Kiddushin 50
״יַקְרִיב אֹתוֹ״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁכּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ. יָכוֹל בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ – תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לִרְצֹנוֹ״.
With regard to one who pledges to bring a burnt-offering, the verse states: “If his offering be a burnt-offering of the herd, he shall offer it a male without blemish; he shall bring it to the door of the Tent of Meeting, according to his will, before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:3). The seemingly superfluous words “he shall offer it” teaches that they coerce him to bring the offering. I might have thought that it can be offered entirely against his will, by taking it from his possession and sacrificing it; therefore, the verse states: “According to his will.”
הָא כֵּיצַד? – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״רוֹצֶה אֲנִי״. וְאַמַּאי? הָא בְּלִבֵּיהּ לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן: דְּבָרִים שֶׁבַּלֵּב אֵינָן דְּבָרִים? וְדִילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דַּאֲנַן סָהֲדִי דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּכַפָּרָה.
How can these texts be reconciled? They coerce him until he says: I want to bring the offering. The Gemara asks: But why should this be effective; but in his heart it is not satisfactory for him to bring the offering, and it is not according to his will. Rather, is it not because we say: Unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters, and his intention is rendered irrelevant by his explicit statement? The Gemara rejects this: But perhaps there it is different, since it is clear to us that it is satisfactory for him to achieve atonement, despite his earlier statement to the contrary.
אֶלָּא מִסֵּיפָא: וְכֵן אַתָּה מוֹצֵא בְּגִיטֵּי נָשִׁים וְשִׁחְרוּרֵי עֲבָדִים, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״רוֹצֶה אֲנִי״. וְאַמַּאי? הָא בְּלִבֵּיהּ לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן דְּבָרִים שֶׁבַּלֵּב אֵינָן דְּבָרִים? וְדִילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, מִשּׁוּם דְּמִצְוָה לִשְׁמוֹעַ דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים.
Rather, the Gemara derives a proof from the latter clause of that same baraita: And similarly, you find with bills of divorce of women and bills of manumission of slaves that when the court rules that a man must divorce his wife or free his slave and he does not want to, they coerce him until he says: I want to divorce my wife, or: I want to free my slave. But why should this be effective; but in his heart it is not satisfactory for him to divorce her or to free him. Rather, is it not because we say that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters? The Gemara rejects this proof as well: But perhaps there it is different, because it is a mitzva to listen to the statements of the Sages, and the assumption is that when he is required to divorce his wife or free his slave, his true desire is to perform the mitzva.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף, מֵהָכָא: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וְאָמַר: כְּסָבוּר הָיִיתִי שֶׁהִיא כֹּהֶנֶת וַהֲרֵי הִיא לְוִיָּה, לְוִיָּה וְנִמְצֵאת כֹּהֶנֶת, עֲנִיָּיה וַהֲרֵי הִיא עֲשִׁירָה, עֲשִׁירָה וַהֲרֵי הִיא עֲנִיָּיה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא הִטְעַתּוּ. וְאַמַּאי? הָא קָאָמַר כְּסָבוּר הָיִיתִי! אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן דְּבָרִים שֶׁבַּלֵּב אֵינָן דְּבָרִים. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: דִּלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דִּלְחוּמְרָא.
Rather, Rav Yosef says: The proof is from here (64a): In the case of one who betroths a woman and he said: I thought that she was the daughter of a priest, and she is in fact the daughter of a Levite; or I thought she was the daughter of a Levite, and she is found to be the daughter of a priest; I thought she was poor, and she is wealthy; or I thought she was wealthy, and she is poor, she is betrothed despite his mistaken assumption, because she did not mislead him. But why is she betrothed; but he said: I thought that she had a different characteristic, and he betrothed her with that in mind? Rather, it is because we say that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters. Abaye said to him: Perhaps it is different there, since the ruling there is that she requires a bill of divorce only as a stringency, and they are not definitively betrothed.
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, מֵהָכָא: בְּכוּלָּם, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמְרָה ״בְּלִבִּי הָיָה לְהִתְקַדֵּשׁ לוֹ״ – אַף עַל פִּי כֵן אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. וְאַמַּאי? הָא קָאָמְרָה ״בְּלִבִּי הָיָה״! וְדִילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּכֵיוָן דְּאַתְנִיה לָאו כֹּל כְּמִינַּהּ דְּעָקְרָא לֵהּ לִתְנָאֵיהּ.
