בבא קמא נ

בבא קמא נ

בְּבוֹר בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ – רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: בּוֹר בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ נָמֵי חַיָּיב, דִּכְתִיב: ״בַּעַל הַבּוֹר״ – בְּבוֹר דְּאִית לֵיהּ בְּעָלִים קָאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא,

in the case where one dug the pit on his own property and then renounced ownership of the surrounding area. Consequently, the entire area except for the pit is now open to public passage. In this case, Rabbi Akiva maintains that one who digs a pit on his own property is also liable, not only when the pit is located in the public domain, as it is written: “The owner of the pit shall pay” (Exodus 21:34). Clearly, the Merciful One is referring to a pit that has an owner. Therefore, the owner of the pit pays even if it is located on private property.

וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל סָבַר: בַּעַל הַתַּקָּלָה.

And Rabbi Yishmael maintains that “the owner of the pit” means that the one responsible for the hazard is liable even if he dug the pit in the public domain and then renounced ownership of it. But one who digs a pit on his own property is not liable.

אֶלָּא מַאי ״זֶהוּ בּוֹר הָאָמוּר בַּתּוֹרָה״ דְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא? זֶהוּ בּוֹר שֶׁפָּתַח בּוֹ הַכָּתוּב תְּחִלָּה לְתַשְׁלוּמִין.

The Gemara asks: Rather, according to Rabba’s explanation, what is meant by the clause: This is the case of Pit that is stated in the Torah, in reference to digging a pit on one’s property, that Rabbi Akiva states? According to him, one is liable for damage in all cases, including digging in the public domain. The Gemara answers: It means that this is the pit with which the verse initially introduces the subject of compensation for damage caused. In that context, the Torah states: “The owner of the pit shall pay” (Exodus 21:34), indicating that even a pit owned on one’s private property renders one liable.

וְרַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: בְּבוֹר בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּמִחַיַּיב, מַאי טַעְמָא? ״בַּעַל הַבּוֹר״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא – בְּבוֹר דְּאִית לֵיהּ בְּעָלִים עָסְקִינַן.

And Rav Yosef said that one can explain the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva differently: With regard to one who dug a pit on his private property and then renounced ownership of the property aside from the pit, everyone agrees that he is liable. What is the reason? Since the Merciful One states: “The owner of the pit,” it indicates that we are dealing with a pit that has an owner.

כִּי פְּלִיגִי – בְּבוֹר בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים; רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל סָבַר: בּוֹר בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים נָמֵי חַיָּיב, דִּכְתִיב ״כִּי יִפְתַּח״ וְ״כִי יִכְרֶה״ – אִם עַל פְּתִיחָה חַיָּיב, עַל כְּרִיָּיה לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? אֶלָּא שֶׁעַל עִסְקֵי פְתִיחָה וְעַל עִסְקֵי כְרִיָּיה בָּאָה לוֹ.

When they disagree, it is in a case where the pit was dug in the public domain. Rabbi Yishmael maintains that one is also liable for a pit dug in the public domain, as it is written: “And if a man shall open a pit,” and: “If a man shall dig a pit” (Exodus 21:33), which raises the question: If he is liable for opening a pit by removing the cover of a pit that has already been dug, then is it not all the more so obvious that he should be liable for digging a new pit? Rather, the verse means that the responsibility for the pit comes to him by engaging in opening the pit and by engaging in digging the pit. Although he does not own the area itself, he is liable for creating a public hazard.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – הָנְהוּ מִיצְרָךְ צְרִיכִי; דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״כִּי יִפְתַּח״ – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: פּוֹתֵחַ הוּא דְּסַגִּי לֵיהּ בְּכִסּוּי, כּוֹרֶה לָא סַגִּי לֵיהּ בְּכִסּוּי עַד דְּטָאֵים לֵיהּ.

