בבא בתרא קעד

בבא בתרא קעד

רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אִם יֵשׁ נְכָסִים לַלֹּוֶה – אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה לֹא יִפָּרַע מֵהֶן.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If the debtor has property, in both this case and in that case, i.e., whether the guarantor is a standard guarantor or an unconditional guarantor, the creditor cannot collect the debt from either type of guarantor.

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁשָּׁנָה רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּמִשְׁנָתֵנוּ – הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ; חוּץ מֵעָרֵב, וְצַיְדָן, וּרְאָיָה אַחֲרוֹנָה.

Rabba bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Wherever Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a halakha in the corpus of our Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, except for the following three cases: The responsibility of the guarantor, and the incident that occurred in the city of Tzaidan (see Gittin 74a), and the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement (see Sanhedrin 31a).

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: ״הַלְוֵהוּ וַאֲנִי עָרֵב״; ״הַלְוֵהוּ וַאֲנִי פּוֹרֵעַ״; ״הַלְוֵהוּ וַאֲנִי חַיָּיב״; ״הַלְוֵהוּ וַאֲנִי נוֹתֵן״ – כּוּלָּן לְשׁוֹן עַרְבוּת הֵן.

§ The Gemara discusses which expressions confer upon a person the status of a standard guarantor, and which confer the status of an unconditional guarantor. Rav Huna says that if one says to a potential creditor: Lend money to him and I am a guarantor, or: Lend money to him and I will repay the debt, or: Lend money to him and I am obligated to repay the debt, or: Lend money to him and I will give the money back to you, all these are expressions that confer the status of a standard guarantee.

״תֵּן לוֹ וַאֲנִי קַבְּלָן״; ״תֵּן לוֹ וַאֲנִי פּוֹרֵעַ״; ״תֵּן לוֹ וַאֲנִי חַיָּיב״; ״תֵּן לוֹ וַאֲנִי נוֹתֵן״ – כּוּלָּן לְשׁוֹן קַבְּלָנוּת הֵן.

If one says: Give money to him and I am an unconditional guarantor, or: Give money to him and I will repay the debt, or: Give money to him and I am obligated to repay the debt, or: Give money to him and I will give the money back to you, all these are expressions that confer the status of an unconditional guarantee. The usage of the word give, as opposed to lend, confers the status of an unconditional guarantor.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: ״הַלְוֵהוּ וַאֲנִי קַבְּלָן״; ״תֵּן לוֹ וַאֲנִי עָרֵב״ – מַאי?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha if one says: Lend money to him and I am an unconditional guarantor? On the one hand, the word lend is used, as opposed to give, but on the other hand, he explicitly states that he will be an unconditional guarantor. What is the halakha if one says: Give money to him and I am a guarantor? On the one hand, the word give is used, as opposed to lend, but on the other hand, he states that he will be a guarantor.

אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: לְשׁוֹן עַרְבוּת – עַרְבוּת, לְשׁוֹן קַבְּלָנוּת – קַבְּלָנוּת.

Rabbi Yitzḥak says in resolving this dilemma: When one employs the language of a standard guarantee, it is a standard guarantee, even if he also used the word give. And when one employs the language of an unconditional guarantee, it is an unconditional guarantee, even if he also used the word lend.

רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר: כּוּלָּן לְשׁוֹן קַבְּלָנוּת הֵן, בַּר מֵ״הַלְוֵהוּ וַאֲנִי עָרֵב״.

Rav Ḥisda says: All of the expressions mentioned in this discussion are expressions of an unconditional guarantee, except for: Lend money to him and I am a guarantor.

רָבָא אָמַר: כּוּלָּן לְשׁוֹן עַרְבוּת הֵן, בַּר מִ״תֵּן לוֹ וַאֲנִי נוֹתֵן״.