Rather, Abaye said that the proof is from here, from the mishna: And in all these cases, despite the fact that she later stated: I intended to become betrothed to him nevertheless, she is not betrothed. But why should her betrothal not take effect at all; but she said: I intended to become betrothed? This clause of the mishna teaches that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant. The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps it is different there, as, since he stipulated explicitly that a certain condition was true, it is not in her power to uproot his condition through thoughts alone.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין: עוֹבָדָא הֲוָה בֵּי רַב חִסְדָּא, וְרַב חִסְדָּא בֵּי רַב הוּנָא, וּפַשְׁטוּהָ מֵהָא: הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ: ״הָבֵא לִי מִן הַחַלּוֹן אוֹ מִן הַדְּלוֹסְקָמָא״, וְהֵבִיא לוֹ. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמַר בַּעַל הַבַּיִת: ״לֹא הָיָה לִי בְּלִבִּי אֶלָּא עַל זֶה״, כֵּיוָן שֶׁהֵבִיא לוֹ מִזֶּה – בַּעַל הַבַּיִת מָעַל. וְאַמַּאי? הָא קָאָמַר ״בְּלִבִּי״! אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן דְּבָרִים שֶׁבַּלֵּב אֵינָן דְּבָרִים?
Rather, Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin says: There was an incident of this kind in Rav Ḥisda’s study hall, and Rav Ḥisda brought the case to Rav Huna’s study hall, and they resolved it from this mishna (Me’ila 21a): In the case of one who says to his agent: Bring me such and such an item from the window ledge or from the box [hadeluskema], forgetting that the item in question was consecrated property and any use of it would constitute misuse of consecrated property, and the agent brought it to him, then although at that point the owner said: My intention was that you bring the item only from this other place, once he brought the item to him from that place that he had mentioned, once the agent uses it the owner is liable for having misused consecrated property. But why should he be responsible; but he said: My intention was for the other place, so the agent did not fulfill his mission. Rather, is it not because we say that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters?
וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דִּלְמִיפְטַר נַפְשֵׁיהּ מִקׇּרְבָּן קָאָתֵי.
The Gemara rejects this: But perhaps it is different there, since it is suspected that he is coming to exempt himself from bringing an offering for his misuse by claiming that he intended a different item. Since there is cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place, his claim is not accepted. This cannot serve as a proof that in general, unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant.
הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵימַר מֵזִיד הֲוָה! לָא עֲבִיד אִינִישׁ דִּמְשַׁוֵּי נַפְשֵׁיהּ רַשִּׁיעָא.
The Gemara responds: If all he wanted to do was exempt himself from the obligation to bring an offering, he could have said that the misuse was intentional, as one who misuses consecrated property intentionally is not obligated to bring an offering. Therefore, there is no cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place. The Gemara counters: It is not common for a person to place himself in the category of a wicked person by claiming to have committed a transgression intentionally. Therefore, once again, there is cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place.
הֲוָה לֵיהּ לוֹמַר ״נִזְכַּרְתִּי״, דִּתְנַן: נִזְכַּר בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, וְלֹא נִזְכַּר שָׁלִיחַ – שָׁלִיחַ מָעַל.
The Gemara continues to ask: To exempt himself from the obligation to bring an offering, he could have said: After the agent left I remembered that it was consecrated property. Such a claim would also have rendered him exempt, as we learned in that same mishna (Me’ila 21a): If one sent an agent to bring a particular item, and the owner remembered that it was consecrated and the agent did not remember but proceeded to fulfill his agency, it is the agent who has misused consecrated property and is liable to bring an offering, not the one who designated him, since the latter remembered and canceled the agency. There is no cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place. Therefore, the fact that this statement is not accepted can serve as a proof that in general, unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant.
הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּזַבְּנִינְהוּ לְנִיכְסֵיהּ אַדַּעְתָּא לְמִיסַּק לְאַרְעָא דְיִשְׂרָאֵל. סְלֵיק וְלָא אִיתְּדַר לֵיהּ. אָמַר רָבָא: כֹּל דְּסָלֵיק – אַדַּעְתָּא לְמֵידַר הוּא, וְהָא לָא אִיתְּדַר לֵיהּ. אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: אַדַּעְתָּא לְמִיסַּק, וְהָא סְלֵיק לֵיהּ.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who sold his property with the intention of ascending to Eretz Yisrael and explicitly stated this intention to the buyer. He ascended to Eretz Yisrael but he was not able to settle there. Upon his return to Babylonia, he sought to nullify the sale. Rava said: Whoever ascends to Eretz Yisrael does so with the intention of settling there, and as he was not able to settle there he can nullify the sale. There are those who say a different version, that Rava said the opposite: He intended to ascend to Eretz Yisrael, and he ascended, so he cannot nullify the sale.
הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּזַבְּנִינְהוּ לְנִיכְסֵיהּ אַדַּעְתָּא לְמִיסַּק לְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, לְסוֹף לָא סְלֵיק. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אִי בָּעֵי, סָלֵיק. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אִי בָּעֵי, לָא סָלֵיק? מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, דְּאִיתְיְלִיד אוּנְסָא בְּאוֹרְחָא.
The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain man who sold his property with the intention of ascending to Eretz Yisrael, but ultimately he did not ascend there. Rav Ashi said: If he had wanted to do so, he could have ascended. Since the matter depended upon him, there are no grounds for nullifying the sale. There are those who say Rav Ashi said as follows: If he had wanted to do so, couldn’t he have ascended? Since nothing prevented him from leaving, the sale is not nullified. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the two versions of Rav Ashi’s statement? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them in a case when circumstances beyond his control occurred along the way, preventing him from going. According to the first version of the statement of Rav Ashi, the sale is upheld; but according to the second version, where Rav Ashi responded in the form of a question, the implication is that if there actually had been something that prevented him from ascending, the sale would be nullified.
מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ: ״צֵא וְקַדֵּשׁ לִי אִשָּׁה פְּלוֹנִית בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״ וְהָלַךְ וְקִדְּשָׁהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. ״הֲרֵי הִיא בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״ וְקִדְּשָׁהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
MISHNA: In the case of one who says to his agent: Go and betroth for me so-and-so in such and such a place, and the agent went and betrothed her in a different place, she is not betrothed, since he instructed that the betrothal take place in a particular location. But if he said: Go and betroth the woman for me, she is in such and such a place; and the agent betrothed her in a different place, she is betrothed, since he did not mean that the agent should betroth her specifically there, but was merely telling him where to find her.
גְּמָ׳ וּתְנַן נָמֵי גַּבֵּי גִיטִּין: הָאוֹמֵר ״תְּנוּ גֵּט זֶה לְאִשְׁתִּי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״ וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר – פָּסוּל, ״הֲרֵי הִיא בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״ וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר – כָּשֵׁר.
GEMARA: The Gemara comments: And we also learned in a mishna with regard to bills of divorce (Gittin 65a): With regard to one who says to his agents: Give this bill of divorce to my wife in such and such a place, and they gave it to her in another place, the divorce is invalid. If he said to them: She is in such and such a place, and they gave it to her in another place, it is valid.
וּצְרִיכָא. דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גַּבֵּי קִידּוּשִׁין – מִשּׁוּם דִּלְקָרוֹבַהּ קָאָתֵי, בְּהַאי אַתְרָא רָחֲמוּ לִי וְלָא מְמַלְּ[לִ]י מִילֵּי עִלָּוַי, בְּהַאי אַתְרָא סָנוּ לִי מְמַלְּ[לִ]י מִילֵּי עִלָּוַי. אֲבָל גַּבֵּי גִּיטִּין, דִּלְרַחוֹקַהּ קָאָתֵי, אֵימַר לָא אִיכְפַּת לֵיהּ.
The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state this halakha with regard to both betrothal and divorce, because had the tanna taught us only with regard to betrothal, you might say: In a case when he is coming to draw her near to him through betrothal, he thinks: They love me in this place and will not say negative remarks about me, but they hate me in that place and will say negative remarks about me. Therefore, he told the agent to perform the betrothal in a certain place and is particular that it take place only there. But with regard to bills of divorce, when he is coming to distance her from him, you might say he does not care where the divorce itself is performed. The tanna therefore informs us that this is not the case.
וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן גַּבֵּי גֵירוּשִׁין, בְּהַאי אַתְרָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּנִיבַּזֵּי, בְּהַאי אַתְרָא לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ, אֲבָל גַּבֵּי קִידּוּשִׁין – אֵימָא לָא אִיכְפַּת לֵיהּ, צְרִיכָא.
And conversely, if the tanna had taught us only with regard to divorce, I would have said that he is particular only in the case of divorce, because in this place it is acceptable for him to degrade himself through divorce, whereas in that place it is not acceptable for him to do so; but with regard to betrothal, which involves no degradation, you might say he does not care where he betroths her. Therefore, it is necessary to state the halakha in both cases.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין עָלֶיהָ נְדָרִים, וְנִמְצְאוּ עָלֶיהָ נְדָרִים – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. כְּנָסָהּ סְתָם וְנִמְצְאוּ עָלֶיהָ נְדָרִים – תֵּצֵא שֶׁלֹּא בִּכְתוּבָּה.
MISHNA: In the case of one who betroths a woman on the condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, and it was found that there were vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, she is not betrothed, since his condition was not fulfilled. If he married her without specification, and it was found that there were vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, the marriage takes effect. Nevertheless, he has the right to divorce her, and she is divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract, as it is assumed that he would not have married her had he known that she was limited by her vows.
עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין עָלֶיהָ מוּמִין וְנִמְצְאוּ בָּהּ מוּמִין – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. כְּנָסָהּ סְתָם וְנִמְצְאוּ בָּהּ מוּמִין – תֵּצֵא שֶׁלֹּא בִּכְתוּבָּה. שֶׁכׇּל הַמּוּמִין הַפּוֹסְלִין בַּכֹּהֲנִים פּוֹסְלִין בַּנָּשִׁים.
Similarly, if he betrothed her on the condition that there are no blemishes upon her, and she was discovered to have blemishes, she is not betrothed. In a case where he married her without specification and she was discovered to have blemishes, he has the right to divorce her, and she is divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract. As to what is defined as a blemish, the rule is that all the blemishes that disqualify priests from performing the Temple service, as detailed in tractate Bekhorot, also disqualify women from receiving their marriage contract in case of divorce.
גְּמָ׳ וּתְנַן נָמֵי גַּבֵּי כְתוּבּוֹת כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא! הָכָא, קִידּוּשִׁין אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, תְּנָא כְּתוּבּוֹת אַטּוּ קִידּוּשִׁין, הָתָם, כְּתוּבּוֹת אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, תְּנָא קִידּוּשִׁין אַטּוּ כְּתוּבּוֹת.
GEMARA: The Gemara comments: And we also learned a mishna like this with regard to the halakhot of marriage contracts, as the same mishna appears in tractate Ketubot (72b). The Gemara explains: Here it was necessary for the tanna to mention this halakha with regard to betrothal, and he taught the halakha of marriage contracts due to teaching the halakha of betrothal; there it was necessary for the tanna to mention this halakha with regard to marriage contracts, and he taught the halakha of betrothal due to teaching the halakha of marriage contracts.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמְקַדֵּשׁ שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים בְּשָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, אוֹ אִשָּׁה אַחַת בְּפָחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשָּׁלַח סִבְלוֹנוֹת לְאַחַר מִכָּאן
MISHNA: In the case of one who betroths two women together with an item worth one peruta, so that the value of each woman’s share was not worth one peruta, or who betroths one woman with an item worth less than one peruta, despite the fact that he later sent the traditional gifts [sivlonot] of a groom to the bride,
אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, שֶׁמֵּחֲמַת קִידּוּשִׁין הָרִאשׁוֹנִים שָׁלַח. וְכֵן קָטָן שֶׁקִּידֵּשׁ.
she is not betrothed, because he sent the gifts on account of the first betrothal, i.e., the item whose value to the woman was less than one peruta, and not to effect betrothal. And similarly, if there was a minor who betrothed a woman, and he sent her gifts after he became an adult, the assumption is that he sent them on account of his betrothal when he was still a minor, and since betrothal performed by a minor is of no account, she is not betrothed.
