זבחים יג

זבחים יג

צַד כָּרֵת לָא פָּרֵיךְ.

does not refute the inference by citing a common element of karet, as the elements of karet in a sin offering and in a Paschal offering are not parallel.

אָשָׁם נָמֵי לַיְיתֵי!

The Gemara asks: If so, let it be derived from this inference that a guilt offering is also disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.

אָשָׁם – פָּרֵיךְ: מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן בְּצִבּוּר כִּבְיָחִיד.

The Gemara answers: With regard to a guilt offering, ben Azzai refutes the inference as follows: What is notable about the common element of a sin offering and a Paschal offering? It is notable in that there are communal offerings as well as individual offerings of these types, as well as communal burnt offerings, whereas there is no communal guilt offering.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: צַד כָּרֵת נָמֵי פָּרֵיךְ, וּבֶן עַזַּאי גְּמָרָא גְּמִיר לַהּ. וְהָא דְּקָאָמַר רַב הוּנָא קַל וָחוֹמֶר – לֹא אֲמָרָהּ אֶלָּא לְחַדֵּד בָּהּ תַּלְמִידָיו.

And if you wish, say instead that actually, ben Azzai also refutes the entire inference, because a sin offering and a Paschal offering uniquely share an element of karet. And the reason ben Azzai maintains that a burnt offering sacrificed not for its sake is disqualified is that he learned it as a tradition. And as for the fact that Rav Huna cites an a fortiori inference, he does not believe it to be the true source for ben Azzai’s halakha; he said it only to sharpen the minds of his students with it, challenging them to refute it.

מַתְנִי׳ הַפֶּסַח וְהַחַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, קִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן; אוֹ לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן – פְּסוּלִים.

MISHNA: With regard to the Paschal offering and the sin offering, where one slaughtered them not for their sake, or where he collected their blood in a vessel, conveyed this blood to the altar, or sprinkled this blood on the altar not for their sake, or where he performed one of these sacrificial rites for their sake and not for their sake, or not for their sake and for their sake, in all these cases the offerings are unfit.

כֵּיצַד לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן? לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח וּלְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים. שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן? לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים וּלְשֵׁם פֶּסַח.

How are these rites performed for their sake and not for their sake? In a case where one slaughtered the Paschal offering for the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a peace offering. How are these rites performed not for their sake and for their sake? In a case where one slaughtered the Paschal offering for the sake of a peace offering and for the sake of a Paschal offering.

שֶׁהַזֶּבַח נִפְסָל בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים: בִּשְׁחִיטָה, וּבְקִבּוּל, וּבְהִילּוּךְ, וּבִזְרִיקָה.

The offering is unfit because a slaughtered offering is disqualified due to prohibited intent in four matters: In the performance of the sacrificial rites of slaughtering the animal, in collecting the blood, in conveying the blood, and in sprinkling the blood.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַכְשִׁיר בְּהִילּוּךְ, שֶׁהָיָה אוֹמֵר: אִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁחִיטָה וְשֶׁלֹּא בְּקַבָּלָה וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּזְרִיקָה, אֲבָל אֶפְשָׁר בְּלֹא הִילּוּךְ – שׁוֹחֵט בְּצַד הַמִּזְבֵּחַ וְזוֹרֵק.

Rabbi Shimon deems the offering fit if the prohibited intent was during the rite of conveying the blood, as he would say: It is impossible to sacrifice an offering without slaughtering the animal, or without collection of the blood, or without sprinkling the blood, but it is possible to sacrifice an offering without conveying the blood to the altar. How so? If one slaughters the animal alongside the altar and sprinkles the blood, the blood does not need to be conveyed. Therefore, the rite of conveying the blood is not significant enough to cause the offering to be disqualified due to prohibited intent while performing it.

רַבִּי אֶלְיעָזָר אוֹמֵר: הַמְהַלֵּךְ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁהוּא צָרִיךְ לְהַלֵּךְ – מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת; בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהַלֵּךְ – אֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת.

Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to one who conveys the blood in a situation where he is required to convey it, prohibited intent while conveying it disqualifies the offering. If he conveys the blood in a situation where he is not required to convey it, prohibited intent while conveying it does not disqualify the offering.

גְּמָ׳ וְקַבָּלָה מִי פָּסְלָה?!

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that a slaughtered offering is disqualified due to prohibited intent while performing four rites, including collection of the blood. The Gemara asks: And does collection of the blood with prohibited intent disqualify the offering?

וְהָתַנְיָא: ״וְהִקְרִיבוּ״ – זוֹ קַבָּלַת הַדָּם. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר קַבָּלַת הַדָּם, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא זְרִיקָה? כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״וְזָרְקוּ״ – הֲרֵי זְרִיקָה אָמוּר; הָא מָה אֲנִי מְקַיֵּים ״וְהִקְרִיבוּ״? זוֹ קַבָּלַת הַדָּם. ״בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֲנִים״ – שֶׁתְּהֵא בְּכֹהֵן כָּשֵׁר וּבִכְלִי שָׁרֵת.

But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall present the blood” (Leviticus 1:5); this is referring to collection of the blood. Do you say it is referring to collection of the blood, or is it referring to only sprinkling the blood? When it states immediately afterward: “And sprinkle the blood roundabout against the altar,” sprinkling the blood is thereby stated. If so, how do I realize the meaning of: “And the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall present”? This is referring to collection of the blood. And the phrase “the sons of Aaron, the priests” teaches that collection of the blood must be performed by a fit priest, i.e., one who has no blemish and who was not disqualified due to flawed lineage, and that he must do so while he is wearing priestly service vestments.

אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: מִנַּיִן לְקַבָּלָה שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא אֶלָּא בְּכֹהֵן כָּשֵׁר וּבִכְלִי שָׁרֵת? נֶאֱמַר כָּאן: ״בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן: ״אֵלֶּה שְׁמוֹת בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֲנִים הַמְּשֻׁחִים״; מָה לְהַלָּן – בְּכֹהֵן כָּשֵׁר וּבִכְלִי שָׁרֵת, אַף כָּאן – בְּכֹהֵן כָּשֵׁר וּבִכְלִי שָׁרֵת.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva said: From where is it derived that collection of the blood may be performed only by a fit priest and while he is wearing service vestments? The expression “the sons of Aaron” is stated here in the verse in Leviticus, and it is stated there: “These are the names of the sons of Aaron, the priests that were anointed, whom he consecrated to minister in the priest’s office” (Numbers 3:3). Just as there, in the verse in Numbers, it mentions the word “priests” with regard to fit priests, i.e., Aaron’s sons, and with regard to priests who were consecrated to serve by being dressed with service vestments (see Exodus 29:30), so too here, the reference is to a fit priest and with regard to one who is wearing service vestments.

אָמַר רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן: אֲקַפֵּחַ אֶת בָּנַיי, אִם לֹא שָׁמַעְתִּי לְהַבְחִין הֶפְרֵשׁ בֵּין קַבָּלָה לִזְרִיקָה. וְאֵין לִי לְפָרֵשׁ.

Rabbi Tarfon said: I will bury my sons if I did not hear a halakha from my teachers discerning a distinction between collection of and sprinkling the blood, but I cannot explicate the distinction, as I do not remember what it was.

אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אֲנִי אֲפָרֵשׁ: קַבָּלָה – לֹא עָשָׂה בָּהּ מַחְשָׁבָה כְּמַעֲשֶׂה, זְרִיקָה – עָשָׂה בָּהּ מַחְשָׁבָה כְּמַעֲשֶׂה. קִבְּלוֹ בַּחוּץ – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב כָּרֵת, זְרָקוֹ בַּחוּץ – עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת. קִבְּלוּהוּ פְּסוּלִין – אֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו, זְרָקוּהוּ פְּסוּלִין – חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva said: I will explicate: With regard to collection, the Torah does not render intent like action. Collecting the blood with prohibited intent does not disqualify the offering. But with regard to sprinkling, the Torah does render intent like action. Furthermore, if one collected the blood outside the Temple, he is not liable to be punished with karet. But if one sprinkled the blood outside the Temple, he is punished with karet. Moreover, if those who are unfit for the Temple service collected the blood, they are not liable for that action. But if those who are unfit for the Temple service sprinkled the blood, they are liable to receive the penalty of death at the hand of Heaven for that action.

