיל וְתוֹרָה זִכְּתָה לוֹ, וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – בִּשְׁאָר אֵבָרִים, הוֹאִיל וּקְנַס חֲכָמִים הוּא.

Those who rule before the Sages, i.e., those who attempt to rule by finding a middle ground between the different opinions, say as follows: The statement of Rabbi Tarfon, that the slave does not require a bill of manumission, seems correct in the case of a tooth or an eye, since the Torah transferred his freedom to him explicitly (Exodus 21:26–27). And the statement of Rabbi Akiva, that he does require a bill of manumission, seems correct in the case of other limbs, since it is a rabbinic penalty that he goes free.

קְנָס?! הָא קְרָאֵי קָא דָרְשִׁינַן! אֶלָּא אֵימָא: הוֹאִיל וּמִדְרַשׁ חֲכָמִים הוּא.

The Gemara questions the wording used: Is it a rabbinic penalty? Don’t we interpret verses to conclude that a slave is emancipated when any of the twenty-four limbs are damaged by the master? Rather, say as follows: the statement of Rabbi Akiva seems correct in the case of other limbs, since it is an interpretation of the Sages, and it is not written explicitly in the Torah. This question of the Gemara remains unresolved.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מְעוּכָּב גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר, אוֹכֵל בִּתְרוּמָה אוֹ אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל? ״קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא – וְהַאי לָאו קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ הוּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דִּמְחוּסָּר גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר, ״קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ״ קָרֵינָא בֵּיהּ?

§ A similar dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a priest’s slave was detained in his master’s possession only due to not having received a bill of manumission, may he partake of teruma, as the slave of a priest may, or may he not partake of it? The Gemara presents the sides of this dilemma: The Merciful One states in the Torah: “But if a priest buy any person, the purchase of his money, he may eat of it” (Leviticus 22:11), and this slave is not the purchase of his money, as the master cannot enslave him. Or perhaps since the slave is still lacking a bill of manumission, the words “the purchase of his money” are said about him.

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: כֹּהֶנֶת שֶׁנִּתְעָרֵב וְלָדָהּ בִּוְלַד שִׁפְחָתָהּ, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אוֹכְלִין בִּתְרוּמָה, וְחוֹלְקִין חֵלֶק אֶחָד עַל הַגּוֹרֶן. הִגְדִּילוּ הַתַּעֲרוֹבוֹת – מְשַׁחְרְרִין זֶה אֶת זֶה!

The Gemara answers: Come and hear a solution to this question based on what Rav Mesharshiyya says: With regard to a woman married to a priest whose offspring was mixed with her maidservant’s offspring, and it is not known who is who, then these two children may partake of teruma. One is a priest and one is the slave of a priest, both of whom may partake of teruma. And they must divide one portion of teruma together at the threshing floor, because the slave of a priest is not allowed to collect teruma at the threshing floor. And when the mixed children have grown up, they free each other, and by doing so the one who was a slave is freed. This teaches that although the son of the maidservant was not enslaved for practical purposes, since his status as a slave could not be confirmed with certainty, he could still partake of teruma, as he was lacking a bill of manumission.

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם, אִם יָבֹא אֵלִיָּהוּ וְיֹאמַר בְּחַד מִינַּיְיהוּ דְּעֶבֶד הוּא, ״קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ״ קָרֵינָא בֵּיהּ; הָכָא, לָאו קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ הוּא כְּלָל.

The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the two children, if Elijah the prophet will come and say about one of them that he is a slave, then he is called “the purchase of his money,” because in reality he is a full-fledged slave. Here, in the dilemma before the Sages, the slave is not the purchase of his money at all because the master declared him ownerless. This question of the Gemara remains unresolved.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: עֶבֶד שֶׁמְּכָרוֹ רַבּוֹ לִקְנָס, מָכוּר אוֹ אֵינוֹ מָכוּר?

§ The Gemara discusses the penalty paid when an ox kills a slave: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a slave whose master sold him to another person only with regard to the penalty, meaning that if this slave were to be killed by an ox then the penalty would be paid to the purchaser, is he sold or is he not sold? In other words, does this sale take effect or not?

תִּיבְּעֵי לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, תִּיבְּעֵי לְרַבָּנַן; תִּיבְּעֵי לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר – עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר אָדָם מַקְנֶה דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לָעוֹלָם, אֶלָּא כְּגוֹן פֵּירוֹת דֶּקֶל – דַּעֲבִידִי דְּאָתוּ; אֲבָל הָכָא – מִי יֵימַר דְּמִינְּגַח? וְאִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר דְּמִינְּגַח – מִמַּאי דִּמְשַׁלֵּם?

The Gemara explains: Raise the dilemma according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that one can transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world, and raise the dilemma according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that one cannot. Raise the dilemma according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as Rabbi Meir states that a person can transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world only in a case such as produce of a date palm, as this is an entity whose manner it is to come, and since one can be assured of the dates growing, one can sell them even beforehand. However, here, who will say that the slave will be gored? And even if you say that he will be gored, from where do you know that the owner of the ox who gored him will pay the penalty?