גְּמָ׳ וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, אַיְּידֵי דְּקָא נָפֵיק מָמוֹנָא מִינֵּיהּ – טָעֵי, אֲבָל פָּחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, אֵימָא יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאֵין קִידּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בְּפָחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה וְכִי קָא מְשַׁדַּר סִבְלוֹנוֹת – אַדַּעְתָּא דְּקִידּוּשִׁין קָא מְשַׁדַּר.
GEMARA: And it is necessary for all these cases to be stated in the mishna, despite their apparent similarity. As, had the tanna taught us only the case of one who betroths two women with an item worth one peruta, we would have said: Since enough of his money for betrothal goes out, i.e., is spent, he errs and thinks that he can betroth two women with one peruta, and the gifts he later sends are not for the sake of betrothal. But if he betrothed a woman with an item worth less than one peruta, you might say: He knows that betrothal does not take effect with an item worth less than one peruta, and when he later sends gifts he sends them with the intention of betrothal, and she should consequently become betrothed with them. The mishna therefore teaches us that she is not betrothed even in that case.
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָנֵי תַּרְתֵּי, מִשּׁוּם דְּבֵין פְּרוּטָה לְפָחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה לָא קִים לְהוּ לְאִינָשֵׁי. אֲבָל קָטָן שֶׁקִּידֵּשׁ – הַכֹּל יוֹדְעִין שֶׁאֵין קִידּוּשֵׁי קָטָן כְּלוּם, אֵימָא: כִּי קָא מְשַׁדַּר סִבְלוֹנוֹת אַדַּעְתָּא דְקִידּוּשֵׁי קָא מְשַׁדַּר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
And had he taught us only these two cases, we would have said that they were necessary because the difference in halakha between betrothal performed with an item worth one peruta and betrothal performed with an item worth less than one peruta is not established or clear to people, and as he might have thought in those cases that his initial betrothal was valid despite each woman receiving less than one peruta, the gifts he sent later were not sent for the sake of betrothal. But in the case of a minor who betroths a woman, everyone knows that the betrothal of a minor is nothing, and you might say that when he later sends gifts, he sends them for the sake of betrothal, and she is betrothed. The mishna therefore teaches us that the same halakha applies in this case as well.
אִיתְּמַר: רַב הוּנָא אָמַר: חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְסִבְלוֹנוֹת. וְכֵן אָמַר רַבָּה: חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְסִבְלוֹנוֹת. אָמַר רַבָּה: וּמוֹתְבִינַן אַשְּׁמַעְתִּין: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשָּׁלַח סִבְלוֹנוֹת לְאַחַר מִכָּאן – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת! אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: הָתָם כִּדְקָתָנֵי טַעְמָא: שֶׁמֵּחֲמַת קִידּוּשִׁין הָרִאשׁוֹנִים שָׁלַח.
It was stated that amora’im discussed the following matter. Rav Huna says: One must be concerned about gifts. If a woman agreed to a betrothal and the prospective husband sent her gifts in the presence of witnesses, one must be concerned about the possibility that he sent them for the sake of betrothal. Therefore, the woman may not become betrothed to another man without first receiving a bill of divorce from this one. And Rabba similarly says that one must be concerned about gifts. Rabba says: And we raised an objection against this halakha of ours, as the mishna teaches: Even if he sent gifts later, she is not betrothed. Abaye said to him: There, in the mishna, the reason is as it teaches: Because he sent the gifts on account of the first betrothal. Therefore, there is no concern that he might have sent them for the sake of betrothal. But in this case, where he had not betrothed her beforehand, he might have intended to betroth her by sending her gifts.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אָמַר רַבָּה: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ, כִּדְקָתָנֵי טַעְמָא: שֶׁמֵּחֲמַת קִידּוּשִׁין הָרִאשׁוֹנִים שָׁלַח. הָכָא הוּא דְּטָעֵי. הָא בְּעָלְמָא הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין.
There are those who say a different version of this discussion. Rabba says: From where do I say this halakha, that one must be concerned about gifts? I have learned it from the reason she is not betrothed, as the mishna teaches: Because he sent the gifts on account of the first betrothal. This indicates that it is here that there is no concern for that he betrothed her, since he erred and thinks she is already betrothed to him by the first act of betrothal, and that there is no need to betroth her again. But generally, where this type of mistake is not possible, the sending of gifts does effect betrothal.
