שבועות כ

שבועות כ

מְסָרְבִין בּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל.

importuning [mesarevin] him to eat.

מַתְנִיתִין – בְּשֶׁאֵין מְסָרְבִין בּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל; בָּרַיְיתָא – בִּמְסָרְבִין בּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וְקָאָמַר ״לָא אָכֵילְנָא״ וְ״לָא אָכֵילְנָא״, דְּכִי קָא מִשְׁתְּבַע הָכִי קָאָמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״.

The Gemara explains: The mishna here is referring to a case where others are not importuning him to eat; therefore, his oath should be understood literally, as obligating himself to eat. The external mishna, in tractate Nedarim, is referring to a case where others are importuning him to eat and he is saying: I will not eat, I will not eat. Under those circumstances, when he takes an oath, this is what he is saying: On my oath I will not eat.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: תְּנִי ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאִי אוֹכַל לָךְ״. אִי הָכִי, מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לִישָּׁנֵיהּ (דאיתקילא) [אִיתְּקִילא] לֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

Rav Ashi, offering a different resolution of the contradiction, says: Teach, i.e., revise the mishna in tractate Nedarim to say in the middle oath: On my oath I will not [she’i] eat of yours, i.e., using a different formulation for: On my oath I will not eat of yours. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the purpose of stating what is effectively the same oath twice? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that there is a concern that the oath was a slip of his tongue and he meant to take an oath that he will eat and instead said: I will not eat, the mishna teaches us that one need not be concerned that this is what occurred.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״מִבְטָא״ – שְׁבוּעָה. ״אִיסָּר״ – שְׁבוּעָה. אִיסּוּר אִיסָּר: אִם אַתָּה אוֹמֵר ״אִיסָּר״ – שְׁבוּעָה, חַיָּיב; וְאִם לָאו, פָּטוּר. ״אִם אַתָּה אוֹמֵר אִיסָּר שְׁבוּעָה״?! וְהָא אָמְרַתְּ: אִיסָּר – שְׁבוּעָה הוּא!

§ The Sages taught: “The clear utterance of her lips, with which she has bound her soul” (Numbers 30:7), is referring to an oath, and: “A bond with which she has bound her soul” (Numbers 30:5), is also referring to an oath. With regard to the prohibition invoked by the word “bond,” if you say a bond is an oath, he is liable, but if not, he is exempt. The Gemara seeks to explicate this baraita: If you say a bond is an oath? But you already said that a bond is an oath.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָכִי קָאָמַר, ״מִבְטָא״ – שְׁבוּעָה. ״אִיסָּר״ – מִיתְּפֵיס בִּשְׁבוּעָה. אִיסּוּר אִיסָּר – אִם אַתָּה אוֹמֵר: מִיתְּפֵיס בִּשְׁבוּעָה כְּמוֹצִיא שְׁבוּעָה מִפִּיו דָּמֵי, חַיָּיב; וְאִם לָאו, פָּטוּר.

Abaye said: This is what the baraita is saying: “Clear utterance” is an oath, whereas “bond” is the association of some object or action with a matter that has already been prohibited by an oath. What is the prohibition invoked by the word “bond”? If you say that creating an association with an oath is like explicitly expressing an oath with his own mouth then he is liable to bring an offering for unwittingly violating the oath and to receive lashes for doing so intentionally. But if it is not like stating an oath explicitly, he is exempt.

מִמַּאי דְּמִבְטָא שְׁבוּעָה – דִּכְתִיב: ״אוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תִשָּׁבַע לְבַטֵּא בִשְׂפָתַיִם״; אִיסָּר נָמֵי – דִּכְתִיב: ״כׇּל נֵדֶר וְכׇל שְׁבֻעַת אִסָּר״;

The Gemara analyzes Abaye’s explanation: From where may one derive that “clear utterance” is an oath? One derives it from the verse written with regard to an oath on an utterance, as it is written: “Or if anyone take an oath to clearly utter with his lips” (Leviticus 5:4). The Gemara asks: Isn’t “bond” also referring to an oath, as it is written: “Every vow, and every oath of a bond to afflict the soul, her husband may let it stand, or her husband may make it void” (Numbers 30:14)?

