מנחות ג

מנחות ג

אָמְרִי: דִּילְמָא מִיצּוּי דְּבָתַר הַזָּאָה הוּא, דְּאָמַר מָר: מִיצָּה דָּמָהּ בְּכׇל מָקוֹם בַּמִּזְבֵּחַ כְּשֵׁירָה.

The Gemara responds: This is not considered recognizably false intent, as people might say: Perhaps it is actually a sin offering and he has already sprinkled its blood below the red line. And as for the fact that he squeezed its blood above the red line, they will say: It is the squeezing that follows sprinkling, which may be performed above the red line in the case of a sin offering. As the Master said: If one squeezed the blood of a bird sin offering in any place on the altar, the offering is valid. Since people might erroneously think that this bird is actually a sin offering, this intent is not considered recognizably false, so the offering is disqualified.

חַטַּאת הָעוֹף שֶׁהִזָּה דָּמָהּ לְמַטָּה לְשֵׁם עוֹלַת הָעוֹף תְּרַצֶּה, דְּמַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ דְּחַטַּאת עוֹף הִיא, דְּאִי עוֹלַת הָעוֹף הִיא – לְמַעְלָה הֲוָה עָבֵיד לַהּ, וּמִיצּוּי הֲוָה עָבֵיד לַיהּ!

The Gemara asks another question: According to Rabba’s resolution, a bird sin offering whose blood a priest sprinkled below the red line for the sake of a bird burnt offering should effect acceptance, as the actions performed on it prove that it is a bird sin offering. Because if it is in fact a bird burnt offering, he would have performed it above the red line, and he would have performed the act of squeezing instead of sprinkling.

הָכִי נָמֵי, אֶלָּא לְפִי שֶׁאֵין הַמְּנָחוֹת דּוֹמוֹת לַזְּבָחִים קָאָמַר – לַזְּבָחִים, וְלֹא לָעוֹפוֹת.

The Gemara responds: Indeed, according to Rabbi Shimon such a bird offering effects acceptance and fulfills the obligation of the owner. In fact, bird offerings were not discussed by Rabbi Shimon at all. Rather, he said: Because meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings, which means that they are not similar to slaughtered animal offerings, but he did not say that they are not similar to bird offerings.

קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן בַּצָּפוֹן לְשֵׁם קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים, לִירַצּוֹ, מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן מוֹכִיחִין עֲלֵיהֶן דְּקׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים נִינְהוּ, דְּאִי קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים – בַּדָּרוֹם הֲוָה עָבֵיד לְהוּ.

The Gemara asks: But if so, then offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered in the northern part of the Temple courtyard, which is a requirement that applies only to offerings of the most sacred order, for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, should effect acceptance for their owners, as the actions performed on them prove that they are offerings of the most sacred order. Because if they are in fact offerings of lesser sanctity, he would have performed their slaughter in the southern part of the Temple courtyard.

אֵימוֹר דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא אַף בַּדָּרוֹם, בַּדָּרוֹם וְלֹא בַּצָּפוֹן מִי אָמַר? דִּתְנַן: שְׁחִיטָתָן בְּכׇל מָקוֹם בָּעֲזָרָה.

The Gemara answers: The slaughter of an offering in the northern part of the Temple courtyard is not indicative of the type of offering one intends it to be, as one can say that the Merciful One states that offerings of lesser sanctity may be slaughtered even in the southern part of the courtyard. Did He say that these offerings must be slaughtered specifically in the southern part and not in the northern part? This is as we learned in a mishna (Zevaḥim 55a), that the slaughter of offerings of lesser sanctity may be performed in any place within the Temple courtyard.

קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן בַּדָּרוֹם לְשֵׁם קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים לִירַצּוֹ, מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן מוֹכִיחִין עֲלֵיהֶן, דְּקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים נִינְהוּ, דְּאִי קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים – בַּצָּפוֹן הֲוָה עָבֵיד לְהוּ.

