עבודה זרה מ״ט

עבודה זרה מ״ט

שֶׁאִם נָטַע וְהִבְרִיךְ וְהִרְכִּיב — מוּתָּר.

that if one planted an orla nut, or sank the shoot of an orla tree into the ground, or grafted an orla tree, that which grows as a result is permitted.

וְכִי תֵּימָא, שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּין שְׁאָר אִיסּוּרִין לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וּמִי שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ? וְהָתַנְיָא: שָׂדֶה שֶׁנִּזְדַּבְּלָה בְּזֶבֶל עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְכֵן פָּרָה שֶׁנִּתְפַּטְּמָה בְּכַרְשִׁינֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, תָּנֵי חֲדָא: שָׂדֶה תִּזָּרַע, פָּרָה תִּשָּׁחֵט, וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: שָׂדֶה תָּבוֹר, וּפָרָה תִּרְזֶה.

And if you would say that this is not difficult, as Rabbi Yosei distinguishes between items that are forbidden due to other prohibitions and items that are forbidden due to idol worship, does he indeed distinguish in this manner? But isn’t it taught that with regard to a field that was fertilized with dung that came from an animal used in idol worship, and similarly, with regard to a cow that was fattened with vetches used in idol worship, there are opposing opinions: It is taught in one baraita that the field may be sown in the normal manner and the cow may be slaughtered and eaten, and it is taught in another baraita that the field should be left fallow, and the cow should be made lean, until the effects of the dung or vetches have passed.

מַאי לָאו הָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, וְהָא רַבָּנַן? לָא, הָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וְהָא רַבָּנַן.

What, is it not that this baraita that rules leniently is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that when both permitted and forbidden items contribute to a result, the result is permitted, and that baraita that rules stringently is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? If so, it is clear that Rabbi Yosei does not distinguish between other prohibitions and idol worship, as in this case of idol worship he still permits the result of permitted and forbidden causes. The Gemara answers: No, these baraitot do not reflect the opinions of Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis. Rather, this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and that baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with him.

הֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבָּנַן? אִילֵימָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבָּנַן דִּשְׂאוֹר.

The Gemara asks: Which dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis is referred to here? If we say that it is the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis with regard to leaven, that dispute does not necessarily correspond to the controversy between these two baraitot.

דִּתְנַן: שְׂאוֹר שֶׁל חוּלִּין וְשֶׁל תְּרוּמָה שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לְתוֹךְ הָעִיסָּה, לֹא בָּזֶה כְּדֵי לְחַמֵּץ וְלֹא בָּזֶה כְּדֵי לְחַמֵּץ, וְנִצְטָרְפוּ וְחִימְּצוּ.

As we learned in a mishna (Orla 2:11): In the case of non-sacred leaven and teruma leaven that fell into a non-sacred batch of dough, and this one alone was not potent enough to cause the dough to become leavened, and that one alone was not potent enough to cause the dough to become leavened, and they combined and caused the dough to become leavened, there is a dispute as to whether this dough has the status of teruma, and is therefore forbidden to non-priests, or whether it has the status of non-sacred bread.

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אַחַר הָאַחֲרוֹן אֲנִי בָּא, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בֵּין שֶׁנָּפַל אִיסּוּר לְכִתְחִלָּה וּבֵין שֶׁנָּפַל אִיסּוּר לְבַסּוֹף, אֵינוֹ אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא בּוֹ כְּדֵי לְחַמֵּץ.

Rabbi Eliezer says: I follow the final element that fell into the dough. If the teruma fell in last, the dough is forbidden to non-priests. And the Rabbis say: Whether the forbidden item, i.e., the teruma, fell in first, or whether the forbidden item fell in last, the dough is not forbidden unless there is enough of the forbidden leaven alone to cause the dough to become leavened.

וְאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁקָּדַם וְסִילֵּק אֶת הָאִיסּוּר, אֲבָל לֹא קָדַם וְסִילֵּק אֶת הָאִיסּוּר — אָסוּר.

And Abaye says: Rabbi Eliezer taught that when the permitted leaven fell in last, the mixture is permitted only in a case where one first removed the forbidden leaven, before the permitted leaven fell into the dough and made it rise. But if one did not first remove the forbidden leaven, the dough is forbidden even if the permitted leaven fell in last. Apparently, Rabbi Eliezer holds that when both permitted and forbidden leaven cause dough to become leavened, the dough is forbidden.

