בבא קמא כה

בבא קמא כה

לֹא אָדוּן קֶרֶן מִקֶּרֶן, אֲנִי אָדוּן קֶרֶן מֵרֶגֶל – וּמָה בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁהֵקֵל עַל הַשֵּׁן וְעַל הָרֶגֶל, בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – הֶחְמִיר בַּקֶּרֶן; מָקוֹם שֶׁהֶחְמִיר עַל הַשֵּׁן וְעַל הָרֶגֶל, בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנַּחְמִיר בַּקֶּרֶן?

will not derive an inference with regard to Goring from a different case of Goring. I will instead derive an inference with regard to Goring from Trampling: And if in a place where the Torah was lenient with regard to damage classified as Eating and Trampling, specifically in the public domain, as the owner is exempt from liability, nevertheless the Torah was strict with regard to damage classified as Goring, requiring him to pay half the cost of the damage, then in a place where the Torah was strict with regard to damage classified as Eating and Trampling, specifically on the property of the injured party as the animal’s owner is obligated to pay the full cost of the damage, is it not right that we should be equally strict with regard to damage classified as Goring and require payment of the full cost of the damage in this case as well?

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין – לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן. מָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – חֲצִי נֶזֶק, אַף בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק – חֲצִי נֶזֶק.

The Rabbis said to him: Here as well, it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, and therefore, just as one is liable to pay half the cost of the damage classified as Goring in the public domain, so too, for damage classified as Goring on the property of the injured party he will be liable to pay only half the cost of the damage, as ultimately your inference still depends on the fact that for Goring in the public domain one pays half the cost of the damage.

גְּמָ׳ וְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן לֵית לֵיהּ דַּיּוֹ?! וְהָא דַּיּוֹ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הוּא! דְּתַנְיָא: מִדִּין קַל וְחוֹמֶר – כֵּיצַד? ״וַיֹּאמֶר ה׳ אֶל מֹשֶׁה: וְאָבִיהָ יָרֹק יָרַק בְּפָנֶיהָ, הֲלֹא תִכָּלֵם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים?!״ – קַל וְחוֹמֶר לַשְּׁכִינָה, אַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר יוֹם! אֶלָּא דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן.

GEMARA: And is it true that Rabbi Tarfon does not accept the principle of: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source? But that cannot be, as the principle that begins with: It is sufficient, is an aspect of Torah law, as it is taught in a baraita: The Sages said that one of the ways in which the Torah may be interpreted is by an a fortiori inference. How is this so? It is written (Numbers 12:14): “And the Lord said to Moses: If her father had but spit in her face, should she not hide in shame seven days? Let her be shut up seven days outside the camp, and after that she shall be brought in again,” and therefore, using an a fortiori inference it can be derived that if the Divine Presence reprimanded her, she should hide in shame for fourteen days. Why was Miriam banished for only seven days? Rather, it is because it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerged from the a fortiori inference to be like the source of the inference. Consequently, this principle is mandated by the Torah itself.

כִּי לֵית לֵיהּ דַּיּוֹ – הֵיכָא דְּמִפְּרִיךְ קַל וָחוֹמֶר; הֵיכָא דְּלָא מִפְּרִיךְ קַל וָחוֹמֶר – אִית לֵיהּ דַּיּוֹ. הָתָם – שִׁבְעָה דִּשְׁכִינָה לָא כְּתִיבִי; אֲתָא קַל וָחוֹמֶר אַיְיתִי אַרְבֵּסַר, אֲתָא דַּיּוֹ אַפֵּיק שִׁבְעָה, וְאוֹקֵי שִׁבְעָה.

