עבודה זרה ט״ז

עבודה זרה ט״ז

אִי אֶפְשָׁר, הָכִי נָמֵי.

If it were possible to avoid selling produce to gentiles without incurring their animosity, indeed it would be prohibited to sell them. Since limiting sales to gentiles to such an extent would cause great harm, it is only prohibited to sell them shields.

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: תְּרִיסִין הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּלָא, דְּכִי שְׁלִים זֵינַיְיהוּ קָטְלִי בְּגַוַּיְיהוּ. וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים: מוֹכְרִים לָהֶם תְּרִיסִין, דְּכִי שְׁלִים זֵינַיְיהוּ מִעְרָק עׇרְקִי. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: הֲלָכָה כְּיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים.

There are those who say: With regard to shields, this is the reason that one is not allowed to sell them to gentiles: As when their use of their weapon is finished in battle, they kill with these shields. And accordingly, the reason that some say in the baraita that one may sell shields to them is because they maintain that this is not a concern, as when their weapon is finished they flee, rather than use their shield as a weapon. Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion cited as: Some say.

אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: אֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶן עֲשָׁשִׁיּוֹת שֶׁל בַּרְזֶל, מַאי טַעְמָא? מִשּׁוּם דְּחָלְשִׁי מִינַּיְיהוּ כְּלֵי זַיִין. אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ מָרֵי וַחֲצִינֵי נָמֵי! אָמַר רַב זְבִיד: בְּפַרְזְלָא הִינְדּוּאָה. וְהָאִידָּנָא דְּקָא מְזַבְּנִינַן, אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: לְפָרְסָאֵי דְּמַגְּנוּ עִילָּוַון.

Rav Adda bar Ahava says: One may not sell blocks [ashashiot] of iron to gentiles. What is the reason? It is because they forge weapons from them. The Gemara asks: If so, then even hoes and axes should not be sold to them, as they too can be used to forge weapons. Rav Zevid said in response: The ruling of Rav Adda bar Ahava was stated with regard to Indian iron, which is of a superior quality and used only for crafting weapons. The Gemara clarifies: And as for the fact that nowadays we do sell all weapons, Rav Ashi said: We sell the weapons to the Persians, who protect us.

עֲגָלִים וּסְיָיחִים. תַּנְיָא: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַתִּיר בִּשְׁבוּרָה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵינָהּ יְכוֹלָה לְהִתְרַפְּאוֹת וְלִחְיוֹת. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: וַהֲלֹא מַרְבִּיעִין עָלֶיהָ וְיוֹלֶדֶת, וְכֵיוָן דְּמַרְבִּיעִין עָלֶיהָ וְיוֹלֶדֶת אָתוּ לְשַׁהוֹיַהּ. אָמַר לָהֶן: לִכְשֶׁתֵּלֵד. אַלְמָא לָא (מְקַבֶּלֶת) [מְקַבְּלָא] זָכָר.

§ The mishna teaches: One may not sell to gentiles calves or foals. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda permits the sale of a damaged animal because it is incapable of being cured and living normally. The Sages said to him: But if one mates her, does she not bear offspring? And since one can mate her and she will bear offspring, the gentile will come to leave her in his possession, and Jews who see the animal in the possession of the gentile will assume that it is permitted to sell large livestock to gentiles. Rabbi Yehuda said to them in response: When she bears offspring, I will agree to be concerned about such a possibility. The Gemara notes: Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda holds that a damaged animal does not accept a male, i.e., since its legs are broken, it cannot participate in intercourse.

בֶּן בְּתִירָא מַתִּיר בַּסּוּס. תַּנְיָא: בֶּן בְּתִירָא מַתִּיר בַּסּוּס, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא עוֹשֶׂה בּוֹ מְלָאכָה שֶׁאֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ חַטָּאת. וְרַבִּי אוֹסֵר מִפְּנֵי שְׁנֵי דְבָרִים: אֶחָד מִשּׁוּם תּוֹרַת כְּלֵי זַיִין, וְאֶחָד מִשּׁוּם תּוֹרַת בְּהֵמָה גַּסָּה.

The mishna also teaches that ben Beteira permits the sale of a horse to a gentile. The Gemara notes that it is taught in a baraita: Ben Beteira permits the sale of a horse because the gentile uses it for performing an act for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, as riding a horse is not prohibited by Torah law. Therefore, there is no reason to prohibit its sale due to the concern that the gentile might use it for a prohibited action. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi prohibits its sale due to two reasons: One is because it has the status of a weapon, as horses are used in battle, and the other one is because it has the status of large livestock.