וְאַבָּיֵי: ״לָא מִיבַּעְיָא״ קָאָמַר. לָא מִיבַּעְיָא בְּעָלְמָא, דְּלָא נְחֵית לְתוֹרַת קִידּוּשִׁין כְּלָל, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ הָכָא, דִּנְחֵית לְתוֹרַת קִידּוּשִׁין אֵימָא: הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
And Abaye rejects this proof, as perhaps the tanna of the mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. The mishna stated, for stylistic reasons, a halakha that it did not need to state, and it should be understood as follows: It is not necessary to state this halakha in general, in a case that does not involve a prior act of betrothal, when he had not entered the laws, i.e., begun the process, of betrothal at all, and it would never have entered his mind that the gifts should be considered to be for betrothal. Rather, even here in the case of the mishna, when he has already entered the laws of betrothal by attempting to betroth this woman with less than one peruta, one might say that the gifts should be considered given for the sake of betrothal. The tanna therefore teaches us that there is no concern for betrothal even in that case. It is thereby possible to object to this inference of Rabba.
מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בְּאַתְרָא דִּמְקַדְּשִׁי וַהֲדַר מְסַבְּלִי – חָיְישִׁינַן, מְסַבְּלִי וַהֲדַר מְקַדְּשִׁי – לָא חָיְישִׁינַן.
The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about it; must one be concerned that the gifts might have been given for the sake of betrothal or not? The Gemara answers: Rav Pappa says: In a place where the custom is that men first betroth women and afterward send gifts we are concerned that he might already have betrothed her or is sending the gifts for the sake of betrothal, since that is the only situation in which gifts are typically sent. But in a place where men first send gifts and afterward betroth women we are not concerned that the gifts are for betrothal.
מִקׇּדְשֵׁי וַהֲדַר מְסַבְּלִי – פְּשִׁיטָא! לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּרוּבָּא מְקַדְּשִׁי וַהֲדַר מְסַבְּלִי, וּמִיעוּטָא מְסַבְּלִי וַהֲדַר מְקַדְּשִׁי. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: נֵיחוּשׁ לְמִיעוּטָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara questions this: In a place where they betroth women and afterward send gifts, it is obvious that if a man sends a woman gifts he must already have betrothed her. The Gemara clarifies: No, it is necessary to teach this halakha due to a place where most men betroth women and afterward send gifts, and a minority of men send gifts and afterward betroth women. Lest you say we should be concerned about the minority and say she is not betrothed, Rav Pappa therefore teaches us that the behavior of the minority is not taken into account.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב אַחָא בַּר רַב הוּנָא מֵרָבָא: הוּחְזַק שְׁטַר כְּתוּבָּה בַּשּׁוּק, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְכִי מִפְּנֵי (שֶׁמַּחְזִיק) [שֶׁהוּחְזַק] שְׁטַר כְּתוּבָּה בַּשּׁוּק נַחְזִיק בָּהּ כְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ? מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ? אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: בְּאַתְרָא דִּמְקַדְּשִׁי וַהֲדַר כָּתְבִי כְּתוּבָּה – חָיְישִׁינַן, כָּתְבִי וַהֲדַר מְקַדְּשִׁי – לָא חָיְישִׁינַן.
The Gemara discusses a related topic: Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna inquired of Rava: If a woman’s marriage contract was established, i.e., seen, by people in the marketplace, what is the halakha; is she assumed to be married? Rava said to him: And should we establish her as a married woman because a marriage contract was established in the marketplace? Since a marriage contract can be written by a man even before betrothal and without the woman’s consent, its existence does not prove that she is married. The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about it? The Gemara answers: Rav Ashi says: In a place where men first betroth women and afterward write a marriage contract, we are concerned that he had betrothed her; but in a place where they write the marriage contract first and afterward betroth women, we are not concerned.