The Gemara asks: If so, then offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered in the southern part of the Temple courtyard for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order should effect acceptance for their owners, as the actions performed on them prove that they are offerings of lesser sanctity. Because if they are in fact offerings of the most sacred order, he would have performed their slaughter in the northern part of the Temple courtyard.

אָמְרִי: קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים נִינְהוּ, וּמִיעְבָּר הוּא דַּעֲבַר, וּשְׁחַט לְהוּ בַּדָּרוֹם.

The Gemara responds: The fact that an offering was slaughtered in the southern part of the Temple courtyard is not a clear indication that it was intended as an offering of lesser sanctity, as people might say: They are in fact offerings of the most sacred order, but the priest transgressed the mitzva to slaughter them in the northern part of the courtyard and slaughtered them in the southern part.

אִי הָכִי, מַחֲבַת לְשֵׁם מַרְחֶשֶׁת נָמֵי, הַאי דְּקָא קָמֵיץ לֵהּ לְמַרְחֶשֶׁת, אֲמַר: הַאי בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת נְדַר, וְהָא דְּמַיְיתֵי לַהּ בְּמַחֲבַת – דְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת הִיא, וּמִעְבָּר הוּא דַּעֲבַר וְאַתְיַיהּ בְּמַחֲבַת!

The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if people might suspect an individual of performing the rite of an offering in an improper manner, then if a priest removes a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering as well, one who sees that this priest removes a handful for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering might say: This owner took a vow to bring a meal offering in a deep pan, and as for the fact that he brings it in a pan, it is actually the meal offering of a deep pan and the owner transgressed the mitzva to bring it in a deep pan, and brought it in a pan. Why, then, does Rabbi Shimon maintain that such a meal offering satisfies the obligation of its owner?

הָתָם, כִּי נָמֵי בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת נָדַר, כִּי מַיְיתֵי לַהּ בְּמַחֲבַת – מַחֲבַת הָוְיָא.

The Gemara explains: There, where the priest removed the handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, even if the owner took a vow to bring a meal offering in a deep pan, when he brings it in a pan it is considered a valid pan meal offering, and therefore the priest’s intention is recognizably false.

כְּדִתְנַן: הָאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי בְּמַחֲבַת״ וְהֵבִיא בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת, ״בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת״ וְהֵבִיא בְּמַחֲבַת – מַה שֶּׁהֵבִיא הֵבִיא, וִידֵי נִדְרוֹ לֹא יָצָא.

This is as we learned in a mishna (102b): One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a pan, and he brought it in a deep pan, or if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, and he brought it in a pan, the meal offering that he brought, he brought, i.e., it is valid and the priest performs the rites of the meal offering that he actually brought, but he did not fulfill the obligation resulting from his vow, and he must bring another meal offering to fulfill that obligation.

וְדִילְמָא אָמַר ״זוֹ לְהָבִיא בְּמַחֲבַת״ וְהֵבִיא בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת, כְּדִתְנַן: זוֹ לְהָבִיא בְּמַחֲבַת וְהֵבִיא בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת, בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת וְהֵבִיא בְּמַחֲבַת – הֲרֵי זוֹ פְּסוּלָה.

The Gemara asks: But even so, the priest’s improper intent remains indiscernible, as people might think: Perhaps the owner said: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering that I must bring in a pan, and in spite of this he brought it in a deep pan. Such a meal offering is disqualified and is not considered a valid pan meal offering, as we learned in that same mishna: One who took a vow, saying: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering that I must bring in a pan, and he brought it in a deep pan, or if he vowed: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering that I must bring in a deep pan, and he brought it in a pan, it is disqualified, as he did not fulfill his vow. If so, how can Rabbi Shimon say that such a meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, when the intent is not recognizably false?

לְרַבָּנַן הָכִי נָמֵי, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: ״אַף יְדֵי נִדְרוֹ יָצָא״, אַלְמָא קְבִיעוּתָא דְמָנָא וְלָא כְּלוּם הוּא, וְלָא שְׁנָא אָמַר ״זוֹ״, וְלָא שְׁנָא אָמַר ״עָלַי״.

