זבחים כח

זבחים כח

כְּאַלְיָה דָּמֵי; וְהָא קָא מְחַשֵּׁב מֵאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ לְאָדָם!

is considered as though it were part of the tail itself. The tail of a sheep sacrificed as a peace offering is burned on the altar rather than eaten. But if so, one who slaughters the sheep with intent to consume the skin of its tail the next day has intent to shift its consumption from consumption by the altar, i.e., burning the offering, to consumption by a person. Since intent to consume part of an offering beyond its designated time renders an offering piggul only if that part is intended for human consumption, why does the mishna rule that such an offering is piggul?

אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא; דְּאָמַר: מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ לַאֲכִילַת אָדָם, וּמֵאֲכִילַת אָדָם לַאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ.

Shmuel says: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: One can have intent to shift an item’s consumption from consumption by the altar to consumption by a person, or from consumption by a person to consumption by the altar, and the offering will still be rendered piggul.

דִּתְנַן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַזֶּבַח לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל; לְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר – כָּשֵׁר. וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל.

This is as we learned in a mishna (35a): In a case of one who slaughters the offering with intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, the offering is fit. And Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit.

בְּמַאי אוֹקֵימְתַּהּ – כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? אֵימָא סֵיפָא, זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל הַשּׁוֹחֵט, וְהַמְקַבֵּל, וְהַמּוֹלִיךְ, וְהַזּוֹרֵק; לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר.

The Gemara asks: In accordance with which opinion did you interpret the mishna here? You interpreted it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. But if so, say the latter clause, i.e., the next mishna (29b): This is the principle: Anyone who slaughters the animal, or who collects the blood, or who conveys the blood, or who sprinkles the blood with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, beyond its designated time, renders it piggul.

דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל אִין, שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל לָא; אֲתָאן לְרַבָּנַן. רֵישָׁא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְסֵיפָא רַבָּנַן?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין.

One can infer that intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it does render it piggul, while intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it does not render it piggul. In this clause, we arrive at the opinion of the Rabbis. Can it be that the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, while the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? Shmuel said to him: Yes. That is how one must understand the mishna.

רַב הוּנָא אָמַר: עוֹר אַלְיָה – לָאו כְּאַלְיָה דָּמֵי. אָמַר רָבָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַב הוּנָא? ״חֶלְבּוֹ הָאַלְיָה״ – וְלֹא עוֹר הָאַלְיָה.

Rav Huna says: The skin of the tail is not considered as though it were the tail itself. Unlike the tail itself, its skin is consumed. Consequently, both this mishna and the next can be understood in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rava said: What is the reasoning of Rav Huna? As the verse states: “And he shall present of the sacrifice of peace offerings an offering made by fire unto the Lord: The fat thereof, the fat tail” (Leviticus 3:9), indicating that the priest must offer the fat of the tail on the altar, but not the skin of the tail.

רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם עוֹר הָאַלְיָה כְּאַלְיָה דָּמֵי; וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – בְּאַלְיָה שֶׁל גְּדִי.

Rav Ḥisda says: Actually, the skin of the tail is considered as though it were the tail itself, and it is burned on the altar. And here, in the mishna, we are dealing with the tail of a kid, which is not burned on the altar but is consumed. Accordingly, intent to consume it outside its designated time renders it piggul.

כּוּלְּהוּ כִּשְׁמוּאֵל לָא אָמְרִי – רֵישָׁא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְסֵיפָא רַבָּנַן לָא מוֹקְמִי. כְּרַב הוּנָא לָא אָמְרִי – עוֹר אַלְיָה כְּאַלְיָה דָּמֵי קָא מַשְׁמַע לְהוּ.

The Gemara notes: All of them, Rav Huna and Rav Ḥisda, do not say as Shmuel says, since they do not wish to interpret that the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And Shmuel and Rav Ḥisda do not say as Rav Huna says, since they heard that the skin of the tail is considered as though it were the tail itself.

כְּרַב חִסְדָּא – מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמְרִי? מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – עוֹר אַלְיָה כְּאַלְיָה דְּמֵי?! תְּנֵינָא: וְאֵלּוּ שֶׁעוֹרוֹתֵיהֶן כִּבְשָׂרָן – עוֹר שֶׁתַּחַת הָאַלְיָה!

