זבחים לו

זבחים לו

בִּפְנִים – בַּחוּץ; וְאֶת הַנִּיתָּנִין בַּחוּץ – בִּפְנִים; שֶׁיֹּאכְלוּהוּ טְמֵאִים; שֶׁיַּקְרִיבוּהוּ טְמֵאִים; שֶׁיֹּאכְלוּהוּ עֲרֵלִים; וְשֶׁיַּקְרִיבוּהוּ עֲרֵלִים; לְשַׁבֵּר עַצְמוֹת הַפֶּסַח; לֶאֱכוֹל הֵימֶנּוּ נָא; וּלְעָרֵב דָּמוֹ בְּדַם הַפְּסוּלִים – כָּשֵׁר.

inside the Sanctuary outside the Sanctuary, or the blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary inside the Sanctuary; and likewise, if he slaughtered the animal with the intent that ritually impure people will partake of it, or that ritually impure people will sacrifice it, or that uncircumcised people will partake of it, or that uncircumcised people will sacrifice it; and likewise, with regard to the Paschal offering, if he had intent during the slaughter to break the bones of the Paschal offering, or to eat from the meat of the Paschal offering partially roasted, or to mix the blood of an offering with the blood of unfit offerings, in all these cases, although he intended to perform one of these prohibited acts, some of which would render the offering unfit, the offering is fit.

שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת אֶלָּא בְּחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ וְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, וְהַפֶּסַח וְהַחַטָּאת שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן.

The reason is that intent does not render the offering unfit except in cases of intent to eat or to burn the offering beyond its designated time and outside its designated area, and in addition, the Paschal offering and the sin offering are disqualified by intent to sacrifice them not for their sake.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי כְּתִיבִי בְּנוֹתָר; כָּתוּב אֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא תוֹתִירוּ מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר״, וְכָתוּב אֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא יַנִּיחַ מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר״; אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְהִנִּיחַ, תְּנֵהוּ לְעִנְיַן מַחְשֶׁבֶת הִינּוּחַ.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems the offering unfit if there was intent to leave it over until the next day or to take it out of its designated area? Rabbi Elazar said: There are two verses that are written with regard to notar. One verse states: “You shall let nothing of it remain until the morning, and that which remains of it until the morning you shall burn with fire” (Exodus 12:10), and one verse states: “He shall not leave any of it until the morning” (Leviticus 7:15). If the additional verse is not necessary for the matter of the prohibition against leaving it overnight, which is already mentioned by the first verse, apply it to the matter of intent of leaving it overnight, which would therefore be prohibited as well.

וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – הַאי קְרָא לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא?! הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״וּבְשַׂר זֶבַח תּוֹדַת שְׁלָמָיו״ – לָמַדְנוּ לְתוֹדָה שֶׁנֶּאֱכֶלֶת לְיוֹם וָלַיְלָה.

The Gemara asks: But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, does this verse come to teach this idea? This verse is necessary for him to derive that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving shall be eaten on the day of his offering; he shall not leave any of it until the morning” (Leviticus 7:15). From the words: “And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving,” we learned with regard to a thanks offering that it is eaten for a day and a night.

חֲלִיפִין, וְולָדוֹת, תְּמוּרוֹת – מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וּבְשַׂר״. חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״זֶבַח״.

With regard to animals exchanged for thanks offerings, and the offspring of thanks offerings, and the substitutes of thanks offerings, from where is it derived that they too are eaten for only a day and a night? The verse states: “And the flesh [uvesar],” and the additional “and” includes them. With regard to a sin offering and a guilt offering, from where is it derived that they are eaten for only a day and a night? The verse states: “Sacrifice,” to include other types of offerings.

וּמִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת שַׁלְמֵי נָזִיר וְשַׁלְמֵי פֶסַח? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״שְׁלָמָיו״. לַחְמֵי תוֹדָה, וְחַלּוֹת וּרְקִיקִים שֶׁבְּנָזִיר – מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״קׇרְבָּנוֹ״ – כּוּלָּן קוֹרֵא אֲנִי בָּהֶן ״לֹא יַנִּיחַ״.