The Gemara responds: According to the Rabbis, i.e., according to the opinion of the mishna just cited, there is indeed a difficulty. But according to Rabbi Shimon there is no difficulty, since with regard to a case where one took a vow, saying: It is incumbent upon me to bring a pan meal offering, and then he brought it in a deep pan, Rabbi Shimon says: He has fulfilled even the obligation resulting from his vow. Evidently, the designation of the vessel for a meal offering is nothing according to Rabbi Shimon, and there is no difference in this regard whether he said: This is for a particular type of meal offering, and there is no difference whether he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a particular meal offering. In both instances the unique actions of each particular meal offering prove its identity, and therefore the owner fulfills his obligation regardless of the priest’s improper intent.

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, עוֹלָה שֶׁשָּׁחַט לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת תְּרַצֶּה, דְּהַאי זָכָר וְהַאי נְקֵבָה, כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא שְׂעִיר נָשִׂיא דְּזָכָר הוּא – לָא יְדִיעַ.

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that in a case where the manner of its preparation proves the identity of an offering the owner fulfills his obligation, then a burnt offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering should effect acceptance. His actions prove that it is a burnt offering, as this, a burnt offering, is always male, and that, a sin offering, is female. The Gemara answers: Since there is one sin offering, the goat of the Nasi, which is male, it is unknown whether this animal was a burnt offering or the sin offering of the Nasi, and its gender is not conclusive proof.

אָמַר: ״לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת יָחִיד״, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? וְתוּ, חַטַּאת יָחִיד שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם עוֹלָה תְּרַצֶּה, דְּחַטָּאת נְקֵבָה וְעוֹלָה זָכָר? מִיכַּסְּיָא בְּאַלְיָה.

The Gemara continues to ask: But in a case where one said: I am hereby slaughtering this animal for the sake of a sin offering of an individual, which is always female, what can be said? Since a male animal cannot be mistaken for such a sin offering, why doesn’t this burnt offering satisfy the obligation of the owner? And furthermore, a sin offering of an individual that one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering should effect acceptance, as such a sin offering is always female, and a burnt offering is always male. The Gemara responds: It is difficult to discern whether a lamb is male or female, as its genitals are covered by its tail. Accordingly, its gender is not considered proof of the type of offering being sacrificed.

הָתִינַח הֵיכָא דְּאַיְיתִי כִּבְשָׂה, אַיְיתִי שְׂעִירָה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֶלָּא, בֵּין זְכָרִים לִנְקֵבוֹת לָאו אַדַּעְתַּיְיהוּ דְאִינָשֵׁי.

The Gemara asks: This works out well in a case where one brought a female lamb as his sin offering, as its tail makes it difficult to discern its sex. But in a case where he brought a female goat, what can be said? Its gender is easily recognized, as goats do not have tails that cover their genitals. The Gemara answers: Rather, discerning between males and females is not on people’s minds, i.e., they do not take notice of the offering’s gender and therefore this aspect of an animal is not considered discernible.

פֶּסַח שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ לְשֵׁם אָשָׁם לִירַצֵּי, דְּהַאי בֶּן שָׁנָה, וְהַאי בֶּן שְׁתֵּים, כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא אֲשַׁם נָזִיר וַאֲשַׁם מְצוֹרָע, לָא פְּסִיקָא לֵיהּ.

The Gemara continues to challenge the opinion of Rabba: A Paschal offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a guilt offering should effect acceptance, as this, the Paschal offering, is in its first year, and that, a guilt offering, is in its second year. The Gemara answers: Since there are two guilt offerings that are brought from lambs in their first year, i.e., the guilt offering of a nazirite (see Numbers 6:12) and the guilt offering of a leper (see Leviticus 14:10), it is not definitively clear to an onlooker what type of offering this lamb is.

אָמַר: ״לְשׁוּם אֲשַׁם גְּזֵילוֹת וּלְשׁוּם אֲשַׁם מְעִילוֹת״, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? וְתוּ, אֲשַׁם גְּזֵילוֹת וַאֲשַׁם מְעִילוֹת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשׁוּם פֶּסַח לִירַצּוֹ, דְּפֶסַח בֶּן שָׁנָה וְהָנֵי בֶּן שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים!