The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Shmuel and Rav Huna do not say as Rav Ḥisda says, that the mishna is referring to the tail of a kid? The Gemara responds that they reason: According to Rav Ḥisda, what is the mishna teaching us by referring specifically to the skin of the tail? Does it mean to teach simply that the skin of the tail is considered edible, like the tail itself? We already learn this in another mishna (Ḥullin 122a): These are the entities whose skin has a halakhic status like that of their meat, since it is soft and edible: The skin beneath the tail.

וְרַב חִסְדָּא – אִיצְטְרִיךְ; סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי לְעִנְיַן טוּמְאָה – דְּרַכִּיךְ מִצְטְרֵף. אֲבָל הָכָא, אֵימָא ״לְמׇשְׁחָה״ – לִגְדוּלָּה, כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁהַמְּלָכִים אוֹכְלִין; וְלָא עֲבִידִי מְלָכִים דְּאָכְלִי הָכִי, אֵימָא לָא; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara asks: And Rav Ḥisda, how would he respond? The Gemara answers: The reference here to the skin of the tail was necessary, as given only the mishna in tractate Ḥullin, it might enter your mind to say: This matter, the equation between the skin of the tail and the tail itself, applies only with regard to the matter of ritual impurity, as the skin of the tail is soft and edible, and it is therefore counted as part of the tail. But here, with regard to the matter of the Temple service, I will say that the verse states with regard to the gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled: “As a consecrated portion” (Numbers 18:8), to indicate that they must be eaten in greatness, in the way that the kings eat. And since kings do not generally eat the skin of the tail, I will say that it is not considered an eaten portion of the offering. The mishna therefore teaches us that it is nevertheless considered like the tail itself.

מֵיתִיבִי: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הָעוֹלָה לְהַקְטִיר כְּזַיִת מֵעוֹר שֶׁתַּחַת הָאַלְיָה; חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – פָּסוּל, וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת; חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – פִּיגּוּל, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: One who slaughters a burnt offering with intent to burn an olive-bulk of the skin beneath the tail outside its designated area renders the offering disqualified, but there is no liability for karet for one who partakes of the offering. If his intent is to burn it beyond its designated time, it is rendered piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for eating it. This is the opinion of the Rabbis.

אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן יְהוּדָה אִישׁ אֲבֵלִים אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב, וְכֵן הָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה אִישׁ כְּפַר עִיכּוּס אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: אֶחָד עוֹר בֵּית הַפְּרָסוֹת בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה, וְאֶחָד עוֹר הָרֹאשׁ שֶׁל עֵגֶל הָרַךְ, וְאֶחָד עוֹר שֶׁתַּחַת הָאַלְיָה, וְכׇל שֶׁמָּנוּ חֲכָמִים גַּבֵּי טוּמְאָה ״וְאֵלּוּ שֶׁעוֹרוֹתֵיהֶן כִּבְשָׂרָן״ – לְהָבִיא עוֹר שֶׁל בֵּית הַבּוֹשֶׁת; חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – פָּסוּל, וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת; חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – פִּיגּוּל, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת.

Elazar ben Yehuda of Avelim says in the name of Rabbi Ya’akov, and so Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda of Kefar Ikos would say in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Whether the hide of the hooves of small livestock, or the skin of the head of a young calf, or the skin beneath the tail, or any of the skins that the Sages listed with regard to ritual impurity under the heading: These are the entities whose skin has a halakhic status like that of their meat, which means to include the skin of the womb, if one has intent to burn one of them outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it, and if one’s intent is to burn it beyond its designated time, he renders it piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for burning or partaking of it.

עוֹלָה אִין, אֲבָל זֶבַח לָא; בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַב הוּנָא – הַיְינוּ דְקָתָנֵי ״עוֹלָה״; אֶלָּא לְרַב חִסְדָּא – מַאי אִירְיָא דְּתָנֵי ״עוֹלָה״? לִיתְנֵי ״זֶבַח״!

One can infer from the baraita that only with regard to a burnt offering, yes, the skin of the tail is burned on the altar like the tail itself. But with regard to another offering, this is not the halakha. Granted, according to Rav Huna, who holds that the skin of the tail of a peace offering is not considered as though it were the tail itself, and it is eaten rather than burned, this is the reason that the tanna teaches about a burnt offering specifically, as all portions of a burnt offering are burned, even those that are eaten in the case of other offerings. But according to Rav Ḥisda, who holds that the skin of the tail is burned together with the tail, why does the tanna specifically teach about a burnt offering? If the skin of the tail is always considered as though it were the tail itself, let the tanna teach about any offering.

