בבא בתרא סה

בבא בתרא סה

הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים. וְרַב יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא לְרַב הוּנָא: ״וְהָא זִמְנִין סַגִּיאִין אַמְרִיתַהּ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב: הִלְכְתָא כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, וְלָא אֲמַר לִי וְלָא מִידֵּי!״ אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״הֵיכִי תְּנִיתַהּ?״ אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״אִיפְּכָא תָּנֵינָא״. ״מִשּׁוּם הָכִי לָא אֲמַר לָךְ וְלָא מִידֵּי״.

The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, while Rav Yirmeya bar Abba says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said to Rav Huna: But many times I said before Rav that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and never did he say anything to me, which indicates that he holds that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and not that of the Rabbis. Rav Huna said to him: How did you teach the mishna before Rav? Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said to him: I taught it with the opposite attributions, that is to say, the opinion that is attributed in the mishna to Rabbi Akiva, I would teach in the name of the Rabbis. Rav Huna said to him: Due to that reason, he never said anything to you, as Rav agreed with the version that you attributed to Rabbi Akiva.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: לֵימָא אָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ –

With regard to the opinions of Rav and Shmuel, Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Shall we say that Rav and Shmuel, in their opinions stated with regard to this matter, each follow their general lines of reasoning, as they appear to have disagreed about this same issue in another context as well?

דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הָאַחִין שֶׁחָלְקוּ – אֵין לָהֶן לֹא דֶּרֶךְ זֶה עַל זֶה, וְלֹא סוּלָּמוֹת זֶה עַל זֶה, וְלֹא חַלּוֹנוֹת זֶה עַל זֶה, וְלֹא אַמַּת הַמַּיִם זֶה עַל זֶה.

As Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: With regard to brothers who divided their father’s estate between them, they do not have a right of way against each other, i.e., to walk through the other’s property to reach his own, even though this is how the place was used in their father’s lifetime; nor do they have the right of ladders against each other, i.e., the right to set up a ladder in the other’s property in order to get to his own; nor do they have the right of windows against each other, i.e., the right to prevent the other from building a wall facing his windows; nor do they have the right of a water channel against each other, i.e., the right to pass a water channel through the other’s property.

וְהִזָּהֲרוּ בָּהֶן, שֶׁהֲלָכוֹת קְבוּעוֹת הֵן. וְרַב אָמַר: יֵשׁ לָהֶן.

Rav Naḥman continues: And be careful with these rulings, since they are established halakhot. And Rav says: They do retain all of these privileges. Consequently, Rav and Shmuel appear to be following their general lines of reasoning here, as Shmuel holds that when the brothers, who are like sellers, divide their father’s estate, they transfer property to each other generously without retaining privileges in each other’s property, while Rav holds that they transfer the property sparingly.

צְרִיכָא; דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּהָהִיא – בְּהָהִיא קָאָמַר רַב, מִשּׁוּם דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: בָּעֵינָא לְמֵידַר בֵּיהּ כִּי הֵיכִי דְּדָרוּ בֵּיהּ אֲבָהָתִי; תִּדַּע, דִּכְתִיב: ״תַּחַת אֲבֹתֶיךָ יִהְיוּ בָנֶיךָ״; אֲבָל בְּהָא – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לִשְׁמוּאֵל;

The Gemara comments: Nevertheless, it was necessary to teach this disagreement in both cases, as the halakha in the one case cannot be derived from the halakha in the other. As had we been taught this dispute only in that case, of the brothers who divided their father’s estate, I would have said that only in that case does Rav say that they retain all of the earlier privileges, because one brother can say to the other: I wish to live in this house just as my ancestors, who had all of those privileges, lived in it. Know that there is substance to this claim, as it is written: “Instead of your fathers shall be your sons” (Psalms 45:17). But in this case of an ordinary house sale, say that he concedes to Shmuel that a seller sells generously.

וְאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא – בְּהָךְ קָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, אֲבָל בְּהָא – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַב; צְרִיכָא.

And if the dispute was stated only in this case of an ordinary house sale, I would have said that only in this case does Shmuel say that a seller sells generously and does not withhold a path for himself, but in that case, of the brothers who divided their father’s estate, say that he concedes to Rav that the desire to live there just as his ancestors did supersedes the seller’s general tendency to sell generously. Therefore, it was necessary to teach this dispute in both cases.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן לְרַב הוּנָא: הִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתִין, אוֹ הִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתַיְיכוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתַיְיכוּ, דִּמְקָרְבִיתוּ לְבָבָא דְּרֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא, דִּשְׁכִיחִי דַּיָּינֵי.

As for the ruling itself, Rav Naḥman, who was a disciple of Shmuel, said to Rav Huna: Is the halakha in accordance with our opinion, or is the halakha in accordance with your opinion? Rav Huna said to him: The halakha is in accordance with your opinion, as you are near the gate of the Exilarch, where the judges are frequently found, and therefore you are more proficient in monetary law.

אִיתְּמַר: שְׁנֵי בָתִּים זֶה לְפָנִים מִזֶּה; שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּמֶכֶר, שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּמַתָּנָה – אֵין לָהֶן דֶּרֶךְ זֶה עַל זֶה. כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן חִיצוֹן בְּמַתָּנָה וּפְנִימִי בְּמֶכֶר.

§ It was stated: If there are two residences, one situated behind the other, and the owner transferred ownership of the two of them, each one to a different person, by means of a sale, or if he transferred ownership of the two of them, each to a different person, as a gift, they do not have a right of way against each other. That is, the one who acquired the inner residence may not pass through the outer residence, since each of them received equal privileges from the previous owner. And all the more so is this the halakha if the outer residence was transferred by means of a gift, and the inner residence was transferred by means of a sale, as it may be assumed that a gift is made in a more generous manner than is a sale.

חִיצוֹן בְּמֶכֶר וּפְנִימִי בְּמַתָּנָה – סְבוּר מִינַּהּ: אֵין לָהֶן דֶּרֶךְ זֶה עַל זֶה;

As for the case where the outer residence was transferred by means of a sale, and the inner residence was transferred by means of a gift, some Sages at first understood from here that they do not have a right of way against each other, that is, that the recipient of the inner residence may not pass through the outer residence.

וְלָא הִיא – מִי לָא תְּנַן: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – בְּמוֹכֵר, אֲבָל בְּנוֹתֵן מַתָּנָה – נוֹתֵן אֶת כּוּלָּן? אַלְמָא מַאן דְּיָהֵיב מַתָּנָה – בְּעַיִן יָפָה יָהֵיב; הָכָא נָמֵי, מַאן דְּיָהֵיב מַתָּנָה – בְּעַיִן יָפָה יָהֵיב.

But that is not so, as didn’t we learn in a mishna (71a): In what case is this statement, that these items are excluded, said? It is said with regard to one who sells a field, but with regard to one who gives it away as a gift, it is assumed that he gives all of it, including everything found in the field. Apparently, one who gives property as a gift gives it more generously than does one who sells it, as gifts are generally given to friends to whom one wishes to transfer as many privileges as possible. Here too, then, one who gives property as a gift gives it more generously than does one who sells it, and so the recipient of the inner residence acquires a right of way through the outer apartment.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמּוֹכֵר אֶת הַבַּיִת – מָכַר אֶת הַדֶּלֶת, אֲבָל לֹא אֶת הַמַּפְתֵּחַ; מָכַר אֶת הַמַּכְתֶּשֶׁת קְבוּעָה, אֲבָל לֹא אֶת הַמִּיטַּלְטֶלֶת; מָכַר אֶת הָאִיצְטְרוֹבֵיל, אֲבָל לֹא אֶת הַקֶּלֶת; וְלֹא אֶת הַתַּנּוּר וְלֹא אֶת הַכִּירַיִם. בִּזְמַן שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ: ״הוּא וְכׇל מַה שֶׁבְּתוֹכוֹ״ –

MISHNA: One who sells a house has, as part of the sale, sold also the door, but not the key. He has sold the mortar that is fixed in the ground, but not the portable one. He has sold the immovable lower millstone [ha’itzterobil], but not the portable upper stone [hakelet], the funnel into which one pours the grain to be ground. And he has sold neither the oven nor the double stove, as they are deemed movable. When the seller says to the buyer: I am selling you it, and everything that is in it,

הֲרֵי כּוּלָּן מְכוּרִין.

all these components are sold as part of the sale of the house.

גְּמָ׳ לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר – דְּאִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר, הָא אָמַר: מָכַר אֶת הַכֶּרֶם – מָכַר תַּשְׁמִישֵׁי כֶרֶם!

GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna that distinguishes between different types of household items is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. As if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, doesn’t he say in a baraita (78b): If one sold a vineyard, he has sold all of the utensils of the vineyard, including the movable ones? The same should be true for the sale of a house.

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר – הָתָם קְבִיעַ, הָכָא לָא קְבִיעַ. וְהָא מַפְתֵּחַ דּוּמְיָא דְּדֶלֶת קָתָנֵי – מָה דֶּלֶת דִּקְבִיעָא, אַף מַפְתֵּחַ דִּקְבִיעַ! אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא, מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר.

The Gemara answers: You may even say that the mishna was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as a distinction can be made between the two cases. There, in the case of a vineyard, the reference is to utensils that are fixed in the vineyard and never removed from it, and therefore they are included in the sale, while here, in the case of a house, the mishna is referring to utensils that are not fixed in the house, and therefore they are not part of the sale. The Gemara objects: But doesn’t the mishna teach the halakha governing a key in similar fashion to the halakha governing the door, indicating that just as a door is fixed in the house, so too, a key is fixed in the house? Rather, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַמּוֹכֵר אֶת הַבַּיִת – מָכַר אֶת הַדֶּלֶת וְאֶת הַנֶּגֶר וְאֶת הַמַּנְעוּל, אֲבָל לֹא אֶת הַמַּפְתֵּחַ; מָכַר אֶת הַמַּכְתֶּשֶׁת הַחֲקוּקָה, אֲבָל לֹא אֶת הַקְּבוּעָה; מָכַר הָאִיצְטְרוֹבֵיל, אֲבָל לֹא אֶת הַקֶּלֶת, לֹא אֶת הַתַּנּוּר, וְלֹא אֶת הַכִּירַיִם, וְלֹא אֶת הָרֵיחַיִם. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הַמְחוּבָּר לַקַּרְקַע – הֲרֵי הוּא כַּקַּרְקַע.

The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 3:1): One who sells a house has sold the door and the door bolt and the lock, but he has not sold the key. He has sold the mortar that was hollowed out of the ground but not the mortar that was fixed to the ground after its construction. He has sold the immovable lower millstone but not the portable upper stone. And he has sold neither the oven, nor the double stove, nor the hand mill. Rabbi Eliezer says: The principle is that any item attached to the ground is considered like the ground and included in the sale.

בִּזְמַן שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ: ״הוּא וְכׇל מַה שֶּׁבְּתוֹכוֹ״ – הֲרֵי כּוּלָּן מְכוּרִין. בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ – לֹא מָכַר לֹא אֶת הַבּוֹר, וְלֹא אֶת הַדּוּת, וְלֹא אֶת הַיָּצִיעַ.

When the seller says to the buyer: I am selling you it and everything that is in it, all these components are sold along with the house. Both in this case and in that case he did not sell the pit or the cistern or the gallery, as they are considered separate entities that are not at all part of the house.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: צִינּוֹר שֶׁחֲקָקוֹ וּלְבַסּוֹף קְבָעוֹ – פּוֹסֵל אֶת הַמִּקְוֶה. קְבָעוֹ וּלְבַסּוֹף חֲקָקוֹ – אֵינוֹ פּוֹסֵל אֶת הַמִּקְוֶה. מַנִּי? לָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְלָא רַבָּנַן.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: A duct that one hollowed out and afterward attached to the ground or to a building invalidates a ritual bath through the water it channels to the bath. The water in a ritual bath must be gathered directly from rain or a stream, not drawn with vessels. If one hollowed out a log and used it to channel water into the bath, this is considered drawn water, as he used a vessel. By contrast, if one attached it first and afterward hollowed it out, it does not invalidate the ritual bath. Before the log was hollowed out, it was already attached to and considered part of the ground, and therefore the act of hollowing it out does not turn it into a vessel. The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is this? It appears to be neither the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, nor that of the Rabbis.

הֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? אִילֵימָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר דְּבַיִת – דִּלְמָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא, דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: מוֹכֵר בְּעַיִן יָפָה מוֹכֵר, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: מוֹכֵר בְּעַיִן רָעָה מוֹכֵר!

The Gemara clarifies the question: To which opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is this referring? If we say it is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the aforementioned baraita with regard to the sale of a house, that any item attached to the ground is considered part of the house and is sold along with it, there is a difficulty. As perhaps this is the reasoning employed in the dispute with regard to the sale of a house, that Rabbi Eliezer holds that one who sells, sells generously anything that is attached to the ground, while the Rabbis hold that one who sells, sells sparingly, selling only utensils that serve an intrinsic function in the house and nothing else, even if they are attached to the ground. But this teaches us nothing about the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis with respect to a ritual bath.

וְאֶלָּא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר דְּכַוֶּורֶת דְּבוֹרִים? דִּתְנַן: כַּוֶּורֶת דְּבוֹרִים – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי הִיא כַּקַּרְקַע – וְכוֹתְבִין עָלֶיהָ פְּרוֹזְבּוּל,

But rather, the reference must be to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer concerning a beehive. As we learned in a mishna (Shevi’it 10:7): With regard to a beehive attached to the ground by clay, Rabbi Eliezer says: It is like land, and therefore one may write a document that prevents the Sabbatical Year from canceling an outstanding debt [prosbol] based upon it. Such a document cannot be written unless the borrower owns some land, and a beehive is considered like land for this purpose.