בִּשְׁלָמָא תּוֹרַת כְּלֵי זַיִין אִיכָּא, דְּקָטֵיל בְּסִחוּפֵיהּ, אֶלָּא תּוֹרַת בְּהֵמָה גַּסָּה מַאי הִיא? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לִכְשֶׁיַּזְקִין מַטְחִינוֹ בְּרֵחַיִים בְּשַׁבָּת. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה כְּבֶן בְּתִירָא.

The Gemara asks: Granted, there is a reason to say that a horse has the status of a weapon, as a horse is taught to kill by striking down enemy troops. But what is the relevance of the observation that it has the status of large livestock? It has already been explained that a horse is used for riding, not for performing acts that are prohibited on Shabbat. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When it becomes elderly and is no longer suitable for use in battle, one makes it grind with a millstone, and therefore it will in fact be used to perform prohibited labor on Shabbat. Nevertheless, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of ben Beteira, and it is permitted to sell a horse to gentiles.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: שׁוֹר שֶׁל פַּטָּם מַהוּ? תִּיבְּעֵי לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, תִּיבְּעֵי לְרַבָּנַן.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to an ox of a fattener, which has been fattened for slaughter, what is the halakha? Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who permits the sale of a damaged animal, and let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who dispute that ruling.

תִּיבְּעֵי לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה: עַד כָּאן לָא קָא שָׁרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אֶלָּא בִּשְׁבוּרָה, דְּלָא אָתֵי לִכְלַל מְלָאכָה, אֲבָל הַאי דְּכִי מְשַׁהֵי לֵיהּ אָתֵי לִכְלַל מְלָאכָה — אָסוּר.

The Gemara elaborates: Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as follows: Perhaps Rabbi Yehuda permits only the sale of a damaged animal, which will never come to be included in the category of an animal that is fit for labor. But with regard to this fattened ox, which if kept for a sufficient amount of time without fattening will come to be included in the category of an animal that is fit for labor, the sale is prohibited.

אוֹ דִלְמָא, אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּנַן לָא קָא אָסְרִי הָתָם אֶלָּא דִּסְתָמֵיהּ לָאו לִשְׁחִיטָה קָאֵי, אֲבָל הַאי דִּסְתָמֵיהּ לִשְׁחִיטָה קָאֵי — אֲפִילּוּ רַבָּנַן שָׁרוּ?

Or perhaps it may be claimed that even according to the Rabbis, they prohibit the sale only there, in the case of a damaged animal that ordinarily does not stand ready for slaughter. But in this case of a fattened ox, which ordinarily stands ready for slaughter, even the Rabbis permit the sale.

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: שֶׁל בֵּית רַבִּי הָיוּ מַקְרִיבִין שׁוֹר שֶׁל פַּטָּם בְּיוֹם אֵידָם, חָסֵר אַרְבַּע רִיבְבָן שֶׁאֵין מַקְרִיבִין אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם אֶלָּא לְמָחָר, חָסֵר אַרְבַּע רִיבְבָן שֶׁאֵין מַקְרִיבִין אוֹתוֹ חַי אֶלָּא שָׁחוּט, חָסֵר אַרְבַּע רִיבְבָן שֶׁאֵין מַקְרִיבִין אוֹתוֹ כׇּל עִיקָּר.

The Gemara suggests a proof: Come and hear that which Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The members of the household of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi were required to bring as a present for the authorities an ox of a fattener on their festival day. They deprived themselves of forty-thousand dinars, i.e., they paid this sum as a bribe, to ensure that they would not have to bring it on the actual day of their festival, but rather on the next day. They deprived themselves again, i.e., they paid a further bribe, of another forty-thousand dinars, to ensure that they would not have to bring it alive but rather slaughtered. They deprived themselves again and paid yet another bribe of forty-thousand dinars to ensure that they would not have to bring it at all.

מַאי טַעְמָא, לָאו מִשּׁוּם דִּלְמָא אָתֵי לְשַׁהוֹיֵי? וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, שֶׁאֵין מַקְרִיבִין אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם אֶלָּא לְמָחָר — מַאי טַעְמָא? אֶלָּא, רַבִּי מִיעְקָר מִילְּתָא בָּעֵי, וְסָבַר: יִעֲקַר וְאָתֵי פּוּרְתָּא פּוּרְתָּא.