Rava says: All of the expressions mentioned in this discussion are expressions of a standard guarantee, except for: Give money to him and I will give the money back to you.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר בַּר אַמֵּימָר לְרַב אָשֵׁי, הָכִי אָמַר אַבָּא: ״תֵּן לוֹ וַאֲנִי נוֹתֵן״ – אֵין לַמַּלְוֶה עַל הַלֹּוֶה כְּלוּם.

Mar bar Ameimar said to Rav Ashi: My father said the following: If one says: Give money to him and I will give the money back to you, this expression binds the guarantor to such an extent that the lender has no claim against the debtor at all; his only option is to collect the debt from the guarantor.

וְלָא הִיא; לָא מִיפְּטַר לֹוֶה מִינֵּיהּ דְּמַלְוֶה, עַד שֶׁיִּשָּׂא וְיִתֵּן בַּיָּד.

The Gemara rejects this last statement: But that is not so. Rather, the debtor is not exempted from dealing with the creditor unless the guarantor takes the money from the creditor and gives it to the debtor with his own hand.

הָהוּא דַּיָּינָא דְּאַחֲתֵיהּ לְמַלְוֶה לְנִכְסֵי [דְלֹוֶה] מִקַּמֵּי דְּלִתְבְּעֵיהּ לְלֹוֶה, סַלְּקֵיהּ רַב חָנִין בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יֵיבָא.

§ The Gemara relates: There was once a certain judge who permitted a creditor to enter the debtor’s property and collect it for his debt before lodging a claim against the debtor himself. Rav Ḥanin, son of Rav Yeiva, overruled that judge and expelled the creditor from the seized property.

אָמַר רָבָא: מַאן חַכִּים לְמֶעְבַּד כִּי הָא מִילְּתָא, אִי לָאו רַב חָנִין בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יֵיבָא! קָסָבַר: נִכְסֵיהּ דְּבַר אִינִישׁ – אִינּוּן מְעָרְבִין יָתֵיהּ; וּתְנַן: הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ עַל יְדֵי עָרֵב – לֹא יִפָּרַע מִן הֶעָרֵב, וְקַיְימָא לַן: לֹא יִתְבַּע עָרֵב תְּחִלָּה.

When Rava heard about this he said: Who is wise enough to perform such a matter, i.e., to issue this ruling, if not Rav Ḥanin, son of Rav Yeiva? He holds that a person’s property is a guarantee for him, i.e., it acts as a guarantor for the loan if the debtor does not repay it; and we learned in the mishna: One who lends money to another with the assurance of a guarantor cannot collect the debt from the guarantor. And we established that the mishna means that he cannot collect the debt from the guarantor at the outset, before seeking payment from the debtor himself. So too, he cannot collect the debt by taking the debtor’s property without first seeking payment from the debtor himself.

הָהוּא עָרְבָא דְּיַתְמֵי, דְּפַרְעֵיהּ לְמַלְוֶה מִקַּמֵּי דְּלוֹדְעִינְהוּ לְיַתְמֵי;

§ The Gemara relates: There was once a certain guarantor for orphans whose father borrowed money and died, and the orphans were minors, and this guarantor repaid the debt to the creditor before informing the orphans that he was repaying the debt for them. The guarantor now sought reimbursement from the orphans.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: פְּרִיעַת בַּעַל חוֹב מִצְוָה, וְיַתְמֵי לָאו בְּנֵי מֶיעְבַּד מִצְוָה נִינְהוּ.

Rav Pappa said: Repaying a creditor is a mitzva, and orphans who are minors are not obligated in performing a mitzva. They therefore do not have to repay any debts owed by their deceased father until they reach the age of majority.

וְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אָמַר: אֵימַר צְרָרֵי אַתְפְּסֵיהּ.

And Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, also said that the orphans do not have to repay the guarantor until reaching majority, but for a different reason: Say that perhaps the deceased gave bundles of money to his creditor before his death, and therefore some or all of the debt has been paid. As long as they are minors, the heirs would not be aware of this payment, but upon reaching majority there is a chance that they may examine their father’s papers and discover that their father had done this. Therefore, payment is deferred until they reach majority.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ?