The Gemara asks: But if one said: I am hereby slaughtering this lamb for the sake of a guilt offering for robbery, or if he said: I am slaughtering it for the sake of a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property, what can be said? These guilt offerings must each be brought from an animal in its second year, and therefore they cannot be mistaken for a Paschal offering, which is in its first year. And furthermore, a guilt offering for robbery or a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property that one slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering should effect acceptance, as a Paschal offering is always in its first year, and these are in their second year.

אֶלָּא, בֵּין בֶּן שָׁנָה לְבֵין בֶּן שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים לָאו אַדַּעְתַּיְיהוּ דְאִינָשֵׁי, דְּאִיכָּא בֶּן שָׁנָה דְּמִיחֲזֵי כְּבֶן שְׁתַּיִם, וְאִיכָּא בֶּן שְׁתַּיִם דְּמִיחֲזֵי כְּבֶן שָׁנָה.

The Gemara answers: Rather, the difference in appearance between an animal that is in its first year and one that is in its second year is not on people’s minds, i.e., this is not a clearly recognizable difference, as there can be an animal in its first year that appears as though it is in its second year, and there can be an animal in its second year that appears as though it is in its first year.

שָׂעִיר שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ לְשׁוּם אָשָׁם לִירַצֵּי, דְּהַאי צֶמֶר וְהַאי שֵׂיעָר, אָמְרִי: דִּיכְרָא אוּכָּמָא הוּא.

The Gemara challenges: A goat sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a guilt offering should effect acceptance. It is clearly not a guilt offering, as this, a guilt offering, is a ram, with white wool, and that, a goat, has black hair. The Gemara responds: People will say that this goat is actually a black ram, and they may indeed mistake it for a guilt offering.

עֵגֶל וּפַר שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשׁוּם פֶּסַח וְאָשָׁם, לִירַצּוֹ, דְּעֵגֶל וּפַר בְּפֶסַח וְאָשָׁם לֵיכָּא! אִין הָכִי נָמֵי,

The Gemara challenges: A calf or a bull that one slaughtered for the sake of either a Paschal offering or a guilt offering should effect acceptance. It is clear that such animals cannot be either offering, as a calf or bull offering is not sacrificed either as a Paschal offering or as a guilt offering. The Gemara responds: Yes, it is indeed so, as according to Rabbi Shimon such offerings effect acceptance for their owners.

וּמַאי זְבָחִים? רוֹב זְבָחִים.

And what does Rabbi Shimon mean when he says that meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings? He means that they are not similar to most slaughtered offerings. There are, however, certain slaughtered offerings whose preparation, which is unique to that particular offering, is proof that it is that offering. In those instances, Rabbi Shimon maintains that the offerings fulfill the obligations of their respective owners despite the improper intent.

רָבָא אָמַר, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן – בְּקוֹמֵץ מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם מִנְחָה, כָּאן – בְּקוֹמֵץ מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם זֶבַח.

§ The Gemara cites another resolution of the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot that report conflicting opinions of Rabbi Shimon. Rava said: It is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that a meal offering that was sacrificed not for its own sake fulfills the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a meal offering. There, where he says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering.

מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם מִנְחָה – ״וְזֹאת תּוֹרַת הַמִּנְחָה״, תּוֹרָה אַחַת לְכׇל הַמְּנָחוֹת; מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם זֶבַח – ״וְזֹאת תּוֹרַת הַמִּנְחָה וְזֶבַח״ לָא כְּתִיב.

Rava elaborates: If one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a different meal offering he fulfills his obligation, as the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7). This indicates that there is one law for all the meal offerings, i.e., they are all considered variations of the same offering, and are different only with regard to how they should be sacrificed ab initio. Conversely, if one sacrificed a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering, since the phrase: And this is the law of the meal offering and a slaughtered offering, is not written anywhere, there is no reason to conclude that one fulfills his obligation under such circumstances.

