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Zevachim 9

Rabbanit Michelle Farber
09.23.2025 | א׳ בתשרי תשפ״וStart Studying Talmud
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Zevachim 9
This is the daf for the first day of Rosh Hashana.
A Pesach offering that is slaughtered outside its designated time with the intent of a different sacrifice is treated as a peace offering—regardless of which specific sacrifice the intent was for. The Gemara seeks the source for this ruling. Back on Zevachim 8, a verse concerning a peace offering was suggested as the basis, appearing to allude to the Pesach offering.
After raising a difficulty with this derivation, the Gemara offers a particular explanation, which is ultimately rejected. A second approach is then proposed, but it faces the same challenge as the first. Three possible resolutions are offered; the first is dismissed, while the third is subjected to four objections—all of which are successfully resolved.
The Gemara then raises a further question: perhaps the verse in question refers not to the Pesach offering, but to a guilt offering. After addressing that possibility, the Gemara probes deeper, suggesting that the verse may not refer to the Pesach offering at all. This concern is also resolved.
A statement of Mavog is introduced regarding a sin offering brought with improper intent. However, it is unclear what specific intent he refers to and what his ruling implies. Several interpretations are presented, each offering a different understanding of Mavog’s position than the one initially assumed.
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Zevachim 10
This is the daf for the second day of Rosh Hashana.
Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish debate whether a Pesach offering or a sin offering becomes disqualified if it is slaughtered with the intent to sprinkle its blood for the sake of a different sacrifice. Their disagreement centers on whether the laws of lishma (proper intent) can be derived from the laws of pigul (disqualifying intent regarding timing), which would imply that a thought during one sacrificial action about a different action could invalidate the offering.
A parallel debate arises regarding idol worship: if one slaughters an animal with the intent to offer its blood to an idol later, does that render the animal prohibited for benefit? The question is raised why both cases need to be stated—why not derive one from the other? This leads to a deeper exploration of the distinctions between them.
Rav Dimi reports that Rav Yirmia brought a proof supporting Rabbi Yochanan’s view, while Rabbi Ila supported Reish Lakish. Rav Yirmia’s proof is based on a kal va’chomer, which undergoes two revisions after difficulties are raised. Rav Papa challenges Rabbi Ila’s proof, but the challenge is ultimately resolved.
In the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer adds the case of a guilt offering that is disqualified if brought not lishma—with intent for a different sacrifice. A braita presents a dialogue in which Rabbi Yehoshua repeatedly rejects Rabbi Eliezer’s proposed reasons. After three attempts, Rabbi Eliezer finally offers an explanation that holds. The Gemara then revisits various lines in the braita for further analysis.
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Zevachim 8
If any of the four sacrificial rites of a sin offering – slaughtering, collecting the blood, carrying it, or sprinkling it – are performed with the intent of a different sacrifice or for a different owner, the offering is disqualified. The Gemara investigates the source of this law. Initially, it cites verses that establish the requirement to slaughter, collect, and sprinkle the blood with the correct intent, both for the appropriate sacrifice and for the proper owner, and that failure to do so invalidates the offering. However, these sources do not explicitly prove that intent for a different sacrifice disqualifies the offering, nor that slaughtering and collecting must be done for the correct owner.
The Gemara first attempts to derive this from verses concerning the sin offerings of a nazirite and a leper, but both are rejected due to unique stringencies in each case. It then explores combinations – nazirite and leper, nazirite and standard sin offering, or leper and standard sin offering – but each pairing is also dismissed, as each has its own distinctive stringency.
Ultimately, Rava derives the requirement to perform all rites with the correct intent, from both the perspective of the sacrifice and the owner, from a verse that juxtaposes the peace offering with the sin offering, as the source for the basic law of proper intent is found in the laws of the peace offering, as explained in Zevachim 4. The verses previously cited in the sugya are then reinterpreted to teach that without proper designation, the offering is invalid—based on the principle that in kodashim (sacrificial laws), repetition in the Torah indicates necessity (l’akev).
The proof from the verses above pertains to a standard sin offering. The Gemara then asks: how do we know the same applies to a sin offering brought for idol worship or to a sliding-scale offering (korban oleh veyored)? These cases are derived through comparative analysis with other offerings mentioned previously.
The discussion shifts to the case of a Pesach offering. If one designates an animal for the Passover sacrifice but slaughters it on a day that is not Pesach, the offering is not disqualified and is instead brought as a peace offering. The father of Shmuel cites a verse from Vayikra 3:6, which discusses peace offerings, as the source. However, a difficulty arises: the verse may only support the case where the animal was offered as a peace offering. If it were offered with the intent for a different sacrifice, it might be disqualified.
To address this, the Gemara explains that the term zevach in the verse encompasses other types of offerings. Yet this resolution is unsatisfactory, as it could still be argued that if the Pesach was offered with intent for any other sacrifice, it should be brought as that sacrifice, not necessarily as a peace offering. To resolve this, the Gemara presents two alternative derivations from the verse and proceeds to analyze their validity.
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Zevachim 9
This is the daf for the first day of Rosh Hashana.
