זבחים ד

זבחים ד

מְנָלַן דְּבָעֵינַן זְבִיחָה לִשְׁמָהּ? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאִם זֶבַח שְׁלָמִים קׇרְבָּנוֹ״ – שֶׁתְּהֵא זְבִיחָה לְשֵׁם [שְׁלָמִים].

§ The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that we require that an offering’s slaughter be performed for its own sake? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And if his offering is a sacrifice [zevaḥ] of peace offerings” (Leviticus 3:1), teaching that slaughter [zeviḥa] must be performed for the sake of a peace offering.

וְדִילְמָא הַיְינוּ שְׁמַיְיהוּ!

The Gemara challenges: But perhaps when the verse states: “A sacrifice of peace offerings,” “a sacrifice of peace offerings” is simply the name of this type of offering, and is not referring to intent of the one slaughtering it.

מִדִּכְתִיב ״הַמַּקְרִיב אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים״, ״הַזּוֹרֵק אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים״ – וְלָא כְּתִיב ״זֶבַח״; וְהָכָא כְּתִיב ״זֶבַח״; שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: שֶׁתְּהֵא זְבִיחָה לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים.

The Gemara answers: From the fact that it is written in other verses: “Who offers the blood of the peace offering” (Leviticus 7:33), and: “Who sprinkles the blood of the peace offering” (Leviticus 7:14), and the term: A sacrifice [zevaḥ], is not written, whereas here, in this verse, the term: “A sacrifice [zevaḥ] of peace offerings,” is written, learn from it that the slaughter [zeviḥa] must be performed for the sake of a peace offering.

אַשְׁכְּחַן זְבִיחָה, שְׁאָר עֲבוֹדוֹת מְנָלַן?

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that slaughter must be performed for the sake of the offering being sacrificed. From where do we derive that the other sacrificial rites, i.e., collecting the blood, conveying it to the altar, and sprinkling it on the altar, must also be performed for the sake of the offering?

וְכִי תֵּימָא לֵילַף מִזְּבִיחָה; מָה לִזְבִיחָה – שֶׁכֵּן נִפְסְלָה שֶׁלֹּא לְשֵׁם אוֹכְלִין בַּפֶּסַח!

And if you would say: Let us derive from the fact that slaughter must be performed for the sake of the offering that the other sacrificial rites must be performed for the sake of the offering as well, this derivation can be refuted, as slaughter has a unique element of stringency: What is unique about slaughter? It is unique in that with regard to a Paschal offering, the offering is disqualified if it is slaughtered not for the sake of those who eat it. If the Paschal offering is slaughtered for the sake of people who are incapable of eating it, such as one who is too ill to eat, it is disqualified. By contrast, performing other rites with this intent does not disqualify the offering. Therefore, one cannot assume that a halakha that applies to slaughter applies to other rites as well.

אֶלָּא אָמַר קְרָא: ״הַמַּקְרִיב אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים״ – שֶׁתְּהֵא קַבָּלָה לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים.

The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: “Who sacrifices [hamakriv] the blood of the peace offering” (Leviticus 7:33), referring to the one who collects the blood of the offering, as the Gemara will explain. This phrase indicates that the collection of the blood must be performed for the sake of a peace offering.

וְלִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּקַבָּלָה, וְלֵילַף שְׁחִיטָה מִינַּהּ!

The Gemara challenges: And let the Merciful One write this halakha in the Torah only with regard to the collection of the blood, and we would derive from it that slaughter must also be performed for the sake of the offering.

מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ – מָה לְקַבָּלָה שֶׁכֵּן פְּסוּלָה בְּזָר וְאִשָּׁה.

The Gemara answers: Because such a derivation can be refuted as follows: What is unique about collection of the blood? It is unique in that it is not valid if performed by a non-priest or a woman, whereas slaughter can be performed by any competent Jew. Therefore, one cannot assume that a halakha that applies to collection applies to slaughter as well.

אַשְׁכְּחַן שְׁחִיטָה וְקַבָּלָה, זְרִיקָה מְנָלַן?

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that slaughter and collection of the blood must be performed for the sake of the offering. From where do we derive that this halakha applies to the sprinkling of the blood as well?

וְכִי תֵּימָא לֵילַף מֵהָנֵי – מָה לְהָנֵי שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנוֹת צָפוֹן, וְיֶשְׁנָן בְּחַטָּאוֹת הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת!