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinion of Rav Pappa and that of Rav Huna, son of Yehoshua, as both agree that the orphans are exempt from repaying the debt until they reach majority?

אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ כְּשֶׁחַיָּיב מוֹדֶה. אִי נָמֵי, דְּשַׁמְּתוּהוּ וּמִת בְּשַׁמְתֵּיהּ.

The Gemara answers: The difference between them is in a case where the one who owed the money, i.e., the deceased, admits explicitly just before his death that he did not yet repay any of his loan. Alternatively, there is a difference between them in a case where the court excommunicated the deceased for not cooperating with the court in repaying his debt, and he died while still in a state of excommunication, which demonstrates that the debt had not been repaid prior to his death. In both of these cases Rav Pappa would exempt the minor orphans from payment, as minors are not obligated to perform mitzvot, while Rav Huna, son of Yehoshua, would require them to repay the debt immediately, as there is no possibility that their father had repaid the debt.

שְׁלַחוּ מִתָּם: שַׁמְּתוּהוּ וּמִת בְּשַׁמְתֵּיהּ, הִלְכְתָא כְּרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ.

The Sages of Eretz Yisrael sent a ruling from there to Babylonia: In a case where the court had excommunicated a debtor for not cooperating in repaying his debt, and the debtor died while still in a state of excommunication, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, and the orphans must repay the debt immediately.

מֵיתִיבִי: עָרֵב שֶׁהָיָה שְׁטַר חוֹב יוֹצֵא מִתַּחַת יָדוֹ – אֵינוֹ גּוֹבֶה. וְאִם כָּתוּב בּוֹ: ״הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי מִמְּךָ״ – גּוֹבֶה.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita (Tosefta 11:15): A guarantor for a debt who has the promissory note for that debt in his possession, indicating that he has repaid the debt, and now seeks reimbursement from the debtor, cannot collect if the debtor has died and the obligation for the debt has fallen to his minor heirs. But if it is written by the creditor in the promissory note: I received repayment from you, the guarantor, then the guarantor can collect the debt from the minor heirs.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ – מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ כְּשֶׁחַיָּיב מוֹדֶה, אֶלָּא לְרַב פָּפָּא – קַשְׁיָא!

The Gemara explains the objection: Granted, according to the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, you find a case where the minor heirs would be required to repay the debt, such as when the one who owed the money, i.e., the deceased, admits explicitly just before his death that he did not yet repay the loan. But according to the opinion of Rav Pappa, who maintains that minor heirs never have to repay their father’s debts, it is difficult. What is the case discussed in the baraita?

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, לְהָכִי טְרַח וּכְתַב לֵיהּ ״הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי״.

The Gemara answers: It is different there, as it is for this reason that the creditor troubled himself and wrote for the guarantor: I received repayment from you. Once the creditor writes this in the promissory note, it attains the status of a promissory note of the guarantor held directly against the debtor, and even Rav Pappa agrees that a debt that is recorded in a promissory note can be collected from the deceased’s property immediately, even from the minor heirs.

