עבודה זרה עב

עבודה זרה עב

וּמַאי ״לֹא נִיתַּן לְהִישָּׁבוֹן״? דְּאֵינוֹ בְּתוֹרַת הִישָּׁבוֹן.

And what does it mean that the stolen object is not subject to restitution? It means that it is not subject to the halakhot of restitution, because it is not technically a theft.

אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: בָּא חֲבֵירוֹ וּנְטָלָהּ מִמֶּנּוּ — נֶהֱרָג עָלֶיהָ. בִּשְׁלָמָא רֵישָׁא, מִשּׁוּם דְּצַעֲרֵיהּ לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, אֶלָּא סֵיפָא, מַאי עָבֵיד?

The Gemara asks: If that is so, say the latter clause of that halakhic statement: If another descendant of Noah came and took the stolen item from him, he is also executed for it. Granted, with regard to the first clause it can be explained that although there is no obligation to return the item, the gentile is executed because he caused the Jew distress; but with regard to the latter clause, what did he do? He did not cause the Jew distress, and since the item is worth less than one peruta, one is not obligated to return it unless he stole it from a gentile. Consequently, the second theft should not be considered a legally significant act.

אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, מְשִׁיכָה בְּגוֹי קוֹנָה, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

Rather, should one not conclude from it that one pulling an item acquires it in a transaction performed by a gentile? Accordingly, the actions of both the first and second gentiles are legally significant acts of theft, for which they are liable to be executed. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is so.

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ: ״אִי מְזַבֵּינְנָא לַהּ לְהָא אַרְעָא — לָךְ מְזַבֵּינְנָא לַהּ״, אֲזַל זַבְּנַהּ לְאִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא, אֲמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: קְנָה קַמָּא.

§ The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain man who said to another: If I sell this land, I will sell it to you, and they performed a formal act of acquisition to ratify the agreement. He went and sold it to another person. Rav Yosef said: The first one has acquired it.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְהָא לָא פְּסַק! וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא דְּכֹל הֵיכָא דְּלָא פְּסַק לָא קְנָה? דִּתְנַן: הַמּוֹכֵר יֵינוֹ לְנׇכְרִי, פָּסַק עַד שֶׁלֹּא מָדַד — דָּמָיו מוּתָּרִין, מָדַד עַד שֶׁלֹּא פָּסַק — דָּמָיו אֲסוּרִין.

Abaye said to him: But he did not fix a price with him for it. And from where do you say that wherever the people involved in the transaction did not fix a price, the buyer has not acquired the item, even if they performed a formal act of acquisition? It is from that which we learned in the mishna: In the case of a Jew who sells his wine to a gentile, if he fixed a price before he measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, deriving benefit from the money paid for the wine is permitted. But if the Jew measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, thereby rendering it forbidden, before he fixed a price, the money paid for the wine is forbidden.

מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ? מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ?! כִּדְקָאָמְרִינַן! דִּלְמָא חוּמְרָא דְּיֵין נֶסֶךְ שָׁאנֵי.

The Gemara asks: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? The Gemara interjects: What is meant by the question: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? The conclusion is as we have stated, that it is evident from the mishna that the acquisition goes into effect only after the price is fixed. The Gemara explains its question: Perhaps due to the stringency of the prohibition of wine used for a libation, the case of the mishna is different and is not characteristic of the halakha in monetary matters.

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין: עוֹבָדָא הֲוָה בֵּי רַב חִסְדָּא, וְרַב חִסְדָּא בֵּי רַב הוּנָא, וּפַשְׁטֻיהָ מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: מָשַׁךְ חֲמָרָיו וּפוֹעֲלָיו וְהִכְנִיסָן לְתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ, בֵּין פָּסַק עַד שֶׁלֹּא מָדַד וּבֵין מָדַד עַד שֶׁלֹּא פָּסַק — לֹא קָנָה, וּשְׁנֵיהֶן יְכוֹלִין לַחֲזוֹר בָּהֶן.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof that an acquisition goes into effect only after the price is fixed, as Rav Idi bar Avin said: There was an incident that came before the school of Rav Ḥisda, and Rav Ḥisda brought it before the school of Rav Huna, and Rav Huna resolved it from that which we learned in a baraita: If one bought from another produce that was loaded on the seller’s donkeys or carried by his laborers, and the purchaser drew the seller’s donkey drivers or laborers laden with produce and brought them into his house, in this case, whether the seller fixed a price before he measured the produce or whether he measured the produce before he fixed a price, the purchaser has not acquired the produce, and both of them, the purchaser or the seller, can retract the transaction, as no act of acquisition took place.

