בבא קמא כד

בבא קמא כד

רִיחֵק נְגִיחוֹתָיו – חַיָּיב; קֵירַב נְגִיחוֹתָיו לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?! אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: זָבָה תּוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁרִיחֲקָה רְאִיּוֹתֶיהָ – טְמֵאָה, קֵירְבָה רְאִיּוֹתֶיהָ – טְהוֹרָה!

When the ox performs its gorings at intervals, its owner is liable; if it performs its gorings successively, is it not all the more so that its owner is liable? They said to Rabbi Meir: The halakha with regard to a woman who experiences a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [zava] will prove that your a fortiori inference is invalid: If her sightings occur at intervals, i.e., if she sees a flow of uterine blood on three consecutive days, she becomes ritually impure; while if her sightings were consecutive, for example if all three occurred on the same day, she remains pure.

אָמַר לָהֶן, הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וְזֹאת תִּהְיֶה טֻמְאָתוֹ בְּזוֹבוֹ״ – תָּלָה הַכָּתוּב אֶת הַזָּב בִּרְאִיּוֹת, וְאֶת הַזָּבָה בְּיָמִים.

Rabbi Meir said to them: The case of the zava does not disprove my opinion, because the verse states in reference to the parallel halakha of a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [zav]: “And this shall be his ritual impurity when he has a discharge” (Leviticus 15:3). The word “this” emphasizes that in this matter the halakha requires following the instructions of the verse precisely as they were recorded, and in this case the verse associates the impurity of the zav with the number of sightings of discharges the man observed, and it associates the impurity of the zava with the number of days during which she experienced sightings of blood, as it says: “Many days” (Leviticus 15:25). By contrast, with regard to the goring ox, the a fortiori inference remains in place.

מִמַּאי דְּהַאי ״וְזֹאת״ – לְמַעוֹטֵי זָבָה מֵרְאִיּוֹת? אֵימָא לְמַעוֹטֵי זָב מִיָּמִים! אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהַזָּב אֶת זוֹבוֹ לַזָּכָר וְלַנְּקֵבָה״ – מַקִּישׁ זָכָר לִנְקֵבָה; מָה נְקֵבָה בְּיָמִים, אַף זָכָר בְּיָמִים.

The Gemara asks about this interpretation: From where is it determined that this additional phrase: “And this,” serves to exclude a zava from having her status determined by individual sightings of blood, associating it instead with the number of days on which she experienced bleeding? Say instead that it serves to exclude the zav from having his status determined by sightings on separate days, indicating that he will be rendered a zav only if he experienced three discharges on a single day and not on separate days. The Gemara answers: The verse states elsewhere: “And one who has a discharge, whether it be a man or a woman” (Leviticus 15:33). The verse juxtaposes the ritual impurity of a male to that of a female to teach that just as the female’s ritual impurity is caused by sightings on multiple days, so too the ritual impurity of a male can be caused by sightings on multiple days.

וְלַקֵּישׁ נְקֵבָה לְזָכָר – מָה זָכָר בִּרְאִיּוֹת, אַף נְקֵבָה בִּרְאִיּוֹת! הָא מַיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא ״וְזֹאת״.

The Gemara asks: The derivation from the verse could just as easily lead to the opposite conclusion. But let him compare the female to the male; just as a male becomes ritually impure based on the number of sightings, even if they all occur on the same day, so too should a female become ritually impure based on the number of sightings, even on the same day. The Gemara answers: But the Merciful One excluded this possibility by making use of the term “and this.”

וּמָה רָאִיתָ? מִסְתַּבְּרָא, קָאֵי בִּרְאִיּוֹת – מְמַעֵט רְאִיּוֹת; קָאֵי בִּרְאִיּוֹת – מְמַעֵט יָמִים?!