אָמַר לְךָ רַב חִסְדָּא: אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, בְּאַלְיָה שֶׁל גְּדִי; וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, תְּנִי: ״זֶבַח״.

Rav Ḥisda could have said to you: If you wish, say that the baraita is referring to the tail of a kid, which is never burned on the altar except in the case of a burnt offering. And if you wish, say instead that one should emend the text of the baraita to teach: One who slaughters any offering, etc.

פָּסוּל וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת כּוּ׳. מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי כְּתִיבִי.

§ The mishna states that if one intends to consume the meat or sprinkle the blood outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified, and there is no liability for karet for one who partakes of it. If one intends to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is rendered piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for burning or partaking of it. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Shmuel says: Two verses are written.

מַאי הִיא? אָמַר רַבָּה: ״שְׁלִישִׁי״ – זֶהוּ חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ.

The Gemara asks: What are these verses? Rabba said: Shmuel is referring to two phrases from the verse: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be credited to he who offers it; it shall be piggul, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18). The Sages taught that this verse is referring not to offerings actually eaten on the third day, but to one who performs one of the sacrificial rites with intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time. Now, when the verse states: “And if any of the flesh…be at all eaten on the third day,” this is referring to intent to consume the meat beyond its designated time.

״פִּגּוּל״ – זֶהוּ חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ. ״וְהַנֶּפֶשׁ הָאוֹכֶלֶת מִמֶּנּוּ״ – אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם; זֶהוּ חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, וּלְמַעוֹטֵי חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ.

When the verse states: “It shall be piggul,” this is referring to one who has intent to consume it outside its designated area. And when the verse states: “And the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity,” i.e., shall be liable to receive karet, “of it” indicates that only one of the above disqualifications carries the penalty of karet for one who partakes of it, but not two of them. And this included case is intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, to the exclusion of intent to consume it outside its designated area, which carries no such penalty.

וְאֵימָא: ״וְהַנֶּפֶשׁ הָאוֹכֶלֶת מִמֶּנּוּ״ – זֶהוּ חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, וּלְמַעוֹטֵי חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ! מִסְתַּבְּרָא חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ עֲדִיף – דִּפְתַח בֵּיהּ. אַדְּרַבָּה! חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ עֲדִיף – דִּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ!

The Gemara asks: But why not say the opposite, that when the verse states: “And the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity,” this is referring to intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, to the exclusion of intent to consume it beyond its designated time? The Gemara responds: It stands to reason that intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time is the preferable candidate to carry the punishment of karet, as the verse opened with it. The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, intent to consume the offering outside its designated area is preferable, as the clause that teaches liability for karet is adjacent to it.

אֶלָּא אֲמַר אַבָּיֵי: כִּי אֲתָא רַב יִצְחָק בַּר אַבְדִּימִי [אָמַר רַב], סָמֵיךְ אַדְּתָנֵי תַּנָּא: כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״שְׁלִישִׁי״ בְּפָרָשַׁת ״קְדֹשִׁים תִּהְיוּ״ – שֶׁאֵין תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר, שֶׁהֲרֵי כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר: ״וְאִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל מִבְּשַׂר זֶבַח הַשְּׁלָמִים בְּיוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי״;

Rather, Abaye said: When Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi came, he said that Rav says: Shmuel was actually referring to two separate verses. And he relied on that which the tanna taught: The verse is seemingly redundant when it states: “And if it be eaten at all on the third day, it is piggul; it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 19:7), in the Torah portion that begins: “You shall be holy” (Leviticus 19:2), as there is no need for the verse to state this, since it is already stated: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day…it shall be piggul” (Leviticus 7:18).

אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, תְּנֵהוּ לְעִנְיַן חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ; וּמִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא גַּבֵּי נוֹתָר: ״וְאֹכְלָיו עֲוֹנוֹ יִשָּׂא״ – לְמַעוֹטֵי חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ.