וְהָא תַּנָּא ״מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ״ קָאָמַר? הָכִי קָאָמַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּמַחְשָׁבָה דְּלָא מִינַּכְרָא הִיא, וְתִיפְּסֵל, ״וְזֹאת תּוֹרַת הַמִּנְחָה״ – תּוֹרָה אַחַת לְכׇל הַמְּנָחוֹת.

The Gemara questions how Rava can say that the verse “And this is the law of the meal offering” serves as the basis for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: But doesn’t the tanna, i.e., Rabbi Shimon, say that his reasoning is that for any particular meal offering, its mode of preparation proves what it is? The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Shimon is saying: Even though sacrificing a meal offering for the sake of a different meal offering is a case where it is not recognizable that the intention fits the offering, i.e., the intent does not match the rites being performed, and the offering should therefore be disqualified, the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering,” which teaches that there is one law for all the meal offerings.

וּמַאי אֲבָל בִּזְבָחִים אֵינוֹ כֵן?

And what does Rabbi Shimon mean when he says: But with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so? This clause indicates that the similarity between the rites of various slaughtered offerings is a reason why they should not be valid, whereas according to the above reasoning the opposite is so.

אַף עַל גַּב דִּשְׁחִיטָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, ״וְזֹאת תּוֹרַת הַמִּנְחָה וְזֶבַח״ לָא כְּתִיב.

The Gemara explains this part of Rabbi Shimon’s statement: Even though there is one manner of slaughter for all animal offerings, and therefore one might think that the owner has fulfilled his obligation despite the improper intent, the phrase: And this is the law of the meal offering and a slaughtered offering, is not written. In other words, it is not stated: This is the law of a slaughtered offering, in the manner that a verse states: “This is the law of the meal offering.” Therefore, the owner of a slaughtered offering does not fulfill his obligation if there is improper intent, notwithstanding the similarity between the acts of slaughter.

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, חַטַּאת חֵלֶב שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת דָּם, לְשׁוּם חַטַּאת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, לְשׁוּם חַטַּאת נָזִיר, לְשׁוּם חַטַּאת מְצוֹרָע – תְּהֵא כְּשֵׁירָה וּתְרַצֶּה, דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: ״וְזֹאת תּוֹרַת הַחַטָּאת״, תּוֹרָה אַחַת לְכׇל חַטָּאוֹת!

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the phrase “And this is the law of the meal offering” teaches that a meal offering is not disqualified despite the improper intent for a different meal offering, then analogously, a sin offering brought to atone for eating forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering to atone for drinking blood, or for the sake of a sin offering to atone for idol worship, or for the sake of a sin offering of a nazirite, or for the sake of a sin offering of a leper should be valid and effect acceptance. As the Merciful One states: “And this is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), from which it should be derived that there is one law for all sin offerings.

לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הָכִי נָמֵי, לְרַבָּנַן הָא אָמַר: חַטַּאת חֵלֶב שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת דָּם, לְשׁוּם חַטַּאת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – כְּשֵׁירָה, לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת נָזִיר מְצוֹרָע – פְּסוּלָה, דְּהָנֵי עוֹלוֹת בַּהֲדַיְיהוּ נִינְהוּ.

The Gemara responds: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, such a sin offering is indeed valid and effects acceptance for its owner. The Gemara notes: According to the Rabbis, Rava says: A sin offering brought to atone for eating forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering to atone for drinking blood or for the sake of a sin offering to atone for idol worship is valid. But if he slaughtered it for the sake of a sin offering of a nazirite or for the sake of a sin offering of a leper it is disqualified, as with regard to these offerings, there are burnt offerings brought together with them.

רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא מַתְנֵי לֵיהּ לְכוּלְּהוּ לִפְסוּלָא, ״וְשָׁחַט אוֹתָהּ לְחַטָּאת״ – לְשֵׁם אוֹתוֹ חַטָּאת.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches that Rava holds that the halakha in all of these cases is disqualification of the sin offering. The reason is that the verse states: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33). The word “it” indicates that it must be sacrificed for the sake of that particular sin offering, and it may not be slaughtered for the sake of a different one.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן – בְּקוֹמֵץ מִנְחַת מַחֲבַת לְשׁוּם מַרְחֶשֶׁת, כָּאן – בְּקוֹמֵץ מִנְחַת מַחֲבַת לְשׁוּם מִנְחַת מַרְחֶשֶׁת.

