מנחות פא

מנחות פא

וְכִי מַפְרִישִׁין תְּחִלָּה לְמוֹתָרוֹת?

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi explains why: And does one separate an animal as a leftover ab initio?

יָתֵיב רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר מָרְתָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר: וְלַיְיתֵי בְּהֵמָה וְלֶחֶם, וְלֵימָא: אִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תְּמוּרָה הִיא – הָא תּוֹדָה וְהָא לַחְמָהּ, וְאִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תּוֹדָה הִיא – הָא לַחְמָהּ וְהָא תִּהְוֵי תְּמוּרָה.

The Gemara suggests another solution: Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta was sitting before Rav Naḥman, and he was sitting and saying: And let him bring another animal with loaves and let him say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then let this be the thanks offering and these its loaves. And if this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then let these be its loaves and this will be a substitute, as the substitute of a thanks offering is not sacrificed with loaves, and it may be consumed for the same duration as the thanks offering itself.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עֲנִי מָרִי, אַרְבְּעִין בְּכַתְפֵּיהּ, וְכָשֵׁר?!

Rav Naḥman said to him: Answer me, my Master: The halakha is that one who separates a substitute is liable to receive forty lashes on his shoulders, and yet you say it is fit to separate a substitute ab initio?

רַב עִילָּא חֲלַשׁ, עָל לְגַבֵּיהּ אַבָּיֵי וְרַבָּנַן, וְיָתְבִי וְקָא אָמְרִי: אִם אִיתַהּ לִדְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּאָמַר: חוּץ לְחוֹמַת הָעֲזָרָה קָדוֹשׁ, לַיְיתֵי לֶחֶם וְלוֹתְבַהּ חוּץ לְחוֹמַת הָעֲזָרָה, וְלֵימָא: אִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תּוֹדָה הִיא – הָא לַחְמָהּ, וְאִי לָא – לִיפּוֹק לְחוּלִּין.

The Gemara relates that Rav Ila took ill, and Abaye and the Sages went to visit him, and they were sitting and saying: If one accepts the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: If the loaves of the thanks offering were within Jerusalem, i.e., the area of consumption of a thanks offering and its loaves, even if they were outside the wall of the Temple courtyard when the thanks offering was slaughtered they are consecrated, then let the owner bring loaves and set them outside the wall of the Temple courtyard and let him say: If this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then let these be its loaves, and if it is not, let them go out and be consumed as non-sacred loaves.

מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא אַרְבַּע לְהָנִיף, הֵיכִי לֶיעְבֵּיד? לַנְפִינְהוּ אַבָּרַאי? ״לִפְנֵי ה׳״ כְּתִיב! גַּוַּואי? קָא מְעַיֵּיל חוּלִּין לָעֲזָרָה! הִלְכָּךְ, לָא אֶפְשָׁר.

The Gemara responds: This too is not a valid remedy, because there are four loaves of the forty that one must wave. How would he perform the mitzva of waving them? Shall he wave them outside the Temple courtyard? He may not, since “waved for a wave offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 7:30) is written in the verse, and waving performed outside the Temple courtyard is not considered “before the Lord.” Shall he wave them inside the Temple courtyard? He will have brought non-sacred food into the Temple courtyard. Therefore, it is not possible.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב שִׁישָׁא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי: אִם אִיתַהּ לִדְחִזְקִיָּה, דְּאָמַר קָדְשׁוּ אַרְבָּעִים מִתּוֹךְ שְׁמוֹנִים – לַיְיתֵי בְּהֵמָה, וְלַיְיתֵי שְׁמוֹנִים בַּהֲדַהּ, וְלֵימָא: אִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תּוֹדָה הִיא – הָא נָמֵי תֶּיהְוֵי תּוֹדָה, וְהָא שְׁמוֹנִים דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ; אִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תְּמוּרָה הִיא – הָא תּוֹדָה וְהָא לַחְמָהּ, וְלִיקְדְּשׁוּ לְהוּ אַרְבָּעִים מִתּוֹךְ שְׁמוֹנִים!

Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this: If one accepts the ruling of Ḥizkiyya, who said with regard to a thanks offering that one slaughtered accompanied by eighty loaves rather than the required forty: Forty of the eighty loaves are consecrated, then let the owner bring an animal and let him bring eighty loaves with it and say: If this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then this additional animal should also be a thanks offering and these eighty loaves should be for both of them. And if this animal that is extant is the substitute, then let this additional animal be a thanks offering and these shall be its loaves, and let forty of the eighty be consecrated for it.

מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא מְמַעֵט בַּאֲכִילָה דְּאַרְבָּעִים.