And Rabbi Akiva, by contrast, holds that one is liable only in the case of a pit located on private property, where he renounced ownership of the property aside from the pit, and one cannot derive otherwise from any extraneous phrases. This is because these phrases are necessary, for if the Merciful One wrote only: “If a man shall open a pit” (Exodus 21:33), I would say that it is specifically when one opens the covering of a pit that has already been dug that it is sufficient for him to place a covering on it to absolve himself of responsibility for damage it causes. This is the case where the Torah states: “And not cover it” (Exodus 21:33). But if one actually digs a pit, it would not be sufficient to place a covering on it, and one would not be exempt from damages unless he completely packs it.

וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״כִּי יִכְרֶה״ – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: כְּרִיָּיה הוּא דְּבָעֵי כִּסּוּי, מִשּׁוּם דַּעֲבַד מַעֲשֶׂה; אֲבָל פּוֹתֵחַ – דְּלָא עֲבַד מַעֲשֶׂה, אֵימָא כִּסּוּי נָמֵי לָא בָּעֵי; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

And conversely, if the Merciful One had written only: “If a man shall dig,” I would say that it is specifically in a case of digging that a covering is required to exempt one from liability, because he performed an action of creating the pit. But for merely opening it, where one has not performed an action, say that he does not require a covering to absolve him of liability. Therefore, the Torah teaches us that he is liable for damage caused by a pit in both cases, and one should interpret the verse that states: “The owner of the pit” (Exodus 21:34), in its plain sense, i.e., that he is the owner of the pit because it is located on his private property. Accordingly, one would not be liable for a pit dug in the public domain.

וְאֶלָּא מַאי ״זֶהוּ בּוֹר הָאָמוּר בַּתּוֹרָה״ דְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל? זֶהוּ בּוֹר שֶׁפָּתַח בּוֹ הַכָּתוּב תְּחִלָּה לִנְזָקִין.

The Gemara asks: But rather, according to Rav Yosef’s explanation, what is meant by the clause: This is the case of Pit that is stated in the Torah, in reference to digging a pit in the public domain, that Rabbi Yishmael states? Isn’t one liable for any pit, including one dug on his own property? The Gemara answers: It means that this is the pit with which the verse initially introduces the subject of damage caused by Pit, as explained by Rabbi Yishmael above. Only afterward does it state: “The owner of the pit shall pay,” referring to a pit dug on one’s own property.

מֵיתִיבִי: הַחוֹפֵר בּוֹר בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וּפְתָחוֹ לִרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד – פָּטוּר; וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ רַשַּׁאי לַעֲשׂוֹת כֵּן, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין עוֹשִׂין חָלָל תַּחַת רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: One who digs a pit whose hollow space is in the public domain and then opens its entrance into private property is exempt, and this is the halakha even though he does not have permission to do so. The reason he does not have permission to do so is that one may not create a hollow space under the public domain.

הַחוֹפֵר בּוֹרוֹת, שִׁיחִין וּמְעָרוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד, וּפְתָחוֹ לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – חַיָּיב. וְהַחוֹפֵר בּוֹרוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד הַסְּמוּכָה לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, כְּגוֹן אֵלּוּ הַחוֹפְרִים לְאוּשִּׁין – פָּטוּר. וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה מְחַיֵּיב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה מְחִיצָה עֲשָׂרָה, אוֹ עַד שֶׁיַּרְחִיק מִמְּקוֹם דְּרִיסַת רַגְלֵי אָדָם וּמִמְּקוֹם דְּרִיסַת רַגְלֵי בְהֵמָה – אַרְבָּעָה טְפָחִים.

One who digs pits, ditches, and caves on private property and then opens their entrances into the public domain is liable. In addition, one who digs pits on private property that is adjacent to the public domain but not actually located in the public domain itself, such as these people who dig foundations [ushin] for their houses or walls, is exempt. But Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, deems one liable even for damage caused by pits made to lay foundations, unless he builds a partition that is ten handbreadths high in front of the pits, or unless he distances them by four handbreadths from the area where pedestrians walk and from the area where animals walk.

טַעְמָא דִּלְאוּשִּׁין, הָא לָאו לְאוּשִּׁין – חַיָּיב;

The Gemara infers: The reason for the exemption is that one digs for the purpose of foundations, which is the usual and accepted practice, but if he did not dig for the purpose of foundations, he is liable. Although he did so on his own property, he is nevertheless liable, since people walk there.