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן: הָעֲבוֹדָה אִם הִטֵּיתָ יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל! אֲנִי שָׁמַעְתִּי וְאֵין לִי לְפָרֵשׁ, אַתָּה דּוֹרֵשׁ וּמַסְכִּים לַשְּׁמוּעָה! בַּלָּשׁוֹן הַזֶּה אָמַר לוֹ: עֲקִיבָא, כׇּל הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִמְּךָ כְּפוֹרֵשׁ מֵחַיָּיו.

Rabbi Tarfon said to him excitedly: I take an oath by the Temple service that you have not deviated left or right from what I heard from my teachers. I myself heard them and I cannot explicate what they taught, whereas you teach this halakha on your own in concurrence with the halakha I heard. He said to Rabbi Akiva, using this language: Akiva, anyone who leaves you is like one who leaves his life. In any event, Rabbi Akiva’s statement in the baraita apparently contradicts the mishna with regard to the matter of whether the collection of the blood with prohibited intent disqualifies the offering.

אָמַר רָבָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן בְּמַחְשֶׁבֶת פִּיגּוּל, כָּאן בְּמַחְשֶׁבֶת שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ.

Rava said: It is not difficult. The baraita here is referring to intent of piggul, i.e., intent to consume or burn the offering after its appointed time. The mishna there is referring to intent not for the sake of the offering.

דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי ״שֶׁהַזֶּבַח נִפְסָל״, וְלָא קָתָנֵי ״מִתְפַּגֵּל״; שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara adds: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches that a slaughtered offering is disqualified in this manner, and it does not teach that an offering is rendered piggul in this manner. Apparently, the mishna is referring to intent that merely disqualifies the offering without rendering it piggul, one who partakes of which is liable to receive karet. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from the mishna’s language that this interpretation is correct.

וּמַחְשֶׁבֶת פִּיגּוּל לָא פָּסְלָה בְּקַבָּלָה?!

The Gemara asks: And does intent of piggul during the collection of the blood not disqualify the offering?

וְהָתַנְיָא: יָכוֹל לֹא תְּהֵא מַחְשָׁבָה מוֹעֶלֶת אֶלָּא בִּזְרִיקָה בִּלְבָד; מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת שְׁחִיטָה וְקַבָּלָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְאִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל מִבְּשַׂר זֶבַח שְׁלָמָיו (פִּיגּוּל הוּא) בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי לֹא יֵרָצֶה״ – בִּדְבָרִים הַמְּבִיאִין לִידֵי אֲכִילָה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.

But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One might have thought that intent to consume an offering after its designated time is effective to render the offering piggul only when one has that intent during sprinkling. From where is it derived to include slaughter and collection of the blood in this halakha? The verse states: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it; it shall be an abhorred thing [piggul ]” (Leviticus 7:18). As derived on 29a, the verse is referring to performance of the sacrificial rites with intent to consume the offering after its designated time. The phrase “is at all eaten” teaches that the verse speaks of matters that lead to consumption, i.e., those sacrificial rites that enable consumption of the offering, including slaughter of the animal and collecting the blood.

יָכוֹל שֶׁאֲנִי מְרַבֶּה אַף שְׁפִיכַת שִׁירַיִים וְהַקְטָרַת אֵימוּרִין?

The baraita continues: One might have thought that I should include even the pouring of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar, after its sprinkling, and the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar.

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי לֹא יֵרָצֶה, הַמַּקְרִיב אוֹתוֹ לֹא יֵחָשֵׁב״ – זְרִיקָה בַּכְּלָל הָיְתָה, וְלָמָּה יָצְתָה? לְהַקִּישׁ אֵלֶיהָ. לוֹמַר לְךָ: מָה זְרִיקָה מְיוּחֶדֶת – שֶׁהִיא עֲבוֹדָה (וּמְכַפֶּרֶת), וּמְעַכֶּבֶת כַּפָּרָה; אַף כׇּל – עֲבוֹדָה, וּמְעַכֶּבֶת כַּפָּרָה. יָצְאוּ שְׁפִיכַת שִׁירַיִים וְהַקְטָרַת אֵימוּרִין – שֶׁאֵין מְעַכְּבִין אֶת הַכַּפָּרָה.