The Gemara rejects this: This is not a valid remedy, because it reduces the consumption of the forty additional loaves, as the priests may not be able to consume the four loaves given from the additional forty, and the owner cannot consume them because they may be the portion of the priest.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב כָּהֲנָא: אִם אִיתָא לִדְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: הִפְרִישׁ חַטָּאת מְעוּבֶּרֶת וְיָלְדָה – רָצָה בָּהּ מִתְכַּפֵּר, רָצָה בִּוְולָדָהּ מִתְכַּפֵּר, לַיְיתֵי בְּהֵמָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת וְיַמְתִּין לָהּ עַד שֶׁתֵּלֵד, וְלַיְיתֵי שְׁמוֹנִים בַּהֲדַהּ, וְלֵימָא: אִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תְּמוּרָה הִיא – הָא וּוְלָדָהּ תּוֹדָה הִיא, וְהָא שְׁמוֹנִים דְּתַרְוַויְיהוּ; וְאִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תּוֹדָה הִיא – הָא נָמֵי תּוֹדָה הִיא, וְהָא שְׁמוֹנִים דְּתַרְוַויְיהוּ הוּא, וְהַאי לֶיהֱוֵי מוֹתָר דְּתוֹדָה.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: If one accepts the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: If one separated a pregnant animal as a sin offering and it gave birth, if he wants he can achieve atonement with it, and if he wants he can achieve atonement with its offspring; then let the owner bring a pregnant animal and wait until it gives birth, and let him bring eighty loaves with it and say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then this and its offspring are thanks offerings, and these eighty loaves should be for both of them. And if this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then this mother should also be a thanks offering, and these eighty loaves should be for both of them, and let this offspring be the leftover of the thanks offering.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאן לֵימָא לַן דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אִם שִׁיְּירוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר? דִּלְמָא אִם שִׁיְּירוֹ אֵינוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר, וְהַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: אָדָם מִתְכַּפֵּר בִּשְׁבַח הֶקְדֵּשׁ.

Rav Kahana said to him: Who shall say to us that the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan is that he said that the offspring is considered the property of the one who dedicated the pregnant mother, such that if he reserved it for a specific consecration it is considered reserved for that consecration? Perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that if he reserved it, it is not considered reserved, and this is the reason that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that one can achieve atonement with the offspring of a pregnant animal separated as a sin offering, as he said: A person achieves atonement with the enhancement of consecrated property, such as the offspring of an animal that was consecrated when pregnant.

רָבִינָא אִיקְּלַע לְדַמְהַורְיָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב דִּימִי בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא מִדַּמְהַורְיָא לְרָבִינָא: וְלַיְיתֵי בְּהֵמָה, וְלֵימָא ״הֲרֵי עָלַי״, וְלַיְיתֵי בְּהֵמָה אַחֲרִיתִי, וְלַיְיתֵי שְׁמוֹנִים בַּהֲדַהּ, וְלֵימָא: אִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תְּמוּרָה הִיא – הָנֵי תַּרְתֵּי תּוֹדוֹת, וְהָא שְׁמוֹנִים דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ; וְאִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תּוֹדָה הִיא – וְהָא דְּאָמְרִי ״עֲלַי״ נָמֵי לֶיהֱוֵי תּוֹדָה, וְהָא שְׁמוֹנִים דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ, וְאִידַּךְ תִּהְוֵי לְאַחְרָיוּת.

Ravina happened to come to Dimhorya. Rav Dimi, son of Rav Huna from Dimhorya, said to Ravina: And let the owner bring an animal and say: It is incumbent upon me to bring an animal for a thanks offering, and let him separate this animal in fulfillment of his vow, and then let him bring another animal, and let him bring eighty loaves with it and say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then these two additional animals are thanks offerings and these eighty loaves should be for both of them. And if this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then this one for which I said: It is incumbent upon me, should also be a thanks offering, and these eighty loaves are for both of them, and let the other animal be for a guarantee, to be sacrificed if my thanks offering gets lost, and it does not require loaves.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה ״טוֹב אֲשֶׁר לֹא תִדֹּר מִשֶּׁתִּדּוֹר וְלֹא תְשַׁלֵּם״, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ: לֵיקוּם וְלִינְדּוֹר בַּתְּחִילָּה?!

Ravina said to him: The Torah said: “Better is it that you should not vow, than that you should vow and not pay” (Ecclesiastes 5:4), and you say: Let him rise up and vow ab initio? Taking a vow to bring an offering is not encouraged. As all possible remedies have been rejected, the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya, that there is no remedy in a case where a thanks offering and its substitute were intermingled and one of them died, stands.

מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי תּוֹדָה״ – יָבִיא הִיא וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַחוּלִּין.