פֵּרְקָן וְהִכְנִיסָן לְתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ, פָּסַק עַד שֶׁלֹּא מָדַד — אֵין שְׁנֵיהֶן יְכוֹלִין לַחֲזוֹר בָּהֶן, מָדַד עַד שֶׁלֹּא פָּסַק — שְׁנֵיהֶן יְכוֹלִין לַחֲזוֹר בָּהֶן.

The baraita continues: But if the purchaser unloaded the produce and brought it into his house, this constitutes an act of acquisition, and therefore if he fixed a price before he measured the produce, neither of them can retract, but if he measured the produce before he fixed a price, both of them can retract. This illustrates that even if there was an act of acquisition, they can retract the transaction until the price has been fixed, in accordance with the statement of Abaye.

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ: ״אִי מְזַבֵּינְנָא לַהּ לְהָא אַרְעָא — מְזַבֵּינְנָא לָךְ בִּמְאָה זוּזֵי״, אֲזַל זַבְּנַהּ לְאִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא בִּמְאָה וְעֶשְׂרִין. אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: קְנָה קַמָּא. מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב יַעֲקֹב מִנְּהַר פְּקוֹד: הַאי זוּזֵי אַנְסוּהּ! וְהִלְכְתָא כְּרַב יַעֲקֹב מִנְּהַר פְּקוֹד.

§ There was a related incident involving a certain man who said to another: If I will desire to sell this land, I will sell it to you for one hundred dinars, and they performed an act of acquisition to ratify the agreement. He went and sold it to another person for one hundred and twenty dinars. Rav Kahana said: The first one has acquired it. Rav Ya’akov of Nehar Pekod objects to this: Those twenty additional dinars compelled him to sell it to the second purchaser. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ya’akov of Nehar Pekod.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ ״כִּדְשָׁיְימִי בִּתְלָתָא״ — אֲפִילּוּ תְּרֵי מִגּוֹ תְּלָתָא. ״כִּדְאָמְרִי בִּתְלָתָא״ — עַד דְּאָמְרִי בִּתְלָתָא. ״כִּדְשָׁיְימִי בְּאַרְבְּעָה״ — עַד דְּאָמְרִי בְּאַרְבָּעָה, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן הֵיכָא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ ״כִּדְאָמְרִי בְּאַרְבָּעָה״.

§ If the seller said to the purchaser: I will sell you this merchandise as it is assessed by three people, even if two out of the three agreed to a certain assessment, the seller must accept this price. If he said: I will sell you this merchandise in accordance with the price that is stated by three people, he is not held to their assessment unless it is stated by all three. If he said: As it is assessed by four people, he is not held to their assessment unless it is stated by all four; and all the more so in a case where he said to him: In accordance with the price that is stated by four people.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״כִּדְשָׁיְימִי בִּתְלָתָא״, וַאֲתוֹ תְּלָתָא וְשָׁמוּהָ, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ אִידַּךְ: לֵיתוֹ תְּלָתָא אַחֲרִינֵי דְּקִים לְהוּ טְפֵי! אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: דִּינָא הוּא דִּמְעַכֵּב. מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: מִמַּאי דְּהָנֵי קִים לְהוּ טְפֵי? דִּלְמָא הָנֵי קִים לְהוּ טְפֵי! וְהִלְכְתָא כְּרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ.

If the seller said to the buyer: I will sell you this merchandise as it is assessed by three people, and three people came and assessed it, and the other one, the purchaser, said: Let three other people, who are more proficient in their assessment, come and assess the merchandise, Rav Pappa said: The halakha is that he can prevent the price from being set until more proficient people assess the merchandise. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, objects to this: From where can he know that those other three are more proficient in their assessment? Perhaps these, the first three, are more proficient. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua.

מַתְנִי׳ נָטַל אֶת הַמַּשְׁפֵּךְ וּמָדַד לְתוֹךְ צְלוֹחִיתוֹ שֶׁל נׇכְרִי, וְחָזַר וּמָדַד לְתוֹךְ צְלוֹחִיתוֹ שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל, אִם יֵשׁ בּוֹ עַכֶּבֶת יַיִן — אָסוּר. הַמְעָרֶה מִכְּלִי אֶל כְּלִי, אֶת שֶׁעֵירָה מִמֶּנּוּ — מוּתָּר, וְאֶת שֶׁעֵירָה לְתוֹכוֹ — אָסוּר.