Therefore, the verse states: “On the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it” (Leviticus 7:18). The phrase “the one who offers it” indicates the sprinkling of the blood. Sprinkling was included in the general category of rites that enable consumption. And for what purpose was it singled out? To compare other halakhot to it, i.e., to say to you: Just as sprinkling is unique, as it is a rite and if not performed it prevents atonement, so too, any rite that prevents atonement if not performed is included in the halakha of piggul. Pouring the remainder of the blood and burning the sacrificial portions are therefore excluded, as they do not prevent atonement if not performed. Evidently, intent of piggul applies to the collection of the blood, contrary to Rava’s resolution of the contradiction between the mishna and the baraita.

אֶלָּא לָא קַשְׁיָא; הָא דְּאָמַר: ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט עַל מְנָת לְקַבֵּל דָּמָהּ לְמָחָר״, הָא דְּאָמַר: ״הֲרֵינִי מְקַבֵּל דָּמָהּ עַל מְנָת לִשְׁפּוֹךְ שִׁירַיִם לְמָחָר״.

The Gemara answers: Rather, it is not difficult. This statement of Rava, that intent of piggul does not apply to collection, is referring to a case where the one slaughtering the offering says: I am hereby slaughtering this offering in order to collect its blood tomorrow. Because the collection of the blood is not considered consumption, such intent does not render the offering piggul. That statement of the baraita is referring to a case where the one collecting the blood says: I am hereby collecting its blood in order to pour the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar tomorrow. Since pouring the remains is considered consumption of the blood on the altar, such intent renders the offering piggul.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ הָהוּא מֵרַבָּנַן לְרָבָא: וּשְׁפִיכַת שִׁירַיִם וְהַקְטָרַת אֵימוּרִין – לָא פָּסְלָה בְּהוּ מַחְשָׁבָה?!

One of the Sages said to Rava: And does prohibited intent with regard to the pouring of the remainder of the blood and the burning of the sacrificial portions not disqualify the offering, as this explanation of the baraita seems to indicate?

וְהָתְנַן: יָכוֹל לֹא תְּהֵא מַחְשָׁבָה מוֹעֶלֶת אֶלָּא בַּאֲכִילַת בָּשָׂר, מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת שְׁפִיכַת שִׁירַיִם וְהַקְטָרַת אֵימוּרִים? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְאִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל״ – בִּשְׁתֵּי אֲכִילוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר: אַחַת אֲכִילַת אָדָם, וְאַחַת אֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ.

But didn’t we learn in a baraita: One might have thought that only prohibited intent with regard to consumption of the meat is effective to render the offering piggul. From where is it derived to include the pouring of the remainder of the blood and the burning of the sacrificial portions? The verse states: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all eaten [he’akhol ye’akhel ] on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18). It is derived from the repeated verb that the verse speaks of two types of consumption: One is consumption of the meat by man, i.e., by the priests or the owner of the offering, and the other one is consumption of the blood and the sacrificial portions on the altar.

לָא קַשְׁיָא; הָא דְּאָמַר: ״הֲרֵינִי זוֹרֵק עַל מְנָת לִשְׁפּוֹךְ שִׁירַיִם לְמָחָר״, הָא דְּאָמַר: ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹפֵךְ שִׁירַיִם עַל מְנָת לְהַקְטִיר אֵימוּרִין לְמָחָר״.

The Gemara answers: It is not difficult. This case, where intent renders the offering piggul, is where the one sprinkling the blood says: I am hereby sprinkling the blood in order to pour the remainder tomorrow. Since sprinkling the blood is necessary for atonement, if it is performed with the intent that consumption occur beyond its designated time, the offering is rendered piggul. That case, where intent does not render the offering piggul, is where he says: I am hereby pouring the remainder in order to burn the sacrificial portions tomorrow. Although burning the portions is considered consumption, pouring the remainder of the blood is not indispensable for atonement, and therefore the offering is not rendered piggul.

אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא: שָׁמַעְתִּי שֶׁטְּבִילַת אֶצְבַּע מְפַגֶּלֶת בְּחַטָּאת פְּנִימִית.

§ Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: I heard that with regard to an inner sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled on the curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, dipping one’s finger in the blood in order to sprinkle it, if he does so with the intent of burning the offering on the altar the following day, renders the offering piggul.

שַׁמְעַהּ אִילְפָא, אַמְרַהּ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב פְּדָא. אֲמַר: כְּלוּם לָמַדְנוּ פִּיגּוּל – אֶלָּא מִשְּׁלָמִים; מָה שְׁלָמִים – אֵין טְבִילַת אֶצְבַּע מְפַגֶּלֶת בָּהֶן, אַף חַטָּאת – אֵין טְבִילַת אֶצְבַּע מְפַגֶּלֶת (בהן) [בָּהּ].

Ilfa heard this statement and said it before Rav Padda. Rav Padda said in response: Did we derive the halakha of piggul with regard to all offerings from anything but a peace offering? The source for the halakha of piggul is the verse stated with regard to peace offerings (Leviticus 7:18). Therefore, just as with regard to a peace offering, prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood to sprinkle it on the altar does not render it piggul, as there is no requirement to sprinkle the blood of a peace offering with one’s finger rather than the containing vessel, so too, with regard to a sin offering, prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood does not render it piggul.

וְכִי הַכֹּל מִשְּׁלָמִים לָמְדוּ?! אִי, מָה שְׁלָמִים – שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן אֵין מוֹצִיא מִידֵי פִּיגּוּל, אַף חַטָּאת – שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ אֵין מוֹצִיא מִידֵי פִּיגּוּל!

The Gemara challenges: But are all of the halakhot of piggul derived from the halakha of a peace offering? If that is so, then just as sacrifice of a peace offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered piggul, as it is still fit, so too, the halakha should be that sacrifice of a sin offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered piggul. In fact, the halakha is that a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake cannot become piggul.

אֶלָּא מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר – מֵרִבּוּיָא דִּקְרָאֵי קָאָתְיָא; הָכָא נָמֵי, מֵרִבּוּיָא דִּקְרָא קָאָתֵי.

Rather, what have you to say to explain this halakha? You must say that it is derived from an amplification of the verse. Here too, the halakha that prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering renders it piggul is derived from an amplification of the verse.

אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: בַּעֲלִיָּה זוֹ שָׁמַעְתִּי, שֶׁטְּבִילַת אֶצְבַּע מְפַגֶּלֶת. תָּהֵי בַּהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: כְּלוּם לָמְדוּ פִּיגּוּל – אֶלָּא מִשְּׁלָמִים; מָה שְׁלָמִים – אֵין טְבִילַת אֶצְבַּע מְפַגֶּלֶת בָּהֶן, אַף חַטָּאת – אֵין טְבִילַת אֶצְבַּע מְפַגֶּלֶת (בהן) [בָּהּ]!

Similarly, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: I heard in this upper story that prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering renders it piggul. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish wondered [tahei] at this halakha: Did the Sages derive the halakha of piggul from anything but a peace offering? Just as with regard to a peace offering, prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood does not render it piggul, so too, with regard to a sin offering, the halakha should be that prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood does not render it piggul.

וְכִי הַכֹּל מִשְּׁלָמִים לָמְדוּ?! אִי, מָה שְׁלָמִים – שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן אֵין מוֹצִיא מִידֵי פִּיגּוּל, אַף חַטָּאת – שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ אֵין מוֹצִיא מִידֵי פִּיגּוּל!