MISHNA: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, must bring it and its loaves from non-sacred money in his possession and not second-tithe money. Since he said: It is incumbent upon me, bringing the offering is an obligation, and one may not fulfill an obligation with second-tithe money.

״תּוֹדָה עָלַי מִן הַחוּלִּין וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר״ – יָבִיא הִיא וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַחוּלִּין. ״תּוֹדָה מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַחוּלִּין״ – יָבִיא. ״הִיא וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר״ – יָבִיא. וְלֹא יָבִיא מֵחִיטֵּי מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי, אֶלָּא מִמְּעוֹת מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי.

If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second-tithe money, he must bring the thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money. If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, he may bring it in that manner. Likewise, if one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves from second-tithe money, he may bring it in that manner. And he may not bring the loaves from second-tithe wheat; rather, he purchases the flour with second-tithe money.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: הָאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי לַחְמֵי תוֹדָה״ – מֵבִיא תּוֹדָה וְלַחְמָהּ. מַאי טַעְמָא? מִידָּע יָדַע הַאי גַּבְרָא דְּלֶחֶם בְּלֹא תּוֹדָה לָא איקָרֵיב, וְהַאי תּוֹדָה וְלַחְמָהּ קָאָמַר, וְהַאי דְּקָאָמַר ״לַחְמֵי תוֹדָה״ – סוֹף מִילְּתָא נָקֵט.

GEMARA: With regard to the various ways in which one can take a vow to bring a thanks offering and its loaves, Rav Huna says: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves of a thanks offering, must bring a thanks offering and its loaves, even though he did not expressly take upon himself the obligation to bring the thanks offering itself. What is the reason? This man knows that loaves are not brought without a thanks offering, and by stating the vow in this manner, he was effectively saying: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves. And the reason he stated his vow in this manner, namely, by saying: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves of a thanks offering, was that he was citing the end of the matter, as the sacrifice of a thanks offering is completed with the bringing of the loaves.

תְּנַן: תּוֹדָה מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַחוּלִּין – יָבִיא כְּמָה שֶׁנָּדַר. וְאַמַּאי? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר ״לַחְמָהּ מִן הַחוּלִּין״ – יָבִיא הִיא וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַחוּלִּין!

The Gemara raises a difficulty with the statement of Rav Huna from that which we learned in the mishna: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, he may bring it as he vowed. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav Huna that one who takes a vow to bring the loaves of a thanks offering intends to bring the thanks offering as well, why does the mishna state that he may bring the thanks offering from second-tithe money? Since he said: Its loaves from non-sacred money, he should bring a thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money.

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּכֵיוָן דְּאָמַר ״תּוֹדָה מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר״, נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי לֶחֶם לִפְטוֹר תּוֹדָתוֹ שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי״.

The Gemara responds: It is different there, in the case of the mishna, as since he said initially: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money, and then said: And its loaves from non-sacred money, he is considered as one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves to exempt the thanks offering of so-and-so. His vow to bring the loaves is not considered a new vow, but rather as a vow to bring loaves for the specific offering he vowed to bring.

אִי הָכִי, רֵישָׁא דְּקָתָנֵי: תּוֹדָה מִן הַחוּלִּין וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר – יָבִיא הִיא וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַחוּלִּין, הָכָא נָמֵי נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי תּוֹדָה לִפְטוֹר לַחְמוֹ שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי״!

The Gemara asks: If that is so, then with regard to the first clause of the mishna, which teaches that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second-tithe money, then he must bring the thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money, here too let it be said that he is considered as one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering to exempt the loaves of so-and-so, and he therefore should bring a thanks offering from second tithe. His initial vow to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money should not include the bringing of the loaves.

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא? בִּשְׁלָמָא לֶחֶם לְמִיפְטַר תּוֹדָה אָתֵי, תּוֹדָה לְמִיפְטַר לֶחֶם מִי אָתְיָא?

The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? Granted, in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, it can be said that he intends that the loaves should be brought to complete the vow of one who is obligated to bring a thanks offering, because loaves come to exempt the thanks offering. But in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second-tithe money, it cannot be said that the thanks offering is meant to complete the vow of one who is obligated to bring the loaves of a thanks offering, as does a thanks offering come to exempt the loaves?

תָּא שְׁמַע: הָאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי תּוֹדָה בְּלֹא לֶחֶם״ וְ״זֶבַח בְּלֹא נְסָכִים״ – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ, וּמֵבִיא תּוֹדָה וְלַחְמָהּ, זֶבַח וּנְסָכִים.