וּמִמַּאי דְּטַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר כִּדְאַבָּיֵי? דִּלְמָא טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מִשּׁוּם דְּ״אַחַר אַחֲרוֹן אֲנִי בָּא״, אִי גְּמִיר בְּאִיסּוּרָא — אֲסוּרָה, וְאִי גְּמִיר בְּהֶיתֵּירָא — מוּתָּרִין, בֵּין סַלְּקֵיהּ וּבֵין לָא סַלְּקֵיהּ!

The Gemara rejects this interpretation: But from where is it apparent that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is in accordance with Abaye’s explanation? Perhaps the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is as he says explicitly: I follow the final element. If the dough’s leavening is completed by the forbidden item, it is forbidden; and if it is completed by the permitted item, it is permitted. And this is the halakha whether one removed the forbidden item or whether one did not remove the forbidden item. Accordingly, Rabbi Eliezer does not necessarily hold that when both a forbidden and a permitted item contribute to a result, the result is forbidden.

אֶלָּא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבָּנַן דְּעֵצִים.

Rather, the two conflicting baraitot cited with regard to a field fertilized with dung used in idol worship can be attributed in accordance with the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis with regard to wood from an ashera tree.

דִּתְנַן: נָטַל הֵימֶנָּה עֵצִים — אֲסוּרָה בַּהֲנָאָה. הִסִּיק בָּהּ אֶת הַתַּנּוּר, חָדָשׁ — יוּתַּץ, יָשָׁן — יוּצַן. אָפָה בּוֹ אֶת הַפַּת — אֲסוּרָה בַּהֲנָאָה.

As we learned in a mishna (49b): If one took wood from an ashera, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. In a case where one kindled a fire in an oven with the wood, if it is a new oven and by kindling the fire he hardened the oven and made it stronger for use in the future, then the oven must be shattered. Since forbidden items were used in the process of forming the oven, one may not derive benefit from the use of the forbidden items. But if it is an old oven it may be cooled; it is prohibited to use the oven only while it is still hot. If one baked bread with wood from the ashera as the fuel, it is prohibited to derive benefit from the bread.

נִתְעָרְבָה בַּאֲחֵרִים — כּוּלָּן אֲסוּרוֹת בַּהֲנָאָה. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: יוֹלִיךְ הֲנָאָה לְיָם הַמֶּלַח. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אֵין פִּדְיוֹן לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.

If this bread was intermingled with other bread, it is prohibited to derive benefit from all the bread. Rabbi Eliezer says: One must take the benefit and cast it into the Dead Sea. In other words, one is not required to destroy the bread. Instead, one should designate money equal in value to the wood that he used from the ashera, and he should destroy this money to offset the benefit he derived from the forbidden wood. The Rabbis said to him: There is no monetary redemption for objects that are forbidden due to idol worship. Once the bread becomes forbidden, it cannot be redeemed by having the value of the forbidden wood cast into the Dead Sea. In any event, Rabbi Eliezer apparently holds that the result of both forbidden and permitted causes is forbidden, as the bread was baked with both forbidden fuel, i.e., the wood from the ashera, and the permitted oven.

רַבָּנַן דִּפְלִיגִי עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, מַאן נִינְהוּ?

The Gemara asks: If the two conflicting baraitot cited with regard to a field fertilized with dung used in idol worship are attributed in accordance with the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis, and if this is referring to Rabbi Eliezer’s statement with regard to bread baked in an oven that was heated with fuel from an ashera, then who are the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, to whom the other baraita is attributed?

אִילֵּימָא רַבָּנַן דְּעֵצִים, אַחְמוֹרֵי מַחְמְרִי!

If we say that the reference is to the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer with regard to bread baked with wood from an ashera, this cannot be, as they are even more stringent than Rabbi Eliezer with regard to this matter. Not only do they deem bread that was baked with both forbidden and permitted fuel to be forbidden, but they require that it be destroyed and not redeemed. In other words, with regard to the status of the bread there is no dispute; all agree that it is forbidden. Therefore, both opinions are in accordance with the baraita that prohibits the result of both forbidden and permitted causes.

אֶלָּא רַבָּנַן דִּשְׂאוֹר, אֵימַר דְּשָׁמְעַתְּ לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן דִּמְקִילִּי בִּשְׂאוֹר, בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מִי מְקִילִּי?

