Hadran: Advancing Talmud Study for Women

What is the status of an animal slaughtered to items connected to the ground, like mountains, seas, rivers or deserts? The Mishna rules that the shechita is invalid, but the assumption from the Mishna is that it is not prohibited for benefit. The Gemara challenges this from a braita which states that such slaughter renders the animal an idolatrous sacrifice (zivchei meitim), which is forbidden for benefit. Abaye resolves this by distinguishing between slaughtering to the item itself – which only disqualifies the shechita – and slaughtering to the angel or deity of the landmark (gadda), which renders it forbidden from any benefit.

Can a person render someone else’s property forbidden by performing an act of idolatry with it? Rav Huna rules that if a friend’s animal is lying before an idol and someone slaughters one siman for the idol, the animal becomes forbidden. He relies on the principle of Ulla that while merely bowing to another’s animal does not forbid it, performing a physical action (ma’aseh) directly on the animal does forbid it.

A difficulty is raised against Rav Huna from a braita regarding one who slaughters a sin offering on Shabbat outside the Temple courtyard for an idol, who is held liable for three distinct sin offerings. If the animal becomes forbidden at the first siman, as per Rav Huna’s position, the completion of the slaughter should not trigger the liability for slaughtering outside the Temple, as it would merely be slaughtering a disqualified animal that would no longer be considered a sacrifice. The Gemara offers two resolutions – applying the case to a bird sin offering where the slaughterer specifies that his intent for idol worship will only take effect upon the completion of the slaughter, or in the shechita of a bird sin offering where half the windpipe was already slit, and in this case the shechita was completed in one small action.

Rav Nachman, Rav Avram, and Rav Yitzchak disagree with Rav Huna and reaffirm the established principle that a person cannot forbid something that is not theirs (ein adam oser davar she’eino shelo) even by performing an action on the item. A difficulty is raised against this position from the braita quoted above with the interpretation given above.

What is the default assumption regarding a gentile’s intent when an animal is slaughtered? The rabbis hold that we do not automatically assume a gentile intends it for idol worship unless he explicitly says so, while Rabbi Eliezer holds a gentile’s default intent is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosi argues that even if he does intend it for idol worship, we do not say that one person’s intent affects another person’s act of slaughter. The Gemara presents two ways to explain this dispute and whether the principle of one person intending and another performing the action applies outside the Temple just as it does inside.

What is the status of an animal if the slaughter was performed with the intent to perform a later part of the service, like throwing the blood or burning the fat, for idol worship? Rabbi Yochanan rules that the animal is disqualified because we can transfer intent from one action to another, and we learn the laws outside the Temple from the laws inside. Reish Lakish rules that it is permitted because we do not transfer intent from one action to another outside the Temple. The Gemara notes they hold the same argument regarding internal Temple sacrifices and l’shma intent, and then explains why it was necessary to state that they argue in both cases. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish from Rabbi Yosi’s position in the Mishna, but is resolved. A braita is then brought to support Rabbi Yochanan’s position.

What is the law if someone performs shechita and only thinks about sprinkling the blood for idol worship after the slaughter is finished? The Gemara cites a case in Caesarea where the Sages did not rule whether it was forbidden or permitted. The issue is whether or not a later action or statement retroactively proves the initial intent. After attempting to connect their ruling with the rabbis’ and Rabbi Eliezer’s positions, that suggestion is rejected and they say it connects with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s ruling. However, the Gemara tries to figure out which ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel it connects to.

Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the halakha follows Rabbi Yosi, meaning the gentile’s intent does not disqualify the Jew’s shechita. The Gemara brings a story where gentiles gave animals to a Jewish butcher and stated the blood and fat were for them, and it was permitted.

Rav Ashi qualifies that if a gentile gives money to a Jewish butcher under Rabbi Eliezer’s view, it is only forbidden if the gentile is powerful enough that the butcher cannot refuse his intent.

What types of signs of life does one need to observe when performing shechita on an animal that is on the verge of death? Rav, Shmuel, and Rava each bring different actions that serve as indicators that would then permit this animal to be eaten, as it is clear the animal was still alive enough at the time of the shechita.

At what point of the slaughtering process does one need to see these signs of life? Rav Chisda, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, and Rava each suggest different points – the middle, the beginning, or the end. Rav Chisda and Rav Nachman provide support for their positions from our Mishna, while Rava brings support from his understanding of a different tannaitic source.

Can one perform shechita on an animal for an idol worshipper? Does one need to be concerned that it will be used for idol worship and therefore the Jew would be benefiting from idol worship? Is it the intent of the owner or the one performing the shechita that determines the designation of the animal?