Hadran: Advancing Talmud Study for Women

What are the defects and traumas that render an animal a treifa? The Mishna lists various categories, such as a perforated gullet, a severed windpipe, a perforated brain membrane, a perforated heart chamber, a broken spine and a severed spinal cord, a completely removed liver, as well as various perforations or tears to the lungs, stomach, gallbladder, small intestines, and rumen. The list also includes severe external trauma, such as falling from a roof, having a majority of the ribs broken, or being clawed by specific predators. The Mishna establishes the overarching rule: any animal afflicted with a defect or injury such that a similar animal cannot survive is deemed a treifa.

Resh Lakish derives the principle that a treifa cannot survive from the verse, “These are the living things which you may eat,” teaching that only an animal capable of living is permitted for consumption, whereas one that cannot live is forbidden. Conversely, the opposing view holds that a treifa can survive, deriving from the same verse that a specific type of animal that is capable of living is permitted for consumption, while another animal that is capable of living (the treifa) is forbidden. However, after the Gemara rejects this proof from the verse, it brings another verse to support the opinion that a treifa can survive: “Between the living thing that may be eaten and the living thing that may not be eaten.”

The Mishna’s list does not include all cases, as there are additional cases of treifot—four that are referenced by the acronym BSGR, and another seven Amoraic traditions known as the “shev (seven) shematata.” Although these cases are not explicitly mentioned in the Mishna, they can be derived from the rule stated at its end, according to which any animal that is incapable of living is considered a treifa. However, how can the tannaitic tradition of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, which limits the list of treifot to exactly eighteen, be reconciled? After a failed attempt, the Gemara settles the count according to Rabbi Yishmael by grouping all types of perforations into one broad category and all types of severed parts into another single category, thereby reconciling the calculated total with all the treifot appearing in the various lists.

Three difficulties are raised from tannaitic sources against the opinion of Rav Nachman, Rav Avram, and Rav Yitzchak that a person cannot forbid property that is not theirs (ein adam oser davar she’eino shelo), and they are resolved. The first difficulty is from the braita regarding a sin offering slaughtered outside the Temple for idol worship, which the Gemara resolves by explaining that since the sacrifice achieves atonement for the owner, it is legally considered his own property. The second difficulty is from the Mishna regarding two people holding a knife where one slaughters for an idol, and the third is from a braita regarding one who renders another’s property impure, mixes it with tithed produce, or pours it as an idolatrous libation. The Gemara resolves these by explaining that the individual has a financial partnership in the item.

The Gemara suggests that the debate between Rav Huna and Rav Nachman is a tannaitic dispute, quoting a dispute regarding whether a gentile can forbid a Jew’s wine by offering it up as a libation to idols. Rav Nachman, however, rejects the comparison, as a Jew who does the same thing would be doing it just to annoy his friend, and does not really intend to worship the idol. Some difficulties are raised against this theory from tannaitic sources, but are resolved by explaining them as referring to cases where the Jew is an apostate.

The Mishna rules that one may not slaughter an animal directly into seas, rivers, or vessels because it looks to others like they are offering it to an idol (mar’it ayin). However, it is permitted to slaughter into a circular pool of water, which Rava clarifies must be murky. Furthermore, one may not slaughter directly into a pit (gumma) anywhere, but the Mishna then permits doing so in one’s house. Abaye and Rava each resolve this seemingly contradictory statement in different manners, and Rava rejects Abaye’s explanation. Rava explains that a person may slaughter next to a pit in their private courtyard so that the blood flows into it to keep the yard clean. In the marketplace, even this is strictly forbidden to prevent copying heretical practices (minim), and anyone who does so must be investigated for heresy. A braita is brought to support Rava’s explanation.

The Mishna establishes that slaughtering a non-sacrifice (chullin) for the sake of a sacrifice that can be voluntarily vowed or donated – such as an olah, asham talui, or todah – renders the shechita invalid, whereas Rabbi Shimon permits it. The rabbis are concerned that people will see this and think that one can slaughter sacrifices outside the Temple. Conversely, slaughtering for sacrifices that cannot be voluntarily vowed, like a sin offering, is valid, as people will assume the slaughterer is just saying it is for the sake of that offering but does not really intend to offer a sacrifice outside the Temple.

What is the status of an animal slaughtered to items connected to the ground, like mountains, seas, rivers or deserts? The Mishna rules that the shechita is invalid, but the assumption from the Mishna is that it is not prohibited for benefit. The Gemara challenges this from a braita which states that such slaughter renders the animal an idolatrous sacrifice (zivchei meitim), which is forbidden for benefit. Abaye resolves this by distinguishing between slaughtering to the item itself – which only disqualifies the shechita – and slaughtering to the angel or deity of the landmark (gadda), which renders it forbidden from any benefit.

Can a person render someone else’s property forbidden by performing an act of idolatry with it? Rav Huna rules that if a friend’s animal is lying before an idol and someone slaughters one siman for the idol, the animal becomes forbidden. He relies on the principle of Ulla that while merely bowing to another’s animal does not forbid it, performing a physical action (ma’aseh) directly on the animal does forbid it.

A difficulty is raised against Rav Huna from a braita regarding one who slaughters a sin offering on Shabbat outside the Temple courtyard for an idol, who is held liable for three distinct sin offerings. If the animal becomes forbidden at the first siman, as per Rav Huna’s position, the completion of the slaughter should not trigger the liability for slaughtering outside the Temple, as it would merely be slaughtering a disqualified animal that would no longer be considered a sacrifice. The Gemara offers two resolutions – applying the case to a bird sin offering where the slaughterer specifies that his intent for idol worship will only take effect upon the completion of the slaughter, or in the shechita of a bird sin offering where half the windpipe was already slit, and in this case the shechita was completed in one small action.

Rav Nachman, Rav Avram, and Rav Yitzchak disagree with Rav Huna and reaffirm the established principle that a person cannot forbid something that is not theirs (ein adam oser davar she’eino shelo) even by performing an action on the item. A difficulty is raised against this position from the braita quoted above with the interpretation given above.