If the reference is rather to the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer with regard to teruma leaven that mixed with non-sacred leaven, as the Rabbis permit the mixture as long as the teruma leaven was not potent enough to cause the dough to rise, the more lenient of the two baraitot cannot be attributed in accordance with this opinion either; as say that you heard that these Rabbis are lenient with regard to the case of leaven; does that mean that they are lenient with regard to cases involving items of idol worship?

אֶלָּא לְעוֹלָם: הָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְהָא רַבָּנַן.

As a result of this question, the Gemara retracts its suggestion that Rabbi Yosei’s opinion in the mishna is based on the opinion that a result caused by both permitted and forbidden items is forbidden. Rather, Rabbi Yosei holds that the result is permitted, as is evident from the case of a ground-up and dispersed object of idol worship and from the case of a planted orla nut. Therefore, the baraitot can actually be attributed as follows: This baraita that permits the use of the field is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and that baraita that prohibits its use is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְדִבְרֵיהֶם דְּרַבָּנַן אֲמַר לְהוּ: לְדִידִי, זֶה וָזֶה גּוֹרֵם מוּתָּר,

And as for the mishna, which seems to indicate that Rabbi Yosei holds that when a result is caused by both permitted and forbidden items it is forbidden, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yosei was not expressing his own opinion. Rather, when he said that one may not plant vegetables under an ashera even during the rainy season, he said so in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis that a result caused by both permitted and forbidden items is forbidden. Rabbi Yosei said to them: According to my own opinion, when both this and that cause it, i.e., when both permitted and forbidden items contribute to a result, the result is permitted. It is therefore permitted to plant vegetables under an ashera during all seasons.

לְדִידְכוּ דְּאָמְרִיתוּ: זֶה וָזֶה גּוֹרֵם — אָסוּר, אוֹדוֹ לִי מִיהַת אַף יְרָקוֹת בִּימוֹת הַגְּשָׁמִים!

But according to your opinion, as you say that when both this and that cause a result it is prohibited, as seen from your ruling that it is prohibited to plant under an ashera during the summer because of the positive effect of the ashera tree’s shade, you should concede to me, in any event, that planting the vegetables even during the rainy season, when there is no shade, is prohibited, because they are fertilized by the fallen foliage.

וְרַבָּנַן? כִּדְאָמַר רַב מָרִי בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב כָּהֲנָא.

The Gemara asks: And how would the Rabbis reply to Rabbi Yosei’s point? The Gemara answers: They would reply in accordance with the aforementioned statement that Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, says (48b), that when a certain activity causes both a benefit and a greater or equal loss, it is not regarded as a benefit. Here, the positive effect on the plant from the tree’s foliage is offset by the fact that its shade prevents rainwater from reaching the plant. Therefore, since there is no overall benefit gained from the ashera, the Rabbis permit planting underneath it in the winter.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי. הָהוּא גִּינְּתָא דְּאִיזְדַּבַּל בְּזִבְלָא דַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, שְׁלַח רַב עַמְרָם קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכִי אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

The Gemara concludes: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara recounts an incident supporting this ruling: There was a certain garden that was fertilized with dung that came from an animal used in idol worship. Rav Amram sent a query to Rav Yosef, asking what the halakha is in such a case. Rav Yosef said to him that this is what Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei; the produce of the garden is therefore permitted.

מַתְנִי׳ נָטַל מִמֶּנָּה עֵצִים — אֲסוּרִין בַּהֲנָאָה. הִסִּיק בָּהֶן אֶת הַתַּנּוּר, אִם חָדָשׁ — יוּתַּץ, וְאִם יָשָׁן — יוּצַן. אָפָה בּוֹ אֶת הַפַּת — אֲסוּרָה בַּהֲנָאָה.

MISHNA: If one took wood from an ashera, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. In a case where one kindled a fire in an oven with the wood, if it is a new oven and by kindling the fire he hardened the oven and made it stronger for use in the future, then the oven must be shattered. Since forbidden items were used in the process of forming the oven, one may not derive benefit from the use of the forbidden items. But if it is an old oven it may be cooled; it is prohibited to use the oven only while it is still hot. If one baked bread with wood from the ashera as the fuel, it is prohibited to derive benefit from the bread.

נִתְעָרְבָה בַּאֲחֵרוֹת — כּוּלָּן אֲסוּרוֹת בַּהֲנָאָה, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: יוֹלִיךְ הֲנָאָה לְיָם הַמֶּלַח, אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אֵין פִּדְיוֹן לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.