The Gemara continues to discuss the statement of Rav Huna that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves of a thanks offering, must bring a thanks offering and its loaves. Come and hear a proof from a baraita that contradicts the opinion of Rav Huna: In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering without loaves, or an animal offering without libations, the court coerces him, and he brings a thanks offering with its loaves, or an offering with its libations.

טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר, אֲבָל לָא אָמַר תּוֹדָה – לָא.

The Gemara infers: The reason that he is coerced to bring a thanks offering with its loaves is that he said that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a thanks offering. But if he did not say that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a thanks offering, but instead said that it is incumbent upon himself to bring the loaves of a thanks offering, he would not be coerced to bring a thanks offering with the loaves, in contradiction to the opinion of Rav Huna.

הוּא הַדִּין אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא אָמַר ״תּוֹדָה״, וְאַיְּידֵי דְּקָא בָּעֵי לְמִיתְנֵא ״זֶבַח בְּלֹא נְסָכִים״, דְּלָא מִתְּנֵי לֵיהּ ״נְסָכִים בְּלֹא זֶבַח״, תְּנָא נָמֵי ״תּוֹדָה״.

The Gemara rejects this: Actually, the same is true even if he did not say that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a thanks offering, but said only: It is incumbent upon me to bring the loaves. And this is the reason that the tanna of the baraita mentions specifically the case of one who renders himself obligated to bring a thanks offering without loaves: Since the tanna wants to teach the case of one who renders himself obligated to bring an animal offering without libations, concerning which he could not teach a case where one renders himself obligated to bring libations without an offering, because, unlike the loaves of a thanks offering, libations are in fact brought on their own and one can take a vow to bring them on their own, he therefore also taught the case of one who renders himself obligated to bring a thanks offering.

אַמַּאי? נֶדֶר וּפִתְחוֹ עִמּוֹ הוּא!

The Gemara addresses the actual statement of the baraita and asks: Why is he coerced to bring a thanks offering and its loaves? Isn’t this an instance of a vow with its inherent opening? That is, the vow should be dissolved entirely on the grounds that the one who took the vow may claim that he thought it was possible to bring a thanks offering without loaves, and now that he has been made aware that he cannot, he regrets taking the vow.

אָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: הָא מַנִּי? בֵּית שַׁמַּאי הִיא, דְּאָמְרִי: תְּפוֹס לָשׁוֹן הָרִאשׁוֹן. דִּתְנַן: ״הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר מִן הַגְּרוֹגְרוֹת וּמִן הַדְּבֵלָה״ – בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: נָזִיר, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ נָזִיר.

Ḥizkiyya said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say: In the case of one who stated a declaration comprising two contradictory statements, attend to only the first statement. As we learned in a mishna (Nazir 9a): If one says: I am hereby a nazirite from dried figs and from pressed figs, which is a contradictory statement, as figs are not prohibited to a nazirite, Beit Shammai say: He is a full-fledged nazirite, as one attends only to the first statement, i.e., I am hereby a nazirite, and the second part is discounted. And Beit Hillel say: The second part of his statement is not discounted, and therefore he is not a nazirite, as he did not accept naziriteship upon himself.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא בֵּית הִלֵּל, בְּאוֹמֵר: אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאֵין נוֹדְרִין כָּךְ, לֹא הָיִיתִי נוֹדֵר כָּךְ, אֶלָּא כָּךְ. וּמַאי כּוֹפִין? דְּקָא בָּעֵי הָדַר בֵּיהּ.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: You may even say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, and the ruling of the baraita is with regard to one who says: Had I known that one does not vow in this manner, i.e., to bring a thanks offering without loaves or an animal offering without libations, I would not have vowed in this manner but in that manner, i.e., I would have vowed to bring a thanks offering with its loaves. There is therefore no opening for a dissolution. And what does the baraita mean when it states that the court coerces him? Why would he require coercion if he says that he would have willingly taken the proper vow? The baraita is referring to a case where, despite the fact that he would have taken the proper vow initially, he now wants to retract his vow altogether.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הָאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי תּוֹדָה בְּלֹא לֶחֶם״, וְ״זֶבַח בְּלֹא נְסָכִים״, וְאָמְרוּ לוֹ: ״הָבֵא תּוֹדָה וְלַחְמָהּ״, וְ״זֶבַח וּנְסָכִים״, וְאוֹמֵר: ״אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הָיִיתִי נוֹדֵר״ – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ, וְאוֹמֵר לוֹ: ״שְׁמֹר וְשָׁמַעְתָּ״.