אֶלָּא מִמַּאי דְּאִיסָּר מִיתְּפֵס בִּשְׁבוּעָה הוּא? דִּכְתִיב: ״אוֹ אָסְרָה אִסָּר עַל נַפְשָׁהּ בִּשְׁבֻעָה״.

Rather, from where may one derive that a bond is the association of some object or action with another matter that has been prohibited by an oath? One may derive it from the verse, as it is written: “Or bound her soul by a bond with an oath” (Numbers 30:11), which indicates that the bond is associated with a preexisting oath.

מְבַטֵּא נָמֵי – הָכְתִיב: ״לְכֹל אֲשֶׁר יְבַטֵּא הָאָדָם בִּשְׁבֻעָה״!

The Gemara asks: Isn’t the term “clear utterance” also associated with an oath in a verse, as it is written: “Whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath” (Leviticus 5:4)?

אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מִבְטָא שְׁבוּעָה מֵהָכָא: ״וְאִם הָיוֹ תִהְיֶה לְאִישׁ וּנְדָרֶיהָ עָלֶיהָ, אוֹ מִבְטָא שְׂפָתֶיהָ אֲשֶׁר אָסְרָה עַל נַפְשָׁהּ״ – וְאִילּוּ שְׁבוּעָה לָא קָאָמַר; בְּמַאי אָסְרָה עַצְמָהּ? בְּמִבְטָא.

Rather, Abaye said: The fact that “clear utterance” means an oath is derived from here: “And if she be married to a husband, while her vows are upon her, or the clear utterance of her lips, with which she has bound her soul” (Numbers 30:7). While in that verse, it does not state: Oath. With what does she impose a prohibition upon herself? She does so with “clear utterance,” indicating that “clear utterance” is referring to an oath.

רָבָא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ, מִיתְּפֵיס בִּשְׁבוּעָה לָאו כְּמוֹצִיא שְׁבוּעָה מִפִּיו דָּמֵי; וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: ״מִבְטָא״ – שְׁבוּעָה. ״אִיסָּר״ – נָמֵי שְׁבוּעָה. אִסָּרֵיהּ דְּאִיסָּר – הִטִּילוֹ הַכָּתוּב בֵּין נֶדֶר לִשְׁבוּעָה; הוֹצִיאוֹ בִּלְשׁוֹן נֶדֶר – נֶדֶר, בִּלְשׁוֹן שְׁבוּעָה – שְׁבוּעָה.

Rava said: Actually, I will say to you that association with an oath is not like expressing an oath with one’s own mouth, and this is what the baraita is saying: “Clear utterance” is an oath. “Bond” can also be an oath, but it is ambiguous. The verse placed the wording of the prohibition of a bond between that of a vow and that of an oath. Therefore, if one expressed a bond with the language of a vow, it is a vow. If one expressed it with the language of an oath, it is an oath.

הֵיכָן הִטִּילוֹ? ״וְאִם בֵּית אִישָׁהּ נָדָרָה אוֹ אָסְרָה אִסָּר עַל נַפְשָׁהּ בִּשְׁבֻעָה וְגוֹ׳״

The Gemara asks: Where did the verse place the word for “bond” between a vow and an oath? The verse says: “And if she vowed in her husband’s house or bound her soul by a bond with an oath” (Numbers 30:11).

וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ; דְּאִיתְּמַר: מַתְפִּיס בִּשְׁבוּעָה – אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: כְּמוֹצִיא שְׁבוּעָה מִפִּיו דָּמֵי, וְרָבָא אָמַר: לָאו כְּמוֹצִיא שְׁבוּעָה מִפִּיו דָּמֵי.