A Pesach offering that is slaughtered outside its designated time with the intent of a different sacrifice is treated as a peace offering—regardless of which specific sacrifice the intent was for. The Gemara seeks the source for this ruling. Back on Zevachim 8, a verse concerning a peace offering was suggested as the basis, appearing to allude to the Pesach offering.
After raising a difficulty with this derivation, the Gemara offers a particular explanation, which is ultimately rejected. A second approach is then proposed, but it faces the same challenge as the first. Three possible resolutions are offered; the first is dismissed, while the third is subjected to four objections—all of which are successfully resolved.
The Gemara then raises a further question: perhaps the verse in question refers not to the Pesach offering, but to a guilt offering. After addressing that possibility, the Gemara probes deeper, suggesting that the verse may not refer to the Pesach offering at all. This concern is also resolved.
A statement of Mavog is introduced regarding a sin offering brought with improper intent. However, it is unclear what specific intent he refers to and what his ruling implies. Several interpretations are presented, each offering a different understanding of Mavog’s position than the one initially assumed.
Zevachim 10
This is the daf for the second day of Rosh Hashana.
Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish debate whether a Pesach offering or a sin offering becomes disqualified if it is slaughtered with the intent to sprinkle its blood for the sake of a different sacrifice. Their disagreement centers on whether the laws of lishma (proper intent) can be derived from the laws of pigul (disqualifying intent regarding timing), which would imply that a thought during one sacrificial action about a different action could invalidate the offering.
A parallel debate arises regarding idol worship: if one slaughters an animal with the intent to offer its blood to an idol later, does that render the animal prohibited for benefit? The question is raised why both cases need to be stated—why not derive one from the other? This leads to a deeper exploration of the distinctions between them.
Rav Dimi reports that Rav Yirmia brought a proof supporting Rabbi Yochanan’s view, while Rabbi Ila supported Reish Lakish. Rav Yirmia’s proof is based on a kal va’chomer, which undergoes two revisions after difficulties are raised. Rav Papa challenges Rabbi Ila’s proof, but the challenge is ultimately resolved.
In the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer adds the case of a guilt offering that is disqualified if brought not lishma—with intent for a different sacrifice. A braita presents a dialogue in which Rabbi Yehoshua repeatedly rejects Rabbi Eliezer’s proposed reasons. After three attempts, Rabbi Eliezer finally offers an explanation that holds. The Gemara then revisits various lines in the braita for further analysis.
Zevachim 8
If any of the four sacrificial rites of a sin offering – slaughtering, collecting the blood, carrying it, or sprinkling it – are performed with the intent of a different sacrifice or for a different owner, the offering is disqualified. The Gemara investigates the source of this law. Initially, it cites verses that establish the requirement to slaughter, collect, and sprinkle the blood with the correct intent, both for the appropriate sacrifice and for the proper owner, and that failure to do so invalidates the offering. However, these sources do not explicitly prove that intent for a different sacrifice disqualifies the offering, nor that slaughtering and collecting must be done for the correct owner.
The Gemara first attempts to derive this from verses concerning the sin offerings of a nazirite and a leper, but both are rejected due to unique stringencies in each case. It then explores combinations – nazirite and leper, nazirite and standard sin offering, or leper and standard sin offering – but each pairing is also dismissed, as each has its own distinctive stringency.
Ultimately, Rava derives the requirement to perform all rites with the correct intent, from both the perspective of the sacrifice and the owner, from a verse that juxtaposes the peace offering with the sin offering, as the source for the basic law of proper intent is found in the laws of the peace offering, as explained in Zevachim 4. The verses previously cited in the sugya are then reinterpreted to teach that without proper designation, the offering is invalid—based on the principle that in kodashim (sacrificial laws), repetition in the Torah indicates necessity (l’akev).
The proof from the verses above pertains to a standard sin offering. The Gemara then asks: how do we know the same applies to a sin offering brought for idol worship or to a sliding-scale offering (korban oleh veyored)? These cases are derived through comparative analysis with other offerings mentioned previously.
The discussion shifts to the case of a Pesach offering. If one designates an animal for the Passover sacrifice but slaughters it on a day that is not Pesach, the offering is not disqualified and is instead brought as a peace offering. The father of Shmuel cites a verse from Vayikra 3:6, which discusses peace offerings, as the source. However, a difficulty arises: the verse may only support the case where the animal was offered as a peace offering. If it were offered with the intent for a different sacrifice, it might be disqualified.
To address this, the Gemara explains that the term zevach in the verse encompasses other types of offerings. Yet this resolution is unsatisfactory, as it could still be argued that if the Pesach was offered with intent for any other sacrifice, it should be brought as that sacrifice, not necessarily as a peace offering. To resolve this, the Gemara presents two alternative derivations from the verse and proceeds to analyze their validity.