The Gemara cites a baraita in support of the response of Ḥizkiyya: Come and hear: In a case involving one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering without loaves, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring an animal offering without libations, and the Sages said to him: Bring a thanks offering with its loaves, or: Bring an animal offering with its libations, and he says: Had I known that such is the requirement I would not have vowed at all; the halakha is that the court coerces him, and says to him: “Observe and hear” (Deuteronomy 12:28).

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְחִזְקִיָּה, נִיחָא לֵיהּ, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן קַשְׁיָא! אָמַר לָךְ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָא וַדַּאי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי הִיא.

The Gemara continues: Granted, this works out well according to Ḥizkiyya, who says that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai that one attends only to the first statement, since this baraita can also be explained in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that the baraita discusses a case where the person who took the vow says: Had I known that one does not vow in this manner I would have vowed to bring a thanks offering with its loaves, this baraita presents a difficulty, as although the individual claims that he would not have taken any vow, he must still bring a thanks offering and its loaves. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you: This latter baraita is certainly in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, but the previous baraita may still be explained in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

מַאי ״שְׁמֹר וְשָׁמַעְתָּ״? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: ״שְׁמֹר״ – הָבֵא תּוֹדָה, ״וְשָׁמַעְתָּ״ – הָבֵא לַחְמָהּ. רָבָא אָמַר: ״שְׁמֹר״ – הָבֵא תּוֹדָה וְלַחְמָהּ, ״וְשָׁמַעְתָּ״ – שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא רָגִיל לַעֲשׂוֹת כֵּן.

The Gemara turns to analyze the baraita itself: What is the relevance of the phrase in the verse that says: “Observe and hear,” to one who vows to bring a thanks offering without its loaves? Abaye says: “Observe” means: Bring a thanks offering; “and hear” means: Bring its loaves. Rava says: “Observe” means: Bring a thanks offering and its loaves; “and hear” means that you should not act in this manner regularly.

״תּוֹדָה הִיא וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר״ – יָבִיא. יָבִיא? לָא סַגִּי דְּלָא מַיְיתֵי? רַב נַחְמָן וְרַב חִסְדָּא אָמְרִי: רָצָה מֵבִיא, לֹא רָצָה לֹא יָבִיא.

§ The mishna teaches that if one states: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves from second-tithe money, he shall bring it in that manner. The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna teach: He shall bring, which suggests that he must bring the thanks offering and loaves from second-tithe money? Is it not sufficient to fulfill his vow even if he does not bring it from second-tithe money but from non-sacred money? In fact, it is preferable that he bring the offering from non-sacred money. Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda say: The mishna does not mean that he must bring it specifically from second-tithe money; rather, if he wants, he brings it from second-tithe money, and if he does not want, he does not need to bring it from second-tithe money.

וְלֹא יָבִיא מֵחִיטֵּי מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי, אֶלָּא מִמְּעוֹת מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי. רַב נַחְמָן וְרַב חִסְדָּא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא מֵחִיטֵּי מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי, אֲבָל מֵחִיטִּין הַלְּקוּחוֹת מִמְּעוֹת מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי – יָבִיא.

§ The mishna teaches: And he may not bring the loaves from second-tithe wheat; rather, he purchases the flour with second-tithe money. With regard to this, Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda both say: The mishna taught only that the loaves may not be brought from second-tithe wheat itself, but he may bring the loaves from wheat purchased with second-tithe money.

יָתֵיב רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי זֵירָא, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא מֵחִיטֵּי מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי, אֲבָל מֵחִיטִּין הַלְּקוּחוֹת בִּמְעוֹת מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי – יָבִיא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רַבִּי, אַתָּה אוֹמֵר כֵּן? אֲנִי אוֹמֵר אֲפִילּוּ מֵחִיטִּין הַלְּקוּחוֹת בִּמְעוֹת מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי לֹא יָבִיא. וְאֵימָא טַעְמָא דִידִי, וְאֵימָא טַעְמָא דִּידָךְ. אֵימָא טַעְמָא דִּידָךְ: תּוֹדָה מֵהֵיכָא קָא יָלְפַתְּ לַהּ? מִשְּׁלָמִים,

The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yirmeya was sitting before Rabbi Zeira, and he was sitting and saying: The mishna taught only that the loaves may not be brought from second-tithe wheat itself, but he may bring the loaves from wheat purchased from second-tithe money. Rabbi Zeira said to him: My teacher, do you say so? I say that he may not bring the loaves even from wheat purchased from second-tithe money. And I will say my reasoning and I will say your reasoning. I will say your reasoning first: From where do you derive that the loaves of a thanks offering may be brought from wheat purchased with second-tithe money? You derive it from the halakha of a peace offering. A thanks offering is a type of peace offering, as the verse states: “And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanks” (Leviticus 7:15), and a peace offering may be brought from second-tithe money.