The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Tarfon does not accept the principle: It is sufficient, it is where this principle completely refutes the a fortiori inference, leaving no halakha derived from it. But where it does not completely refute the a fortiori inference, Rabbi Tarfon accepts the principle: It is sufficient. Consequently, there, with regard to Miriam, the seven days during which she deserved to be banished from the camp due to the rebuke of the Divine Presence were not written, so the a fortiori inference came and brought those days plus additional days, adding up to a total of fourteen, and then the principle: It is sufficient, came and removed seven days and left seven days intact. Consequently, the a fortiori inference was effective with regard to the seven days during which she was banished from the camp.

אֲבָל הָכָא – חֲצִי נֶזֶק כְּתִיב; וַאֲתָא קַל וָחוֹמֶר וְאַיְיתִי חֲצִי נֶזֶק אַחֲרִינָא, וְנַעֲשָׂה נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם; אִי דָּרְשַׁתְּ דַּיּוֹ – אִפְּרִיךְ לֵיהּ קַל וָחוֹמֶר!

But here, payment for half the cost of the damage is written explicitly in the Torah with regard to the halakha of Goring in the public domain, and the a fortiori inference comes and brings an additional payment for half the cost of the damage, forming a payment of the full cost of the damage. If you interpret the halakha employing the principle: It is sufficient, to reduce the payment to half the cost of the damage, this completely refutes the a fortiori inference, as no halakha would be derived from the inference; the initial payment for half the cost of the damage was written explicitly in the Torah. Consequently, in this case, Rabbi Tarfon does not employ the principle: It is sufficient.

וְרַבָּנַן, שִׁבְעָה דִשְׁכִינָה כְּתִיבִי – ״תִּסָּגֵר שִׁבְעַת יָמִים״.

The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis understand this matter? How do they respond to Rabbi Tarfon’s reasoning? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, the seven days during which Miriam had to be banished due to the reprimand she received from the Divine Presence are in fact written in the Torah: “Let her be shut up seven days.” This indicates that the a fortiori inference is not required to teach the halakha of the seven days she was banished, as it would have added only the extra seven days. This means that according to the Rabbis, there is a source in the Torah that the principle: It is sufficient, is employed even when it refutes the a fortiori inference completely.

וְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, הָהוּא ״תִּסָּגֵר״ – דְּדָרְשִׁינַן דַּיּוֹ הוּא.

The Gemara asks: And what would Rabbi Tarfon say about that reasoning? The Gemara answers: He would say that this verse: “Let her be shut up seven days,” is necessary to teach us the basic fact that we interpret the halakha according to the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source.

וְרַבָּנַן, כְּתִיב קְרָא אַחֲרִינָא – ״וַתִּסָּגֵר מִרְיָם״. וְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, הָהוּא – דַּאֲפִילּוּ בְּעָלְמָא דָּרְשִׁינַן דַּיּוֹ, וְלֹא תֹּאמַר: הָכָא – מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ שֶׁל מֹשֶׁה, אֲבָל בְּעָלְמָא לָא; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara asks: And what would the Rabbis say in response? The Gemara answers: They would point out that a different verse is written about Miriam: “And Miriam was shut up outside the camp seven days” (Numbers 12:15). The Gemara asks: And how would Rabbi Tarfon respond to that? The Gemara answers: That verse teaches that we interpret the halakha according to the principle: It is sufficient, even generally, and not only in this specific case. And this point is necessary so that you do not say: Here the principle: It is sufficient, is employed due to respect for Moses, but generally that is not done. This verse therefore teaches us that this is not so.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: וְהָא הַאי תַּנָּא, דְּלָא דָּרֵישׁ דַּיּוֹ, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא מִפְּרִיךְ קַל וָחוֹמֶר! דְּתַנְיָא: קֶרִי בְּזָב מִנַּיִין? וְדִין הוּא, מָה טָהוֹר בְּטָהוֹר – טָמֵא בְּטָמֵא; טָמֵא בְּטָהוֹר – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא טָמֵא בְּטָמֵא?