The baraita continues: And from where is it derived to include the peace offering of a nazirite, i.e., the ram that a nazirite brings at the close of his term of naziriteship, and the peace offering of Passover? The verse therefore states: “His peace offerings,” in the plural. With regard to the loaves of the thanks offering, and the loaves and wafers that are part of the offering brought by a nazirite, from where is it derived that they are eaten for only a day and a night? The verse states: “His offering.” With regard to all of them I will read the phrase “He shall not leave any of it until the morning” as being applicable. Evidently, this verse is necessary to teach numerous halakhot concerning the allotted time to partake of offerings.

אִם כֵּן, לֵימָא קְרָא: ״לֹא תוֹתִירוּ״, מַאי ״לֹא יַנִּיחַ״? אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְהִינּוּחַ, תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְמַחְשֶׁבֶת הִינּוּחַ.

The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse state: And you shall let nothing of it remain until the morning, as stated in the other verse. What is indicated by the phrase “He shall not leave any of it”? If it is not necessary for the matter of the prohibition against leaving it overnight, apply it to the matter of intent to leave it overnight.

הָתִינַח לְהָנִיחַ, לְהוֹצִיא מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara now questions the source cited by Rabbi Elazar: This works out well to explain the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to one who had intent to leave the sacrificial portions overnight. But with regard to disqualifying the offering due to one who had intent to remove them from the Temple, what can be said to explain the source of Rabbi Yehuda, as it cannot be derived from these verses?

וְעוֹד, טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סְבָרָא הוּא! דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר לָהֶם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: אִי אַתֶּם מוֹדִים שֶׁאִם הִנִּיחוֹ לְמָחָר – שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל? אַף חִישֵּׁב לְהַנִּיחוֹ לְמָחָר – פָּסוּל. אֶלָּא טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סְבָרָא הוּא?! וְנִיפְלוֹג נָמֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּכוּלְּהוּ!

And furthermore, the statement of Rabbi Elazar can be questioned, as the rationale of Rabbi Yehuda is based on logical reasoning and is not derived from a verse. This is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: Do you not concede that if he left it over until the next day that it is disqualified? So too, if he intended to leave it over until the next day it is disqualified. Clearly, Rabbi Yehuda bases his opinion on logical reasoning, as he equates intent with action. The Gemara asks: Rather, is the rationale of Rabbi Yehuda based on logical reasoning and not derived from the verse? But if so, Rabbi Yehuda should also disagree with regard to all of the other cases in the mishna due to the same reasoning.

בְּהֵי נִיפְלוֹג? בְּשׁוֹבֵר עַצְמוֹת הַפֶּסַח וְלֶאֱכוֹל מִמֶּנּוּ נָא – זִיבְחָא גּוּפֵיהּ מִי מִיפְּסִיל?!

The Gemara rejects this: With regard to which case should Rabbi Yehuda disagree? Should he disagree with regard to one who slaughters the offering with intent to break the bones of the Paschal offering, or with intent to partake of the Paschal offering while it is partially roasted? Even had he actually realized such intent, would the offering itself thereby be disqualified? It presumably would not, as the presenting of the blood effects acceptance.

עַל מְנָת שֶׁיֹּאכְלוּהוּ טְמֵאִים וְשֶׁיַּקְרִיבוּהוּ טְמֵאִים – זִיבְחָא גּוּפֵיהּ מִי מִיפְּסִיל?! שֶׁיֹּאכְלוּהוּ עֲרֵלִים וְשֶׁיַּקְרִיבוּהוּ עֲרֵלִים – זִיבְחָא גּוּפֵיהּ מִי מִיפְּסִיל?! לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרִינָא: כֹּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ?!

Likewise, if a rite was performed on the condition that ritually impure individuals will partake of it, or that ritually impure individuals will sacrifice it, i.e., burn the sacrificial portions on the altar, would the offering itself be disqualified if such actions occurred? Likewise, if it was done with the intent that uncircumcised individuals will partake of it, or that uncircumcised individuals will sacrifice it, would the offering itself be disqualified if this occurred? The Gemara presents another version of this question: Is it in his power to execute these actions that are contingent upon the will of others?