MISHNA: In a case where a Jew took a funnel and measured wine into a gentile’s jug, and then measured wine with the same funnel into a Jew’s jug, if there is a remnant of wine left in the funnel, the wine measured into the Jew’s jug is forbidden, as some of the wine that was measured into the gentile’s jug is mixed in it. In the case of one who pours wine from one vessel into another vessel, the wine left in the vessel from which he poured is permitted, but the wine in the vessel into which he poured is forbidden.

גְּמָ׳ תְּנַן הָתָם: הַנִּצּוֹק, וְהַקָּטַפְרֵס, וּמַשְׁקֶה טוֹפֵחַ — אֵינוֹ חִיבּוּר, לֹא לְטוּמְאָה וְלֹא לְטׇהֳרָה. הָאַשְׁבּוֹרֶן — חִיבּוּר לְטוּמְאָה וּלְטׇהֳרָה.

GEMARA: We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Teharot 8:9): A stream of water, and water descending an incline [vehakatafres], and liquid that rendered an item moist do not constitute a connection between liquids, neither with regard to ritual impurity nor with regard to purity. These liquids do not constitute a connection that transmits impurity, e.g., if impure water is in one place and becomes attached to water above it, the water above is not considered attached to the impure water and is not rendered impure. They also do not constitute a connection for purification, e.g., if two collections of water are attached via the pouring of a stream, they do not join together to form the amount of water necessary to form a valid ritual bath, through which people and items can become ritually pure. A pond constitutes a connection between liquids with regard to impurity and with regard to purity.

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: נִצּוֹק וְקָטַפְרֵס וּמַשְׁקֶה טוֹפֵחַ חִיבּוּר לְעִנְיַן יֵין נֶסֶךְ.

Rav Huna says: A stream of water, and water descending an incline, and liquid that rendered an item moist constitute a connection with regard to the matter of wine used for a libation.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן לְרַב הוּנָא: מְנָא לָךְ הָא? אִילֵּימָא מִדִּתְנַן: הַנִּצּוֹק וְהַקָּטַפְרֵס וּמַשְׁקֶה טוֹפֵחַ אֵינוֹ חִיבּוּר לֹא לְטוּמְאָה וְלֹא לְטׇהֳרָה, לְטוּמְאָה וּלְטׇהֳרָה הוּא דְּלָא הָוֵי חִיבּוּר, הָא לְעִנְיַן יֵין נֶסֶךְ הָוֵי חִיבּוּר — אֵימָא סֵיפָא: הָאַשְׁבּוֹרֶן חִיבּוּר לְטוּמְאָה וּלְטׇהֳרָה, לְטוּמְאָה וּלְטׇהֳרָה הוּא דְּהָוֵי חִיבּוּר, הָא לְעִנְיַן יֵין נֶסֶךְ לָא הָוֵי חִיבּוּר. אֶלָּא מֵהָא לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna: From where do you derive this? If we say it is derived from that which we learned in the mishna: A stream, and water descending an incline, and liquid that rendered an item moist do not constitute a connection between liquids, neither with regard to ritual impurity nor with regard to purity, and it is inferred that it is with regard to impurity and with regard to purity that it does not constitute a connection, but with regard to wine used for a libation it does constitute a connection, then say the latter clause: A pond constitutes a connection between liquids with regard to impurity and with regard to purity. It can be inferred from here that with regard to impurity and with regard to purity it is a connection, but with regard to wine used for a libation it is not a connection, contrary to the halakha inferred from the former clause. Rather, clearly no inference is to be learned from this mishna.

תְּנַן: נָטַל אֶת הַמַּשְׁפֵּךְ וּמָדַד לְתוֹךְ צְלוֹחִיתוֹ שֶׁל נׇכְרִי, וְחָזַר וּמָדַד לְתוֹךְ צְלוֹחִיתוֹ שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל.