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Is the fundamental principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, actually accepted by all authorities? But there is this tanna, who does not interpret the halakha in accordance with the principle: It is sufficient, even though it is a case where the principle does not refute the a fortiori inference completely. As it is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that the semen of a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [zav] imparts ritual impurity by someone carrying it as well as by coming into contact with it, just as the actual gonorrhea-like discharge does? It is a logical derivation from an a fortiori inference: Just as spittle, which is ritually pure when coming from a person who is ritually pure, is impure when coming from someone like a zav who is impure, is it not logical that semen, which is impure when coming from someone who is pure, should be impure when coming from someone who is impure?

וְקָא מַיְיתֵי לַהּ בֵּין לְמַגָּע בֵּין לְמַשָּׂא. וְאַמַּאי? נֵימָא: אַהֲנִי קַל וָחוֹמֶר לְמַגָּע, אַהֲנִי דַּיּוֹ לְאַפּוֹקֵי מַשָּׂא!

And the tanna brings this derivation and applies it whether discussing ritual impurity imparted by contact or whether discussing impurity imparted by carrying. And why is this the case? Let us say: The a fortiori inference is effective in teaching that the semen of a zav imparts ritual impurity by contact alone, as is the halakha with regard to the semen of a pure man, and the principle: It is sufficient, is effective by limiting the scope of the a fortiori inference to exclude the semen of a zav from imparting ritual impurity by carrying. Since the tanna does not formulate his derivation in this manner, it appears that he rejects the principle: It is sufficient, in all situations.

וְכִי תֵּימָא: לְמַגָּע לָא אִצְטְרִיךְ קַל וָחוֹמֶר, דְּלָא גָּרַע מִגַּבְרָא טָהוֹר; אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: ״מִקְּרֵה לָיְלָה״ כְּתִיב – מִי שֶׁקִּרְיוֹ גּוֹרֵם לוֹ; יָצָא זֶה, שֶׁאֵין קִרְיוֹ גּוֹרֵם לוֹ – אֶלָּא דָּבָר אַחֵר גָּרַם לוֹ; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

And if you would say that the a fortiori inference was not necessary to teach that the seminal emission of the zav imparts ritual impurity by contact, as it is certainly no less impure than if it had come from a man who was pure, so the inference was necessary only to teach that the semen of a zav imparts impurity by carrying, this is not correct. In fact, it was necessary to teach this point, as it may enter your mind to say that since it is written in the verse: “If there be among you any man that is not clean because of something that happens to him by night” (Deuteronomy 23:11), this means that a seminal emission is ritually impure if it came from someone who had something happen to him, and this causes him to experience the emission, but the verse is excluding this zav, who did not have something happen to him to cause him to experience the emission, but rather another matter, i.e., his gonorrhea-like condition, caused him to experience the emission. Consequently, it teaches us that this is incorrect.

מִידֵּי ״וְלֹא דָּבָר אַחֵר״ כְּתִיב?!

Abaye responded: In the verse “something that happens to him by night,” is it also written: But not another matter? This limiting clause is not written in the verse, and therefore the halakha that the semen of a zav imparts ritual impurity by contact can be understood from the explicit verse in the Torah, and there is no need to derive it from an a fortiori inference. Therefore, the only function of the a fortiori inference is to teach the halakha that the semen of a zav imparts impurity by carrying. Applying the principle: It is sufficient, would refute the a fortiori inference completely, so there is no proof that the tanna would apply the principle in all circumstances.

וּמַאן תַּנָּא דְּשָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּאָמַר: שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע שֶׁל זָב מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא? לָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וְלָא רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ. דִּתְנַן: שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע שֶׁל זָב מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַגָּע, וְאֵין מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא; דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: אַף מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא, לְפִי שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר בְּלֹא צִחְצוּחֵי זִיבָה.