The Gemara responds: But are all of the halakhot of piggul derived from those of a peace offering? If so, just as sacrifice of a peace offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered piggul, so too, the halakha should be that sacrifice of a sin offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered piggul.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: אִין, הַכֹּל מִשְּׁלָמִים לָמְדוּ. הוֹאִיל וְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ פּוֹסֵל בִּשְׁלָמִים, וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ פּוֹסֵל בְּחַטָּאת; מָה חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ הַפּוֹסֵל בִּשְׁלָמִים – מוֹצִיא מִידֵי פִּיגּוּל, אַף שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ הַפּוֹסֵל בְּחַטָּאת – מוֹצִיאָהּ מִידֵי פִּיגּוּל.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: Indeed, all of the halakhot of piggul, even this one, are derived from a peace offering. Since in the case of a peace offering, intent to consume it outside its designated area disqualifies it, and in the case of a sin offering, sacrifice not for its sake disqualifies it, one can infer that just as intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, which disqualifies a peace offering, precludes its being rendered piggul, so too, sacrifice not for its sake, which disqualifies a sin offering, precludes its being rendered piggul. By contrast, dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering with intent to consume it after its designated time does not render it piggul, as there is no parallel halakha with regard to a peace offering.

אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: מִצִּדַּהּ תְּבָרַאּ! מָה לְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ הַפּוֹסֵל בִּשְׁלָמִים – שֶׁכֵּן נוֹהֵג בְּכׇל הַזְּבָחִים; תֹּאמַר בְּשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג אֶלָּא בְּפֶסַח וְחַטָּאת בִּלְבַד?!

Rabbi Yirmeya says: This inference is inherently disjointed: What is notable about intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, which disqualifies a peace offering? It is notable in that its disqualification applies to all slaughtered offerings. This is why it precludes the offering from becoming piggul. Need you say the same with regard to disqualification by sacrifice not for its sake, which applies only to a Paschal offering and a sin offering?

אֶלָּא מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר – דָּבָר הַפּוֹסֵל בָּהֶן מוֹצִיאָם מִידֵי פִּיגּוּל, דָּבָר הַמְעַכֵּב בָּהֶן מְבִיאָן לִידֵי פִּיגּוּל;

Rather, what have you to say to explain this derivation? One must say that it is not based on a case-to-case comparison, but on a principle that is derived from a peace offering, namely: Any matter that disqualifies a peace offering, e.g., intent to consume it outside its designated area, precludes its being rendered piggul, and any matter that prevents atonement if not performed renders the offering piggul if performed with intent to consume it beyond its designated time.

הָכָא נָמֵי – דָּבָר הַפּוֹסֵל בָּהּ מוֹצִיא מִידֵי פִּיגּוּל, דָּבָר הַמְעַכֵּב בָּהּ מְבִיאָה לִידֵי פִּיגּוּל.

One infers therefore that here too, with regard to an inner sin offering, any matter that disqualifies it, e.g., sacrifice not for its sake, precludes its being rendered piggul, and any matter that prevents atonement if not performed renders it piggul if it is performed with intent to consume it beyond its designated time. Accordingly, dipping one’s finger in the blood with intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time renders it piggul, as this rite is indispensable.

אָמַר רַב מָרִי: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא – זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל הַקּוֹמֵץ, וְנוֹתֵן בִּכְלִי, וְהַמּוֹלִיךְ, וְהַמַּקְטִיר.

Rav Mari says: We learn in a mishna as well that dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering with intent to consume it beyond its designated time renders the offering piggul (Menaḥot 12a): This is the principle: With regard to anyone who removes a handful from a meal offering, or who places the handful in a vessel, or who conveys the handful to the altar, or who burns it on the altar, if he does so with intent that the offering will be consumed after its designated time the offering is piggul.

בִּשְׁלָמָא קוֹמֵץ – הַיְינוּ שׁוֹחֵט; מוֹלִיךְ – הַיְינוּ מוֹלִיךְ; מַקְטִיר נָמֵי – הַיְינוּ זוֹרֵק; אֶלָּא נוֹתֵן בִּכְלִי מַאי נִיהוּ?

Since the halakhot of piggul are derived from those of a peace offering, one can ask: Granted, the one who removes a handful of a meal offering can render the offering piggul, as he is considered equivalent to the one who slaughters a peace offering. Just as the blood is the essential part of an animal offering, and it is removed by slaughter, so too, the handful of a meal offering is its essential part. Likewise, the one who conveys the handful is equivalent to the one who conveys the blood of a peace offering, and the one who burns the handful is equivalent to the one who sprinkles the blood too. But to what is the one who places the handful in a vessel equivalent? From where is it derived that he, too, can render the offering piggul?