הָא מַנִּי? בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבָּה – רֵישָׁא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, וְסֵיפָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.

The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? Granted, according to Rabba, the first clause, where one is seemingly exempt for opening a pit onto private property even if he subsequently renounced ownership of the area, can be established in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and the last clause can be established in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that one is liable for a pit dug on his own property if it is open to public traffic.

אֶלָּא לְרַב יוֹסֵף, בִּשְׁלָמָא סֵיפָא – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל; אֶלָּא רֵישָׁא מַנִּי? לָא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, וְלָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא!

But according to Rav Yosef’s explanation, granted, with regard to the last clause, all agree that this is the halakha. But with regard to the first clause, which exempts one who digs a pit on his own property, in accordance with whose opinion is this? It appears to be neither that of Rabbi Yishmael nor that of Rabbi Akiva, since Rav Yosef explained that both of them maintain that one is liable for a pit on his own property, even if he subsequently renounces ownership of the area.

אָמַר לְךָ רַב יוֹסֵף: כּוּלַּהּ דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל הִיא, וְרֵישָׁא – שֶׁלֹּא הִפְקִיר לֹא רְשׁוּתוֹ וְלֹא בּוֹרוֹ.

The Gemara answers that Rav Yosef could have said to you: Everyone agrees with the entire passage. As for the first clause, which exempts one who digs a pit under the public domain and opens it onto his own property, it is referring to a case where one did not renounce ownership of either his property or his pit. This certainly is not included in the category of Pit with regard to damages, and the owner is therefore exempt.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: הַשְׁתָּא דְּאוֹקֵימְתַּהּ לְרַב יוֹסֵף לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל, לְרַבָּה נָמֵי לָא תּוֹקְמַהּ כְּתַנָּאֵי –

Rav Ashi said: Now that you have interpreted Rav Yosef’s explanation of the baraita as being in accordance with all opinions, then also according to Rabba, you are not required to establish it as a dispute between tanna’im.

מִדְּרֵישָׁא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, סֵיפָא נָמֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל; וְטַעְמָא דִּלְאוּשִּׁין, הָא לָאו לְאוּשִּׁין חַיָּיב – כְּגוֹן דְּאַרְוַוח אַרְווֹחֵי לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים.

Rather, one can say that since the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who exempts one who renounces ownership of his property but not the pit, the last clause can also be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. And it was previously inferred that the reason for the exemption when digging on one’s private property adjacent to the public domain is that one digs to lay foundations. But if it is not to lay foundations, one is liable. For instance, in a case where one widened the pit unnecessarily, extending it into the public domain, he has effectively dug a pit in the public domain itself.

מֵיתִיבִי: הַחוֹפֵר בּוֹר בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד, וּפְתָחוֹ לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – חַיָּיב. בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד הַסְּמוּכָה לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – פָּטוּר. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבָּה, כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל הִיא. אֶלָּא לְרַב יוֹסֵף, בִּשְׁלָמָא רֵישָׁא – רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, אֶלָּא סֵיפָא מַנִּי? לָא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל וְלָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא!

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: One who digs a pit on private property and opens it into the public domain is liable. But if he dug it on private property that was adjacent to the public domain, he is exempt. Granted, according to Rabba, this mishna is entirely in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who does not hold one liable for digging on his own property. But according to Rav Yosef, granted, the first clause works out well in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who holds one liable even for digging in the public domain, but whose opinion is the latter clause? It appears to be neither that of Rabbi Yishmael nor that of Rabbi Akiva.

אָמַר לָךְ: בְּחוֹפֵר לְאוּשִּׁין, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.

The Gemara answers that Rav Yosef could have said to you: The latter clause of this baraita is referring to one who digs to lay foundations, and therefore all agree with the ruling.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: חָפַר וּפָתַח וּמָסַר לָרַבִּים – פָּטוּר. חָפַר וּפָתַח וְלֹא מָסַר לָרַבִּים – חַיָּיב, וְכֵן מִנְהָגוֹ שֶׁל נְחוּנְיָא חוֹפֵר בּוֹרוֹת שִׁיחִין וּמְעָרוֹת, שֶׁהָיָה חוֹפֵר וּפוֹתֵחַ וּמוֹסֵר לָרַבִּים. וּכְשֶׁשָּׁמְעוּ חֲכָמִים בַּדָּבָר, אָמְרוּ: קִיֵּים זֶה הֲלָכָה זוֹ. הֲלָכָה זוֹ וְתוּ לָא?! אֶלָּא אֵימָא: אַף הֲלָכָה זוֹ.