הָהוּא עָרְבָא דְּגוֹי דְּפַרְעֵיהּ לְגוֹי מִקַּמֵּי דְּלִתְבְּעִינְהוּ לְיַתְמֵי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מָרְדֳּכַי לְרַב אָשֵׁי, הָכִי אָמַר אֲבִימִי מֵהַגְרוֹנְיָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חָיְישִׁינַן לִצְרָרֵי – הָנֵי מִילֵּי יִשְׂרָאֵל; אֲבָל גּוֹי, כֵּיוָן דְּבָתַר עָרְבָא אָזֵיל – לָא חָיְישִׁינַן לִצְרָרֵי.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain guarantor who had guaranteed a loan given by a gentile, who repaid the gentile creditor before the gentile creditor claimed repayment from the orphans who survived the debtor. The guarantor now sought reimbursement from the orphans. Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: This is what Avimi of Hagronya said in the name of Rava: Even according to the one who says that we are concerned for the possibility that the deceased may have given bundles of money to the creditor before his death, this statement applies only in the case of a Jewish creditor. But in the case of a gentile creditor, since according to gentile law he is entitled to go directly to a guarantor, we are not concerned for the possibility that the deceased may have given bundles of money. The debtor would not repay the gentile before the loan is due, as the latter has the right to collect directly from the guarantor, and would thereby receive double payment.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַדְּרַבָּה! אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לָא חָיְישִׁינַן לִצְרָרֵי – הָנֵי מִילֵּי יִשְׂרָאֵל; אֲבָל גּוֹיִם, כֵּיוָן דְּדִינַיְיהוּ בָּתַר עָרְבָא אָזְלִי, אִי לָאו דְּאַתְפְּסֵיהּ צְרָרֵי מֵעִיקָּרָא – לָא הֲוָה מְקַבֵּל לֵיהּ.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Mordekhai: On the contrary, even according to the one who says that we are not concerned for the possibility that the deceased may have given bundles of money, this statement applies only in the case of a Jewish creditor. But in the case of a gentile creditor, since according to gentile law they are entitled to go directly to a guarantor, no guarantor would accept upon himself to guarantee such a loan if the debtor had not given bundles of money as collateral to the gentile creditor from the outset.

וְכֵן הָיָה רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: הֶעָרֵב לְאִשָּׁה בִּכְתוּבָּתָהּ [וְכוּ׳]. מֹשֶׁה בַּר עַצְרִי עָרְבָא דִּכְתוּבְּתַהּ דְּכַלָּתֵיהּ הֲוָה. רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ – צוּרְבָּא מִדְּרַבָּנַן הֲוָה, וּדְחִיקָא לֵיהּ מִילְּתָא. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לֵיכָּא דְּנֵיזִיל דְּנַסְּבֵיהּ עֵצָה לְרַב הוּנָא, דִּנְגָרְשַׁהּ לִדְבֵיתְהוּ וְתֵיזִיל וְתִגְבֵּי כְּתוּבָּה מֵאֲבוּהּ, וַהֲדַר נַהְדְּרַהּ?

§ The mishna teaches: And so Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would say: If there is a guarantor for a woman for her marriage contract, and her husband is divorcing her, the husband must take a vow prohibiting himself from deriving any benefit from her so that he can never remarry her. The Gemara relates an incident pertaining to this ruling: Someone named Moshe bar Atzari was a guarantor for the marriage contract of his daughter-in-law, guaranteeing the money promised by his son in the event of death or divorce. His son, named Rav Huna, was a young Torah scholar, and was in financial straits. Abaye said: Is there no one who will go advise Rav Huna that he should divorce his wife, and she will go and collect her marriage contract from Rav Huna’s father, and then Rav Huna should remarry her?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וְהָא ״יַדִּירֶנָּה הֲנָאָה״ תְּנַן! אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אַטּוּ כֹּל דִּמְגָרֵשׁ – בְּבֵי דִינָא מְגָרֵשׁ?

Rava said to Abaye: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that when a husband divorces his wife in such circumstances he must take a vow prohibiting himself from deriving any benefit from her, thereby precluding the possibility of remarriage? Abaye said to him: Is that to say that everyone who divorces his wife divorces her in a court? Rav Huna could be advised to divorce his wife outside the court, in which case he could do so without being forced to take the prescribed vow.

לְסוֹף אִיגַּלַּאי מִילְּתָא דְּכֹהֵן הוּא. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, הַיְינוּ דְאָמְרִי אִינָשֵׁי: בָּתַר עַנְיָא אָזְלָא עַנְיוּתָא.