The Gemara comments: Abaye and Rava both follow their own lines of reasoning, as it was stated: With regard to one who associates some object or action with another matter that has been prohibited by an oath, Abaye says: It is like explicitly expressing an oath with his mouth, and Rava says: It is not like explicitly expressing an oath with his mouth.

מֵיתִיבִי: אֵיזֶה אִיסָּר הָאָמוּר בַּתּוֹרָה? הָאוֹמֵר: ״הֲרֵי עָלַי שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל בָּשָׂר וְשֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה יַיִן״ כַּיּוֹם שֶׁמֵּת בּוֹ אָבִיו, כַּיּוֹם שֶׁמֵּת בּוֹ פְּלוֹנִי, כְּיוֹם שֶׁנֶּהֱרַג בּוֹ גְּדַלְיָה בֶּן אֲחִיקָם, כַּיּוֹם שֶׁרָאָה יְרוּשָׁלַיִם בְּחוּרְבָּנָהּ – אָסוּר. וְאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: וְהוּא שֶׁנָּדוּר וּבָא מֵאוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: What is the bond mentioned in the Torah? A bond applies to one who says: It is incumbent upon me that I will not eat meat and that I will not drink wine like on the day that his, i.e., my, father died, or: Like on the day that so-and-so died, or: Like on the day that Gedaliah ben Ahikam was killed, or: Like on the day on which he saw Jerusalem in its destruction. One who makes one of these pronouncements is prohibited from eating meat and drinking wine. And Shmuel says: This is the case only when he is prohibited from eating meat and drinking wine by vow since that day, e.g., the day his father died.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְאַבָּיֵי, מִדְּמַתְפִּיס בְּנֶדֶר – נֶדֶר, מַתְפִּיס בִּשְׁבוּעָה – שְׁבוּעָה.

The Gemara explains the objection: Granted, according to the opinion of Abaye, from the fact that a vow that one associates with another vow is considered a vow, as Shmuel’s ruling demonstrates, one may conclude that an oath that one associates with another oath is considered an oath.

אֶלָּא לְרָבָא קַשְׁיָא!

But according to Rava’s opinion, that association with an oath is not considered an oath, the baraita poses a difficulty, as it indicates that association with a vow is considered a vow; a corresponding rule should apply to an oath.

אָמַר לָךְ רָבָא, תָּרֵיץ וְאֵימָא הָכִי: אֵיזֶהוּ אִיסַּר נֶדֶר הָאָמוּר בַּתּוֹרָה? הָאוֹמֵר: ״הֲרֵי עָלַי שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל בָּשָׂר וְשֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה יַיִן״ כַּיּוֹם שֶׁמֵּת בּוֹ אָבִיו, כַּיּוֹם שֶׁנֶּהֱרַג בּוֹ פְּלוֹנִי. וְאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: וְהוּא שֶׁנָּדוּר וּבָא מֵאוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם.

The Gemara answers: Rava could say to you: Resolve the difficulty posed by the baraita and say that the baraita teaches this: Which is the bond of a vow mentioned in the Torah? When is a bond, i.e., the acceptance of a prohibition on oneself, considered a vow? According to Rava, “bond” in the verse is not referring to association. Rather, it is referring to one who says: It is incumbent upon me that I will not eat meat and that I will not drink wine like on the day that his, i.e., my, father died, or: Like on the day that so-and-so was killed. And Shmuel says: This is the halakha only when he is prohibited from eating meat and drinking wine by vow since that day, e.g., the day his father died.

מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״אִישׁ כִּי יִדֹּר נֶדֶר לַה׳״ – עַד שֶׁיִּדּוֹר בְּדָבָר הַנָּדוּר.

What is the reason for Shmuel’s caveat? The verse states: “When a man vows a vow to the Lord” (Numbers 30:3). The redundancy in the phrase “vows a vow” teaches that when one associates a vow with another prohibition, it does not take effect unless he vows by associating it with an item forbidden by means of a vow. Association is derived from this verse and is limited to vows.