Therefore, if the verse is not referring to the matter of intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, apply it to the matter of intent to consume it outside its designated area. And as for the punishment of karet, the Merciful One restricted it to the prohibition of notar, i.e., actually partaking of the offering beyond its designated time, as the verse states: “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 19:8). This indicates that one is liable to receive karet for partaking of notar, to the exclusion of intent to consume the offering outside its designated area.

וְאֵימָא: ״וְאֹכְלָיו עֲוֹנוֹ יִשָּׂא״ – זֶהוּ חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, וּלְמַעוֹטֵי נוֹתָר מִכָּרֵת!

The Gemara asks: But why not say instead that when the verse states: “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity,” this is referring to intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, and the verse serves to exclude notar from the penalty of karet?

מִסְתַּבְּרָא נוֹתָר הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְאוֹקוֹמֵי בְּכָרֵת – לְמִגְמַר ״עָוֹן״–״עָוֹן״ לְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ בְּז״ב.

The Gemara responds: It stands to reason that notar should be interpreted as carrying the penalty of karet, because this would allow one to derive by way of verbal analogy between “iniquity” and “iniquity” stated with regard to the case of intent to consume the meat beyond its designated time, that the punishment of karet applies to the latter as well. The verbal analogy would be apt since one prohibition is similar to the other in that they share features that form the acronym zayin, beit: Both concern the offering’s designated time [zeman], and both are applicable to an offering sacrificed on a private altar [bama].

אַדְּרַבָּה! חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְאוֹקוֹמֵי בְּכָרֵת – לְמִגְמַר ״עָוֹן״–״עָוֹן״ לְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ בְּמקד״ש!

The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, intent to consume the offering outside its designated area should be interpreted as carrying the penalty of karet, because this would allow one to derive by way of verbal analogy between “iniquity” and “iniquity” stated with regard to the case of intent to consume the meat beyond its designated time, that the punishment of karet applies to the latter as well. The verbal analogy would still be apt since one prohibition is similar to the other in that both share features that form the acronym mikdash: Both concern intent [maḥashava]; both disqualify the entire offering even if one had intent with regard to only part [ketzat] of it; both occur while collecting or sprinkling the offering’s blood [dam]; and with regard to both the verse contains an extraneous mention of the third [shelishi] day.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, תָּנֵי זַבְדִּי בַּר לֵוִי: אַתְיָא ״קֹדֶשׁ״–״קֹדֶשׁ״; כְּתִיב הָכָא: ״אֶת קֹדֶשׁ ה׳ חִלֵּל וְנִכְרְתָה״, וּכְתִיב הָתָם: ״וְשָׂרַפְתָּ אֶת הַנּוֹתָר בָּאֵשׁ וְגוֹ׳״; מָה לְהַלָּן נוֹתָר, אַף כָּאן נוֹתָר.

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Zavdi bar Levi taught: It is derived that the prohibition of notar carries the penalty of karet by way of verbal analogy between “sacred” and “sacred.” It is written here: “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity, because he has profaned the sacred item of the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 19:8). And it is written there: “And if any of the flesh of the consecration, or of the bread, remain until the morning, then you shall burn the remainder [notar] with fire; it shall not be eaten, because it is sacred” (Exodus 29:34). Just as the verse there is referring to notar, so too, the verse here is referring to notar.

וּמִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא גַּבֵּי נוֹתָר ״וְאֹכְלָיו עֲוֹנוֹ יִשָּׂא״ – לְמַעוֹטֵי חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ מִכָּרֵת.

And consequently, when the Merciful One restricted the penalty of karet to the prohibition of eating notar, as the verse states: “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity,” this restriction serves to exclude the case of intent to consume the offering outside its designated area from the penalty of karet.

וּמַאי חָזֵית דִּקְרָא אֲרִיכָא – בְּחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, וּ״שְׁלִישִׁי״ דְּפָרָשַׁת ״קְדֹשִׁים תִּהְיוּ״ – חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ? אֵיפוֹךְ אֲנָא!

The Gemara returns to the initial assumption that the statement of Shmuel is referring to two verses: And what did you see that led you to conclude that the long verse (Leviticus 7:18) is referring to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, and that the verse that mentions the third day (Leviticus 19:7) in the Torah portion that begins: “You shall be holy,” is referring to intent to consume it outside its designated area? I might just as well reverse the two.