Ultimately, it was revealed that this Rav Huna was a priest, who may not marry a divorcée, even his own ex-wife. Abaye’s suggestion was therefore not an option for him. Upon hearing this, Abaye said: This is in accordance with the adage that people say: Poverty follows the poor.

וּמִי אָמַר אַבָּיֵי הָכִי? וְהָא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אֵיזֶהוּ ״רָשָׁע עָרוּם״? זֶה הַמַּשִּׂיא עֵצָה לִמְכּוֹר בִּנְכָסִים כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל!

The Gemara asks: But did Abaye really say this? Would he really encourage giving such advice? But doesn’t Abaye himself say: Who is a cunning, wicked person? This is one who provides advice to sell property in accordance with the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. As taught elsewhere (Ketubot 95b), if one says: My property is hereby bequeathed to you, and after you die it will pass to so-and-so, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules that the first recipient can sell the property, which would thereby deprive the second recipient from receiving it. Abaye said that giving advice to someone to pursue such action, though it is legally sound, is considered wicked. Here as well, why would he give advice to Rav Huna to divorce his wife only in order to force his father to pay the marriage contract?

בְּנוֹ שָׁאנֵי, וְצוּרְבָּא מֵרַבָּנַן שָׁאנֵי.

The Gemara answers: When dealing with one’s son it is different. It is not considered wickedness to force a father to give money to his own son. Moreover, when dealing with a Torah scholar it is different. It is not considered wickedness to procure money for a Torah scholar, because the money enables him to pursue his studies.

וְהָא עָרֵב הוּא, [וְקַיְימָא לַן] עָרֵב דִּכְתוּבָּה לֹא מִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד! קַבְּלָן הֲוָה.

The Gemara asks another question with regard to this incident: But wasn’t Moshe bar Atzari a guarantor? And we maintain, as the Gemara will soon note, that a guarantor for a marriage contract does not become obligated to pay. The Gemara answers: He was an unconditional guarantor.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: קַבְּלָן דִּכְתוּבָּה – אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֵית לֵיהּ נִכְסֵי לְבַעַל, מִשְׁתַּעְבַּד – שַׁפִּיר. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: אִי אִית לֵיהּ מִשְׁתַּעְבַּד, אִי לֵית לֵיהּ לָא מִשְׁתַּעְבַּד – מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara objects: This works out well according to the one who says that an unconditional guarantor for a marriage contract becomes obligated to pay it even if the husband has no property of his own at the time of the marriage. According to this opinion all is well. But according to the one who says: If the husband has his own property the unconditional guarantor becomes obligated to pay, but if the husband does not have his own property he does not become obligated, what is there to say? Rav Huna obviously did not have any property of his own. Why, then, was his father held responsible for paying his marriage contract according to this latter opinion?

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מִיהְוֵי הֲוָה לֵיהּ, וְאִישְׁתְּדוּף. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: אַבָּא לְגַבֵּי בְּרֵיהּ – שַׁעְבּוֹדֵי מְשַׁעְבַּד נַפְשֵׁיהּ.

The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that Rav Huna had property when he got married, so that his father’s guarantee took effect, but it became blighted, i.e., it was ruined or lost in the interim. And if you wish, say instead: A father, vis-à-vis his son, sincerely obligates himself to guarantee his marriage contract, even when the son has no property of his own.

דְּאִיתְּמַר: עָרֵב דִּכְתוּבָּה – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל לָא מִשְׁתַּעְבַּד. קַבְּלָן דְּבַעַל חוֹב – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מִשְׁתַּעְבַּד. קַבְּלָן דִּכְתוּבָּה, וְעָרֵב דְּבַעַל חוֹב – פְּלִיגִי; מָר סָבַר: אִי אִית לֵיהּ נִכְסֵי לְלֹוֶה – מִשְׁתַּעְבַּד, אִי לֵית לֵיהּ – לָא מִשְׁתַּעְבַּד; וּמָר סָבַר: בֵּין אִית לֵיהּ וּבֵין לֵית לֵיהּ – מִשְׁתַּעְבַּד.