If this bread was intermingled with other bread, it is prohibited to derive benefit from all the bread. Rabbi Eliezer says: One must take the benefit and cast it into the Dead Sea. In other words, one is not required to destroy all of the loaves. Instead, one should designate money equal in value to the wood that he used from the ashera, and he should destroy this money to offset the benefit he derived from the forbidden wood. The Rabbis said to him: There is no monetary redemption for objects that are forbidden due to idol worship. Once the bread becomes forbidden, it cannot be redeemed by having the value of the forbidden wood cast into the Dead Sea.

נָטַל הֵימֶנָּה כַּרְכֵּור — אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה. אָרַג בּוֹ אֶת הַבֶּגֶד — אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה. נִתְעָרֵב בַּאֲחֵרִים וַאֲחֵרִים בַּאֲחֵרִים — כּוּלָּן אֲסוּרִין בַּהֲנָאָה. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: יוֹלִיךְ הֲנָאָה לְיָם הַמֶּלַח. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אֵין פִּדְיוֹן לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.

If one took wood from an ashera for use as a weaving shuttle [karkor], it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. If one wove a garment with it, it is prohibited to derive benefit from the garment. If the garment was intermingled with other garments, and those other garments were intermingled with others, it is prohibited to derive benefit from all of them. Rabbi Eliezer says: One must take the benefit and cast it into the Dead Sea. The Rabbis said to him: There is no monetary redemption for objects that are forbidden due to idol worship.

גְּמָ׳ וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן קַמַּיְיתָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, מִשּׁוּם דִּבְעִידָּנָא דְּקָא גָמְרָה פַּת קָלֵי לַהּ אִיסּוּרָא, אֲבָל כַּרְכֵּור דְּאִיתֵיהּ לְאִיסּוּרָא בְּעֵינֵיהּ, אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לְרַבָּנַן.

GEMARA: The mishna presents two cases where Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree. The Gemara explains: And both are necessary; as if the mishna had taught us only the first case, concerning the forbidden bread, one might have thought that it is only in this case that Rabbi Eliezer says that the bread is permitted after casting the value gained from the forbidden wood into the Dead Sea, because at the time that the bread has finished baking, the forbidden wood has burned up. But in the case of the shuttle, where the original forbidden piece of wood is still extant, perhaps one will say that he concedes to the Rabbis that the forbidden garment may not be redeemed.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן כַּרְכֵּור, בְּהָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן, אֲבָל פַּת — אֵימָא מוֹדוּ לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. צְרִיכָא.

And if the mishna had taught us only the case of the shuttle, one might have thought that it is only in this case that the Rabbis say that the forbidden garment may not be redeemed, because the original forbidden piece of wood is still extant. But in the case of the bread, where the forbidden wood was already burned up by the time the bread finished baking, perhaps one will say that they concede to Rabbi Eliezer that the bread may be redeemed. Therefore, both cases are necessary.

אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה בַּר נַחְמָנִי אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר זְעֵירִי: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: אָמַר לִי אַבָּא בַּר רַב חִסְדָּא, הָכִי אָמַר זְעֵירִי: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.

Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rabba bar Naḥmani, says that Rav Ḥisda says that Ze’eiri says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. There are those who say there is a different version of this ruling: Rav Ḥisda says: Abba bar Rav Ḥisda said to me that this is what Ze’eiri says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא פַּת, אֲבָל חָבִית — לָא, וְרַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ חָבִית מוּתֶּרֶת.

Rav Adda bar Ahava says: They taught that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer only in the case of forbidden bread. But with regard to the case of a barrel of wine used for an idolatrous libation, which was intermingled with permitted barrels of wine, the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. And Rav Ḥisda says: Even in the case of a barrel of libation wine, the wine in the other barrels is permitted once the value of the forbidden barrel has been cast into the Dead Sea.

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּאִיתְעָרַב לֵיהּ חָבִיתָא דְּיֵין נֶסֶךְ בְּחַמְרֵיהּ, אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא, אֲמַר: שְׁקוֹל אַרְבַּע זוּזֵי וּשְׁדִי בְּנַהֲרָא, וְנִשְׁתְּרֵי לָךְ.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain man, and it happened that a barrel of wine used for a libation became intermingled with his wine. He came before Rav Ḥisda to ask what he should do. Rav Ḥisda said to him: Take four dinars and cast them into the river, and the rest of the wine will be permitted to you.