What is the reason that they paid a bribe to evade the responsibility of bringing a fattened ox to the authorities? Is it not due to the concern that perhaps they will come to keep the animal until it is fit for labor? The Gemara rejects this proof: And according to your reasoning, what is the reason that they paid a bribe to ensure that they would not have to bring it on the day of the festival, but rather the next day? Rather, it must be explained that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi wanted to abolish the matter entirely, and he reasoned: It is best to abolish it gradually, little by little, and in this manner they ultimately had no obligation to bring the animal at all. Therefore, no proof can be brought from this incident with regard to the halakha of the sale of a fattened ox.

וְכִי מְשַׁהֵי לֵיהּ בָּרֵיא וְעָבֵיד מְלָאכָה? אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אָמַר לִי זְבִידָא בַּר תּוֹרָא, מְשַׁהֵינַן לֵיהּ וְעָבֵיד עַל חַד תְּרֵין.

It was stated that if a fattened ox is kept for a sufficient amount of time without fattening it will come to be included in the category of an animal that is fit for labor. Concerning this, the Gemara asks: But even when a fattened ox is kept until it is slim, does it become healthy and able to perform labor? Rav Ashi said that the expert in this matter, Zevida, said to me: We keep a young ox that has been fattened until it is slim, and it performs twice the work of other oxen.

מַתְנִי׳ אֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶם דּוּבִּין וַאֲרָיוֹת וְכׇל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ נֶזֶק לָרַבִּים. אֵין בּוֹנִין עִמָּהֶם בָּסִילְקֵי, גַּרְדּוֹם, אִיצְטַדְיָיא, וּבִימָה, אֲבָל בּוֹנִין עִמָּהֶם בִּימוֹסְיָאוֹת וּבֵית מֶרְחֲצָאוֹת. הִגִּיעַ לְכִיפָּה שֶׁמַּעֲמִידִין בָּהּ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה — אָסוּר לִבְנוֹת.

MISHNA: One may not sell bears, or lions, or any item that can cause injury to the public, to gentiles. One may not build with them a basilica [basileki], a tribunal [gardom], a stadium [itztadeyya], or a platform. But one may build with them small platforms [bimmusiot] and bathhouses. Even in this case, once he reaches the arched chamber in the bath where the gentiles put up objects of idol worship, it is prohibited to build it.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב חָנִין בַּר רַב חִסְדָּא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ אָמַר רַב חָנָן בַּר רָבָא אָמַר רַב: חַיָּה גַּסָּה הֲרֵי הִיא כִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה לְפִירְכּוּס, אֲבָל לֹא לִמְכִירָה.

GEMARA: Rav Ḥanin bar Rav Ḥisda says, and some say Rav Ḥanan bar Rava says that Rav says: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm [lefirkus], i.e., the symptoms of vitality required at the time of slaughtering. If an animal in danger of dying was slaughtered but did not display any spasmodic movement when it was slaughtered, it is not kosher. If it did spasm after being slaughtered, its meat is kosher But its status is not the same as that of small livestock with regard to its sale. Rather it is considered like large livestock, and therefore its sale to gentiles is always prohibited.

וַאֲנִי אוֹמֵר: אַף לִמְכִירָה, מָקוֹם שֶׁנָּהֲגוּ לִמְכּוֹר — מוֹכְרִין, שֶׁלֹּא לִמְכּוֹר — אֵין מוֹכְרִין.

Rav Ḥanan bar Rava added: This is the statement of Rav, but I say that even with regard to its sale a large beast is akin to small livestock. Therefore, in a place where the people were accustomed to sell large beasts, one may sell them, and in a place where the people were not accustomed to sell them, one may not sell them.

תְּנַן: אֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶן דּוּבִּין וַאֲרָיוֹת וְלֹא כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ נֶזֶק לָרַבִּים. טַעְמָא דְּאִית בֵּיהּ נֶזֶק לָרַבִּים, הָא לֵית בֵּיהּ נֶזֶק לָרַבִּים — שְׁרֵי! אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא: בַּאֲרִי שָׁבוּר,

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s statement. We learned in the mishna: One may not sell bears, or lions, or any item that can cause injury to the public, to gentiles. The Gemara analyzes the mishna: The reason that these beasts cannot be sold to gentiles is because they can cause injury to the public. It may be inferred from here that another beast, which does not cause injury to the public, is permitted to be sold to gentiles. Rabba bar Ulla says in response: This mishna does not pose a problem for Rav, as he holds that it is referring to a damaged lion, which is not fit for labor;

וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: סְתָם אֲרִי שָׁבוּר הוּא אֵצֶל מְלָאכָה.

and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna on 14b, that it is permitted to sell to a gentile large livestock that are damaged. Yet, it is prohibited to sell large undamaged beasts, just as one may not sell large undamaged livestock. Rav Ashi says: It is not necessary to explain that the mishna is referring to such a specific case. Rather, an ordinary lion is considered damaged with regard to labor, as lions are not generally used to perform labor. Therefore there is no concern that a lion will be used to perform prohibited labor on Shabbat.