The Gemara asks: And what did you see to make you exclude associating the ritual impurity of women with the number of sightings, rather than excluding associating the ritual impurity of men with the number of days? The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that this is so, as the context of the verse deals with sightings, and therefore an additional phrase serves to exclude sightings, but can you say that in a context where it deals with sightings it excludes days? The exclusionary term “and this” appears in the section discussing the halakhot of the zav, in the context of which it mentions sightings and not days, and therefore when it excludes something from these halakhot and limits them to specific cases, it will exclude it from being associated with sightings.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵיזֶהוּ מוּעָד – כֹּל שֶׁהֵעִידוּ בּוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים; וְתָם – שֶׁיְּהוּ הַתִּינוֹקוֹת מְמַשְׁמְשִׁין בּוֹ וְאֵינוֹ נוֹגֵחַ; דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: מוּעָד – כֹּל שֶׁהֵעִידוּ בּוֹ שָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים, וְלֹא אָמְרוּ שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים אֶלָּא לַחֲזָרָה בִּלְבָד.

The Gemara returns to the subject of classifying an ox as innocuous or forewarned: The Sages taught in a baraita: Which type of ox is deemed forewarned? Any animal about which witnesses testified that it gored on three days is forewarned. And it reverts to its former innocuous status if children pet it and nevertheless it does not gore; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Shimon says: A forewarned ox is any ox about which witnesses testified that it gored three times, and the Sages spoke about three days only with regard to reversals, meaning that in order for an ox to revert to innocuous status, the ox must refrain from goring on three separate days. Each of these additional views on this subject combine aspects of both of the opinions mentioned in the mishna, those of Rabbi Yehuda and those of Rabbi Meir.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּמוּעָד, שֶׁהֲרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי מוֹדֶה לוֹ; וַהֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּתָם, שֶׁהֲרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי מוֹדֶה לוֹ.

Rav Naḥman says that Rav Adda bar Ahava says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda concerning the criteria for deeming an animal forewarned, as Rabbi Yosei concedes to his opinion on this issue, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir concerning the criteria for reverting the status of an animal to innocuous, as Rabbi Yosei concedes to his opinion on that issue.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: וְלֵימָא מָר הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּמוּעָד, שֶׁהֲרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מוֹדֶה לוֹ; וַהֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּתָם, שֶׁהֲרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מוֹדֶה לוֹ! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סְבִירָא לִי, דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי נִימּוּקוֹ עִמּוֹ.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: And let the Master say the reverse, that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir concerning the criteria for deeming an animal forewarned, as Rabbi Shimon concedes to his opinion on this issue and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda concerning the criteria for reverting the status of an ox to innocuous, as Rabbi Shimon concedes to his opinion on that issue. Rav Naḥman replied to Rava: I hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as Rabbi Yosei’s analysis [nimmuko] is with him, i.e., it is sound.

אִבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: ״שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים״ דְּקָתָנֵי – לְיַיעוֹדֵי תּוֹרָא, אוֹ לְיַיעוֹדֵי גַּבְרָא?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: The three days that the mishna teaches in the context of Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion with regard to the testimony needed to assign the status of forewarned to an ox, are they needed in order to render the ox forewarned, or are they needed in order to forewarn the man who owns the ox, to inform him that he needs to take precautions to keep it from causing further harm?

לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? דְּאָתוּ תְּלָתָא כִּיתֵּי סָהֲדִי בְּחַד יוֹמָא. אִי אָמְרַתְּ לְיַיעוֹדֵי תּוֹרָא, מִיַּיעַד; וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ לְיַיעוֹדֵי גַּבְרָא, לָא מִיַּיעַד – מֵימָר אָמַר: הַשְׁתָּא הוּא דְּקָמַסְהֲדוּ בִּי. מַאי?

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two possibilities? The Gemara answers: The practical difference is in a case where three groups of witnesses came to the court on one day, each testifying about a separate instance of goring caused by the ox on three separate days. If you say that their testimony serves to render the ox forewarned by determining that it gored on three separate days, then in this case the animal has been classified as forewarned on the basis of their testimony. But if you say that their testimony serves to forewarn the man, the ox has not been classified as forewarned on the basis of this testimony since the owner heard all of the testimony on a single day. This enables him to say: It is only now that they testified against me; and therefore his ox will not be deemed forewarned until he has been issued warnings over the course of three separate days. What, then, is the solution to the dilemma raised above?

תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵין הַשּׁוֹר נַעֲשֶׂה מוּעָד, עַד שֶׁיָּעִידוּ בּוֹ בִּפְנֵי בְעָלִים וּבִפְנֵי בֵית דִּין. הֵעִידוּ בּוֹ בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בְעָלִים, בִּפְנֵי בְעָלִים וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין – אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה מוּעָד, עַד שֶׁיָּעִידוּ בּוֹ בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין וּבִפְנֵי בְעָלִים.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution from a baraita (Tosefta 2:3): An ox does not become forewarned until witnesses testify against it in the presence of its owner and in the presence of a court. If they testified against it in the presence of a court but not in the presence of its owner, or in the presence of its owner but not in the presence of a court, it does not become forewarned until they testify against it in the presence of a court and in the presence of its owner.

הֶעִידוּהוּ שְׁנַיִם בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה, וּשְׁנַיִם בַּשְּׁנִיָּה, וּשְׁנַיִם בַּשְּׁלִישִׁית – הֲרֵי כָּאן שָׁלֹשׁ עֵדִיּוֹת, וְהֵן עֵדוּת אַחַת לַהֲזָמָה.

Furthermore, if two witnesses testified against the ox concerning its first incident of goring, and two other witnesses testified against it concerning the second incident, and two other witnesses testified against it concerning the third incident, there are three separate testimonies here, but they are considered as one with regard to rendering their statements as conspiring testimony.

נִמְצֵאת כַּת רִאשׁוֹנָה זוֹמֶמֶת – הֲרֵי כָּאן שְׁתֵּי עֵדִיּוֹת, וְהוּא פָּטוּר וְהֵן פְּטוּרִים. נִמְצֵאת כַּת שְׁנִיָּה זוֹמֶמֶת – הֲרֵי כָּאן עֵדוּת אַחַת, וְהוּא פָּטוּר וְהֵן פְּטוּרִים.

Therefore, if the first set of witnesses is determined to be conspiring witnesses, there are two testimonies remaining here that claim that the ox gored, and the owner must pay for half the cost of the damage in each case. But the owner of the ox is exempt from having to pay the full cost of the damage, and the conspiring witnesses are exempt from paying the owner what he would have had to pay were their testimony accepted and his ox deemed forewarned, as they testified only concerning the first incident of goring, and the ox would not have been deemed forewarned on the basis of this testimony alone. And similarly, if the second set of witnesses was also determined to be conspiring witnesses, there is one testimony remaining here that claims that the ox gored, the third. At this point too, the owner of the ox is exempt from having to pay the full cost of the damage and the conspiring witnesses are exempt from having to pay the owner the full cost of the damage.

נִמְצֵאת כַּת שְׁלִישִׁית זוֹמֶמֶת – כּוּלָּן חַיָּיבִין. וְעַל זֶה נֶאֱמַר: ״וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם וְגוֹ׳״.

If the third group of witnesses was also determined to be conspiring witnesses, all the witnesses become liable. The third group is liable to pay the owner of the animal the payment for half the cost of the damage they tried to make him pay for the third incident of goring, and all three groups must share in the payment of the other half of the damage for the final incident that they tried to charge him for by classifying his ox as forewarned. And concerning this it is stated: “And you shall do unto him as he had conspired to do unto his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19).

אִי אָמְרַתְּ לְיַיעוֹדֵי תּוֹרָא – שַׁפִּיר.

The Gemara clarifies: If you say that the purpose of the testimony is to render the ox forewarned, the halakha presented in this baraita works out well, as according to this opinion it can be said that all of the witnesses came on the same day at the behest of the alleged victim of the third incident, and therefore they were all certainly aware of each other’s testimony. Consequently, the first set of witnesses shares in the responsibility for the testimony of the last group, as they are all co-witnesses in the effort to have the ox rendered forewarned.

אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ לְיַיעוֹדֵי גַּבְרָא, לֵימְרוּ הָנָךְ קַמָּאֵי: אֲנַן מִי הֲוָה יָדְעִינַן דְּבָתַר תְּלָתָא יוֹמֵי – אָתוּ הָנֵי וּמְיַיעֲדִי לֵיהּ?

But if you say that the witnesses came to forewarn the man, to caution him to safeguard his animal from causing harm, then they must have come on three separate days. And if so, let these first witnesses say: Did we know that after three days these other witnesses were going to come to testify about the animal? Therefore, it must be that the case in the baraita is one where the three groups of witnesses all came on the same day, and if that is so, the purpose of the testimony must be to render the ox forewarned.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַמְרִיתַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב כָּהֲנָא, וַאֲמַר לִי: וּלְיַיעוֹדֵי תּוֹרָא מִי נִיחָא?! וְלֵימְרוּ הָנָךְ בָּתְרָאֵי: אֲנַן מְנָא יָדְעִינַן דְּכֹל דְּקָאֵי בֵּי דִינָא – לְאַסְהוֹדֵי בְּתוֹרָא קָאָתוּ? אֲנַן לְחַיּוֹבֵי גַּבְרָא פַּלְגָא נִזְקָא אָתֵינַן!

Rav Ashi said: I recited this halakha before Rav Kahana and he replied to me in response to this proof: And does it work out well to say that they are coming to render the ox forewarned? Even in a case where all of the witnesses arrive in court on the same day, let these last witnesses say: From where were we to know that all those standing in court came to testify about the ox? We came to make this person liable to pay for half the cost of the damage his animal allegedly caused, but we are not responsible for the attempt to make him pay the full cost of the damage for the third incident.

דְּקָמְרַמְּזִי רַמּוֹזֵי. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: כְּשֶׁבָּאוּ רְצוּפִים.

The Gemara answers: It must be that the case concerns a situation where the different groups of witnesses were observed signaling to each other, and therefore it is clear that they were aware of each other’s testimony and that they came to the court for this purpose. Rav Ashi said: The case is one where they all came in succession, one following the other, and therefore it is clear that the latter witnesses are aware of the former.

רָבִינָא אָמַר: בְּמַכִּירִין בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר, וְאֵין מַכִּירִין אֶת הַשּׁוֹר.

Ravina said: In this case the witnesses said that they were acquainted with the owner of the goring ox but they were not familiar with the ox itself. This indicates that they were coming to court to render the ox forewarned, as the witnesses are not able to identify the goring ox and they would not be able to hold its owner liable to pay for half the cost of the damage, as this payment is paid only from the proceeds of the sale of the animal. Therefore, the only purpose of their testimony would be to hold the owner liable to pay the full cost of the damage for the third incident, as this payment is made from the owner’s superior-quality land.

אֶלָּא הֵיכִי מְיַיעֲדִי לֵיהּ? דְּאָמְרִי: תּוֹרָא נַגְּחָנָא אִית לָךְ בְּבַקְרָךְ, אִבְּעִי לָךְ לְנַטּוֹרֵי לְכוּלֵּיהּ בַּקְרָא.

The Gemara asks: But if they were not familiar with the ox, how could they render it forewarned? The Gemara answers: They said to the animal’s owner: You have a goring ox among your cattle, and therefore you need to safeguard all of the cattle.

אִבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הַמְשַׁסֶּה כַּלְבּוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ בַּחֲבֵירוֹ, מַהוּ? מְשַׁסֶּה – וַדַּאי פָּטוּר; בַּעַל כֶּלֶב – מַאי? מִי אָמְרִינַן מָצֵי אָמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא – מַאי עָבֵידְנָא לֵיהּ? אוֹ דִלְמָא, אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ: כֵּיוָן דְּיָדְעַתְּ בְּכַלְבָּךְ דִּמְשַׁסֵּי לֵיהּ וּמִשְׁתַּסֵּי, לָא אִבְּעִי לָךְ לְאַשְׁהוֹיֵיהּ?