§ The Sages taught: If someone dug or opened a well and transferred it to the public for their use, he is exempt from damage caused by the well. If he dug or opened a well and did not transfer it to the public, he is liable. And this was the practice of Neḥunya the digger of pits, ditches, and caves, who would dig, open, and transfer them to the public so that there would be wells of water for public use. When the Sages heard about the matter, they said: This individual has fulfilled this halakha. The Gemara asks: Only this halakha and no more? Isn’t it well known that Neḥunya was a great man? Rather, say: He fulfilled even this halakha and did not forget to transfer the wells to the public.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּבִתּוֹ שֶׁל נְחוּנְיָא חוֹפֵר שִׁיחִין שֶׁנָּפְלָה לְבוֹר גָּדוֹל, בָּאוּ וְהוֹדִיעוּ אֶת רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן דּוֹסָא. שָׁעָה רִאשׁוֹנָה אָמַר לָהֶם: שָׁלוֹם. שְׁנִיָּה אָמַר לָהֶם: שָׁלוֹם. שְׁלִישִׁית אָמַר לָהֶם: עָלְתָה.

Having mentioned the deeds of Neḥunya, the Gemara relates that the Sages taught: An incident occurred involving the daughter of Neḥunya the ditchdigger, where she fell into a large cistern and no one could extricate her from it. They came and informed Rabbi Ḥanina ben Dosa so that he would pray on her behalf. When the first hour had passed from the time of her fall, he said to them: She is at peace and unharmed. After the second hour, he said to them: She is at peace. After the third hour, he said to them: She has ascended from the well, and indeed this was the case.

אָמְרוּ לָהּ: מִי הֶעֱלִךְ? אָמְרָה לָהֶם: זָכָר שֶׁל רְחֵלִים נִזְדַּמֵּן לִי, וְזָקֵן אֶחָד מַנְהִיגוֹ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: נָבִיא אַתָּה? אָמַר לָהֶם: ״לֹא נָבִיא אָנֹכִי, וְלֹא בֶּן נָבִיא אָנֹכִי״, אֶלָּא כָּךְ אָמַרְתִּי: דָּבָר שֶׁאוֹתוֹ צַדִּיק מִצְטַעֵר בּוֹ – יִכָּשֵׁל בּוֹ זַרְעוֹ?

They said to her: Who brought you up out of the well? She said to them: A male sheep, i.e., a ram, happened to come to me, and a certain old man, i.e., Abraham, was leading it, and he pulled me out. They said to Rabbi Ḥanina ben Dosa: Are you a prophet? How did you know she had ascended? Rabbi Ḥanina ben Dosa said to them: “I am no prophet, neither am I a prophet’s son” (Amos 7:14), but this is what I said to myself: Shall the offspring of Neḥunya stumble by means of the very matter which distressed that righteous man?

אָמַר רַבִּי אַחָא: אַף עַל פִּי כֵן, מֵת בְּנוֹ בַּצָּמָא. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וּסְבִיבָיו נִשְׂעֲרָה מְאֹד״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא מְדַקְדֵּק עִם סְבִיבָיו אֲפִילּוּ כְּחוּט הַשַּׂעֲרָה. רַבִּי נְחוּנְיָא אָמַר מֵהָכָא: ״אֵל נַעֲרָץ בְּסוֹד קְדֹשִׁים רַבָּה, וְנוֹרָא עַל כׇּל סְבִיבָיו״.

Rabbi Aḥa says: Although Neḥunya ensured that others would have water, even so, his son died of thirst, fulfilling that which is stated: “And around Him it storms [nisara] mightily” (Psalms 50:3). This teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, is scrupulous with those around Him, i.e., the righteous, even to the extent of a hairsbreadth [hasa’ara], so that even minor transgressions elicit a severe punishment. Rabbi Neḥunya says: The same idea may be learned from here, in the following verse: “A God dreaded in the great council of the holy ones, and feared by all those that surround Him” (Psalms 89:8), indicating that God is most careful and exacting with those that surround Him, i.e., the righteous.

אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: כׇּל הָאוֹמֵר הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא וַתְּרָן הוּא, יִוָּתְרוּ חַיָּיו, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הַצּוּר תָּמִים פׇּעֳלוֹ, כִּי כׇל דְּרָכָיו מִשְׁפָּט״. אָמַר רַבִּי חָנָא וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר נַחְמָנִי, מַאי דִּכְתִיב:

Rabbi Ḥanina says: Anyone who states that the Holy One, Blessed be He, is forgiving [vateran] of transgressions, his life will be relinquished [yivatru], as it is stated: “The Rock, His work is perfect, for all His ways are justice” (Deuteronomy 32:4). In other words, God does not waive heavenly justice. Rabbi Ḥana says, and some say that Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says: What is the meaning of that which is written

״אֶרֶךְ אַפַּיִם״ – וְלָא כְּתִיב ״אֶרֶךְ אַף״? אֶרֶךְ אַפַּיִם לַצַּדִּיקִים וְלָרְשָׁעִים.

in the verse that recounts the thirteen attributes of mercy: “Long-suffering [erekh appayim]” (Exodus 34:6), using the plural form, and it is not written as erekh af, in the singular? In order to teach that He is long-suffering for both the righteous and for the wicked and does not punish them immediately for their transgressions.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: לֹא יְסַקֵּל אָדָם מֵרְשׁוּתוֹ לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים. מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאָדָם אֶחָד שֶׁהָיָה מְסַקֵּל מֵרְשׁוּתוֹ לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וּמְצָאוֹ חָסִיד אֶחָד. אָמַר לוֹ: רֵיקָה, מִפְּנֵי מָה אַתָּה מְסַקֵּל מֵרְשׁוּת שֶׁאֵינָהּ שֶׁלָּךְ לִרְשׁוּת שֶׁלָּךְ? לִגְלֵג עָלָיו.

§ The Sages taught: A person should not throw stones from his property into the public domain. An incident occurred involving a certain individual who was throwing stones from his property into the public domain, and a certain pious man found him. The latter said to him: Lowlife [reika], for what reason are you throwing stones from property that is not yours into your property? The man mocked him, as he did not understand what he meant, as the property from which he was throwing stones was his.

לְיָמִים נִצְרַךְ לִמְכּוֹר שָׂדֵהוּ, וְהָיָה מְהַלֵּךְ בְּאוֹתוֹ רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וְנִכְשָׁל בְּאוֹתָן אֲבָנִים; אָמַר: יָפֶה אָמַר לִי אוֹתוֹ חָסִיד – מִפְּנֵי מָה אַתָּה מְסַקֵּל מֵרְשׁוּת שֶׁאֵינָהּ שֶׁלָּךְ לִרְשׁוּת שֶׁלָּךְ.

Some days later, he was forced to sell his field from which he had thrown the stones. And he was walking in the same public domain into which he had thrown them, and he stumbled on those same stones. He said: That pious man said it well to me when he said: For what reason are you throwing stones from property that is not yours into your own property, since that property no longer belongs to me, and only the public domain remains mine to use.

מַתְנִי׳ הַחוֹפֵר בּוֹר בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וְנָפַל לְתוֹכוֹ שׁוֹר אוֹ חֲמוֹר – חַיָּיב. אֶחָד הַחוֹפֵר בּוֹר, שִׁיחַ וּמְעָרָה, חֲרִיצִין וּנְעִיצִין – חַיָּיב. אִם כֵּן לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר ״בּוֹר״? מָה בּוֹר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית – עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים; אַף כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית – עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים. הָיוּ פְּחוּתִין מֵעֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, וְנָפַל לְתוֹכוֹ שׁוֹר אוֹ חֲמוֹר, וּמֵת – פָּטוּר. וְאִם הוּזַּק בּוֹ – חַיָּיב.

MISHNA: In the case of one who digs a pit in the public domain and an ox or a donkey fell into it, he is liable. The halakha is the same for one who digs either a pit; a ditch, which is narrow and long; or a cave, which is rectangular and roofed; trenches and water channels. In all these cases he is liable. If so, why is the verse stated as referring to a pit, as it states: “And if a man shall open a pit” (Exodus 21:33)? To teach that just as a pit that has sufficient depth to cause death when falling into it is at least ten handbreadths deep, so too, any other excavations that have sufficient depth to cause death may be no less than ten handbreadths. If any of the types of excavations were less than ten handbreadths deep, and an ox or a donkey fell into one of them and died, the digger of the excavation is exempt. But if it was injured in it, not killed, he is liable to pay damages.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב: בּוֹר שֶׁחִיְּיבָה עָלָיו תּוֹרָה – לְהֶבְלוֹ, וְלֹא לַחֲבָטוֹ. אַלְמָא קָסָבַר: חֲבָטָה – קַרְקַע עוֹלָם הוּא דְּמַזְּקָא לֵיהּ.

GEMARA: Rav says: Damage by Pit for which the Torah obligates one to pay is referring specifically to damage caused by the pit’s lethal fumes, i.e., suffocation, but not to damage caused by the impact of hitting the ground, for which the digger of the pit is exempt from paying compensation. The Gemara continues to explain: Apparently, it can be inferred that Rav maintains that with regard to the impact of hitting the bottom of the pit, it is merely the ground that injures him. The digger of the pit does not own the ground, so it is not a case where his property caused damage. Therefore, he does not bear responsibility for the damage.

וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: לְהֶבְלוֹ, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן לַחֲבָטוֹ. וְאִם תֹּאמַר: לַחֲבָטוֹ אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה, וְלֹא לְהֶבְלוֹ – הַתּוֹרָה הֵעִידָה עַל הַבּוֹר, וַאֲפִילּוּ מָלֵא סְפוֹגִין שֶׁל צֶמֶר.

And Shmuel says: The Torah renders one liable for damage caused by its lethal fumes, and all the more so for damage resulting from the impact. Shmuel adds: And if you say that the Torah spoke only about liability for its impact and not for its lethal fumes, one could respond that the Torah testifies about a pit without specifying for which type of pit one is liable, and this includes even a pit full of woolen sponges [sefogin], which would completely absorb the impact.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דַּעֲבַד גּוֹבַהּ בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים; לְרַב – אַגּוֹבַהּ לָא מִיחַיַּיב, לִשְׁמוּאֵל – אַגּוֹבַהּ נָמֵי מִיחַיַּיב.

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinions of Rav and Shmuel, given that falling into any pit involves injury due to both the lethal fumes and the impact? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in the case where one fashioned a mound with a height of ten handbreadths in the public domain without digging, and an animal fell from this raised platform and died. According to Rav, the one who fashioned the mound is not liable for damage by Pit in the case of a mound, since there are no fumes, as the animal fell to the level ground. By contrast, according to Shmuel, he is also liable for damage by Pit in the case of a mound, since there is nevertheless an impact when hitting the ground.

מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַב? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְנָפַל״ – עַד שֶׁיִּפּוֹל דֶּרֶךְ נְפִילָה. וְלִשְׁמוּאֵל, ״וְנָפַל״ – כֹּל דְּהוּ מַשְׁמַע.

The Gemara asks: What is the source for the reasoning of Rav, that one is not liable in that case? The Gemara answers: Since the verse states: “And an ox or a donkey fall therein” (Exodus 21:33), indicating that there is no liability for damage by Pit unless the animal falls in the normal manner of falling, but not where it first climbed onto an elevated surface and then fell from there to the level ground. And according to Shmuel, the term: “And an ox or a donkey fall,” indicates any manner of falling, regardless of whether the animal fell into a hole or fell to the ground from an elevated surface.

תְּנַן: אִם כֵּן לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר ״בּוֹר״? מָה בּוֹר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית – עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, אַף כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית – עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים. בִּשְׁלָמָא לִשְׁמוּאֵל – ״אַף כֹּל״ לְאֵתוֹיֵי גּוֹבַהּ. אֶלָּא לְרַב – ״אַף כֹּל״ לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי?