The Gemara attempts to bring proof for Rav Huna’s opinion from that which we learned in the mishna here: In a case where a Jew took a funnel and measured wine into a gentile’s jug, and then measured wine with the same funnel into a Jew’s jug,

אִם יֵשׁ בּוֹ עַכֶּבֶת יַיִן — אָסוּר. הָא עַכֶּבֶת יַיִן בְּמַאי קָא מִתַּסְרָא? לָאו בְּנִצּוֹק? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: נִצּוֹק חִיבּוּר.

if there is a remnant of wine left in the funnel, it is rendered forbidden. In what manner is this remnant of wine rendered forbidden? Is it not by the stream of wine going down from the funnel into the gentile’s vessel, thereby connecting the gentile’s vessel and the funnel and rendering the wine in the funnel forbidden? Conclude from it that a stream constitutes a connection.

תָּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: שֶׁפְּחָסַתּוּ צְלוֹחִיתוֹ, אֲבָל לֹא פְּחָסַתּוּ צְלוֹחִיתוֹ — מַאי? לָא, תִּפְשׁוֹט דְּנִצּוֹק אֵינוֹ חִיבּוּר! לָא, פְּחָסַתּוּ צְלוֹחִיתוֹ — תִּפְשׁוֹט לָךְ דְּאָסוּר, נִצּוֹק — תִּיבְּעֵי.

Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches that the mishna is referring to a situation where the wine in the gentile’s jug rose and reached the funnel. The Gemara infers: But in a case where the wine in the jug did not rise and reach the funnel, what is the halakha? It is not forbidden. Therefore, resolve the dilemma and conclude that a stream is not a connection. The Gemara rejects this inference: No, Rabbi Ḥiyya means to say that in a case where the wine in the jug rose and reached the funnel you can resolve the dilemma and conclude that it is forbidden, but with regard to a stream the dilemma remains unresolved.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמְעָרֶה מִכְּלִי לִכְלִי, אֶת שֶׁמְּעָרֶה מִמֶּנּוּ — מוּתָּר, הָא דְּבֵינֵי בֵּינֵי — אָסוּר. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: נִצּוֹק חִיבּוּר.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the second topic discussed in the mishna: In the case of one who pours wine from one vessel into another vessel, the wine left in the vessel from which he poured is permitted. The Gemara infers: But the stream of wine between the two vessels is forbidden. Conclude from it that a stream constitutes a connection.

אִי נִצּוֹק חִיבּוּר, אֲפִילּוּ דְּגַוֵּיהּ דְּמָנָא נָמֵי לִיתְּסַר! הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, דְּקָא מְקַטֵּיף קַטּוֹפֵי. מִכׇּל מָקוֹם, נִצּוֹק חִיבּוּר!

The Gemara raises an objection to this proof: If a stream constitutes a connection, even the wine inside the vessel being poured from should also be forbidden. The Gemara responds to this objection: This is not difficult. It is the case where the one pouring the wine interrupts the flow, so the reason the wine in the vessel being poured from is permitted is that the stream is interrupted; but in any case, a stream is considered a connection.

וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: אֶת שֶׁעֵירָה לְתוֹכוֹ הוּא דַּאֲסִיר, הָא דְּבֵינֵי בֵּינֵי שְׁרֵי! אֶלָּא, מֵהָא לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara rejects the proof: According to your reasoning, say that there is an inference from the latter clause of the mishna: It is the wine in the vessel into which he poured that is forbidden due to the forbidden remnant of wine in the funnel, but by inference, the stream of wine between the two vessels is permitted, contrary to the conclusion from the previous clause. Rather, no inference is to be learned from this mishna.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמְעָרֶה מֵחָבִית לַבּוֹר, קִילּוּחַ הַיּוֹרֵד מִשְּׂפַת חָבִית לְמַטָּה — אָסוּר! תַּרְגְּמַהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: בְּגוֹי הַמְעָרֶה, דְּאָתֵי מִכֹּחוֹ.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from a baraita: In the case of one who pours wine from a barrel into a wine cistern containing forbidden wine, the stream of wine coming from the rim of the barrel downward is rendered forbidden. Evidently, a stream constitutes a connection. Rav Sheshet interpreted this baraita as referring to a gentile pouring the wine from the barrel into the cistern, and the wine streaming out of the barrel is rendered forbidden because it came from the gentile’s force, i.e., the stream was powered by the gentile’s action. If a gentile moves wine, the wine is forbidden, even if the gentile did not touch it. The stream is not rendered forbidden by virtue of its connection to the wine in the cistern.