אִילֵּימָא דְּדָמֵי לְקַבָּלָה – מִי דָּמֵי?! הָתָם מִמֵּילָא, הָכָא אִיהוּ קָא שָׁקֵיל וְרָמֵי!

If we say that placing the handful in a vessel is comparable to collection of the blood, as both rites involve placing the essential part of the offering in a vessel, one may respond: Are these rites actually comparable? There, in the case of a peace offering, the collection of the blood is performed passively. The blood spills into the vessel by itself. Here, in the case of a meal offering, the priest takes the handful himself and places it in a vessel. Clearly, placing the handful in a vessel is not equivalent to any specific rite in the sacrifice of a peace offering.

אֶלָּא כֵּיוָן דְּלָא סַגִּי דְּלָא יָהֵיב – עַל כָּרְחֵיהּ עֲבוֹדָה חֲשׁוּבָה הִיא; הָכָא נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא סַגִּי דְּלָא עָבֵיד לַהּ – עַל כָּרְחֵיהּ הַיְינוּ הוֹלָכָה.

Rather, since it is not sufficient for the handful to be sacrificed without first placing it in a service vessel, it is, perforce, an important rite. One who performs it can therefore render the offering piggul like those who perform other essential rites. Here too, with regard to dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering, although it has no equivalent in the sacrifice of a peace offering, since it is not sufficient if the priest does not perform it, it is perforce considered part of the conveying of the blood, and the priest can render the offering piggul while performing it.

לָא, לְעוֹלָם דְּדָמֵי לְקַבָּלָה; וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ: הָכָא מִמֵּילָא, הָתָם אִיהוּ קָא שָׁקֵיל וְיָהֵיב – כֵּיוָן דְּאִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי מַתַּן כְּלִי הוּא, מָה לִי מִמֵּילָא מָה לִי קָא שָׁקֵיל וְיָהֵיב.

The Gemara responds: No, actually, placing the handful in a vessel is comparable to the collection of the blood. And despite the distinction that you say, namely, that here, in the case of a peace offering, the blood spills by itself, while there, in the case of a meal offering, the priest takes the handful himself and places it in the vessel, nevertheless, since both this rite and that rite involve placement of the essential part of the offering in a vessel, they are equivalent. What difference is it to me if the blood spills into the vessel by itself, and what difference is it to me if the priest takes the handful himself and places it in the vessel? By contrast, dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering has no equivalent in a peace offering. Therefore, piggul does not apply to it.

לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי – דְּתָנֵי חֲדָא: טְבִילַת אֶצְבַּע מְפַגֶּלֶת בְּחַטָּאת, וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: לֹא מְפַגֶּלֶת וְלֹא מִתְפַּגֶּלֶת; מַאי, לָאו תַּנָּאֵי הִיא?

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the principle that dipping one’s finger in the blood is considered part of conveying it to the curtain is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in one baraita: With regard to an inner sin offering, dipping one’s finger in the blood with intent that it be consumed beyond its designated time renders it piggul. And it is taught in another baraita: Dipping one’s finger in the blood with intent that it be consumed beyond its designated time does not render it piggul, and neither does slaughtering the animal with the intent to dip his finger in the blood the next day render it piggul. What, is it not that this matter is a dispute between tanna’im?

לָא; הָא רַבָּנַן, הָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.

The Gemara responds: No, both tanna’im agree that dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering is part of conveying it to the curtain. Rather, this baraita, which states that a priest can render the offering piggul while dipping his finger in its blood, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in the mishna (13a), who hold that one can render the offering piggul while conveying the blood to the altar. That baraita, which states the opposite, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the mishna, who holds that one cannot render the offering piggul while conveying the blood.

אִי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, מַאי אִירְיָא טְבִילַת אֶצְבַּע? הָאָמַר:

The Gemara asks: If the latter baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, why is it referring specifically to dipping one’s finger? Doesn’t he say