מִסְתַּבְּרָא אֲרִיכָא בְּחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – דְּגָמַר ״עָוֹן״–״עָוֹן״ מִנּוֹתָר, דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ בְּז״ב.

The Gemara responds: It stands to reason that the long verse is referring to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, as this allows for one to derive by way of verbal analogy between “iniquity” and “iniquity” from notar that an offering sacrificed with such intent carries the penalty of karet. The verbal analogy is apt since one prohibition is similar to the other in that both share the features mentioned above that form the acronym: Zayin, beit.

אַדְּרַבָּה! אֲרִיכָא בְּחוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, וּ״שְׁלִישִׁי״ דִּ״קְדֹשִׁים תִּהְיוּ״ בְּחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – מִשּׁוּם דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ, סַמְכֵיהּ וְקָא מְמַעֵט לֵיהּ!

The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, it stands to reason that the long verse is referring to intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, and that the verse that mentions the third day in the Torah portion that begins: “You shall be holy,” is referring to intent to consume it beyond its designated time. This is due to the fact that the latter intent is similar to notar in that both prohibitions share the features mentioned above that form the acronym: Zayin, beit, and it is therefore reasonable that the Torah juxtaposed the two in adjacent verses. And if so, when the verse states with regard to notar: “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity,” this excludes intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time from the penalty of karet.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: כּוּלְּהוּ מִקְּרָא אֲרִיכָא אָתַיִין; דִּכְתִיב: ״הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל״ – בִּשְׁתֵּי אֲכִילוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אֶחָד אֲכִילַת אָדָם וְאֶחָד אֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ.

Rather, Rava says: One must accept the original interpretation of Shmuel’s statement, that all of these halakhot with regard to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time or outside its designated area are derived from the long verse. As it is written: “If any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be credited to he who offers it; it shall be piggul, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18). When the verse states: “Be at all eaten [he’akhol ye’akhel],” using a doubled verb, the verse speaks of intent with regard to two consumptions, one consumption by a person, and one consumption by the altar, i.e., burning the offering. Improper intent with regard to either of these acts renders the offering piggul.

״מִבְּשַׂר זֶבַח שְׁלָמָיו״ – מָה שְׁלָמִים מְפַגְּלִין וּמִתְפַּגְּלִין, אַף כֹּל מְפַגְּלִין וּמִתְפַּגְּלִין.

The phrase “any of the flesh of his peace offerings” indicates that just as a peace offering possesses that which renders piggul and that which is rendered piggul, i.e., the blood, which renders the offering piggul through one’s intent with regard to its rites, and the meat, which is rendered piggul through such intent, so too the verse is referring to all offerings that possess that which renders an offering piggul and that which is rendered piggul.

״שְׁלִישִׁי״ – זֶה חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ.

The term “on the third day” indicates that the verse is referring to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, as peace offerings may be eaten for only two days.

״לֹא יֵרָצֶה״ – כְּהַרְצָאַת כָּשֵׁר, כֵּן הַרְצָאַת פָּסוּל; וּמָה הַרְצָאַת כָּשֵׁר – עַד שֶׁיַּקְרִיבוּ כׇּל מַתִּירָיו, אַף הַרְצָאַת פָּסוּל – עַד שֶׁיַּקְרִיבוּ כׇּל מַתִּירָיו.

The phrase “it shall not be accepted” indicates that an offering is deemed piggul following the stage of the service at which it would have otherwise effected atonement. Therefore, like the acceptance of a fit offering, so is the acceptance of a disqualified offering, and just as the acceptance of a fit offering does not occur until one sacrifices all its permitting factors, i.e., one sprinkles the blood properly, so too the acceptance of a disqualified offering does not occur until one sacrifices all its permitting factors.

״הַמַּקְרִיב״ – בְּהַקְרָבָה הוּא נִפְסָל, וְאֵינוֹ נִפְסָל בִּשְׁלִישִׁי. ״אוֹתוֹ״ – בַּזֶּבַח הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, וְאֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר בַּכֹּהֵן.

The term “he who offers” indicates that piggul is disqualified at the time of offering, due to improper intent, and it is not disqualified on the third day literally. And when the verse states “it,” this indicates that the verse is speaking of a disqualification of the offering only, but it is not speaking of the priest, who is not disqualified from the priesthood through such intent.

״לֹא יֵחָשֵׁב״ –

The phrase “neither shall it be credited [yeḥashev]”