§ The Gemara cites a third resolution of the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot that report conflicting opinions of Rabbi Shimon. Rav Ashi said that it is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering is fit and fulfills the obligation of the owner, he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, i.e., he mentions only the vessel and not the offering. There, where it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering.

מִנְחַת מַחֲבַת לְשׁוּם מַרְחֶשֶׁת – בְּמָנָא קָא מְחַשֵּׁב, וּמַחְשָׁבָה בְּמָנָא לָא פָּסְלָה; מִנְחַת מַחֲבַת לְשׁוּם מִנְחַת מַרְחֶשֶׁת – בְּמִנְחָה דְּפָסְלָה בָּהּ מַחְשָׁבָה קָא מְחַשֵּׁב.

Rav Ashi elaborates: When one bringing a pan meal offering states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, he has intent only with regard to the type of vessel, and intention with regard to the type of vessel does not disqualify offerings, as he is not sacrificing the vessel, and therefore the owner’s obligation is fulfilled. By contrast, when he states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, he has intent with regard to the type of meal offering, which improper intention does disqualify. Consequently, the owner’s obligation is not fulfilled.

וְהָא תַּנָּא ״מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ״ קָאָמַר? הָכִי קָאָמַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּמַחְשָׁבָה מִינְּכַר הִיא, תִּיפְּסֵל.

The Gemara questions how Rav Ashi can maintain that this is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon: But doesn’t the tanna, i.e., Rabbi Shimon, say that his reasoning is that for any particular meal offering, its mode of preparation proves what it is? The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Shimon is saying: Even though when he removes a handful from a pan meal offering explicitly for the sake of a deep pan, it is a case where the falseness of the intention is recognizable and the offering should therefore be disqualified, it is nevertheless valid and fulfills the owner’s obligation, as intentions with regard to the vessel are irrelevant.

וּמַאי אֲבָל בִּזְבָחִים אֵינוֹ כֵן? אַף עַל גַּב דִּשְׁחִיטָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, זְרִיקָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, קַבָּלָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן – בִּזְבִיחָה דְּפָסְלָה בֵּיהּ מַחְשָׁבָה קָא מְחַשֵּׁב.

The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Shimon mean when he says: But with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so? He means that even though there is one manner of slaughter for all offerings, and one manner of sprinkling of the blood for all offerings, and one manner of collection of the blood for all offerings, i.e., if one performs any of these rites for the sake of a different offering it is not recognizable that his intent is false, and therefore it might have been thought that the owner does fulfill his obligation, nevertheless he has improper intent with regard to an aspect of slaughtering, such as slaughtering a burnt offering for the sake of a peace offering, which improper intention does disqualify.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: חֲרֵבָה מִשּׁוּם בְּלוּלָה, אַמַּאי אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְשׁוּם בִּילָּה בְּעָלְמָא.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: If this is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon, then with regard to a case where one removes a handful from a dry meal offering for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil, why did Rabbi Shimon say that it fulfills the owner’s obligation? Since his intent concerns the meal offering itself, it should disqualify the offering. Rav Ashi said to him: When Rabbi Shimon says that such a meal offering fulfills the owner’s obligation he is referring to a case where one removes a handful merely for the sake of mixing, not for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil.

אִי הָכִי, לְשׁוּם שְׁלָמִים נָמֵי, לְשׁוּם שְׁלָמִים בְּעָלְמָא?

The Gemara challenges: If so, then when one slaughters a burnt offering for the sake of a peace offering as well, one can say that his intent is merely for the sake of peace [shelamim] between himself and God. Why then does Rabbi Shimon say that this burnt offering does not fulfill the obligation of the owner?