מֵיתִיבִי: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶן בְּהֵמָה גַּסָּה, כָּךְ אֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶן חַיָּה גַּסָּה, וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמּוֹכְרִין לָהֶן בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה — חַיָּה גַּסָּה אֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶן. תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַב חָנָן בַּר רָבָא, תְּיוּבְתָּא.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: Just as one may not sell large livestock to gentiles, so too one may not sell large beasts to them. And even in a place where the people were accustomed to sell small livestock to gentiles; nevertheless, one may not sell large beasts to them. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rav Ḥanan bar Rava is a conclusive refutation.

רָבִינָא רָמֵי מַתְנִיתִין אַבָּרַיְיתָא וּמְשַׁנֵּי, תְּנַן: אֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶן דּוּבִּין וַאֲרָיוֹת וְלֹא כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ נֶזֶק לָרַבִּים, טַעְמָא דְּאִית בֵּיהּ נֶזֶק, הָא לֵית בֵּיהּ נֶזֶק — מוֹכְרִין.

The Gemara presents a different version of this discussion. Ravina raises a contradiction between the mishna here and a baraita and resolves the contradiction. We learned in the mishna: One may not sell bears, or lions, or any item that can cause injury to the public, to gentiles. Ravina analyzes the mishna: The reason a beast such as a lion cannot be sold to gentiles is that it can cause injury to the public, from which it may be inferred that with regard to another beast, which does not cause injury to the public, one may sell it to gentiles.

וּרְמִינְהִי: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֵין מוֹכְרִין בְּהֵמָה גַּסָּה, כָּךְ אֵין מוֹכְרִין חַיָּה גַּסָּה, וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמּוֹכְרִין בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה, חַיָּה גַּסָּה אֵין מוֹכְרִין. וּמְשַׁנֵּי: בַּאֲרִי שָׁבוּר, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: סְתָם אֲרִי שָׁבוּר הוּא אֵצֶל מְלָאכָה.

And Ravina raises a contradiction from a baraita: Just as one may not sell large livestock to gentiles, so too, one may not sell large beasts to them. And even in a place where the people were accustomed to sell small livestock to gentiles, one may not sell large beasts to them. The baraita indicates that one may never sell large beasts to gentiles, even if it poses no danger to the public. And Ravina resolves the contradiction between the mishna and the baraita: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a damaged lion, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Ashi says there is a different explanation: An ordinary lion is considered damaged with regard to labor.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב נַחְמָן: מַאן לֵימָא לַן דַּאֲרִי חַיָּה גַּסָּה הִיא? דִּלְמָא חַיָּה דַּקָּה הִיא!

Rav Naḥman objects to the inference drawn from the mishna: Who will tell us that a lion is considered a large beast? Perhaps it is considered a small beast, in which case it cannot be inferred that the mishna permits the sale of large beasts.

רַב אָשֵׁי דָּיֵיק מַתְנִיתִין וּמוֹתֵיב תְּיוּבְתָּא, תְּנַן: אֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶן דּוּבִּים וַאֲרָיוֹת וְלֹא כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ נֶזֶק לָרַבִּים. טַעְמָא דְּאִית בֵּיהּ נֶזֶק, הָא לֵית בֵּיהּ נֶזֶק מוֹכְרִין.

The Gemara explains: Rav Ashi examined the mishna here carefully, and from it he raises a refutation of the opinion of Rav Ḥanan bar Rava, who permitted the sale of large beasts. We learned in the mishna: One may not sell bears, or lions, or any item that can cause injury to the public, to gentiles. Rav Ashi inferred two conclusions from here. First, the reason a beast such as a lion cannot be sold to gentiles is because it can cause injury to the public, whereas with regard to a beast that does not cause injury to the public, one may sell it to gentiles. This inference was cited in contradiction of the opinion of Rav, as explained before.