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of one who incites another’s dog against another, i.e., a third person, and he is injured, what is the halakha? The one who incited the animal against him is certainly exempt, since he did not cause the damage directly and neither did his property; but what is the halakha with regard to the owner of the dog? The Gemara explains the different sides of the question: Do we say that the owner of the dog can say to the injured party: What did I do to the dog? Or perhaps we say to him: Since you were aware that if others incite your dog it is prone to being affected by the incitement and attacking, you ought not to have kept it in your possession. Since you did, you are liable for the damage and the injuries it causes.

אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: וְתָם – שֶׁיְּהוּ הַתִּינוֹקוֹת מְמַשְׁמְשִׁין בּוֹ, וְאֵינוֹ נוֹגֵחַ. הָא נוֹגֵחַ – חַיָּיב! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, מִי קָתָנֵי: נָגַח חַיָּיב? דִּלְמָא הָא נָגַח – לָא הָוֵי תָּם; וּבְהָהִיא נְגִיחָה לָא מִחַיַּיב.

Rabbi Zeira said: Come and hear a solution from the baraita: And an ox reverts to its former innocuous status if children pet it and nevertheless it does not gore. It can be inferred from this that if it gores when the children pet it, the owner would be liable to pay for the damage. An ox that gores because children pet it can be likened to one that gores because it was incited to do so, and nevertheless the mishna holds the owner liable. Abaye said: Is it taught in the baraita that if it gored the owner is liable? Perhaps that is not what the baraita means. It merely means that if it gored it does not revert to innocuous status; but the owner is not liable for any of the damage caused by that goring because the children incited the animal to do so, and therefore nothing can be conclusively demonstrated from the baraita.

תָּא שְׁמַע: שִׁיסָּה בּוֹ אֶת הַכֶּלֶב, שִׁיסָּה בּוֹ נָחָשׁ – פָּטוּר. מַאי, לָאו פָּטוּר מְשַׁסֶּה, וְחַיָּיב בַּעַל כֶּלֶב? לָא; אֵימָא: פָּטוּר אַף מְשַׁסֶּה.

The Gemara attempts to prove this point from another source: Come and hear a solution from a mishna (Sanhedrin 76b): If one incited a dog against another person, or incited a snake against another person, he is exempt. What, is it not that the one who incited the dog against him is exempt, but the owner of the dog is liable? The Gemara rejects this: No, say that even the one who incited the animal against him is exempt, as well as the owner.

אָמַר רָבָא, אִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר: הַמְשַׁסֶּה כַּלְבּוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ בַּחֲבֵירוֹ – חַיָּיב; שִׁיסָּהוּ הוּא בְּעַצְמוֹ – פָּטוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? כׇּל הַמְשַׁנֶּה, וּבָא אַחֵר וְשִׁינָּה בּוֹ – פָּטוּר.

Rava said: Even if you say that one who incites the dog of another against yet another person is liable, nevertheless if he incited the dog against himself, i.e., the dog bit the one who was inciting it to attack, he is exempt. What is the reason for this? Due to the principle that with regard to anyone who deviates from normative behavior in his actions, if another came along afterward and deviates from the norm with regard to the action the first has done and thereby causes damage to him, the one who causes the damage is exempt from liability. Since this individual deviated from the normative behavior and incited the dog against himself, the owner of the dog is not responsible for any damage the dog causes to him as a result, although generally speaking any time a dog bites it is in and of itself a deviation from its typical behavior and something for which its owner would normally be held liable.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרָבָא: אִיתְּמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ כְּווֹתָיךְ – דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: שְׁתֵּי פָּרוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, אַחַת רְבוּצָה וְאַחַת מְהַלֶּכֶת, וּבִעֲטָה מְהַלֶּכֶת בִּרְבוּצָה – פְּטוּרָה. רְבוּצָה בִּמְהַלֶּכֶת – חַיֶּיבֶת.