And if you would say: Let us derive from these rites, i.e., slaughter and collection, that this halakha applies to the sprinkling of the blood as well, this derivation can be refuted: What is unique about these rites? They are unique in that for offerings of the most sacred order, it is required that they be performed in the north of the Temple courtyard. And furthermore, these rites are performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings as well as standard sin offerings. The sprinkling of the blood on the external altar, by contrast, is performed in all portions of the Temple courtyard, and it is not performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings, whose blood is sprinkled only in the Sanctuary.

אֶלָּא אָמַר קְרָא: ״הַזּוֹרֵק אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים״ – שֶׁתְּהֵא זְרִיקָה לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים.

The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: “Who sprinkles the blood of the peace offering” (Leviticus 7:14), indicating that the sprinkling of the blood must be performed for the sake of a peace offering.

וְלִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בִּזְרִיקָה, וְלֵילַף מִינַּהּ!

The Gemara challenges: And let the Merciful One write this halakha only with regard to sprinkling, and we would derive from it that it applies to slaughter and collection as well.

מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ – מָה לִזְרִיקָה, שֶׁכֵּן חַיָּיב עָלֶיהָ זָר מִיתָה.

The Gemara answers: That would not be sufficient, because such a derivation can be refuted, as sprinkling has a unique element of stringency. What is unique about sprinkling? It is unique in that a non-priest is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven for performing it.

אַשְׁכְּחַן כּוּלְּהוּ, הוֹלָכָה מְנָלַן?

The Gemara asks: We found a source for this halakha with regard to all four rites save conveying the blood to the altar. From where do we derive that this latter rite must also be performed for the sake of the offering?

וְכִי תֵּימָא לֵילַף מִכּוּלְּהוּ; מָה לְכוּלְּהוּ – שֶׁכֵּן עֲבוֹדָה שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לְבַטְּלָהּ; תֹּאמַר בְּהוֹלָכָה – שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לְבַטְּלָהּ?!

And if you would say: Let us derive from all the other rites that conveying the blood must also be performed for the sake of the offering, this derivation can also be refuted: What is unique about all of the other rites? They are unique in that each of them is an indispensable rite. Would you say that any requirement that applies to those rites necessarily applies also with regard to conveying the blood, which is dispensable? If an offering is slaughtered by the side of the altar, it is unnecessary to convey its blood to the altar.

אֶלָּא אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהִקְרִיב אֶת הַכֹּל הַמִּזְבֵּחָה״, וְאָמַר מָר: זוֹ הוֹלָכַת אֵבָרִים לַכֶּבֶשׁ; וְתַנְיָא: ״וְהִקְרִיבוּ״ – זוֹ קַבָּלַת הַדָּם; וְאַפֵּיק רַחֲמָנָא בִּלְשׁוֹן הוֹלָכָה – לְמֵימְרָא דְּהוֹלָכָה לָא תַּפְּקַהּ מִכְּלַל קַבָּלָה.

The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: “And the priest shall sacrifice [vehikriv] the whole, and make it smoke upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:13), and the Master said that this is referring to conveying the limbs of the offering to the ramp of the altar. And it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall present [vehikrivu] the blood” (Leviticus 1:5), that this is referring to the collection of the blood. And one can infer that the Merciful One expresses collection of the blood in the same language used for conveying, to say that you should not exclude conveying from the category of collection of the blood. Therefore, the halakhot of collection apply to conveying.

וְאַשְׁכְּחַן שִׁנּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ, שִׁנּוּי בְּעָלִים מְנָלַן?

The Gemara asks further: And we found a source for the halakha concerning deviation with regard to the type of offering, i.e., that an offering may not be slaughtered for the sake of a different type of offering. From where do we derive the halakha concerning deviation with regard to the owner, i.e., that an offering may not be slaughtered for the sake of one who is not the owner?

אָמַר רַב פִּנְחָס בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַמֵּי, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וּבְשַׂר זֶבַח תּוֹדַת שְׁלָמָיו״ – שֶׁתְּהֵא זְבִיחָה לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה. אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ – דְּנָפְקָא לַן מֵהָתָם; תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְשִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים.

