Hadran: Advancing Talmud Study for Women

This is the daf for Shabbat.

Rav Sheisha brings a fifth explanation of an ambiguous line in the braita brought on Menachot 5b, “If you had raised a difficulty on the logical argument.” As in all the previous explanations, also this one is rejected.

Rav Ashi suggests that one could knock out the logical argument from the beginning as perhaps one could not even bring a kal v’chomer from blemished animals as they have a stringency. This suggestion of Rav Ashi is modified a few times and ultimately his explanation is that if one were to make a kal v’chomer with both blemished animals and ones born not through natural childbirth, one could reject that kal v’chomer as they both have a stringency that is not in a treifa as they have noticeable issues, whereas a treifa is not necessarily noticeable.

The braita concluded that the source for a treifa not being able to be offered on the altar is derived from “from the cattle.” However, two other verses also are used to exclude a treifa. Why are all three verses necessary?

The Mishna rules that any meal offering that the kemitza is done by a non-kohen, onen, impure person, etc. (i.e. not in the proper manner), is disqualified. Ben Beteira disagrees and explains that if it was done with the left hand, one returns the kometz to the pile and redoes it with the right hand. If a kohen took the kemitza but there was something else in there like a pebble or frankincense, it is invalid as the kemitza must be a precise handful, no more and no less.

The Gemara first questions the language of the Mishna – why does it list the mincha offering brought for a sin together separately from the others. The answer is that the Mishna is highlighting that even according to Rabbi Shimon who holds that a sinner’s offering should not be glorious, it still needs to be done properly. Even though in Zevachim, the parallel Mishna relating to sacrifices does not single out the sin offering, the Gemara explains why there was no need there to explain it according to Rabbi Shimon, but there was a need here.

Rav explains that any disqualification can be fixed by redoing it. At first, they question Rav’s ruling in light of the rabbis’ position in the Mishna, but then they explain that Rav holds like ben Beteira and is coming to explain that even though ben Beteira only mentioned the disqualification of the left hand in the Mishna, his ruling applies for all disqualifications. The Gemara raises a difficulty on this from tannaitic sources that show that this was clear even before Rav made his statement. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different explanation – that Rav was pointing out that ben Beteira permits it to be redone even if the kometz was placed in a sanctified vessel, which disagrees with a tannaitic opinion that it can be fixed only if it wasn’t yet placed in a sanctified vessel. According to others, Rav is coming to teach the exact opposite and to show that he agrees with the tannaitic opinion that it can only be fixed if it was not yet placed in the vessel.

There are three different opinions about the status of the mincha offering of the omer that is offered for the sake of a different offering. Rav says it is completely disqualified, Reish Lakish holds it is valid, but the obligation to bring the mincha is not fulfilled and a new one must be brought, and Rava holds that it is valid and the obligation is fulfilled.

Rav added another disqualified case to the list – a guilt offering of the nazir and leper. After a discussion about why he would distinguish between that guilt offering and a guilt offering for theft or misuse of consecrated property, the Gemara brings a braita that clearly contradicts Rav as it says explicitly that a guilt offering of a leper offered for the sake of the wrong sacrifice is brought on the altar.

A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish’s position. If the omer offering that is brought for the sake of the wrong offering does not fulfill its obligation, how can it be offered on the altar as one can only offer on the altar items that can be eaten by Jews and this is an offering from the chadash (new grain) and the chadash is only permitted with the omer offering. Two answers are brought to resolve this difficulty. The first answer is brought by Rav Ada bar Ahava who suggests that since it will be permitted later that day, when the omer offering is brought correctly, it is not considered a forbidden item. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Ada, two are resolved but the last one is not. Rav Papa offers an alternative answer – that the actual omer offering does not permit the chadash, but the illumination of the eastern horizon on that day permits it (16th of Nisan).

This suggestion of Rav Papa is further supported by claiming that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish both agreed that the chadash is permitted from that time and not from the offering of the omer, as is derived from a statement of Reish Lakish.