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא? הָתָם זֶבַח גּוּפֵהּ אִיקְּרִי שְׁלָמִים, דִּכְתִיב: ״הַמַּקְרִיב אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים״, ״הַזֹּרֵק אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים״. הָכָא מִנְחָה גּוּפַהּ מִי אִיקְּרַי בְּלוּלָה? ״וְכׇל מִנְחָה בְלוּלָה בַשֶּׁמֶן״ כְּתִיב, ״בְּלוּלָה בַשֶּׁמֶן״ אִיקְּרַי, ״בְּלוּלָה״ סְתָמָא לָא אִיקְּרַי.

The Gemara rejects this challenge: How can these cases be compared? There, the offering itself is called shelamim, as it is written: “Who sacrifices the blood of the peace offering [shelamim]” (Leviticus 7:33), and it is also written: “Who sprinkles the blood of the peace offering” (Leviticus 7:14). Here, by contrast, is a meal offering itself called mixed? It is written: “And every meal offering, mixed with oil” (Leviticus 7:10), indicating that there is a meal offering that is called: Mixed with oil, but it is not simply called: Mixed. One’s intent to sacrifice a dry meal offering for the sake of mixing is therefore not a reference to the offering itself.

כּוּלְּהוּ כְּרַבָּה לָא אָמְרִי, דְּאַדְּרַבָּה, מַחְשָׁבָה דְּמִנַּכְרָא פְּסַל רַחֲמָנָא.

§ Three resolutions have been suggested for the apparent contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon in two baraitot concerning whether or not a meal offering whose handful was removed not for its own sake fulfills the obligation of its owner. Rabba’s answer was that there is a difference between intent for another meal offering, in which case the owner fulfills his obligation, as the intent is recognizably improper, and intent for someone else, which is not recognizably improper. The Gemara comments: All the other Sages, i.e., Rava and Rav Ashi, do not say as Rabba did in resolving the contradiction, as they do not accept his reasoning, claiming that on the contrary, the Merciful One disqualifies recognizably false intent.

כְּרָבָא לָא אָמְרִי, ״וְזֹאת תּוֹרַת״ לָא מַשְׁמַע לְהוּ.

The Gemara continues: Rava resolved the contradiction by saying that a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of another meal offering effects acceptance for the owner, as the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7), indicating that there is one law for all meal offerings, whereas a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of an animal offering does not effect acceptance. Rabba and Rav Ashi do not say as Rava did in resolving the contradiction, as the verse that states: “And this is the law of the meal offering,” does not indicate to them that there should be one law for all meal offerings.

כְּרַב אָשֵׁי לָא אָמְרִי, מִשּׁוּם קוּשְׁיָא דְּרַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא.

The Gemara continues: Rav Ashi resolved the contradiction by saying that when one removes the handful from a meal offering for the sake of a vessel the meal offering effects acceptance for the owner, as intent concerning the vessel itself is inconsequential, whereas when one removes the handful for the sake of another meal offering, the meal offering does not fulfill the owner’s obligation. Rabba and Rava did not say as Rav Ashi did in resolving the contradiction because of the difficulty posed by Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, from a case where one removes the handful of a dry meal offering for the sake of a mixed one. Rabbi Shimon holds that such a meal offering fulfills the owner’s obligation even though his intent concerns the meal offering itself, not the vessel.

מִילְּתָא דִּפְשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ לְרַבָּה לְהַאי גִּיסָא, וּלְרָבָא לְהַאי גִּיסָא, מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְרַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא. דְּבָעֵי רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ: בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא מֵרַבִּי אַסִּי: מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם זֶבַח

The Gemara notes: The matter that is obvious to Rabba in one way, i.e., that with regard to meal offerings recognizably false intention is disregarded, but when the false intention is not recognizable the offering does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, and that is obvious to Rava in the other way, i.e., that in cases of recognizably false intention the offering should not fulfill the owner’s obligation, is a dilemma for Rav Hoshaya. As Rav Hoshaya raises a dilemma, and some say that Rav Hoshaya raises this dilemma before Rav Asi: In the case of one who sacrifices a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering,