Hadran: Advancing Talmud Study for Women

After suggesting that one can learn from Rabbi Meir’s opinion about melika of a bird that is a treifa, that one can learn a binyan av from a kal va’chomer, the Gemara rejects this explanation because it is derived from chulin, not kodashim.

Can one derive a law through a binyan av and then use another method of hermeneutics to derive something else? The Gemara only suggests an answer for a binyan av on a binyan av, but that answer is rejected since the method of derivation in the braita does not make sense. It must be derived from a verse in the Torah, Vayikra 2:6, and the braita is just being used as an asmachta.

The remainder of the blood of the inner offerings is poured on the base of the altar on the western side. This is derived from Vayikra 4:7, where it states, “opposite the entrance to Ohel Moed,” which refers to the exit of the sanctuary located on the western side of the altar.

In Vayikra chapter 4, the phrase “pour on the base of the altar” is mentioned in connection with three different sacrifices. Each one teaches a different law relating either to the base of the altar or to the pouring of the remainder. The Gemara explains why these verses were available to be extrapolated and why they were not necessary for their straightforward meaning.

The Gemara explores various hermeneutical methods used to derive halakhic laws – juxtaposition (hekesh), gezeira shava (verbal analogy), kal va’chomer (a fortiori reasoning), and binyan av (paradigm from precedent). It raises the question: can a law derived through one method serve as the basis for further derivation, either by the same method or a different one? They systematically examine each possible permutation, presenting logical arguments and textual proofs to evaluate the validity and limitations of such compound derivations. Importantly, this entire discussion is confined to laws pertaining to sacrificial items (kodashim) alone.

From where do we derive that the law regarding slaughtering of the burnt offering must be in the North, and that if not, it is disqualified? Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North, and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering, a logical argument is made that the same requirement must apply to the burnt offering itself: how can a secondary prohibition be more strict than the primary prohibition? Three halakhot are brought to challenge this logic, but all difficulties are resolved. The Gemara then presents a second derivation for the requirement of the North for a burnt offering, based on the repetition of this requirement in Vayikra 4:29, following its initial mention in verse 24.

The guilt offering must also be slaughtered and its blood collected in the North, and if not, it is disqualified. This is derived from two verses: Vayikra 7:2 and 14:13. A difficulty is raised regarding the use of the second verse, which relates to the sacrifices brought by the leper during the purification process, as that verse is needed for a different drasha. However, this challenge is resolved.

The verse concerning the leper’s sacrifices juxtaposes the guilt offering with both the burnt offering and the sin offering. If the law of the North for a guilt offering is derived from the burnt offering, why is the sin offering mentioned in that verse as well? Ravina explains that its inclusion teaches the principle that a law derived through juxtaposition cannot be used to teach that same law in another case through juxtaposition. Rava derives this principle from a different source: the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, Vayikra 4:9–10.

Can a law derived by juxtaposition be used to teach something through a gezeira shava? Initially, a proof is brought from the law regarding leprous clothing, which is derived from the law concerning a person with leprosy—originally derived through a gezeira shava. Rabbi Yochanan rejects this proof, arguing that the rules for deriving laws related to sacrificial items differ from those governing other laws. This distinction is demonstrated by the requirement of the North in the case of a guilt offering, which could have been derived from a gezeira shava from the sin offering, but was not – precisely for this reason.