Once the Gemara raised the issue, it clarifies: And who is the tanna about whom you heard that he said: Semen of a zav imparts ritual impurity by carrying? It was not Rabbi Eliezer and not Rabbi Yehoshua. As we learned in a baraita: Semen of a zav imparts ritual impurity by contact but it does not impart ritual impurity by carrying; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And Rabbi Yehoshua says: It also imparts ritual impurity by carrying, as it is impossible for semen to emerge without small drops of gonorrhea-like discharge [ziva] accompanying it.

עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הָתָם – אֶלָּא שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר בְּלֹא צִחְצוּחֵי זִיבָה, הָא לָאו הָכִי – לָא! אֶלָּא הַאי תַּנָּא הוּא – דִּתְנַן: לְמַעְלָה מֵהֶן

Rabbi Yehoshua says there that the semen of a zav imparts ritual impurity by carrying only because it is impossible for semen to emerge without small drops of ziva accompanying it. This indicates that if not for this reason, the semen would not impart ritual impurity by carrying, according to the opinions of both Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara explains: Rather, it must be that this tanna is the one who holds the opinion that the semen of a zav imparts ritual impurity by carrying, as we learned in a mishna listing the sources of ritual impurity (Kelim 1:3): Of a greater degree than the ritual impurities listed previously in the mishna, i.e., the impurity of a creeping animal, semen, and one who contracted ritual impurity from a corpse,

זוֹבוֹ שֶׁל זָב, וְרוּקּוֹ, וְשִׁכְבַת זַרְעוֹ, וּמֵימֵי רַגְלָיו, וְדַם הַנִּדָּה – מְטַמְּאִין בֵּין בְּמַגָּע בֵּין בְּמַשָּׂא.

are the ziva of a zav, and his spittle, and his semen, and his urine, and the blood of a menstruating woman, all of which impart impurity both by touching and by carrying.

וְדִלְמָא הָכִי נָמֵי – לְפִי שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר בְּלֹא צִחְצוּחֵי זִיבָה! אִם כֵּן, לִתְנְיַיהּ גַּבֵּי זוֹבוֹ; מַאי שְׁנָא דְּקָתָנֵי לַהּ גַּבֵּי רוּקּוֹ? אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּאָתֵי מֵרוּקּוֹ.

The Gemara questions this assertion: But perhaps here too the reason for the severity of ritual impurity of the semen is indeed because it is impossible for it to emerge without small drops of ziva accompanying it, but it is not due to the impurity of the semen itself. The Gemara rejects this opinion: If that would be so, let the tanna of the mishna teach it in the list of bodily fluids along with, meaning list it immediately following, his ziva. What is different about semen that he teaches it along with: His spittle? Rather, it is because its halakha comes from, i.e., it is derived from, that of his spittle, and therefore the semen itself imparts impurity by carrying, even if there would not be small drops of ziva accompanying it.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: וְהָא הַאי תַּנָּא לָא דָּרֵישׁ דַּיּוֹ, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא מִפְּרִיךְ קַל וָחוֹמֶר! דְּתַנְיָא: מַפָּץ בְּמֵת מִנַּיִין? וְדִין הוּא, וּמָה פַּכִּין קְטַנִּים – שֶׁטְּהוֹרִים בְּזָב, מְטַמֵּא בְּמֵת; מַפָּץ – שֶׁמְּטַמֵּא בְּזָב, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּטַמֵּא בְּמֵת?

The Gemara returns to the primary discussion concerning the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: But there is this tanna who does not apply the principle: It is sufficient, at all, even though such application would not refute the entire a fortiori inference. As it is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that a thick mat can contract ritual impurity from a corpse? It is a logical derivation based on an a fortiori inference: And just as small clay vessels, into which even a finger cannot be inserted because of their narrow opening and which remain ritually pure despite contact with a zav, nevertheless become impure if present under one roof with a corpse, then is it not right that a mat, which can become impure due to contact with a zav, will similarly become impure if present under one roof with a corpse?