The Gemara challenges Rav’s opinion: We learned in the mishna: If so, why is the verse stated as referring to a pit, as it states: “And if a man shall open a pit” (Exodus 21:33)? To teach that just as a pit that has sufficient depth to cause death when falling into it is at least ten handbreadths deep, so too, any other excavations that have sufficient depth to cause death may be no less than ten handbreadths. Now, granted that according to Shmuel, the term: So too, any other, serves to include the case where the animal fell from a height of ten handbreadths, in which case the one who fashioned the mound would also be liable. But according to Rav, who exempts him in that case, what does the term: So too, any other, add?

לְאֵתוֹיֵי חֲרִיצִין וּנְעִיצִין. חֲרִיצִין וּנְעִיצִין בְּהֶדְיָא קָתָנֵי לְהוּ! תָּנֵי, וַהֲדַר מְפָרֵשׁ.

The Gemara answers: According to Rav, it serves to include trenches and water channels. The Gemara asks: But trenches and water channels are explicitly taught in the mishna. Why does the mishna then allude to them again? The Gemara answers: It first teaches the halakha about them and then explains its source in the Torah.

וְהָנֵי כּוּלְּהוּ דְּקָתָנֵי – לְמָה לִי? צְרִיכָא; דְּאִי תְּנָא בּוֹר, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: בּוֹר עֲשָׂרָה – הוּא דְּאִית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּקַטִּין וּכְרִיכָא; אֲבָל שִׁיחַ – דַּאֲרִיךְ, אֵימָא: בַּעֲשָׂרָה לֵית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא.

Having mentioned these details, the Gemara asks: And why do I need all these cases that are taught by the mishna? The Gemara answers: They are necessary, for had it taught only the case of a pit, I would say that it is specifically a pit of ten handbreadths that contains lethal fumes, because it is constricted and round. Therefore, this measurement suffices to cause death. But concerning a ditch, which is long, say that in a case where it is ten handbreadths deep, there are no lethal fumes and there is no liability. Therefore, the mishna teaches both the case of a pit and a ditch.

וְאִי תְּנָא שִׁיחַ, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: שִׁיחַ עֲשָׂרָה הוּא דְּאִית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּקַטִּין; אֲבָל מְעָרָה – דִּמְרַבְּעָא, אֵימָא: בַּעֲשָׂרָה לֵית בַּהּ הַבְלָא.

And furthermore, had the mishna taught the case of a ditch in addition to the pit, I would say that it is specifically a ditch of ten handbreadths that contains the necessary lethal fumes, because it is narrow. But concerning a cave, which is rectangular and not narrow, say that in a case where it is ten handbreadths deep, there are no lethal fumes and there is no liability. Therefore, the mishna teaches the case of a cave as well.

וְאִי תָּנֵי מְעָרָה, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: מְעָרָה בַּעֲשָׂרָה הוּא דְּאִית בַּהּ הַבְלָא, מִשּׁוּם דִּמְטַלְּלָא; אֲבָל חֲרִיצִין – דְּלָא מְטַלְּלִי, אֵימָא: בַּעֲשָׂרָה לֵית בְּהוּ הַבְלָא.

And furthermore, had the mishna taught the case of a cave in addition to the previous two, I would say that it is specifically a cave of ten handbreadths that contains lethal fumes, because it is covered. But concerning trenches, which are not covered, say that at a depth of ten handbreadths, there are no lethal fumes and there is no liability. Therefore, the mishna also teaches the case of trenches.

וְאִי תְּנָא חֲרִיצִין, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: חֲרִיצִין עֲשָׂרָה הוּא דְּאִית בְּהוּ הַבְלָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּלֵית בְּהוּ רְוִיחָא מִלְּעֵיל טְפֵי מִתַּתַּאי; אֲבָל נְעִיצִין – דִּרְוִיחִי מִלְּעֵיל טְפֵי מִתַּתַּאי, אֵימָא בַּעֲשָׂרָה לֵית בְּהוּ הַבְלָא; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

And finally, had the mishna taught the case of trenches in addition to the previous three, I would say that it is specifically trenches of ten handbreadths that contain lethal fumes, since they are no wider at the top than at the bottom. But with regard to channels, which are wider at the top than at the bottom, say that at a depth of ten handbreadths there are no lethal fumes and there is no liability. Therefore, the mishna teaches us the case of channels as well, and each subsequent case listed contains a novel aspect.