A braita teaches that one can derive from a verse “from the cattle” that a treifa cannot be brought on the altar. However, the braita suggests that it could have been derived by a kal v’chomer, but since one can raise a difficulty against that kal v’chomer, it is derived from a verse. However, it is unclear what the difficulty could have been and the Gemara brings several possible suggestions. But difficulties are raised against each of them.

What was clear to Raba on one hand and Rava on the other – regarding how to understand Rabbi Shimon’s words and whether a noticeably incorrect intent (machshava nikeret) disqualifies or not – was not clear to Rav Hoshaya, who deliberated on how to interpret Rabbi Shimon’s position. The Gemara explains why he did not accept the opinions of Raba, Rava, or Rav Ashi as a sufficient explanation for his doubt.

The Mishna mentions two exceptions to the rule of a meal offering (mincha) that was perfomed for the wrong purpose (where the offering is valid but the owner has not fulfilled their obligation): the sinner’s meal offering (minchat choteh) and the jealousy offering  of a Sotah (minchat kenaot) are completely disqualified if perfomed for the wrong purpose (shelo lishmah). What is the source for this? The Gemara initially presents a derivation for each of them from the sin offering (chatat), but after rejecting these derivations due to a difficulty regarding the guilt offering (asham), it brings a different exposition based on a gezeirah shava (verbal analogy) to both of these meal offerings.

Rav adds the Omer meal offering to this list, stating that if it was performed for the wrong purpose, it is disqualified because it is intended to permit the consumption of the “new grain” (chadash), and if brought for the wrong purpose, it fails to permit it and is useless. He says the same regarding the nazirite’s guilt offering (asham nazir) and the leper’s guilt offering (asham metzora). If so, why are this meal offering and these sacrifices not mentioned in the Mishnayot in Menachot and Zevachim that list those disqualified if they were brought for the wrong purpose? The Gemara answers this question and settles the difficulty.

The Gemara further challenges Rav: if the asham nazir and asham metzora are meant to “enable” (le’hachshir) a status change and fail to do so when brought for the wrong purpose, then the guilt offering for misappropriation (asham me’ilot) and the guilt offering for theft (asham gezeilot) – which are meant to “atone” (le’chaper) – likewise fail to atone; why then are they valid if brought for the wrong purpose? Rabbi Yirmiya makes a distinction between offerings that “enable” status (machshirim) and those that “atone” (mechaperim). He brings proof from the laws of sacrifices brought after the death of the owner, specifically citing a Mishna regarding a woman after childbirth (yoledet). Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, challenges this distinction (regarding the laws after death) from a Mishna in Nazir, where an enabling sacrifice is indeed brought after death.

There are three ways to resolve the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon in two braitot: in one, he states that a meal-offering (mincha) brought for a different purpose than its original intent is valid and fulfills the owner’s obligation, while in the other, he states that it is valid but does not fulfill the owner’s obligation. Raba, Rava, and Rav Ashi each offer different resolutions to this contradiction.

Raba explains Rabbi Shimon’s words according to their simple meaning – that when it is evident from a person’s actions that their stated thought was not sincere (or was a lie), we can disregard the thought and validate the offering. The Gemara raises nine challenges to Raba’s position from other cases involving bird offerings and animal sacrifices where the actions clearly contradict the stated intent, yet the sacrifice still does not fulfill the owner’s obligation. For most of these challenges, the Gemara answers that the cases are not truly comparable, but in some instances, it concedes that Rabbi Shimon would indeed agree that the sacrifice fulfills the owner’s obligation in those scenarios as well.

Rava and Rav Ashi resolve the difficulty differently. According to both, the principle of “its actions prove its intent” (ma’asav mochiach alav) must be interpreted in a different way. The Gemara raises a challenge against each of their views and subsequently resolves them. According to Rava’s final position, it emerges that Rabbi Shimon would even validate a specific case of a sin-offering offered as a different sin-offering, and it would be accepted as fulfilling the obligation.