מְקַדְּשִׁי וַהֲדַר כָּתְבִי – פְּשִׁיטָא! לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּלָא שְׁכִיחַ סָפְרָא. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא סָפְרָא הוּא דְּאִתְרְמִי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara questions this: In a place where men first betroth women and afterward write the marriage contract it is obvious that there should be a concern that he has betrothed her. The Gemara clarifies: No, it is necessary to teach this halakha due to a place where a scribe is not commonly available. Lest you say that he wrote the marriage contract early because there was a scribe who happened to be there, and the prospective husband took the opportunity to avail himself of the scribe’s services while intending to perform the betrothal later, Rav Ashi therefore teaches us that there is no concern that he might have done so since the custom is to first betroth the woman.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמְקַדֵּשׁ אִשָּׁה וּבִתָּהּ אוֹ אִשָּׁה וַאֲחוֹתָהּ כְּאַחַת – אֵינָן מְקוּדָּשׁוֹת. וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּחָמֵשׁ נָשִׁים וּבָהֶן שְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת, וְלִיקֵּט אָדָם אֶחָד כַּלְכַּלָּה שֶׁל תְּאֵנִים. וְשֶׁלָּהֶן הָיְתָה, וְשֶׁל שְׁבִיעִית הָיְתָה, וְאָמַר: ״הֲרֵי כּוּלְּכֶם מְקוּדָּשׁוֹת לִי בְּכַלְכַּלָּה זוֹ״, וְקִיבְּלָה אַחַת מֵהֶן עַל יְדֵי כּוּלָּן. וְאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים: אֵין אֲחָיוֹת מְקוּדָּשׁוֹת.
MISHNA: In the case of one who betroths a woman and her daughter or a woman and her sister in one act of betrothal, by saying: You are both betrothed to me, neither of them is betrothed. And an incident occurred involving five women, and among them were two sisters, and one person gathered a basket of figs that were from their field, and the fruit was of the Sabbatical Year, and he said: You are hereby all betrothed to me with this basket, and one of them accepted it on behalf of all of them. And the Sages said: The sisters are not betrothed.
גְּמָ׳ מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״אִשָּׁה אֶל אֲחֹתָהּ לֹא תִקָּח לִצְרֹר״, הַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה: בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ צָרוֹת זוֹ לָזוֹ, לֹא יְהֵא לוֹ לִיקּוּחִים אֲפִילּוּ בְּאַחַת מֵהֶם. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב ״וְנִכְרְתוּ הַנְּפָשׁוֹת הָעֹשֹׂת מִקֶּרֶב עַמָּם״ – אִי קִידּוּשִׁין לָא תָּפְסִי בַּהּ, כָּרֵת מִי מִחַיַּיב?
GEMARA: With regard to the halakha that betrothal does not take effect if one betroths these two women simultaneously, the Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rami bar Ḥama said: It is as the verse states: “And you shall not take a woman to her sister, to be a rival to her” (Leviticus 18:18). The Torah states: When he betroths them together so that they would become rival wives to one another, he will not be able to take, i.e., betroth, even one of them. Rava said to him: If so, how would you explain this, that it is written at the end of the passage: “Whoever shall do any of these abominations, even the souls that do them shall be cut off from among their people” (Leviticus 18:29); if betrothal does not take effect with her, what renders him liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet]? If he is not betrothed to either woman, and he engages in intercourse with either one, he is not liable for karet, as this punishment is incurred for this sin only if he engaged in intercourse with the sister of his wife.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: קְרָא בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה, וּמַתְנִיתִין כִּדְרַבָּה. דְּאָמַר רַבָּה: כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה אֲפִילּוּ בְּבַת אַחַת אֵינוֹ.
Rather, Rava says: The verse is discussing a case where he betrothed them consecutively. He first betrothed one sister and then engaged in intercourse with the other, which accounts for the punishment of karet. And the mishna is to be explained in accordance with the statement of Rabba, as Rabba says: Any matters that cannot be accomplished sequentially cannot be accomplished even if one performs them simultaneously. Here too, since he is unable to betroth the mother and daughter or the two sisters sequentially, his betrothal of both of them simultaneously does not take effect.
גּוּפָא. אָמַר רַבָּה: כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה אֲפִילּוּ בְּבַת אַחַת אֵינוֹ. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי:
The Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rabba says: Any matters that cannot be accomplished sequentially cannot be accomplished even if one performs them simultaneously. Abaye raised an objection to his opinion from a baraita (Tosefta, Demai 8:10):