וְטַעְמָא אֲרִי, דִּסְתָם אֲרִי שָׁבוּר הוּא אֵצֶל מְלָאכָה, אֲבָל מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא דְּעָבֵיד מְלָאכָה — לָא. תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַב חָנָן בַּר רָבָא, תְּיוּבְתָּא.

And Rav Ashi then inferred, in resolution of Rav’s opinion, that the reason the mishna specifies that one may sell a lion if it does not pose a danger to the public is that an ordinary lion is considered damaged with regard to labor. But a different animal that performs labor may not be sold. This presents a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Ḥanan bar Rava. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rav Ḥanan bar Rava is a conclusive refutation.

וְחַיָּה גַּסָּה מִיהַת מַאי מְלָאכָה עָבְדָא? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אֲמַר לִי מָר יְהוּדָה, דְּבֵי מָר יוֹחָנִי טָחֲנִי רֵיחַיִם בַּעֲרוֹדֵי.

The Gemara asks: But in any event, what labor can a large beast perform? Why is it necessary to prohibit the sale of large beasts if they are not trained to perform any labor? Abaye said: Mar Yehuda said to me that in the house of Mar Yoḥani, they grind the mill with wild asses, which are considered large beasts.

אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כִּי הֲוֵינַן בֵּי רַב יְהוּדָה, אֲמַר לַן: גְּמִירוּ מִינַּאי הָא מִילְּתָא, דְּמִגַּבְרָא רַבָּה שְׁמִיעַ לִי, וְלָא יָדַעְנָא אִי מֵרַב אִי מִשְּׁמוּאֵל: חַיָּה גַּסָּה הֲרֵי הִיא כִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה לְפִירְכּוּס.

§ Rabbi Zeira said: When we were in the study hall of Rav Yehuda, he said to us: Learn from me this matter, which I heard from a great man, but I do not know if I heard it from Rav or from Shmuel: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm, i.e., the symptoms of vitality required at the time of slaughtering.

כִּי אֲתַאי לְקוּרְקוּנְיָא, אַשְׁכַּחְתֵּיהּ לְרַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָשֵׁי, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: חַיָּה גַּסָּה הֲרֵי הִיא כִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה לְפִירְכּוּס. אָמֵינָא: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל אִיתְּמַר. כִּי אֲתַאי לְסוּרָא, אַשְׁכַּחְתֵּיהּ לְרַבָּה בַּר יִרְמְיָה דְּיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר לַהּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: חַיָּה גַּסָּה הֲרֵי הִיא כִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה לְפִירְכּוּס. אָמֵינָא: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אִיתְּמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב וְאִיתְּמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל.

Rabbi Zeira continued: When I came to the city of Korkoneya, I found Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi sitting and saying in the name of Shmuel: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm. I said to myself: One can conclude from here that this was stated in the name of Shmuel. When I came to Sura, I found Rabba bar Yirmeya sitting and saying in the name of Rav: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm. I said to myself: One can conclude from here that this was stated in the name of Rav, and it was also stated in the name of Shmuel.

כִּי סְלֵיקִית לְהָתָם, אַשְׁכַּחְתֵּיהּ לְרַב אַסִּי דְּיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר: אָמַר רַב חָמָא בַּר גּוּרְיָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: חַיָּה גַּסָּה הֲרֵי הִיא כִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה לְפִירְכּוּס. אֲמַרִי לֵיהּ: וְלָא סָבַר לַהּ מָר דְּמַאן מָרָא דִּשְׁמַעְתְּתָא רַבָּה בַּר יִרְמְיָה? אָמַר לִי: פַּתְיָא אוּכָּמָא, מִינַּאי וּמִינָּךְ תִּסְתַּיֵּים שְׁמַעְתָּא.

When I ascended to there, Eretz Yisrael, I found Rav Asi sitting and saying that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya says in the name of Rav: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm. I said to him: And doesn’t the Master hold that the Master who is responsible for dissemination of this halakha is Rabba bar Yirmeya? Why don’t you attribute the statement to him? Rav Asi said to me: Black pot [patya], a term of endearment for a scholar who works hard studying Torah: From me and from you this halakha may be concluded. In other words, our two statements should be combined to form one accurate attribution of the halakha.

אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי: אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא, אָמַר רַב אַסִּי, אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר יִרְמְיָה, אָמַר רַב חָמָא בַּר גּוּרְיָא, אָמַר רַב: חַיָּה גַּסָּה הֲרֵי הִיא כִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה לְפִירְכּוּס.