Zevachim 7
In trying to answer whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments neglected after the animal was designated (between designation and slaughter) or only for those neglected before designation, the Gemara cites Rabbi Shimon. He explains that the reason two goats are offered on Shavuot is that the second goat atones for impurities in the Temple that occurred after the first goat was offered. If both goats were designated at the same time, this would support the view that an offering can atone for sins committed after designation. A difficulty is raised with that proof because it assumes simultaneous designation; perhaps the second goat needs to be designated only after the first was offered. That possibility is hard to accept because the verse does not indicate a later designation. Rav Papa also rejects the proof, suggesting instead that the court could stipulate from the outset that the second goat will only become sanctified after the blood of the first goat is offered. Two objections are raised to Rav Papa’s reply. First, Rabbi Shimon does not accept the court’s stipulations—he therefore would not recognize a court’s postponement of consecration, as shown by his ruling that animals reserved for one year cannot serve as the Tamid in the following year. Second, Rabbi Yirmeya’s question about whether the second goat can cover impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the first goat’s blood and the second’s implies it was understood that the goat covers from the time of designation. That second difficulty is, however, resolved, and the original question remains unanswered.
There is a dispute between Raba and Rav Chisda about a toda (thanksgiving offering) brought on behalf of another who needs to bring a toda. Each presents his reasoning; Raba cites a baraita in support, but his proof is rejected.
Rava gives six rulings about issues of incorrect intention during the sacrificial rites and adds a seventh about the nature of the olah (burnt offering). He teaches that the olah does not itself provide atonement; rather, it is a gift to God offered after a person has repented for not fulfilling a positive commandment. If the person has not yet repented, the offering provides no atonement, for the sacrifices of the wicked are despicable.
The Mishna states that both a sin offering and a Pesach sacrifice brought for the sake of the wrong sacrifice or for the wrong person are disqualified. The Gemara first adduces the source for this rule for Pesach and then for the sin offering.
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Zevachim 6
Continuing the discussion surrounding Reish Lakish’s response to Rabbi Elazar, the Gemara examines whether heirs acquire the sacrificial offering of someone who dies. Various sources are presented supporting both sides of the debate. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the heirs do not acquire the offering, though they may receive a limited degree of atonement through it.
Another question arises regarding a sacrifice brought lo lishma, with intent for a different type of offering. If the original sacrifice is still offered, does it fulfill its intended purpose? If not, why is it brought at all? And if it does, why is a second offering required? Rav Ashi clarifies that the first offering is brought due to the power of its original designation, while the second is needed to achieve full atonement.
The Gemara also explores whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments that were neglected between the time the animal was designated and the time it was slaughtered, or only for those neglected before its designation. Sources are cited in an attempt to resolve this question.
Zevachim 5
Reish Lakish grappled with the legal concept of a sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of fulfilling a different offering (lo lishma). If such a sacrifice is valid and not disqualified, why does it fail to fulfill the owner’s obligation? And conversely, if it does not fulfill the obligation, why is it offered at all?
Rabbi Elazar responded by citing a precedent: a sacrifice that does not provide atonement but is nevertheless brought. For example, when a woman gives birth, she becomes obligated to bring a pair of birds—one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering. If she dies before fulfilling this obligation, her children still bring the burnt offering. In this case, the sacrifice is offered despite not providing atonement for the heirs.
Reish Lakish accepted that there is precedent for bringing a burnt offering, and similarly for offerings like the peace offering, which may be brought without atonement. However, he continued to question the case of the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar replied that Reish Lakish’s view aligns with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna, who holds that a guilt offering is disqualified if slaughtered not for its intended purpose. Yet Reish Lakish resisted being confined to Rabbi Eliezer’s position, expressing a desire to understand the mainstream view as well.
Reish Lakish then proposed that the principle might be derived from Devarim 23:24, which discusses a neder (vow) that becomes a nedava (voluntary offering). This verse had previously been interpreted as referring to a sacrifice brought lo lishma.
Some questioned this verse being used by Reish Lakish, as the verse only applies to voluntary offerings, such as those brought through a vow, and not to obligatory ones like the guilt offering. In response, Abaye suggested that Reish Lakish intended to derive the principle from both that verse and another: “And he slaughtered it as a sin offering” (Vayikra 4:33). From the word “it,” we learn that only a sin offering is disqualified when not brought lishma. The verse in Devarim then explains that although other sacrifices may be brought, they do not fulfill the owner’s obligation.
Although the verse in Devarim refers specifically to burnt and peace offerings, Abaye argued that the principle could be extended to guilt offerings through a kal v’chomer argument. However, this reasoning was rejected, as one can distinguish between voluntary and obligatory offerings. Rava then suggested a different derivation from Vayikra 7:37, which juxtaposes various types of sacrifices in a single verse. This allows the laws of lishma to be extended from the peace offering to other offerings as well. This interpretation compares the other offerings to the peace offering, which is valid even when not brought lishma, rather than to the sin offering, which is disqualified, as per the earlier drasha that limited the disqualification to the sin offering alone (“And he slaughtered it as a sin offering”).
Later, other rabbis revisited the discussion between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Elazar, raising two questions. First, why didn’t Rabbi Elazar respond that a guilt offering can also be brought after death? Rav Sheshet addressed this question. Second, why didn’t Reish Lakish counter that the heirs who bring their mother’s burnt offering do, in fact, receive atonement—thus undermining the precedent cited by Rabbi Elazar?
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