כַּיּוֹם שֶׁמֵּת בּוֹ אָבִיו. פְּשִׁיטָא! כְּיוֹם שֶׁנֶּהֱרַג בּוֹ גְּדַלְיָה בֶּן אֲחִיקָם אִיצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: כֵּיוָן דְּכִי לָא נָדַר נָמֵי אָסוּר – כִּי נָדַר נָמֵי לָא הָוְיָא עֲלֵיהּ אִיסּוּר, וְהַאי לָאו מִיתְּפֵיס בְּנֶדֶר הוּא; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara discusses the baraita: One who says: It is incumbent upon me that I will not eat meat and that I will not drink wine like on the day that his father died. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that he is prohibited from eating meat and drinking wine? Why does the baraita need to mention the specific example of a vow concerning the day his father died? The Gemara answers: It was necessary that the baraita state that the vow takes effect for the sake of the other example: Like on the day that Gedaliah ben Ahikam was killed. Otherwise, it may enter your mind to say: Since, even if he did not vow to refrain from eating meat or drinking wine on that day they would be prohibited to him anyway, as it is a public fast day, when he did vow to refrain from eating and drinking on that day, the prohibition of the vow would not take effect on him, and that subsequent vow would then not be associated with a vow, but with an ordinary prohibition. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that the vow made on the fast day takes effect and the second vow can be associated with it.

וְאַף רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן סָבַר לַהּ לְהָא דְּרָבָא; דְּכִי אֲתָא רָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: ״מִבְטָא לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״, ״אִיסָּר לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ – שְׁבוּעָה.

The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yoḥanan also holds in accordance with this opinion of Rava that a bond is not an association with an oath, but an oath itself, as when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one says: By my clear utterance I will not eat of yours, or: On my bond I will not eat of yours, it is an oath.

כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: ״אוֹכַל״ וְ״לֹא אוֹכַל״ – שֶׁקֶר, וְאַזְהַרְתֵּיהּ מֵהָכָא: ״לָא תִשָּׁבְעוּ בִשְׁמִי לַשָּׁקֶר״. ״אָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ – שָׁוְא, וְאַזְהַרְתֵּיהּ מֵהָכָא: ״לֹא תִשָּׂא אֶת שֵׁם ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ לַשָּׁוְא״.

§ When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one takes an oath, saying: I will eat, or: I will not eat, relating to the future, and does not fulfill it, it is a false oath. And its prohibition in the Torah is from here: “And you shall not take an oath by My name falsely, so that you profane the name of your God; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:12). If one takes an oath, saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, relating to past actions, and it is a lie, it is an oath taken in vain, and its prohibition in the Torah is from here: “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain; for the Lord will not absolve of guilt he that takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:7).

קוּנָּמוֹת – עוֹבֵר בְּ״לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״.

Rav Dimi continued: With regard to vows where one states that an item is forbidden like an offering [konamot], if he subsequently derives benefit from that item, one violates the prohibition: “When a man vows a vow to the Lord, or takes an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word; he shall do according to all that proceeds out of his mouth” (Numbers 30:3).

מֵיתִיבִי: שָׁוְא וְשֶׁקֶר אֶחָד הֵן. מַאי, לָאו מִדְּשָׁוְא לְשֶׁעָבַר – אַף שֶׁקֶר נָמֵי לְשֶׁעָבַר? אַלְמָא ״אָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ שֶׁקֶר הוּא!

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: The prohibitions against taking an oath in vain and taking a false oath are one. The Gemara suggests: What, is the baraita not teaching that if an oath taken in vain refers to the past, a false oath also refers to the past? Apparently, the statements: I ate, and: I did not eat, are both false oaths, contrary to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that a false oath is one that relates to the future.