מַתְנִי׳ כֵּיצַד מְבַטְּלָהּ? קִירְסֵם וְזֵירֵד, נָטַל מִמֶּנָּה מַקֵּל אוֹ שַׁרְבִיט, אֲפִילּוּ עָלֶה — הֲרֵי זֹה בְּטֵלָה. שִׁיפָּהּ לְצׇרְכָּהּ — אֲסוּרָה, שֶׁלֹּא לְצׇרְכָּהּ — מוּתֶּרֶת.

MISHNA: How does one revoke the idolatrous status of an ashera? If a gentile trimmed dry wood or pruned green wood from the tree for his own benefit, or if he removed from it a stick, or a rod, or even a leaf, he has thereby revoked its idolatrous status, as he has proven that he no longer worships it. If a gentile shaved down the tree for its own sake, to improve its appearance, it remains prohibited to derive benefit from it. If he shaved it down not for its own sake, it is permitted.

גְּמָ׳ אוֹתָן שְׁפָאִין — מָה תְּהֵא עֲלֵיהֶן? פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַב הוּנָא וְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר רַב: חַד אָמַר אֲסוּרִין, וְחַד אָמַר מוּתָּרִין.

GEMARA: With regard to those shavings that were shaved off for the sake of the ashera, what should be done with them? Rav Huna and Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav disagree about it; one says the shavings are forbidden and one says they are permitted.

תַּנְיָא כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר מוּתָּרִין, דְּתַנְיָא: גּוֹי שֶׁשִּׁיפָּה עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לְצׇרְכּוֹ — הִיא וּשְׁפָאֶיהָ מוּתָּרִין, לְצׇרְכָּהּ — הִיא אֲסוּרָה וּשְׁפָאֶיהָ מוּתָּרִין, וְיִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁשִּׁיפָּה עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, בֵּין לְצׇרְכָּהּ בֵּין לְצׇרְכּוֹ — הִיא וּשְׁפָאֶיהָ אֲסוּרִין.

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the one who says that the shavings are permitted, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a gentile who shaved down an object of idol worship for his own sake, as he wished to use the shavings, the tree and its shavings are permitted. The idolatrous status has been revoked from both the object and its shavings. If he shaved it for its, i.e., for the idol’s, own sake, it remains forbidden, but its shavings are permitted. And in the case of a Jew who shaved down an object of idol worship, whether for its sake or for his own sake, the object and its shavings remain forbidden, as a Jew cannot revoke an object’s idolatrous status.

אִיתְּמַר: עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּבְּרָה, רַב אָמַר: צָרִיךְ לְבַטֵּל כׇּל קֵיסָם וְקֵיסָם, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה אֵינָהּ בְּטֵלָה אֶלָּא דֶּרֶךְ גְּדִילָתָהּ.

It was stated: With regard to an object of idol worship that broke, Rav says: It is necessary to revoke the idolatrous status of each and every sliver. And Shmuel says: An object of idol worship can have its status nullified only if part of it breaks off in the course of its natural manner of growth.

אַדְּרַבָּה, דֶּרֶךְ גְּדִילָתָהּ מִי מְבַטְּלָא? אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֵין עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה צְרִיכָה לְבַטֵּל אֶלָּא דֶּרֶךְ גְּדִילָתָהּ.

The Gemara inquires about Shmuel’s ruling: On the contrary, can an object possibly have its idolatrous status nullified by breaking in the course of its natural manner of growth? The Gemara answers: Rather, this is what Shmuel is saying: If an object of idol worship breaks, its idolatrous status is automatically nullified, as the idol worshipper will see that it broke and will no longer attribute any power to it. It needs to have its idolatrous status actively revoked only in a case where it broke off in the course of its natural manner of growth. For example, if leaves fall from a worshipped tree, the tree and the leaves retain their idolatrous status. In this case, the idol worshipper will not attribute the fallen leaves to a lack of power of the tree.

לֵימָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: עוֹבְדִין לִשְׁבָרִין, וּמַר סָבַר: אֵין עוֹבְדִין לִשְׁבָרִין?

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rav and Shmuel disagree about this: One Sage, Rav, holds that people worship even fragments of idols. Therefore, the fact that an idol broke does not result in the nullification of its idolatrous status. And one Sage, Shmuel, holds that people do not worship fragments of idols.

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא עוֹבְדִין לִשְׁבָרִין, וְהָכָא בְּשִׁבְרֵי שְׁבָרִים קָמִיפַּלְגִי, מָר סָבַר: שִׁבְרֵי שְׁבָרִים אֲסוּרִין, וּמָר סָבַר: שִׁבְרֵי שְׁבָרִים מוּתָּרִין.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, everyone agrees that people worship fragments of idols. And here, it is with regard to fragments of fragments that they disagree. One Sage, Rav, holds that fragments of fragments are forbidden; and one Sage, Shmuel, holds that fragments of fragments are permitted.

וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא שִׁבְרֵי שְׁבָרִים מוּתָּרִין, וְהָכָא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה שֶׁל חֻלְיוֹת, וּבְהֶדְיוֹט שֶׁיָּכוֹל לְהַחְזִירָהּ קָמִיפַּלְגִי. מָר סָבַר: כֵּיוָן דְּהֶדְיוֹט יָכוֹל לְהַחְזִירָהּ לָא בָּטְלָה, וּמַר סָבַר: אֵין עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בְּטֵלָה אֶלָּא דֶּרֶךְ גְּדִילָתָהּ, דְּהַיְינוּ אוֹרְחֵיהּ, הָא לָאו גְּדִילָתָהּ הִיא, וְאֵין צְרִיכָה לְבַטֵּל.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that fragments of fragments are permitted, and here they disagree with regard to objects of idol worship that are composed of segments that come apart and that a layman can reassemble. One Sage, Rav, holds that since a layman can reassemble it, its idolatrous status is not nullified. And one Sage, Shmuel, holds that an object of idol worship needs to have its status revoked only when it breaks in the course of its natural manner of growth, as that is its typical manner. This case, where the idol is disassembled, is not related to its natural growth and therefore it requires no further act to revoke its idolatrous status.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ כׇּל הַצְּלָמִים.

מַתְנִי׳ רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: שָׁלֹשׁ אֲבָנִים זוֹ בְּצַד זוֹ בְּצַד מַרְקוּלִיס — אֲסוּרוֹת, וּשְׁתַּיִם — מוּתָּרוֹת. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: שֶׁנִּרְאוֹת עִמּוֹ — אֲסוּרוֹת, וְשֶׁאֵין נִרְאוֹת עִמּוֹ — מוּתָּרוֹת.

MISHNA: Rabbi Yishmael says: Three stones that are adjacent to each other at the side of Mercury [Markulis] are prohibited, as that idol was worshipped by tossing stones toward it, which then became part of the idol. But if there are only two stones, then they are permitted. And the Rabbis say: Those stones that are adjacent to Mercury and appear to have fallen from it are prohibited. But those stones that are not adjacent to it are permitted.

גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבָּנַן קָסָבְרִי עוֹבְדִין לִשְׁבָרִים, נִרְאוֹת עִמּוֹ דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר מִינֵּיהּ נְפַל — אֲסוּרוֹת, שֶׁאֵין נִרְאוֹת עִמּוֹ — מוּתָּרוֹת.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Granted, one can explain that the Rabbis hold that idol worshippers worship fragments of idols. Therefore, those stones that are adjacent to Mercury, where it can be said that they fell from its pile of stones, are prohibited; as they are considered fragments of an object of idol worship, namely the stone pile. And those that are not adjacent to Mercury are permitted, as they did not fall from it.

אֶלָּא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל מַאי קָסָבַר? אִי עוֹבְדִין לִשְׁבָרִין, אֲפִילּוּ תַּרְתֵּי נָמֵי לִיתְּסַר! אִי אֵין עוֹבְדִין לִשְׁבָרִים, אֲפִילּוּ תְּלָת נָמֵי לָא!

But with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, what does he hold? If he holds that idol worshippers worship fragments of idols, even two stones should be prohibited. If he holds that idol worshippers do not worship fragments of idols, even three stones should not be prohibited.

אָמַר רַב יִצְחָק בַּר יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁנָּשְׁרוּ מִמֶּנּוּ — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֲסוּרוֹת, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: אֵין עוֹבְדִין לִשְׁבָרִים — הָנֵי מִילֵּי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה דְּלָאו הַיְינוּ אוֹרְחֵיהּ, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא תַּבּוֹרֵי מִיתַּבְּרִי — הַיְינוּ אוֹרְחֵיהּ, כִּי פְּלִיגִי בִּסְתָמָא.

Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In a case where it is known that these stones fell from the pile of stones, everyone agrees that they are prohibited, and this is the halakha even according to the one who says: Idol worshippers do not worship fragments. As that statement applies only to a form of idol worship where that is not the normal manner in which it is worshipped. But here, where the stones thrown onto the pile are broken stones from the outset, this is its normal manner of worship. They disagree only when it is not specifically known where these stones came from.