לְעָרֵב דָּמָן בְּדַם הַפְּסוּלִין – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר: אֵין דָּם מְבַטֵּל דָּם. לִיתֵּן אֶת הַנִּיתָּנִין לְמַעְלָה לְמַטָּה, לְמַטָּה לְמַעְלָה – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר: שֶׁלֹּא לִמְקוֹמוֹ נָמֵי מְקוֹמוֹ קָרֵינָא בֵּיהּ.

With regard to a case where one had intent to mix their blood with the blood of unfit offerings, where Rabbi Yehuda also does not disagree with the ruling of the mishna that the offering is valid, he conforms to his line of reasoning, as he says: Blood does not nullify blood. Therefore, even if one would actually mix the two types of blood, it would not be disqualified. Likewise, in cases where one had intent to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or those that are to be placed below the red line above the red line, Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his line of reasoning, as he says: Blood that was not placed in its proper place on the altar is also considered to be placed in its proper place, and it effects acceptance of the offering.

וְלִיפְלוֹג בַּנִּיתָּנִין בִּפְנִים שֶׁנְּתָנָן בַּחוּץ, וְהַנִּיתָּנִין בַּחוּץ שֶׁנְּתָנָן בִּפְנִים!

The Gemara suggests: And let him disagree with regard to a case of blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary that was placed outside, and blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary that was placed inside, as the verse explicitly states that an external sin offering whose blood was sprinkled inside is disqualified (see Leviticus 6:23).

קָסָבַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: בָּעֵינַן מְקוֹם שֶׁיְּהֵא מְשׁוּלָּשׁ – בְּדָם, בְּבָשָׂר וּבְאֵימוּרִין.

The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yehuda holds that in order to disqualify an offering with the intent to perform a rite outside its designated area, we require that the intended place have threefold functionality, i.e., for the presenting of the blood, for the eating of the meat, and for the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar, which is true only of the area outside the Temple courtyard, which was valid for these three activities during an era in which it was permitted to sacrifice offerings on private altars. Therefore, intent to present the blood in the Sanctuary, which lacks these three elements, does not disqualify the offering, as the meat and sacrificial portions are never eaten or burned there.

וּמִי אִית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַאי סְבָרָא?! וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: ״דָּבָר רָע״ – רִיבָּה כָּאן חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ בַּדָּרוֹם וְחַטָּאת שֶׁנִּכְנַס דָּמָהּ לִפְנִים, פְּסוּלָה.

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda accept this reasoning that it must be a place of threefold functionality? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says that the verse states: “You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox, or a sheep, that has a blemish, even any evil thing” (Deuteronomy 17:1). The verse included here a sin offering that one slaughtered in the south and not on the northern side of the Temple courtyard as required, and likewise a sin offering whose blood entered inside, i.e., it was slaughtered with the intent that its blood would be brought inside the Sanctuary, that they are disqualified. This indicates that an offering slaughtered with improper intent with regard to a place that lacks threefold functionality nevertheless renders the offering not valid.

וְלֵית לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה שְׁלִישִׁי?! וְהָתְנַן, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: הִכְנִיס בְּשׁוֹגֵג – כָּשֵׁר. הָא בְּמֵזִיד – פָּסוּל; וְקַיְימָא לַן בְּשֶׁכִּיפֵּר.

The Gemara responds: And does Rabbi Yehuda not accept the requirement of a place of three functions? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (82a) that Rabbi Yehuda said: If he brought the blood into the Sanctuary unwittingly, the blood remains fit for presenting, from which it may be inferred: But if he brought it in intentionally, it is unfit. And we maintain that Rabbi Yehuda deems it unfit only where one actually effected atonement, i.e., he presented the blood on the inner altar.

הַשְׁתָּא וּמָה הָתָם (עָיְילִי עָיְילָא) [דְּעַיּוֹלֵי עַיְּילֵיהּ], אִי כִּיפֵּר אִין אִי לֹא כִּיפֵּר לָא; הָכָא דְּחַשֵּׁיב חַשּׁוֹבֵי, לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?! תְּרֵי תַּנָּאֵי וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

Now, it stands to reason that if there, where one actually brought the blood inside, only if he effected atonement, yes, it is unfit, but if he did not effect atonement it is not unfit, then here, where he merely thought to bring it inside, all the more so is it not clear that it should be valid? The Gemara answers: There are two tanna’im, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda concerning a place with threefold functionality.

וְסָבַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ בַּדָּרוֹם –

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda hold that with regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered in the south,

יְהֵא חַיָּיב?!

the slaughterer would be liable to receive lashes?

וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ בַּדָּרוֹם – יְהֵא חַיָּיב? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא תִזְבַּח לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ שׁוֹר וָשֶׂה וְגוֹ׳ כֹּל דָּבָר רָע״ – עַל דָּבָר רָע אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ, וְאִי אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ עַל חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ בַּדָּרוֹם! תְּרֵי תַּנָּאֵי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: One might have thought that with regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered in the south, he would be liable for it. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox, or a sheep, that has a blemish, even any evil thing” (Deuteronomy 17:1), to teach that for slaughtering an evil thing, such as a blemished offering, you deem him liable to receive lashes, but you do not deem him liable for a sin offering that he slaughtered in the south. The Gemara answers: Here too, there are two tanna’im, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, שֶׁחוֹזֵר וְקוֹבְעוֹ לְפִיגּוּל.

§ Rabbi Abba says: Although Rabbi Yehuda says that an offering is rendered not valid if it was slaughtered with the intent that its blood would be left over until the next day, Rabbi Yehuda concedes that if the priest subsequently collected, conveyed, or presented the blood with the intent to sacrifice or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, he then establishes the offering as piggul. The intent to leave it overnight does not prevent it from being rendered piggul, in contrast to intent to sacrifice or partake of it outside its designated area, or performing a sacrificial rite of the Paschal offering or a sin offering not for its own sake, which do prevent the offering from subsequently being rendered piggul (see 29b).

אָמַר רָבָא: תִּדַּע – דְּפִיגּוּל לִפְנֵי זְרִיקָה לָא כְּלוּם הוּא, וְאָתְיָא זְרִיקָה וְקָבְעָה לַהּ בְּפִיגּוּל.

Rava says: Know that this is so, as intent to sprinkle the blood the next day, which renders an offering piggul and which inherently includes the intent to leave the blood over until the next day so that he can then sprinkle it, is nothing before the sprinkling of the blood. And his intent during the slaughter to sprinkle the blood the next day does not render the offering piggul until the blood is sprinkled, and then the sprinkling of the blood comes and establishes the offering as piggul. Clearly, the intent to leave the blood over until the next day does not prevent the offering from subsequently being rendered piggul.

וְלָא הִיא; הָתָם הוּא חֲדָא מַחְשָׁבָה הִיא, הָכָא תְּרֵי מַחְשָׁבוֹת.

The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: But it is not so that this is a valid proof, as there, with regard to standard piggul intent, it is one intent that is established with the sprinkling of the blood. By contrast, here, where he initially had intent to leave the blood until the next day and subsequently had intent to sprinkle it beyond its designated time, there are two separate intents. Therefore, since an improper intent already exists, the offering cannot thereafter be rendered piggul.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא לְרַבִּי אַבָּא: לִיתֵּן אֶת הַנִּיתָּנִין לְמַעְלָה לְמַטָּה, לְמַטָּה לְמַעְלָה; לְאַלְתַּר – כָּשֵׁר. חָזַר וְחִישֵּׁב חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – פָּסוּל, וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת. חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – פִּיגּוּל, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת.

Rav Huna raised an objection to Rabbi Abba from a baraita: If one slaughtered an offering with the intent to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or to place the blood that is to be placed below the red line above the red line, and he had intent to do so immediately, i.e., on the same day, then it is valid, as such intent does not disqualify the offering. If he then had intent to sacrifice the offering outside its designated area, it is disqualified, but there is no liability to receive karet for it. If he had intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, then it is rendered piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for it.

לְמָחָר – פָּסוּל. חָזַר וְחִישֵּׁב בֵּין חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ בֵּין חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – פָּסוּל, וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת. תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא! תְּיוּבְתָּא.