The Gemara elaborates on the issue under discussion. This is as it was stated: Everyone agrees that a standard guarantor for a marriage contract does not become obligated to pay the marriage contract, and everyone agrees that an unconditional guarantor for a creditor, i.e., for a loan, becomes obligated to repay the loan. With regard to an unconditional guarantor for a marriage contract and a standard guarantor for a creditor, the Sages disagree. One Sage holds that if the debtor or husband has his own property, these guarantors become obligated for the guarantees they have undertaken, but if he does not have his own property the guarantor does not become obligated. And one Sage holds that whether the debtor or husband has property or does not have property, the guarantor becomes obligated to pay it.

וְהִלְכְתָא: עָרֵב – בֵּין אִית לֵיהּ וּבֵין לֵית לֵיהּ, מִשְׁתַּעְבַּד; בַּר מֵעָרֵב דִּכְתוּבָּה – דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּאִית לֵיהּ לְבַעַל, לָא מִשְׁתַּעְבַּד. מַאי טַעְמָא? מִצְוָה הוּא דַּעֲבַד, וְלָאו מִידֵּי חַסְּרֵהּ.

And the halakha is that a guarantor becomes obligated to pay, whether the debtor has his own property or does not have property. This is to the exclusion of a guarantor for a marriage contract, in which case even if the husband has his own property he does not become obligated to pay. What is the reason for this? The intention of the guarantor is to perform the mitzva of facilitating a marriage by encouraging the woman to consent to the marriage as a result of his involvement, but he does not truly intend to obligate himself. And furthermore, in contrast to a guarantor for a loan, where the creditor stands to suffer a loss if he is not repaid, the woman does not suffer any concrete loss, as the husband does not borrow money from the woman. Therefore, the level of commitment of the guarantor in this case is lower. Accordingly, the Sages instituted that the guarantor does not become responsible for payment of the marriage contract from his own property.

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: שְׁכִיב מְרַע שֶׁהִקְדִּישׁ כׇּל נְכָסָיו, וְאָמַר ״מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי בְּיָדִי״ – נֶאֱמָן; חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם עוֹשֶׂה קְנוּנְיָא עַל הֶקְדֵּשׁ.

§ Rav Huna says that a person on his deathbed who consecrated all his property to the Temple treasury, and then says: So-and-so has one hundred dinars in my possession, i.e., I owe one hundred dinars to so-and-so, is deemed credible, and the money is to be repaid to that person. The reason for this is that there is a presumption that a person does not collude against the Temple treasury. He would not lie about owing money to someone, thereby causing a loss to the Temple treasury.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב נַחְמָן: וְכִי אָדָם עוֹשֶׂה קְנוּנְיָא עַל בָּנָיו?! דְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: שְׁכִיב מְרַע שֶׁאָמַר ״מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי בְּיָדִי״; אָמַר ״תְּנוּ״ – נוֹתְנִין. לֹא אָמַר ״תְּנוּ״ – אֵין נוֹתְנִין. אַלְמָא אָדָם עָשׂוּי שֶׁלֹּא לְהַשְׂבִּיעַ אֶת בָּנָיו;

Rav Naḥman objects to this ruling: And does a person collude against his children? Of course not. Yet, as Rav and Shmuel both say that in the case of a person on his deathbed who says: So-and-so has one hundred dinars in my possession, only if he says explicitly: Give him the money, the children give it, but if he did not say explicitly: Give him the money, the children do not give it. The person on his deathbed is not assumed to be telling the truth about owing the money unless he explicitly instructs that the money be given. Apparently, then, it is assumed that a person is prone to make false statements so as not to make his sons appear sated, i.e., wealthy. A person on his deathbed may falsely claim that he is in debt in order to dispel the notion that his children are wealthy heirs.