Rav Pinḥas, son of Rav Ami, says: The verse states with regard to a thanks offering: “And the meat of the sacrifice [zevaḥ] of his thanksgiving peace offering shall be eaten on the day of his offering” (Leviticus 7:15), apparently indicating that its slaughter [zeviḥa] must be performed for the sake of a thanks offering. And if this language is not needed for the matter of deviation with regard to the type of offering, and in fact it is not, as we already derived this halakha from there, i.e., the verse cited concerning peace offerings, apply it to the matter of deviation with regard to the owner. It is thereby derived that an offering must be slaughtered for the sake of its owner.

וְהַאי לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא?! הָא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״וּבְשַׂר זֶבַח תּוֹדַת שְׁלָמָיו״ – אַבָּא חָנִין אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: בָּא לְלַמֵּד, תּוֹדָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים – כְּשֵׁרָה, שְׁלָמִים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה – פְּסוּלָה. מָה הֶפְרֵשׁ בֵּין זֶה לָזֶה? תּוֹדָה קְרוּיָה שְׁלָמִים, וְאֵין שְׁלָמִים קְרוּיִין תּוֹדָה.

The Gemara asks: But does this verse come to teach this halakha? Isn’t it necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: Concerning the phrase “and the meat of the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace offering,” Abba Ḥanin says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: It comes to teach that a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering is fit; whereas a peace offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit. What is the difference between this offering and that offering? A thanks offering is called a peace offering in that verse, but a peace offering is not called a thanks offering.

אֲנַן מִ״זֶּבַח״ קָאָמְרִינַן.

The Gemara answers: We are saying that it is derived from the superfluous term: “Sacrifice [zevaḥ],” that the slaughter [zeviḥa] must be performed for the sake of the owner. The term “peace offering” teaches Abba Ḥanin’s ruling.

וְאַכַּתִּי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״זֶבַח״!

The Gemara disputes this: But the term “sacrifice [zevaḥ]” is still necessary to serve as the source for another halakhic midrash: From where is it derived that the meat of a sin offering and a guilt offering may be eaten only on the day the animal is sacrificed and the following night, like a thanks offering? The verse states: “And the meat of the sacrifice [zevaḥ] of his thanksgiving peace offering shall be eaten on the day of his offering.” The phrase teaches that not only thanks offerings, but any slaughtered offering [zevaḥ] is subject to this time limit unless the Torah specifies otherwise.

אִם כֵּן, נִכְתּוֹב קְרָא: ״וּבְשַׂר תּוֹדַת שְׁלָמָיו [זֶבַח]״; מַאי ״זֶבַח״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.

The Gemara answers: If that were so, i.e., if the term “sacrifice” indicated only that a sin offering and a guilt offering may be eaten only for the period of time for which a thanks offering may be eaten, let the verse write: And the meat of his thanksgiving peace offering sacrifice. What is indicated by the mention of the word sacrifice before the phrase “his thanksgiving peace offering”? Rather, conclude two conclusions from it.

אַשְׁכְּחַן זְבִיחָה, שְׁאָר עֲבוֹדוֹת מְנָלַן?

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that slaughter must be performed for the sake of the owner. From where do we derive that the other sacrificial rites must also be performed for the sake of the owner?

וְכִי תֵּימָא לֵילַף מִזְּבִיחָה – מָה לִזְבִיחָה שֶׁכֵּן פּוֹסֵל שֶׁלֹּא לְשֵׁם אוֹכְלִין בַּפֶּסַח!

And if you would say: Let us derive from slaughter that the other rites must be performed for the sake of the owner as well, this derivation can be refuted: What is unique about slaughter? It is unique in that with regard to a Paschal offering, slaughter not for the sake of those who eat it disqualifies the offering, whereas performing the other rites not for the sake of the owner does not.

נֶאֶמְרָה זְבִיחָה בְּשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ, וְנֶאֶמְרָה זְבִיחָה בְּשִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים; מָה זְבִיחָה הָאֲמוּרָה בְּשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ – לֹא חִלַּקְתָּ בֵּין זְבִיחָה לִשְׁאָר עֲבוֹדוֹת, אַף זְבִיחָה הָאֲמוּרָה בְּשִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים – לֹא תְּחַלֵּק בָּהֶן בֵּין זְבִיחָה לִשְׁאָר עֲבוֹדוֹת.

The Gemara answers: A term of slaughter is stated with regard to deviation from the type of offering, and a term of slaughter is stated with regard to deviation with regard to the owner. Just as concerning the term slaughter stated with regard to deviation from the type of offering, you did not differentiate between slaughter and the other sacrificial rites, and all four rites must be performed for the sake of the offering, so too, concerning the term slaughter stated with regard to deviation in the context of the owner, you should not differentiate between slaughter and the other sacrificial rites.

אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ – שֶׁכֵּן פְּסוּלָהּ בְּגוּפָהּ, וְיֶשְׁנוֹ בְּאַרְבַּע עֲבוֹדוֹת,

The Gemara counters: This derivation can be refuted: What is unique about deviation from the type of offering, as opposed to deviation with regard to the owner? It is unique with regard to four matters: First, it is unique in that its disqualification concerns the essence of the offering itself. And second, it is unique in that deviation from the type of offering applies to the four sacrificial rites, whereas performing a rite for the sake of the owner is relevant only to the sprinkling of the blood, which atones for the owner.

וְיֶשְׁנוֹ לְאַחַר מִיתָה, וְיֶשְׁנוֹ בְּצִיבּוּר כִּבְיָחִיד!

And third, it is unique in that deviation from the type of offering applies even after the death of the owner, when the owner’s heir brings the offering, whereas intent for the sake of the owner is irrelevant after the owner has died. And fourth, it is unique in that deviation from the type of offering applies with regard to communal offerings as well as with regard to individual offerings, whereas employing the term owner is irrelevant with regard to communal offerings, which are owned by the public.

וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּתַרְתֵּי לָאו דַּוְקָא, תַּרְתֵּי מִיהָא דַּוְקָא.

And although two of these distinctions are not precise, the other two are in any event precise distinctions, based upon which a distinction can be drawn.

מַאי שְׁנָא שִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים דְּלָא הָוֵי פְּסוּלוֹ בְּגוּפוֹ – מַחְשָׁבָה בְּעָלְמָא; שִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ נָמֵי מַחְשָׁבָה בְּעָלְמָא הוּא! אֶלָּא כֵּיוָן דְּאַחְשְׁבַהּ – פַּסְלַהּ; הָכָא נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּאַחְשְׁבַהּ – פַּסְלַהּ.

The Gemara explains why two of the distinctions are not precise: What is different about deviation with regard to the owner, such that its disqualification does not concern the offering itself? It is that this merely constitutes a change of thought. Deviation from the type of offering is also merely a change of thought; the offering is not physically affected. Rather, this distinction between deviation with regard to the owner and deviation from the type of offering is false; one should claim that if deviation from the type of offering disqualifies it once the one who slaughtered it had that intent, here too, once the one who slaughtered it had intent to deviate from its owner, he disqualified it.

וּלְרַב פִּנְחָס בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מָרִי, דְּאָמַר יֵשׁ שִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים לְאַחַר מִיתָה – תַּרְתֵּי מִיהָא אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ!

The Gemara explains the difficulty with the second distinction, the case where the owner died: And according to Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Mari, who says that disqualification by deviation with regard to the owner applies even after the owner’s death, there is no distinction in this regard between deviation from the type of offering and deviation with regard to the owner. In any event, there are two remaining distinctions based on which the comparison between a deviation from the type of offering and a deviation with regard to the owner can be refuted.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְנִרְצָה לוֹ לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו״ – וְלֹא עַל חֲבֵירוֹ.

Rather, Rav Ashi says that the halakha that it is prohibited to sprinkle the blood for the sake of one other than the owner is derived from a verse. The verse states: “And it shall be accepted for him to atone for him” (Leviticus 1:4), teaching that the sacrificial rite that atones for the owner, namely, the sprinkling of the blood, must be performed specifically for him, and not for another.

וְהַאי לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא?! הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״וְנִרְצָה לוֹ לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו״ – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֶת שֶׁעָלָיו – חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתוֹ, וְאֶת שֶׁאֵינוֹ עָלָיו – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתוֹ.

The Gemara asks: But does this verse come to teach this halakha? Isn’t it necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to the verse: “And it shall be accepted for him to atone for him [alav],” Rabbi Shimon says: This indicates that in a case where one consecrated an animal as an offering and it died or was lost, if it was initially incumbent upon him [alav] to bring an offering, i.e., if he had accepted upon himself a personal obligation to bring an offering, he bears responsibility for it, i.e., he is obligated to bring another offering in its stead. But if it was not incumbent upon him [alav] to bring an offering, i.e., if he consecrated a specific animal without accepting upon himself any personal obligation, he does not bear responsibility for it if it dies or is lost.

וְאָמַר רַב יִצְחָק בַּר אַבְדִּימִי: מַאי טַעְמָא? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר ״עָלַי״ – כְּמַאן דְּטָעוּן לֵיהּ אַכַּתְפֵּיהּ דָּמֵי.

And Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi says: What is the reasoning behind this distinction? Once a person said: It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering, it is considered as though the offering is loaded upon his shoulders. He does not discharge his obligation until he brings some offering.

רַב אָשֵׁי מִ״וְּנִרְצָה לוֹ לְכַפֵּר״ קָאָמַר.

The Gemara answers: Rav Ashi says that the halakha that it is prohibited to sprinkle the blood for the sake of one other than the owner is derived from the phrase “And it shall be accepted for him,” not from the term “for him,” on which the baraita is based.

אַשְׁכְּחַן זְבִיחָה וּזְרִיקָה, קַבָּלָה מְנָלַן?

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that slaughter and the sprinkling of the blood must be performed for the sake of the owner. From where do we derive that the collection of the blood must also be performed for the sake of the owner?

וְכִי תֵּימָא לֵילַף מִזְּבִיחָה וּזְרִיקָה – מָה לִזְבִיחָה וּזְרִיקָה שֶׁכֵּן עֲבוֹדָה שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ בַּחוּץ!

And if you would say: Let us derive from slaughter and sprinkling that collection must also be performed for the sake of the owner, this derivation can be refuted: What is unique about slaughter and sprinkling? They are unique in that each is a rite for which one is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven if he performs it outside the Temple.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַתְיָא מֵאֵיל נָזִיר; דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאֶת הָאַיִל יַעֲשֶׂה זֶבַח שְׁלָמִים״ – שֶׁתְּהֵא עֲשִׂיָּיתוֹ לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים; וְאִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ – דְּנָפְקָא לֵיהּ מֵהָתָם, תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְשִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים.

Rather, Rav Ashi says that the halakha that the collection of the blood must also be performed for the sake of the owner is derived from the case of a nazirite’s ram. As it is written: “And he shall offer the ram for a sacrifice [zevaḥ] of peace offerings unto the Lord” (Numbers 6:17), indicating that its offering should be performed for the sake of a peace offering. And if the verse is not necessary for the matter of deviation from the type of offering, as we derived that from there, i.e., the verses cited earlier (4a), apply it to the matter of deviation with regard to the owner. It is thereby derived that its sacrificial rites must be performed for the sake of its owner.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בַּר אַבָּא לְרָבָא, אֵימָא: ״יַעֲשֶׂה״ – כָּלַל, ״זֶבַח״ – פָּרַט; כְּלָל וּפְרָט – אֵין בַּכְּלָל אֶלָּא מַה שֶּׁבַּפְּרָט; זְבִיחָה אִין, מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא לָא!

Rav Aḥa bar Abba said to Rava, in objection to this derivation: Say that the term: “Shall offer,” is a generalization and: “A sacrifice [zevaḥ],” is a detail. According to the principles of biblical hermeneutics, where there is a generalization and a detail, the generalization includes only that which is specified in the detail. Accordingly, slaughter [zeviḥa], yes, must be performed for the sake of its owner; but no other rite must be performed for the sake of its owner in order for the offering to be fit.

אִי כְּתִיב ״יַעֲשֶׂה שְׁלָמִים זֶבַח״ – כִּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ; הַשְׁתָּא דִּכְתִיב ״יַעֲשֶׂה זֶבַח שְׁלָמִים״ – הָוֵה לֵיהּ כְּלָל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מָלֵא, וְכׇל כְּלָל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מָלֵא – אֵין דָּנִין אוֹתוֹ בִּכְלָל וּפְרָט.

The Gemara answers: If it had been written: Shall offer the ram for peace offerings as a sacrifice [zevaḥ], it would be as you say. The clause: Shall offer the ram for peace offerings, would be considered a generalization, and: Sacrifice [zevaḥ], would be a detail. Now that it is written: “Shall offer the ram for a sacrifice [zevaḥ] of peace offerings,” the term “shall offer” is an incomplete generalization, as the term “for a sacrifice” interrupts between “shall offer” and “peace offerings.” And one cannot derive a halakha from any incomplete generalization by employing the principle of a generalization and a detail.

רָבִינָא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם דָּנִין, וְ״לַה׳״ חָזַר וְכָלַל.

Ravina says there is a different answer: Actually, one can derive a halakha from verses with incomplete generalizations using the principle of a generalization and a detail. And the reason this halakha applies to other rites besides slaughter is that by adding the term “unto the Lord,” it then makes a generalization.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּיפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: וְהָא לָא דָּמֵי כְּלָלָא קַמָּא לִכְלָלָא בָּתְרָא; כְּלָלָא קַמָּא – מְרַבֵּה עֲשִׂיּוֹת וְתוּ לָא, כְּלָלָא בָּתְרָא – כׇּל ״לַה׳״ וַאֲפִילּוּ שְׁפִיכַת שִׁירַיִים וְהַקְטָרַת אֵימוּרִין! הָא תַּנָּא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בִּכְלָלֵי וּפְרָטֵי דָּרֵישׁ כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא:

Before Ravina concluded his interpretation, Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: But the former generalization is dissimilar to the latter generalization. The former generalization includes only the essential sacrificial actions and nothing more, whereas the latter generalization includes any sacrificial duty unto the Lord, and even pouring the remains of the blood on the base of the altar and burning the sacrificial portions of the offering on the altar. Ravina responded: The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught generalizations and details in cases like this.

כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל – אִי אַתָּה דָן אֶלָּא כְּעֵין הַפְּרָט; מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – עֲבוֹדָה וּבָעֵינַן לִשְׁמָן, אַף כׇּל עֲבוֹדָה וּבָעֵינַן לִשְׁמָן.

Ravina concludes his explanation: Since the term: “Unto the Lord,” is another generalization, the verse is formulated as a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, and you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Just as the mentioned detail, slaughter, is defined as an essential rite and we require that it be performed for the sake of the owner, so too, we require that every essential rite be performed for the sake of the owner.

אִי מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – עֲבוֹדָה וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ בַּחוּץ, אַף כׇּל עֲבוֹדָה וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ בַּחוּץ; שְׁחִיטָה וּזְרִיקָה – אִין, קַבָּלָה וְהוֹלָכָה – לָא!

The Gemara asks: If the verse is referring only to actions similar to the detail, not all of the essential rites are necessarily included. Perhaps it should be derived that just as the mentioned detail, slaughter, is defined as an essential rite, and one is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven for performing it outside the Temple, so too, any essential rite for which one is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven for performing it outside the Temple is included in the verse. Accordingly, slaughter and sprinkling the blood are included, but collection of the blood and conveying it are not.

אִי נָמֵי, מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – דָּבָר הַטָּעוּן צָפוֹן וְיֶשְׁנוֹ בְּחַטָּאוֹת הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת, אַף כֹּל הַטָּעוּן צָפוֹן וְיֶשְׁנוֹ בְּחַטָּאוֹת הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת; שְׁחִיטָה וְקַבָּלָה – אִין, זְרִיקָה – לָא!

Alternatively, it could be derived that just as the item mentioned in the detail is clearly defined as an action that requires performance in the north of the Temple courtyard and is performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings, so too, any rite that requires performance in the north and is performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings is included in the halakha. Accordingly, slaughter and collection are included; sprinkling the blood is not.

אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר הָכִי וְאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר הָכִי, שְׁקוּלִין הֵן וְיָבֹאוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן. לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרִינָא: וַחֲדָא חֲדָא תֵּיקוּ בְּמִילְּתָא.

The Gemara answers: Both possibilities are equally valid; this derivation can be said and that derivation can be said. Either collection or sprinkling might be included in the halakha. Consequently, they are equal, and therefore both are included. Or according to another version of the Gemara’s answer, they are equal, and therefore each one, i.e., both collection and sprinkling, shall stand in its status.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: זְרִיקָה – מִדְּרַב אָשֵׁי נָפְקָא.

The Gemara provides an alternative answer: If you wish, say instead that sprinkling is derived from the verse that Rav Ashi cited: “And it shall be accepted for him to atone for him.” Therefore, when the verse states: “And he shall offer the ram for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord,” indicating the inclusion of rites similar to slaughter, it is apparently referring not to sprinkling but to collection.

אַשְׁכְּחַן אֵיל נְזִיר, שְׁאָר שְׁלָמִים מְנָלַן?

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that a nazirite’s ram must be sacrificed for the sake of its owner. From where do we derive that this halakha applies with regard to other peace offerings as well?

וְכִי תֵּימָא נֵילַף מֵאֵיל נָזִיר – מָה לְאֵיל נָזִיר, שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ עִמָּהֶן דָּמִים אֲחֵרִים!

And if you would say: Let us derive from a nazirite’s ram that all peace offerings must be sacrificed for the sake of their owners, this derivation can be refuted: What is unique about a nazirite’s ram? It is unique in that there is other blood, i.e., there are other offerings, a sin offering and a burnt offering, that must be brought by a nazirite together with his ram.

אִם כֵּן, נִכְתּוֹב ״שְׁלָמָיו״; מַאי ״שְׁלָמִים״ – לְרַבּוֹת כׇּל שְׁלָמִים.

The Gemara answers: If that is so, if this halakha is unique to a nazirite’s ram, let the verse write: His peace offerings [shelamav]. What is indicated by writing “peace offerings [shelamim]”? It is written to include all types of peace offerings.

אַשְׁכְּחַן שְׁלָמִים, שְׁאָר כׇּל קֳדָשִׁים מְנָלַן?

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that a peace offering must be sacrificed for its own sake and for the sake of its owner. From where do we derive that this halakha applies with regard to all other offerings?

וְכִי תֵּימָא נֵילַף מִשְּׁלָמִים, מָה לִשְׁלָמִים שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנִין סְמִיכָה וּנְסָכִים וּתְנוּפַת חָזֶה וָשׁוֹק!

And if you would say: Let us derive from a peace offering that all offerings must be sacrificed with these intentions, this derivation can be refuted: What is unique about a peace offering? It is unique in that it requires placing hands on the head of the offering, and it is accompanied by libations, and it requires the waving of the breast and the right hind leg by the priest and owner together. No other offering possesses all three of these requirements.

אֶלָּא אָמַר קְרָא: ״זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה לָעֹלָה וְלַמִּנְחָה וְלַחַטָּאת וְלָאָשָׁם וְלַמִּלּוּאִים וּלְזֶבַח הַשְּׁלָמִים״ – הַקִּישָׁן הַכָּתוּב לִשְׁלָמִים; מָה שְׁלָמִים – בֵּין שִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ בֵּין שִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים, בָּעֵינַן לִשְׁמָהּ; אַף כׇּל בֵּין שִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ בֵּין שִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים, בָּעֵינַן לִשְׁמָהּ.

The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37). The verse juxtaposes all types of offerings with peace offerings, indicating that just as we require the sacrifice of a peace offering to be performed for its sake, both concerning deviation from the type of offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner, so too, we require the sacrifice of every type of offering to be performed for its sake, both concerning deviation from the type of offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner.

אֵימָא הֵיכָא דְּשָׁחֵיט לְהוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – לִיפַּסְלוּ!

§ Having established the source for the requirement to sacrifice offerings with the rightful owner and the specific type of offering in mind, the Gemara inquires: Why not say that in a case where one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are disqualified? Why, according to the mishna, do they remain fit?

אָמַר קְרָא: ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר וְעָשִׂיתָ כַּאֲשֶׁר נָדַרְתָּ וְגוֹ׳״ – הַאי נְדָבָה?! נֶדֶר הוּא! [אֶלָּא] אִם כְּמָה שֶׁנָּדַרְתָּ עָשִׂיתָ – יְהֵא נֶדֶר, וְאִם לָאו – יְהֵא נְדָבָה.

The Gemara answers: The verse states: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed [nadarta] freely [nedava] to the Lord your God, that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The Gemara interprets the words nadarta and nedava exegetically: How can the offering mentioned in this verse be a gift offering [nedava]? It is already referred to as a vow offering [neder]. Rather, the verse indicates that if you did what you had vowed to do, i.e., sacrificed your vow offering properly, it shall be a satisfactory vow offering; but if you did not sacrifice it properly, it shall be rendered a voluntary gift offering. Although it does not satisfy the obligation of your vow, it remains a valid offering.

וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ״, וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ ״זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה״; דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״מוֹצָא״ – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא

And it was necessary for the Torah to include the verse: “That which has gone out of your lips,” and it was necessary to include the verse: “This is the law.” As, had the Merciful One written in the Torah only the verse: “That which has gone out of your lips,” I would say