מִידֵּי אִירְיָא?! הָא כִּדְאִיתָא, וְהָא כִּדְאִיתָא. וּמַאי ״דָּבָר אֶחָד הֵן״? דִּבְדִיבּוּר אֶחָד נֶאֶמְרוּ, כִּדְתַנְיָא: ״זָכוֹר״ וְ״שָׁמוֹר״ בְּדִיבּוּר אֶחָד נֶאֶמְרוּ – מַה שֶּׁאֵין יָכוֹל הַפֶּה לְדַבֵּר, וּמָה שֶׁאֵין הָאוֹזֶן יָכוֹל לִשְׁמוֹעַ.

The Gemara answers: Are the cases comparable? This case, of a false oath, is as it is and that case, of an oath taken in vain, is as it is. What, then, is the meaning of the assertion of the baraita that they are one? It is that both were spoken in a single utterance at the giving of the Torah, like that which is taught in a baraita: “Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy” (Exodus 20:8), and: “Observe the Sabbath day, to keep it holy” (Deuteronomy 5:12), were spoken in one utterance, in a manner that the human mouth cannot say and that the human ear cannot hear.

בִּשְׁלָמָא הָתָם בְּדִיבּוּר אֶחָד נֶאֶמְרוּ, כִּדְרַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה – דְּאָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: נָשִׁים חַיָּיבוֹת בְּקִידּוּשׁ הַיּוֹם דְּבַר תּוֹרָה, דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״זָכוֹר״ וְ״שָׁמוֹר״ – כׇּל שֶׁיֶּשְׁנוֹ בִּשְׁמִירָה יֶשְׁנוֹ בִּזְכִירָה, וְהָנֵי נְשֵׁי הוֹאִיל וְאִיתַנְהוּ בִּשְׁמִירָה אִיתַנְהוּ נָמֵי בִּזְכִירָה. אֶלָּא הָכָא לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ?

The Gemara asks: Granted, there, “remember” and “observe” were spoken in a single utterance in order to teach the halakha that Rav Adda bar Ahava says; as Rav Adda bar Ahava says: Women are obligated to recite kiddush sanctifying the seventh day, by Torah law, even though it is a positive, time-bound mitzva, since the verses state: “Remember,” and: “Observe,” indicating that anyone who is obligated to observe, i.e., is prohibited from performing labor on Shabbat, is obligated to remember, by reciting kiddush. And these women, since they are obligated to observe, they also are obligated to remember. But here, with regard to the prohibitions against taking a false oath and taking an oath in vain, for what halakha is it necessary for them to have been spoken in a single utterance?

אֶלָּא כְּשֵׁם שֶׁלּוֹקֶה עַל שָׁוְא, כָּךְ לוֹקֶה נָמֵי עַל שֶׁקֶר.

The Gemara explains: Rather, the baraita states that these two oaths are one to teach that just as one is flogged for taking an oath in vain, so is one also flogged for taking a false oath.

כְּלַפֵּי לְיָיא? אֶלָּא אֵימָא: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁלּוֹקֶה עַל שֶׁקֶר, כָּךְ לוֹקֶה נָמֵי עַל שָׁוְא.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it the opposite [kelapei layya]? It is clear that one receives lashes for taking a false oath about the future, which one violates with an action, but an oath taken in vain about the past is merely a verbal pronouncement. Rather, say like this: Just as one is flogged for taking a false oath, i.e., violating one’s oath about the future, so is one also flogged for taking an oath in vain.

פְּשִׁיטָא – הַאי לָאו וְהַאי לָאו! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא כְּדַאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: ״לֹא יִנָּקֶה״ כְּלָל;

The Gemara asks: Why must the baraita state that one is flogged for either type of oath? Isn’t it obvious? This is a prohibition and that is a prohibition, and for both one is liable to receive lashes. The Gemara answers: Lest you say as Rav Pappa said to Abaye, that the verse: “For the Lord will not absolve of guilt he that takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:7), might indicate that God will not absolve him at all, and even if he is punished he cannot atone for his sin,