וְקָמַיְיתֵי לַהּ בֵּין לְטוּמְאַת עֶרֶב, בֵּין לְטוּמְאַת שִׁבְעָה. וְאַמַּאי? אֵימָא: אַהֲנִי קַל וָחוֹמֶר לְטוּמְאַת עֶרֶב, וְאַהֲנִי דַּיּוֹ לְאַפּוֹקֵי טוּמְאַת שִׁבְעָה!

And the tanna cites this a fortiori inference both to derive the halakha that the mat becomes ritually impure with impurity that lasts until nightfall, as it would if it were to come into contact with a zav, and to derive that the mat becomes ritually impure with impurity that lasts for seven days, as would any vessel that contracted ritual impurity from a corpse. And why does he do so? Say instead that the a fortiori inference is effective in deriving the halakha that the mat can contract ritual impurity from a corpse, but only with regard to rendering it impure until nightfall, and also say that the principle: It is sufficient, is effective by limiting the scope of the a fortiori inference to exclude the possibility that the mat would be rendered impure for seven days.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כְּבָר רְמָא נִיהֲלֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר זְכַרְיָה לְאַבָּיֵי, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: תַּנָּא – מִמַּפָּץ בְּשֶׁרֶץ מַיְיתֵי לַהּ, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: מַפָּץ בְּשֶׁרֶץ מִנַּיִין? וְדִין הוּא, וּמָה פַּכִּין קְטַנִּים – שֶׁטְּהוֹרִים בְּזָב, טְמֵאִין בְּשֶׁרֶץ; מַפָּץ – שֶׁטָּמֵא בְּזָב, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא טָמֵא בְּשֶׁרֶץ?

Ravina said to Rav Aḥa: This question was already raised by Rav Naḥman bar Zekharya to Abaye, and Abaye said to him in response: This tanna does not derive the halakha with regard to the mat through an a fortiori inference from the case of a zav. Rather, he derives it from the halakha of a mat that came into contact with the carcass of a creeping animal, and this is what he is saying: The first derivation is as follows: From where is it derived that a mat is susceptible to impurity imparted by the carcass of a creeping animal? And it is a logical derivation based on an a fortiori inference: And just as small vessels, which remain pure despite contact with a zav, nevertheless become impure from contact with the carcass of a creeping animal, is it not right that a mat, which becomes impure from the impurity of a zav, will likewise become impure from contact with the carcass of a creeping animal?

אֶלָּא מַפָּץ בְּמֵת מִנַּיִין? נֶאֱמַר ״בֶּגֶד וָעוֹר״ בְּשֶׁרֶץ, וְנֶאֱמַר ״בֶּגֶד וָעוֹר״ בְּמֵת; מָה ״בֶּגֶד וָעוֹר״ הָאָמוּר בְּשֶׁרֶץ – מַפָּץ טָמֵא בּוֹ, אַף ״בֶּגֶד וָעוֹר״ הָאָמוּר בְּמֵת – מַפָּץ טָמֵא בּוֹ.

The second derivation is as follows: But from where is it derived that a mat contracts impurity from a corpse? It is derived through a verbal analogy. With regard to impurity imparted by the carcass of a creeping animal, it is stated: “Or a garment or leather” (Leviticus 11:32), and with regard to impurity imparted by a corpse it is stated: “A garment, or anything made of leather” (Numbers 31:20). Just as with regard to the terms “garment” and “leather” stated with regard to a creeping animal, a mat becomes impure from it, so too with regard to the terms “garment” and “leather” stated with regard to a corpse, a mat becomes impure from it.

מוּפְנֶה; דְּאִי לָא מוּפְנֶה, אִיכָּא לְמִפְרַךְ: מָה לְשֶׁרֶץ – שֶׁכֵּן מְטַמֵּא בְּכַעֲדָשָׁה, תֹּאמַר בְּמֵת – שֶׁאֵין מְטַמֵּא בְּכַעֲדָשָׁה, אֶלָּא בִּכְזַיִת.

The Gemara notes: It must be that the words “garment” and “leather” are free, i.e., those terms must be extraneous in their contexts, and the Torah included them for the express purpose of establishing the verbal analogy, as a verbal analogy that is based on otherwise extraneous terms cannot be logically refuted. Because if these terms are not free, the verbal analogy can be refuted: What is unique about a creeping animal? It is unique in that it renders items impure even by means of contact with a lentil-bulk of a creeping animal. Shall you also say that this is the case with regard to a corpse, whose halakhot are less strict in that it does not render items impure by means of contact with a lentil-bulk of a corpse but rather by means of contact with an olive-bulk? Unless the terms are free, the analogy can be refuted.

לָאיֵי אִפְּנוֹיֵי מוּפְנֶה – מִכְּדֵי שֶׁרֶץ אִתַּקַּשׁ לְשִׁכְבַת זֶרַע, דִּכְתִיב: ״אוֹ אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר תֵּצֵא וְגוֹ׳״, וּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ: ״אוֹ אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִגַּע בְּכׇל שֶׁרֶץ״; וּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ בְּשִׁכְבַת זֶרַע: ״וְכׇל בֶּגֶד וְכׇל עוֹר אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה עָלָיו שִׁכְבַת זָרַע״.

The Gemara affirms: Indeed, the terms are free. The Gemara proves that the terms “garment” and “leather” are extraneous in their context. Now, since ritual impurity imparted by contact with a creeping animal is juxtaposed to ritual impurity imparted by contact with semen, as it is written: “And one who comes into contact with anyone impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, or a man from whom semen is emitted” (Leviticus 22:4), and juxtaposed to that verse is the verse: “Or a man who touches any creeping animal which makes him impure, or a person who may make him impure with any impurity that he has” (Leviticus 22:5); and it is written with regard to the impurity of semen: “And every garment and all leather that has semen on it shall be washed with water and will be impure until evening” (Leviticus 15:17), since the verses appear next to each other, the halakhot of each can be derived from the other.

״בֶּגֶד וָעוֹר״ דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא בְּשֶׁרֶץ – לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ לְאַפְנוֹיֵי.

Consequently, why do I need the words “garment” and “leather” that the Merciful One wrote with regard to a creeping animal? The relevant halakha could be derived from the halakhot of seminal impurity. Consequently, learn from it that “garment” and “leather” were mentioned to render them free, i.e., extraneous, but the Torah included them for the express purpose of establishing the verbal analogy.

וְאַכַּתִּי מוּפְנֶה מִצַּד אֶחָד הוּא! הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מוּפְנֶה מִצַּד אֶחָד – לְמֵידִין וְאֵין מְשִׁיבִין, שַׁפִּיר; אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לְמֵידִין וּמְשִׁיבִין, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara comments: And still, the terms “garment” and “leather” are free only from one side of the verbal analogy, because although the terms “garment” and “leather,” stated with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a creeping animal, are extraneous in their context, as the relevant halakha could have been derived in another manner, those terms stated with regard to impurity imparted by a corpse are not extraneous in their context. This works out well according to the one who says that with regard to a verbal analogy that is free from only one side, one can derive from it and one cannot refute it logically; it is well. But according to the one who says that one can derive a halakha from a verbal analogy of this kind and one can also refute it logically, what can be said? It has already been established that the carcass of a creeping animal is stricter in some senses than a corpse.

דְּמֵת נָמֵי אִפְּנוֹיֵי מוּפְנֶה – מִכְּדֵי מֵת אִתַּקַּשׁ לְשִׁכְבַת זֶרַע, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהַנּוֹגֵעַ בְּכׇל טְמֵא נֶפֶשׁ, אוֹ אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר תֵּצֵא מִמֶּנּוּ וְגוֹ׳״; וּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ בְּשִׁכְבַת זֶרַע: ״וְכׇל בֶּגֶד וְכׇל עוֹר אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה עָלָיו שִׁכְבַת זָרַע״; ״בֶּגֶד וָעוֹר״ דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא בְּמֵת – לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ לְאַפְנוֹיֵי, וְהָוֵי מוּפְנֶה מִשְּׁנֵי צְדָדִין.