Rav Pappa said to Rava: It was stated in the name of Reish Lakish in accordance with your opinion, that if anyone deviates from normative behavior in his actions, if another came along afterward and deviates from the norm with regard to the action the first has done and thereby causes damage to him, the one who causes the damage is exempt from liability. As Reish Lakish says: If there were two cows in the public domain, one prone in the street and the other one walking, if the walking cow kicked the prone cow, its owner is exempt from liability. But if the prone cow kicked the walking cow, its owner is liable. The rationale for this is that since it is typical behavior for cows to walk in the public domain and the prone cow deviated from this behavior, even if the walking cow also acted atypically and kicked the prone cow, the owner is exempt from liability.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא – בְּהָהִיא חַיּוֹבֵי מְחַיֵּיבְנָא, דְּאָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ: כִּי אִית לָךְ רְשׁוּתָא – לְסַגּוֹיֵי עֲלַי; לְבַעוֹטֵי בִּי לֵית לָךְ רְשׁוּתָא.

Rava said back to Rav Pappa: That is not in accordance with my opinion, as I would have held the owner of the walking cow liable in that case, because in my opinion we say to him on behalf of the prone cow: It is true that you have the right to tread on me in the public domain but you do not have the right to kick me, and therefore Rava’s and Reish Lakish’s opinions are not exactly the same.

מַתְנִי׳ שׁוֹר הַמַּזִּיק בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק, כֵּיצַד? נָגַח, נָגַף, נָשַׁךְ, רָבַץ, בָּעַט; בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק. בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק – רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: חֲצִי נֶזֶק.

MISHNA: And what is the case of the ox that causes damage while on the property of the injured party, mentioned in an earlier mishna (15b) that listed animals that are forewarned? If the animal gored, pushed, bit, squatted upon, or kicked another animal in the public domain, the owner is liable to pay half the cost of the damage if the ox was innocuous, but if it acted while on the property of the injured party, Rabbi Tarfon says: He must pay the full cost of the damage, and the Rabbis say: He must pay half the cost of the damage, as in any other case classified as Goring.

אֲמַר לָהֶם רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן: וּמָה בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁהֵקֵל עַל הַשֵּׁן וְעַל הָרֶגֶל – בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר; הֶחְמִיר עֲלֵיהֶן בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק – לְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם; מְקוֹם שֶׁהֶחְמִיר עַל הַקֶּרֶן – בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, לְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק; אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנַּחְמִיר עָלָיו בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק – לְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם?

Rabbi Tarfon said to the Rabbis: If in a place where the Torah was lenient with regard to damage classified as Eating and with regard to Trampling, specifically in the public domain, as the owner is exempt from liability, nevertheless the Torah was strict with regard to these forms of damage if they occurred on the property of the injured party, requiring him to pay the full cost of the damage, then in a place where the Torah was strict with regard to cases of damage classified as Goring, specifically in the public domain, requiring the owner to pay for half the cost of the damage, is it not right that we should be strict with regard to this form of damage if it occurs on the property of the injured party to likewise require the owner of the animal to pay the full cost of the damage?

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין – לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן. מָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – חֲצִי נֶזֶק, אַף בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק – חֲצִי נֶזֶק.

The Rabbis said to him: Although there is an a fortiori inference being applied here, still it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, meaning that the halakha cannot be stricter with the inference than it is with the case that serves as the source of the inference. Therefore, just as one is liable to pay half the cost of the damage classified as Goring in the public domain, so too, for damage classified as Goring on the property of the injured party he is liable to pay only half the cost of the damage.

אָמַר לָהֶם: אַף אֲנִי

Rabbi Tarfon said to them: If that is your opinion, then I as well