The Gemara notes that in fact this ruling was also stated: Rabbi Zeira says that Rav Asi says that Rabba bar Yirmeya says that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya says that Rav says: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm.

אֵין בּוֹנִין כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שָׁלֹשׁ בָּסִילְקָאוֹת הֵן, שֶׁל מְלָכִים, וְשֶׁל מֶרְחֲצָאוֹת, וְשֶׁל אוֹצָרוֹת. אָמַר רָבָא: שְׁתַּיִם לְהֶיתֵּר וְאֶחָד לְאִיסּוּר, וְסִימָן: ״לֶאְסֹר מַלְכֵיהֶם בְּזִקִּים״.

§ The mishna teaches that one may not build a basilica in conjunction with gentiles. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There are three types of basilicas: Those of kings, and those of bathhouses, and those of storehouses. Rava says: Two of these types are permitted, as they are not used for inflicting the death penalty, and one is prohibited [le’isor]. And a mnemonic device for this ruling, that the basilica of kings is prohibited, is the verse: “To bind [le’esor] their kings with chains” (Psalms 149:8).

וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רָבָא: כּוּלָּם לְהֶיתֵּר. וְהָתְנַן: אֵין בּוֹנִין עִמָּהֶן בָּסִילְקֵי, גַּרְדּוֹם, אִיצְטַדְיָיא וּבִימָה! אֵימָא: שֶׁל גַּרְדּוֹם וְשֶׁל אִיצְטַדְיָיא וְשֶׁל בִּימָה.

And there are those who say that this is what Rava says: All these types of basilica are permitted. The Gemara asks: How can it be permitted to build any type of basilica; but didn’t we learn in the mishna: One may not build with them a basilica, a tribunal, a stadium, or a platform? The Gemara answers: Say that the mishna means the following: One may not build in conjunction with gentiles a basilica of a tribunal, or of a stadium, or of a platform. But it is permitted to build a basilica that is not used for sentencing and inflicting the death penalty.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כְּשֶׁנִּתְפַּס רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְמִינוּת, הֶעֱלֻהוּ לַגַּרְדּוֹם לִידּוֹן. אָמַר לוֹ אוֹתוֹ הֶגְמוֹן: זָקֵן שֶׁכְּמוֹתְךָ יַעֲסוֹק בִּדְבָרִים בְּטֵלִים הַלָּלוּ?

§ Apropos the above discussion, the Gemara relates incidents involving Sages who were sentenced by the ruling authorities. The Sages taught: When Rabbi Eliezer was arrested and charged with heresy by the authorities, they brought him up to a tribunal to be judged. A certain judicial officer [hegemon] said to him: Why should an elder like you engage in these frivolous matters of heresy?

אָמַר לוֹ: נֶאֱמָן עָלַי הַדַּיָּין. כְּסָבוּר אוֹתוֹ הֶגְמוֹן: עָלָיו הוּא אוֹמֵר, וְהוּא לֹא אָמַר אֶלָּא כְּנֶגֶד אָבִיו שֶׁבַּשָּׁמַיִם. אָמַר לוֹ: הוֹאִיל וְהֶאֱמַנְתִּי עָלֶיךָ, דִּימוֹס — פָּטוּר אַתָּה.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The Judge is trusted by me to rule correctly. That officer thought that Rabbi Eliezer was speaking about him; but in fact he said this only in reference to his Father in Heaven. Rabbi Eliezer meant that he accepted God’s judgment, i.e., if he was charged he must have sinned to God in some manner. The officer said to him: Since you put your trust in me, you are acquitted [dimos]; you are exempt.

כְּשֶׁבָּא לְבֵיתוֹ, נִכְנְסוּ תַּלְמִידָיו אֶצְלוֹ לְנַחֲמוֹ, וְלֹא קִיבֵּל עָלָיו תַּנְחוּמִין. אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: רַבִּי, תַּרְשֵׁינִי לוֹמַר דָּבָר אֶחָד מִמַּה שֶּׁלִּימַּדְתַּנִי? אָמַר לוֹ: אֱמוֹר. אָמַר לוֹ: רַבִּי, שֶׁמָּא מִינוּת בָּא לְיָדְךָ

When Rabbi Eliezer came home, his students entered to console him for being accused of heresy, which he took as a sign of sin, and he did not accept their words of consolation. Rabbi Akiva said to him: My teacher, allow me to say one matter from all of that which you taught me. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Speak. Rabbi Akiva said to him: My teacher, perhaps some statement of heresy came before you