The Gemara answers: The terms “garment” and “leather,” as stated with regard to impurity imparted by a corpse, are also free. Since the impurity of a corpse is juxtaposed with that of semen, as it is written: “And one who comes into contact with anyone impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, or a man from whom semen is emitted” (Leviticus 22:4), and it is written with regard to semen: “And every garment and all leather that has semen on it” (Leviticus 15:17), why do I need the terms “garment” and “leather” that the Merciful One wrote with regard to impurity imparted by a corpse? Learn from it that they are mentioned in order to render them free, and therefore it is free from both sides.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: דּוּן מִינַּהּ – וְאוֹקֵי בְּאַתְרַאּ; אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: דּוּן מִינַּהּ וּמִינַּהּ, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara questions this from a different angle: This works out well according to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it and interpret it according to its new place. This would mean that the halakha that a mat becomes impure from a corpse is derived from the halakha that a mat becomes impure from semen, but the details of that impurity, i.e., the length of the time it is impure, are interpreted according to the halakhot of impurity imparted by a corpse, for seven days. But according to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it and infer the details of the halakha from it as well, which would mean that the details of the impurity would also be interpreted according to the halakhot of impurity imparted by semen, what can be said? According to the latter opinion, it should be concluded that just as the impurity imparted to a mat by the carcass of a creeping animal lasts only until nightfall, so too, a mat rendered impure by a corpse remains impure only until nightfall.

אָמַר רָבָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְכִבַּסְתֶּם בִּגְדֵיכֶם בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי״ – כׇּל טְמָאוֹת שֶׁאַתֶּם מִטַּמְּאִין בְּמֵת, לֹא יְהוּ פְּחוּתִין מִשִּׁבְעָה.

In response to this, Rava said: This opinion does not lead to that conclusion, as there is a Torah edict indicating otherwise. The verse states (Numbers 31:24): “And you shall wash your garments on the seventh day.” This teaches that any ritually impure items that you render impure due to contact with a corpse must remain impure for a period of no less than seven days. Therefore, since it has been inferred that the mat is susceptible to the impurity imparted by a corpse, it automatically falls into the same category of other items similarly rendered impure by a corpse and must remain impure for a period of at least seven days.

וּתְהֵא שֵׁן וָרֶגֶל חַיָּיב בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר – וּמָה קֶרֶן, שֶׁבִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק אֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם אֶלָּא חֲצִי נֶזֶק – בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים חַיֶּיבֶת; שֵׁן וָרֶגֶל, שֶׁבִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק מְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁבִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים חַיָּיב?

§ Up to this point, the Gemara discussed how to properly apply the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. It now returns to discussing the main subject of the mishna, which is the various views concerning Goring, the primary category of damage. The Gemara suggests: And let one be held liable for Eating and Trampling if these take place in the public domain. This can be inferred via an a fortiori inference, as follows: And if with regard to damage classified as Goring, for which, if it took place on the property of the injured party, according to the Rabbis one is liable to pay only half the cost of the damage, yet the owner of the animal is nevertheless liable for damage caused in the public domain, then with regard to damage classified as Eating and Trampling, whose halakhot are more strict, as one pays the full cost of the damage caused on the property of the injured party, is it not right that one should be liable for damage caused in the public domain?

אָמַר קְרָא: ״וּבִעֵר בִּשְׂדֵה אַחֵר״ – וְלֹא בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים.

The Gemara rejects this: The verse states with regard to Eating or Trampling (Exodus 22:4): “And it consumed in the field of another,” meaning that one’s liability for this form of damage is limited to damage caused on the property of the injured party, but not for damage caused in the public domain.