תְּנַן: הָיוּ פְּחוּתִין מֵעֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, וְנָפַל לְתוֹכוֹ שׁוֹר אוֹ חֲמוֹר, וָמֵת – פָּטוּר. וְאִם הוּזַּק בּוֹ – חַיָּיב. נָפַל לְתוֹכוֹ שׁוֹר אוֹ חֲמוֹר, וּמֵת – פָּטוּר; מַאי טַעְמָא – לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּלֵית בֵּיהּ חַבְטָה?

The Gemara raises a further challenge from that which we learned in the mishna: If any of the types of excavations were less than ten handbreadths deep, and an ox or a donkey fell into one of them and died, the digger of the excavation is exempt. But if it was injured, not killed, he is liable to pay damages. What is the reason for the ruling of: If an ox or a donkey fell into it and died, he is exempt? Is it not because at this height there is not sufficient impact, although there are lethal fumes?

לָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּלֵית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא. אִי הָכִי, אִם הוּזַּק בּוֹ חַיָּיב? הָא לֵית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא! אָמְרִי: אֵין הַבְלָא לְמִיתָה, וְיֵשׁ הַבְלָא לִנְזָקִין.

The Gemara responds: No, he is exempt because there are no lethal fumes. The Gemara challenges this: If that is so, that a pit less than ten handbreadths deep lacks sufficient lethal fumes, why is the one who dug it liable if the animal is injured; but there are no lethal fumes? The Gemara answers: There are not sufficient fumes to cause death, but there are sufficient fumes to cause damage.

הָהוּא תּוֹרָא דִּנְפַל לַאֲרִיתָּא דְּדַלָּאֵי, שַׁחְטֵיהּ מָרֵיהּ. טַרְפֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain ox that fell into a water channel [la’arita dedala’ei] whose depth was one cubit, i.e., six handbreadths. Because it suffered the impact of the fall, its owner assumed it would die and slaughtered it first, in order to eat the meat. Rav Naḥman, who was concerned that its organs were crushed by the fall, deemed it an animal with a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], which it is prohibited to consume.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: אִי שְׁקֵיל מָרֵיהּ דְּהַאי תּוֹרָא קַבָּא דְקִמְחָא, וַאֲזַל תְּנָא בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא: אִם שָׁהֲתָה מֵעֵת לְעֵת – כְּשֵׁירָה; לָא אַפְסְדֵיהּ לְתוֹרָא דְּשָׁוֵה כַּמָּה קַבֵּי. אַלְמָא קָסָבַר רַב נַחְמָן: יֵשׁ חֲבָטָה בְּפָחוֹת מֵעֲשָׂרָה.

Furthermore, Rav Naḥman said: If the owner of this ox had taken a kav of flour to bake into bread to eat instead of slaughtering his animal for its meat, and gone and learned in the study hall that although an ox that falls and hits the ground is considered tereifa if slaughtered immediately, if the animal remained alive for twenty-four hours and is then slaughtered, it is fit to eat, he would not have lost his ox that was worth several kav of flour. The Gemara notes: Apparently, Rav Naḥman maintains that there is an impact caused even by a pit that is less than ten handbreadths, as Rav Naḥman was concerned in this case that its organs were crushed and it was fatally wounded.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: הָיוּ פְּחוּתִין מֵעֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, וְנָפַל לְתוֹכוֹ שׁוֹר אוֹ חֲמוֹר, וּמֵת – פָּטוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּלֵית בֵּיהּ חַבְטָה?

Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Naḥman from the mishna: If any of the types of excavations were less than ten handbreadths deep, and an ox or a donkey fell into one of them and died, he is exempt. What is the reason for this? Is it not because there is no significant impact capable of causing death? If so, why is this animal deemed a tereifa?