אִי גּוֹי הַמְעָרֶה, אֲפִילּוּ גַּוָּא דְּחָבִיתָא נָמֵי מִתְּסַר! כֹּחַ דְּגוֹי מִדְּרַבָּנַן הוּא דַּאֲסִיר, הַהוּא דִּנְפַק לְבָרַאי — גְּזַרוּ בֵּיהּ רַבָּנַן, הַהוּא דִּלְגַוַּאי — לָא גְּזַרוּ בֵּיהּ רַבָּנַן.

The Gemara raises an objection to this interpretation: If the reference is to a gentile who pours the wine, even the wine inside the barrel is rendered forbidden, because the gentile is also powering the movement of the barrel itself. The Gemara responds to this objection: The halakha that a gentile’s force renders wine forbidden is by rabbinic law. With regard to the wine that is poured out of the barrel, the Sages decreed that it is forbidden; but with regard to the wine that remains inside the barrel, the Sages did not decree that it is forbidden.

אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב חִסְדָּא לְהָנְהוּ סָבֹיָתָא: כִּי כָיְילִיתוּ חַמְרָא לְגוֹיִם — (קָטְפִי) [קַטִּיפוּ] קַטּוֹפֵי, אִי נָמֵי (נָפְצִי) [נַפִּיצוּ] נַפּוֹצֵי. אֲמַר לְהוּ רָבָא לְהָנְהוּ שָׁפוֹכָאֵי: כִּי שָׁפְכִיתוּ חַמְרָא — לָא לִיקְרַב גּוֹי לְסַיַּיע בַּהֲדַיְיכוּ, דִּלְמָא מִשְׁתְּלִיתוּ וְשָׁדֵיתוּ לֵיהּ עֲלֵיהּ, וְקָאָתֵי מִכֹּחוֹ וַאֲסִיר.

The Gemara relates accounts of how the Sages ruled concerning this matter: Rav Ḥisda said to certain wine retailers: When you measure wine for gentiles, pour with interruptions, rather than in a smooth steady stream, or toss it out in a single action that does not create a steady stream. Rava said to certain wine pourers: When you pour wine, do not let a gentile approach to help you, lest you let your guard down and rest the vessel in the gentile’s hands, and the wine will emerge due to his force and will be rendered forbidden.

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּאַסֵּיק חַמְרָא בְּגִישְׁתָּא וּבַת גִּישְׁתָּא, אֲתָא גּוֹי אַנַּח יְדֵיהּ אַגִּישְׁתָּא, אַסְרֵיהּ רָבָא לְכוּלֵּיהּ חַמְרָא.

The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain man who siphoned wine from a barrel with a large tube and a small tube. A gentile came and rested his hand upon the large tube. Rava deemed the entire quantity of wine forbidden, including the wine that was still in the barrel.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרָבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב אַדָּא בַּר מַתְנָה לְרָבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רָבִינָא לְרָבָא: בְּמַאי? בְּנִצּוֹק. שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ נִצּוֹק חִיבּוּר? שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּכוּלֵּי חַמְרָא אַגִּישְׁתָּא וּבַת גִּישְׁתָּא גְּרִיר.

Rav Pappa said to Rava, and some say it was Rav Adda bar Mattana who said this to Rava, and some say it was Ravina who said this to Rava: By what mechanism was the wine rendered forbidden? Was it by the stream of wine that went through the large tube, which was rendered forbidden by the contact of the gentile, and the rest of the barrel was rendered forbidden by the connection with that stream? Should one conclude from this ruling that a stream constitutes a connection? Rava rejects this inference: It is different there, as all of the wine in the barrel is drawn toward the large tube and the small tube, and so it is as though the gentile had touched all of the wine in the barrel.

אָמַר מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן: קְנִישְׁקְנִין שְׁרֵי, וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי דִּקְדֵים פְּסַק יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֲבָל קְדֵם פְּסַק גּוֹי — לָא. רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא אִיקְּלַע לְבֵי רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא, שְׁרָא לְהוּ לְמִשְׁתֵּא בִּקְנִישְׁקְנִין.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, says: For a Jew and a gentile to drink simultaneously from a vessel with tubes for several people to drink from [kenishkanin] is permitted. And this statement applies only in a case where the Jew stops drinking first, before the gentile; but if the gentile stops drinking first, it does not apply and the wine is forbidden, as wine from the gentile’s mouth returns to the vessel and renders all of the wine forbidden. Rabba bar Rav Huna happened to come to the house of the Exilarch, and he permitted them to drink from a kenishkanin together with gentiles.