The baraita continues: If one had intent to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line or vice versa the next day, then it is disqualified, due to his intent to leave it overnight, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. In this case, if he then had intent to sacrifice the same offering either beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, it is disqualified, and there is no liability to receive karet for it. Evidently, intent to leave it overnight prevents the offering from subsequently being rendered piggul. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Abba is indeed a conclusive refutation.

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר רָבִינָא בַּר סֵילָא: חִישֵּׁב שֶׁיֹּאכְלוּהוּ טְמֵאִים לְמָחָר – חַיָּיב. אָמַר רָבָא: תִּדַּע, דְּבָשָׂר לִפְנֵי זְרִיקָה לָא חֲזֵי, וְכִי מְחַשֵּׁב בֵּיהּ – מִיפְּסִיל.

§ Rav Ḥisda says that Ravina bar Sila says: If one slaughtered an offering with intent that impure individuals would eat the meat of the offering the next day, one is liable to receive karet due the prohibition of piggul. Although impure individuals are not fit to partake of the meat, this is nevertheless considered intent to partake of it beyond its designated time. Rava says: Know that this is so, as meat prior to the sprinkling of the blood is not fit to be eaten, and when one has improper intent with regard to it, it is disqualified. Clearly, intent to partake of a forbidden item beyond its designated time renders the offering piggul.

וְלָא הִיא; הָתָם זָרֵיק וּמִיחֲזֵי, הָכָא לָא מִיחְזֵי כְּלָל.

The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: But it is not so, as there, with regard to standard piggul intent, he sprinkles the blood, and the meat is rendered fit to be eaten the next day. By contrast, here, it is not rendered fit to be eaten by impure individuals at all. Therefore, such intent is not considered significant intent to consume the meat after its designated time.

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא, מַרְגְּלָא בְּפוּמֵּיהּ דְּרַב דִּימִי בַּר חִינָּנָא: בְּשַׂר פֶּסַח שֶׁלֹּא הוּצְלָה, וְלַחְמֵי תוֹדָה שֶׁלֹּא הוּרְמוּ – חַיָּיבִין עֲלֵיהֶן מִשּׁוּם טוּמְאָה.

Rav Ḥisda says that Rav Dimi bar Ḥinnana was wont to say the following halakha: With regard to the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted, and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, although it is prohibited for them to be eaten, nevertheless one is liable to receive karet due to violating the prohibition against eating them in a state of impurity.

אָמַר רָבָא: תִּדַּע, דְּתַנְיָא: ״אֲשֶׁר לַה׳״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֵימוּרֵי קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים לְטוּמְאָה.

Rava said: Know that this is so, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings that pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20). The added words “that pertain to the Lord” serve to include the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity with regard to impurity, teaching that one who partakes of them while impure is liable to receive karet.

אַלְמָא אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָאו בְּנֵי אֲכִילָה נִינְהוּ – חַיָּיבִין עֲלֵיהֶן מִשּׁוּם טוּמְאָה; הָכָא נָמֵי, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָאו בְּנֵי אֲכִילָה נִינְהוּ – חַיָּיבִין עֲלֵיהֶן מִשּׁוּם טוּמְאָה.

Apparently, even though they are not fit for consumption, one is liable to receive karet due to violating the prohibition against eating them in ritual impurity. Here too, with regard to the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted, and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, even though they are not fit to be eaten, one is liable to receive karet due to violating the prohibition against eating them in impurity.

וְלָא הִיא; הָתָם – אֵימוּרֵי קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים חֲזוּ לְגָבוֹהַּ; לְאַפּוֹקֵי בְּשַׂר פֶּסַח שֶׁלֹּא הוּצְלָה וְלַחְמֵי תוֹדָה שֶׁלֹּא הוּרְמוּ – דְּלָא חֲזוּ לָא לְגָבוֹהַּ וְלָא לְהֶדְיוֹט.

The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: But it is not so, as there, the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that are burned on the altar are at least fit for the Most High, i.e., for the consumption of the altar, and therefore one is liable to receive karet for eating them while ritually impure. This is to the exclusion of the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, which are not fit at all, not for the Most High, and not for an ordinary person.

לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרִינָא: הָא אֵימוּרִין לָא חֲזוּ! וְלָא הִיא; הָנָךְ חֲזוּ לְמִילְּתַיְיהוּ, וְהָנֵי לָא חֲזוּ כְּלָל.

The Gemara presents another version of the proof and its rejection: But the sacrificial portions are not fit, and yet one is liable if he consumes them while impure. The Gemara responds: But it is not so, since these sacrificial portions are fit for their matters, and these, i.e., the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, are not fit at all.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ כׇּל הַפְּסוּלִין

מַתְנִי׳ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: כׇּל הַנִּיתָּנִין עַל מִזְבֵּחַ הַחִיצוֹן, שֶׁנָּתַן בְּמַתָּנָה אַחַת – כִּיפֵּר. וּבְחַטָּאת – שְׁתֵּי מַתָּנוֹת. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: אַף חַטָּאת שֶׁנְּתָנָהּ מַתָּנָה אַחַת – כִּיפֵּר.

MISHNA: Beit Shammai say: With regard to all the offerings whose blood is to be placed on the external altar, even those that require that the blood be sprinkled on two opposite corners of the altar so that it will run down each of its four sides, in a case where the priest placed the blood on the altar with only one placement, he facilitated atonement. And in the case of a sin offering, which requires four placements, one on each of the four corners of the altar, at least two placements are necessary to facilitate atonement. And Beit Hillel say: Even with regard to a sin offering, in a case where the priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement after the fact.

לְפִיכָךְ אִם נָתַן אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה כְּתִיקְנָהּ וְאֶת הַשְּׁנִיָּה חוּץ לִזְמַנָּהּ – כִּיפֵּר.

Therefore, since the priest facilitates atonement with one placement in all cases other than a sin offering according to Beit Shammai, and even in the case of a sin offering according to Beit Hillel, if he placed the first placement in its proper manner, and the second with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, he facilitated atonement. Since the second placement is not indispensable with regard to achieving atonement, improper intent while performing that rite does not invalidate the offering.

וְאִם נָתַן אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה חוּץ לִזְמַנָּהּ וְאֶת הַשְּׁנִיָּה חוּץ לִמְקוֹמָהּ – פִּיגּוּל, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת.

And based on the same reasoning, if he placed the first placement with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time and he placed the second placement with the intent to eat the offering outside its designated area, the second of which does not render an offering piggul, the offering is piggul, an offering disqualified by improper intention, and one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet] for its consumption. This is because the intent that accompanied the second placement does not supersede the piggul status of the offering.

כׇּל הַנִּיתָּנִין עַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ הַפְּנִימִי – שֶׁאִם חִיסֵּר אַחַת מִן הַמַּתָּנוֹת, כְּאִילּוּ לֹא כִּיפֵּר. לְפִיכָךְ, נָתַן כּוּלָּן כְּתִיקְנָן וְאַחַת שֶׁלֹּא כְּתִיקְנָהּ – פְּסוּלָה, וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת.

All this applies to those offerings whose blood is to be placed on the external altar. But with regard to all the offerings whose blood is to be placed on the inner altar, if the priest omitted even one of the placements, it is as though he did not facilitate atonement. Therefore, if he placed all the placements in their proper manner, and one placement in an improper manner, i.e., with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, the offering is disqualified, as it is lacking one placement; but there is no liability for karet for one who partakes of the offering, as the improper intention related to only part of the blood that renders the offering permitted for consumption, and an offering becomes piggul only when the improper intention relates to the entire portion of the offering that renders it permitted for consumption.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִנַּיִן לַנִּיתָּנִין עַל מִזְבֵּחַ הַחִיצוֹן, שֶׁנְּתָנָן בְּמַתָּנָה אַחַת – שֶׁכִּיפֵּר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְדַם זְבָחֶיךָ יִשָּׁפֵךְ״. וְהַאי לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא?! הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא:

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived with regard to those offerings whose blood is placed on the external altar, that if the priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement? The verse states: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27), indicating that a single pouring of blood suffices. The Gemara asks: But does this verse come to teach this halakha? That verse is necessary for that which is taught in another baraita discussing a different matter: