עבודה זרה י״ד

עבודה זרה י״ד

גְּמָ׳ מַאי ״אִיצְטְרוֹבְלִין״? תּוּרְנִיתָא. וּרְמִינְהוּ: הוֹסִיפוּ עֲלֵיהֶן אֲלֶכְסִין וְאִיצְטְרוֹבְלִין, מוֹכְסָסִין וּבְנוֹת שׁוּחַ, וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ אִיצְטְרוֹבְלִין תּוּרְנִיתָא — תּוּרְנִיתָא מִי אִיתָא בִּשְׁבִיעִית?

GEMARA: The Gemara analyzes the terms in the mishna: What is the meaning of itzterubalin? This is the plant known as torenita. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: The Sages added to the list of plants whose use is prohibited during the Sabbatical Year: Alekesin and itzterubalin, mukhsasin, and benot shuaḥ. And if it would enter your mind to say that itzterubalin is torenita, is there torenita that is subject to the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year?

וְהָתְנַן: ״זֶה הַכְּלָל: כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ עִיקָּר — יֵשׁ לוֹ שְׁבִיעִית, וְכֹל שֶׁאֵין לוֹ עִיקָּר — אֵין לוֹ שְׁבִיעִית״! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב סָפְרָא: פֵּירֵי דְּאַרְזָא, וְכֵן כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: פֵּירֵי דְּאַרְזָא.

The Gemara explains: But didn’t we learn in a baraita that this is the principle: Anything that has a root and grows is subject to the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year, and anything that does not have a root is not subject to the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year? If so, torenita, which has no roots, is not subject to the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year, and therefore it cannot be identified as itzterubalin. Rather, Rav Safra says: What is itzterubalin? It is the fruit of the cedar tree. And similarly, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Elazar says: Itzterubalin is the fruit of the cedar tree.

בְּנוֹת שׁוּחַ — אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: תְּאֵינֵי חִיוָּרָאתָא. וּפְטוֹטָרוֹת — אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בִּפְטוֹטְרוֹתֵיהֶן שָׁנוּ.

The mishna includes benot shuaḥ among the items one may not sell to a gentile. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: These are white figs. The mishna states: And petotarot. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is not another type of fruit; rather, the mishna here taught that the sale of the various fruits listed in the mishna is prohibited only when they are sold with their stems, not if they have been pruned.

לְבוֹנָה — אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: לְבוֹנָה זַכָּה. תָּנָא: וּמִכּוּלָּן מוֹכְרִין לָהֶן חֲבִילָה, וְכַמָּה חֲבִילָה? פֵּירֵשׁ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָא: אֵין חֲבִילָה פְּחוּתָה מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה מָנִין.

The mishna taught that selling frankincense to gentiles is prohibited. Rabbi Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The mishna is referring specifically to pure frankincense, which is used as incense for objects of idol worship. A Sage taught: And with regard to all of these items whose sale is prohibited, one may sell to gentiles a large bundle of merchandise, as it is clear that the gentile intends to sell the merchandise rather than sacrifice it to his object of idol worship. And how much does such a bundle weigh? Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira explained: For the purposes of this halakha, no bundle is less than the weight of three hundred dinars.

וְלֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא אָזֵיל וּמְזַבֵּין לְאַחֲרִינֵי וּמַקְטְרִי! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אַ״לִּפְנֵי״ מִפַּקְּדִינַן, אַ״לִּפְנֵי״ דְּ״לִפְנֵי״ לָא מִפַּקְּדִינַן.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But let us be concerned lest the buyer go and sell these items to another gentile, and they sacrifice them. Abaye said in response: This scenario is certainly possible, but we are commanded only not to “place a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14), i.e., one may not be the direct cause of a gentile’s idol worship. We are not commanded not to place a stumbling block before one who may subsequently place it before the blind.

וְתַרְנְגוֹל לָבָן. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹנָה אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר רַב זְבִיד, וְאִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹנָה אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: ״תַּרְנְגוֹל לְמִי״ — מוּתָּר לִמְכּוֹר לוֹ תַּרְנְגוֹל לָבָן, ״תַּרְנְגוֹל לָבָן לְמִי״ — אָסוּר לִמְכּוֹר לוֹ תַּרְנְגוֹל לָבָן.

§ The mishna teaches: And it is prohibited to sell a white rooster to a gentile. Rabbi Yona says that Rabbi Zeira says that Rav Zevid says the following ruling; and there are those who teach merely that Rabbi Yona says that Rabbi Zeira says it. If a gentile says: Who has a rooster, without specifying any particular type, it is permitted to sell him a white rooster. But if he says: Who has a white rooster, it is prohibited to sell him a white rooster.

תְּנַן: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: מוֹכֵר הוּא לוֹ תַּרְנְגוֹל לָבָן בֵּין הַתַּרְנְגוֹלִין. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּקָאָמַר: ״תַּרְנְגוֹל לָבָן לְמִי, תַּרְנְגוֹל לָבָן לְמֵי״ — אֲפִילּוּ בֵּין הַתַּרְנְגוֹלִין נָמֵי לָא!

The Gemara raises an objection to this opinion. We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: He may sell a white rooster to a gentile, provided that it is sold along with other types of roosters. What are the circumstances? If we say that the gentile says: Who has a white rooster, who has a white rooster; in that case one may not provide him a white rooster even if it is sold along with other roosters, as the gentile specified that he wants a white rooster.

אֶלָּא לָאו דְּקָא אָמַר ״תַּרְנְגוֹל לְמִי, תַּרְנְגוֹל לְמִי״, וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, בֵּין הַתַּרְנְגוֹלִין — אִין, בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ — לָא, וּלְתַנָּא קַמָּא אֲפִילּוּ בֵּין הַתַּרְנְגוֹלִין נָמֵי לָא!

Rather, is it not referring to a case where the gentile says: Who has a rooster, who has a rooster; without mentioning a white rooster, and even so, according to Rabbi Yehuda if he sells him a white rooster along with other roosters then yes, it is permitted, but selling only a white rooster by itself is not permitted? And one can infer that according to the first tanna, who prohibits the sale of a white rooster, one may not sell him a white rooster even if it is sold along with other roosters. This does not accord with the statement of Rabbi Yona, who rules that if the gentile says: Who has a rooster, without specifying any particular type, it is permitted to sell him even a white rooster.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר ״זֶה וָזֶה״.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The mishna is not discussing the case of a gentile who asks for a rooster without specifying its color, as everyone agrees that in such a situation it is permitted to sell him a white rooster. Rather, here we are dealing with a case where the Jew had several different roosters, and the gentile says, pointing to different roosters: Sell me this one and that one, and one of the roosters he chose was white.

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: אֵימָתַי? בִּזְמַן שֶׁאָמַר ״תַּרְנְגוֹל זֶה לָבָן״, אֲבָל אִם אָמַר ״זֶה וָזֶה״ — מוּתָּר. וַאֲפִילּוּ אָמַר ״תַּרְנְגוֹל זֶה״, גּוֹי שֶׁעָשָׂה מִשְׁתֶּה לִבְנוֹ אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ חוֹלֶה בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ — מוּתָּר.

The Gemara notes that this explanation is also taught in a baraita. Rabbi Yehuda said: When is selling a white rooster prohibited? It is prohibited when the gentile said: Sell me this white rooster. But if he said: Sell me this one and that one, it is permitted. And even if he said: Sell me this rooster, and he pointed to a white rooster, in the case of a gentile who is preparing a feast for his son or who has a sick person in his house, it is permitted to sell it to him, as it is clear that he wants it for the celebration for his son or for the sick person, not for idol worship.

וְהָתַנְיָא: גּוֹי שֶׁעָשָׂה מִשְׁתֶּה לִבְנוֹ, אֵינוֹ אָסוּר אֶלָּא אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם וְאוֹתוֹ הָאִישׁ בִּלְבַד. אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם וְאוֹתוֹ הָאִישׁ מִיהָא אָסוּר! אָמַר רַב יִצְחָק בַּר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: בְּטַוְוזִיג.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a mishna (8a): In the case of a gentile who made a feast for his son, engaging in business is prohibited only on that day, and with that man alone? This indicates that in any event, conducting business on that day and with that man is prohibited. Rav Yitzḥak bar Rav Mesharshiyya said: The baraita is speaking about a picnic [betavuzig], i.e., a social gathering rather than a wedding feast. A mere social gathering does not include the sacrifice of offerings to idolatry.

תְּנַן: וּשְׁאָר כׇּל הַדְּבָרִים — סְתָמָן מוּתָּר, וּפֵירוּשָׁן אָסוּר. מַאי סְתָמָן וּמַאי פֵּירוּשָׁן? אִילֵּימָא: סְתָמָא דְּקָאָמַר חִיטֵּי חִוָּורָתָא, פֵּירוּשָׁן דְּקָאָמַר לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.

§ We learned in the mishna: And with regard to all remaining items, without specification it is permitted to sell them, but with specification it is prohibited to sell them. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Without specification, and what is meant by: With specification? If we say that without specification is referring to a case when the gentile says that he wants white wheat without stating the reason he wants it, and with specification is referring to a case when he says that he will use the wheat for idol worship, why is it necessary for the mishna to teach this halakha?

לָא סְתָמָן צְרִיכָא לְמֵימַר דִּמְזַבְּנִינַן, וְלָא פֵּירוּשָׁן צְרִיכָא לְמֵימַר דְּלָא מְזַבְּנִינַן, אֶלָּא סְתָמָן — דְּקָאָמַר חִיטֵּי, פֵּירוּשָׁן — דְּקָאָמַר חִוָּורָתָא.

It does not need to be said that when he asks for the item without specification one may sell white wheat to him, and it does not need to be said that when he asks for it with specification one may not sell it to him, as he expressly stated that he will use it for idol worship. Rather, when the mishna says that he asks without specification, this is referring to a case where the gentile says that he wishes to buy wheat, in which case it is permitted to sell to him. If so, the case when he asks with specification is one where he says that he wants white wheat, which is an item used in idol worship, and the mishna teaches that it is prohibited to sell this to him.

מִכְּלָל דְּתַרְנְגוֹל, אֲפִילּוּ סְתָמָן נָמֵי לָא! אָמְרִי: לְעוֹלָם סְתָמָן — דְּקָאָמַר חִיטֵּי חִוָּורָתָא, פֵּירוּשָׁן — דְּקָאָמַר לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.

By inference, this means that in the case of a rooster, referred to earlier in the mishna, even if the gentile requests without specification, i.e., without saying that he wants a white one, it is not permitted to sell it to him. This conclusion contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Zeira. The Gemara rejects this argument: Say in response that actually, without specification is referring to a case where the gentile says that he wants to purchase white wheat, and with specification is referring to a case where he says that he needs it for idol worship.

וּפֵירוּשָׁן אִצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הַאי גַּבְרָא לָאו לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה קָא בָּעֵי, אֶלָּא מֵיבָק הוּא דַּאֲבִיק בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְסָבַר: כִּי הֵיכִי דְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא אֲבִיק בֵּיהּ, כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא נָמֵי אֲבִיקוּ, אֵימָא הָכִי כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִיתְּבוּ לִי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

And as for the objection that this ruling is superfluous, in fact it is necessary for the mishna to state the halakha in a case where he specified that he would use the item for idol worship. The Gemara elaborates: It might enter your mind to say that this man does not really need the wheat for his idol worship. Rather, he is deeply attached to idol worship, and he thought that just as that man, i.e., he himself, is so attached to it, everyone else is also attached to idol worship. Therefore, he reasoned: I will say this, that I intend to use the item for idol worship, so that they will give it to me. Consequently, it is necessary for the mishna to teach us that if he says that he intends to use the item for idol worship it is prohibited to sell it to him, as he might be telling the truth.

בָּעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי: ״תַּרְנְגוֹל לָבָן קָטוּעַ לְמִי״, מַהוּ לִמְכּוֹר לוֹ תַּרְנְגוֹל לָבָן שָׁלֵם? מִי אָמְרִינַן: מִדְּקָאָמַר ״קָטוּעַ״, לָא לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה קָבָעֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא אִיעָרוֹמֵי קָא מַעֲרֵים?

§ Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: If a gentile asks the merchants: Who has a damaged white rooster, what is the halakha with regard to whether it is permitted to sell him an unblemished white rooster? Do we say that from the fact that he says that he wants a damaged rooster, it may be inferred that he does not need it for idol worship, as gentiles do not sacrifice defective animals, and therefore it is permitted? Or perhaps he is only employing artifice. In other words, he knows that a Jew will not sell him an undamaged white rooster upon request, and as it is unlikely that someone has a damaged white rooster to sell him, he hopes that he will receive an undamaged one. If so, it is prohibited to sell him a white rooster.

אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר הַאי אִיעָרוֹמֵי הוּא דְּקָא מַעֲרֵים, ״תַּרְנְגוֹל לָבָן לְמִי, תַּרְנְגוֹל לָבָן לְמִי״, וִיהַבוּ לֵיהּ שָׁחוֹר וּשְׁקַל, וִיהַבוּ לֵיהּ אָדוֹם וּשְׁקַל, מַהוּ לִמְכּוֹר לוֹ לָבָן? מִי אָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דִּיהַבוּ שָׁחוֹר וּשְׁקַל, אָדוֹם וּשְׁקַל, לָאו לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה קָא בָּעֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא אִיעָרוֹמֵי קָא מַעֲרֵים? תֵּיקוּ.

If you say that this gentile is employing artifice, and it is prohibited, in a case where he said: Who has a white rooster, who has a white rooster; and they brought him a black rooster and he took it, or in a case where they bought him a red one and he took it, what is the halakha with regard to whether it is permitted to sell him a white rooster? Do we say: Since they brought him a black rooster and he took it, or they bought him a red one and he took it, evidently he does not need the rooster for idol worship? Or perhaps, here too he is employing artifice? The Gemara comments: These dilemmas shall stand unresolved.

רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אַף דֶּקֶל וְכוּ׳. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב חִסְדָּא לַאֲבִימִי: גְּמִירִי דַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה דְּאַבְרָהָם אָבִינוּ אַרְבַּע מְאָה פִּירְקֵי הָוְיָין, וַאֲנַן חַמְשָׁה תְּנַן, וְלָא יָדְעִינַן מַאי קָאָמְרִינַן.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Meir says: It is prohibited to sell even a good palm tree and ḥatzav to gentiles. Rav Ḥisda said to Avimei: It is learned as a tradition that the tractate Avoda Zara of our forefather Abraham contained four hundred chapters, and we have learned only five chapters in our tractate Avoda Zara, and we do not even know the meaning of what we are saying.

וּמַאי קַשְׁיָא? דְּקָתָנֵי: רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר אַף דֶּקֶל טָב, חָצָב (ונקלס) [וְנִקְלָבֵס] אָסוּר לִמְכּוֹר לַגּוֹיִם. דֶּקֶל טָב הוּא דְּלָא מְזַבְּנִינַן, הָא דֶּקֶל בִּישׁ מְזַבְּנִינַן? וְהָתְנַן: אֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶם בִּמְחוּבָּר לַקַּרְקַע! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי ״דֶּקֶל טָב״? פֵּירוֹת דֶּקֶל טָב. וְכֵן אֲמַר רַב הוּנָא: פֵּירוֹת דֶּקֶל טָב.

Avimei asked him: And what in the mishna here poses a difficulty for you? He replied: I do not understand the mishna which teaches the following: Rabbi Meir says: It is prohibited to sell even a good palm tree, ḥatzav, and naklas to gentiles. It may be inferred from here that it is a good palm tree that one does not sell to gentiles, but one may sell a bad palm tree. But didn’t we learn in another mishna (19b) that one may not sell to gentiles anything that is attached to the ground? Avimei said to him: What is the meaning of: A good palm tree? It means the detached fruit of a good palm tree. And similarly, Rav Huna says: The mishna means the fruit of a good palm tree.

חָצָב — קַשְׁבָּא. (נקלס) [נִקְלָבֵס] — כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר רַבִּי חָמָא בַּר יוֹסֵף: קוּרְיָיטֵי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב דִּימִי: תְּנַן (נקלס) [נִקְלָבֵס] וְלָא יָדְעִינַן מַהוּ, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ קוּרְיָיטֵי וְלָא יָדְעִינַן מַאי אַהֲנֵית לַן! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַהֲנַאי לְכוּ, דְּכִי אָזְלַתְּ הָתָם אָמְרַתְּ לְהוּ (נקלס) [נִקְלָבֵס] וְלָא יָדְעִי, אָמְרַתְּ לְהוּ קוּרְיָיטֵי וְיָדְעִי, וְקָא מַחְווּ לָךְ.

The Gemara explains the meaning of other terms that appear in the mishna. Ḥatzav is a type of date known as kashba. With regard to the meaning of naklas, the Gemara relates: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Ḥama bar Yosef said that it is referring to koreyatei. Abaye said to Rav Dimi: We learned in the mishna naklas, and we did not know what it is, and now you have said that it means koreyatei, and we do not know what that is either. How have you helped us? Rav Dimi said to him: I have in fact helped you, as when you go there, to Eretz Yisrael, and say to them naklas, and they do not know what it means, say to them koreyatei, and they will know what it is, and they will show it to you.

מַתְנִי׳ מָקוֹם שֶׁנָּהֲגוּ לִמְכּוֹר בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה לַגּוֹיִם — מוֹכְרִין, מָקוֹם שֶׁנָּהֲגוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִמְכּוֹר — אֵין מוֹכְרִין. וּבְכׇל מָקוֹם אֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶם בְּהֵמָה גַּסָּה, עֲגָלִים וּסְיָיחִים, שְׁלֵמִין ושְׁבוּרִין. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַתִּיר בַּשְּׁבוּרָה, וּבֶן בְּתִירָא מַתִּיר בַּסּוּס.

MISHNA: In a place where the residents were accustomed to sell small domesticated animals to gentiles, one may sell them. In a place where they were not accustomed to sell them, one may not sell them. But in every place, one may not sell them large livestock, calves, or foals, whether these animals are whole or damaged. The Sages prohibited these sales lest a Jew’s animal perform labor for the gentile on Shabbat in violation of an explicit Torah prohibition, as explained in the Gemara. Rabbi Yehuda permits the sale of a damaged animal because it is incapable of performing labor, and ben Beteira permits the sale of a horse for riding, because riding a horse on Shabbat is not prohibited by Torah law.

גְּמָ׳ לְמֵימְרָא דְּאִיסּוּרָא לֵיכָּא, מִנְהֲגָא הוּא דְּאִיכָּא, הֵיכָא דִּנְהִיג אִיסּוּר — נְהוּג, הֵיכָא דִּנְהִיג הֶיתֵּר — נְהוּג.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one may not sell small domesticated animals to gentiles if it is not the accepted practice. The Gemara infers: That is to say that there is no prohibition involved; rather, there is a custom not to sell small domesticated animals. Therefore, where the practice is to prohibit the sale, that is what is practiced, and where the practice is to permit the sale, that is what is practiced.

וּרְמִינְהִי: אֵין מַעֲמִידִין בְּהֵמָה בְּפוּנְדְּקָאוֹת שֶׁל גּוֹיִם, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁחֲשׁוּדִין עַל הָרְבִיעָה. אָמַר רַב: מָקוֹם שֶׁהִתִּירוּ לִמְכּוֹר — הִתִּירוּ לְיַיחֵד, מָקוֹם שֶׁאָסְרוּ לְיַיחֵד — אָסְרוּ לִמְכּוֹר.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the mishna on 22a: One may not keep an animal in the inns of gentiles, because they are suspected of engaging in bestiality. If so, it should be prohibited in all places to sell animals to gentiles, as one is thereby placing a stumbling block before the blind. Rav says: The halakha of the mishna there, with regard to keeping an animal in a gentile inn, is contingent on the halakha of the mishna here. If it is a place where the Sages permitted one to sell animals to gentiles, it must be that the gentiles of that location are not suspected of engaging in bestiality. Therefore, the Sages permitted one to leave the animal in seclusion with the gentile at the inn. Conversely, in a place where the Sages prohibited one from leaving the animal in seclusion with the gentile at the inn, because the gentiles there are suspected of engaging in bestiality, they also prohibited one from selling animals to gentiles there.