בבא קמא ס

בבא קמא ס

סִלְתָּא, שְׁרָגָא, דְּהָהוּא וַדַּאי מַעֲשֵׂה דִידֵיהּ גָּרְמוּ.

of thin wood and a candle [sheraga], since in that case his own action, i.e., that of the one who sent the flame, definitely caused the fire to spread.

שִׁלַּח בְּיַד פִּקֵּחַ – הַפִּקֵּחַ חַיָּיב וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מַאן דְּתָנֵי ״לִיבָּה״ לָא מִשְׁתַּבַּשׁ, וּמַאן דְּתָנֵי ״נִיבָּה״ לָא מִשְׁתַּבַּשׁ.

The mishna teaches that if one sent a fire in the hand of a halakhically competent person, the halakhically competent person is liable…If another came and fanned the flame the one who fanned it is liable. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says with regard to the correct text of the mishna: The one who teaches it using the word fanned [libba] is not mistaken, and the one who teaches it using the word blew [nibba] is not mistaken.

מַאן דְּתָנֵי ״לִיבָּה״ לָא מִשְׁתַּבַּשׁ – דִּכְתִיב: ״בְּלַבַּת אֵשׁ״. וּמַאן דְּתָנֵי ״נִיבָּה״ לָא מִשְׁתַּבַּשׁ – דִּכְתִיב: ״בּוֹרֵא נִיב שְׂפָתָיִם״.

Rav Naḥman explained: The one who teaches using the word fanned [libba] is not mistaken, as it is written: “With a flame [belabbat] of fire” (Exodus 3:2), and the one who teaches using the word blew [nibba] is not mistaken, as it is written: “He creates the fruit [niv] of the lips” (Isaiah 57:19), which can be interpreted as referring to the breath of the lips.

לִבְּתָה הָרוּחַ – כּוּלָּן פְּטוּרִין. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: לִיבָּה וְלִבְּתָה הָרוּחַ, אִם יֵשׁ בְּלִבּוּיוֹ כְּדֵי לְלַבּוֹתָהּ – חַיָּיב, וְאִם לָאו – פָּטוּר.

§ The mishna teaches: If the wind fanned the flames, all the people involved are exempt, indicating that even if one fanned the fire at the same time that the wind was blowing he is exempt. The Gemara cites a baraita in which the Sages taught the same idea explicitly: In a case where one fanned the flame and at the same time the wind fanned it, if his fanning has sufficient strength by itself to fan the flames, he is liable for damage caused by the fire, since even without the wind the fire would have spread. But if his fanning alone was not sufficient, he is exempt.

אַמַּאי? לֶיהֱוֵי כְּזוֹרֶה וְרוּחַ מְסַיַּיעְתּוֹ!

The Gemara asks: Why is he exempt if his fanning is not sufficient? Let it be the same halakha as the case of one who winnows grain on Shabbat by throwing it into the air, and the wind assists him by separating the chaff from the grain. In such a case he is liable for desecrating Shabbat, despite the fact that without the assistance of the wind he would not have been able to winnow the grain.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁלִּיבָּה מִצַּד אֶחָד, וְלִבַּתּוּ הָרוּחַ מִצַּד אַחֵר. רָבָא אָמַר: כְּגוֹן שֶׁלִּיבָּה בְּרוּחַ מְצוּיָה, וְלִבַּתּוּ הָרוּחַ בְּרוּחַ שֶׁאֵינָהּ מְצוּיָה. רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר: כְּגוֹן דְּצַמְּרַהּ צַמּוֹרֵי.

Abaye said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he fanned the fire from one side and the wind fanned it from the other side, and the fire was blown in the direction the wind was blowing. Therefore, it is clear that his fanning did not help the fire spread, so he is exempt. Rava says: We are dealing with a case where he fanned it along with a typical wind, and this was not sufficient to cause the fire to spread, and suddenly an atypical wind came and fanned it. Therefore, he is exempt since he could not have anticipated this. Rabbi Zeira said: We are dealing with a case where he only heated [detzamera tzamurei] the fire by breathing on it, rather than fanning it properly.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: כִּי אָמְרִינַן זוֹרֶה וְרוּחַ מְסַיַּיעְתּוֹ – הָנֵי מִילֵּי לְעִנְיַן שַׁבָּת, דִּמְלֶאכֶת מַחְשֶׁבֶת אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה; אֲבָל הָכָא – גְּרָמָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא, וּגְרָמָא בִּנְזָקִין פָּטוּר.

Rav Ashi said: When we say that one is liable in a case where he winnows and the wind assists him, this statement applies with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat. With regard to Shabbat, the principle is that the Torah prohibited planned, constructive labor. The primary consideration is that his objective is accomplished, even if he did not perform the entire act of labor. But here, in the context of damages, he is considered to have caused damage merely through indirect action, and one who causes damage through indirect action is exempt.

מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ אֶת הַבְּעֵרָה, וְאָכְלָה עֵצִים אוֹ אֲבָנִים אוֹ עָפָר – חַיָּיב; שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי תֵצֵא אֵשׁ וּמָצְאָה קֹצִים, וְנֶאֱכַל גָּדִישׁ אוֹ הַקָּמָה אוֹ הַשָּׂדֶה, שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם הַמַּבְעִר אֶת הַבְּעֵרָה״.

MISHNA: If one sends forth a fire, i.e., allows it to escape, and it consumes wood, or stones, or earth, he is liable, as it is stated: “If a fire breaks out, and catches in thorns, so that a stack of grain, or standing grain, or the field, is consumed, the one who kindled the fire shall pay compensation” (Exodus 22:5), which teaches that he is liable also for destroying the field itself.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רָבָא: לְמָה לִי דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״קוֹצִים״, ״גָּדִישׁ״, ״קָמָה״ וְ״שָׂדֶה״?

GEMARA: With regard to the verse cited in the mishna, Rava says: Why do I need the Merciful One to write in the Torah all of these terms: “Thorns,” “a stack of grain,” “standing grain,” and “field,” which seem to be redundant?

צְרִיכִי; דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״קוֹצִים״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: קוֹצִים הוּא דְּחַיַּיב רַחֲמָנָא – מִשּׁוּם דִּשְׁכִיחַ אֵשׁ גַּבַּיְיהוּ, וּשְׁכִיחַ דְּפָשַׁע; אֲבָל גָּדִישׁ – דְּלָא שְׁכִיחַ אֵשׁ גַּבַּיְיהוּ, וְלָא שְׁכִיחַ דְּפָשַׁע, אֵימָא לָא. וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״גָּדִישׁ״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: גָּדִישׁ חַיַּיב רַחֲמָנָא – מִשּׁוּם דְּהֶפְסֵד מְרוּבֶּה הוּא; אֲבָל קוֹצִים – דְּהֶפְסֵד מוּעָט, אֵימָא לָא.

Rava explains: All the terms are necessary, because if the Merciful One had written only “thorns” in the Torah, I would say that it is specifically thorns for which the Merciful One renders one liable, because it is common for fire to be near them, and it is common that one is negligent. But with regard to a stack of grain, with regard to which it is not common for fire to be near it, as grain is valuable, so one keeps it out of harm’s way, and it is not common that one is negligent in allowing it to catch fire, I would say that he should not be liable. And if the Merciful One had written only: “A stack of grain,” I would say that it is specifically for such a stack that the Merciful One renders him liable, because it involves a substantial financial loss. But with regard to thorns, which involve only a minimal loss, I would say that he should not be liable. Therefore, the verse teaches that he is liable for damage to thorns as well.

״קָמָה״ לְמָה לִי? מָה קָמָה בְּגָלוּי – אַף כֹּל בְּגָלוּי.

Why do I need the Torah to state the term “standing grain”? It is in order to teach that just as standing grain is exposed, so too, one is liable only for damage caused by fire for all items that are exposed. One is exempt from liability for damage to items that are concealed.

וּלְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דִּמְחַיֵּיב אַנִּזְקֵי טָמוּן בָּאֵשׁ, ״קָמָה״ לְמָה לִי? לְרַבּוֹת כׇּל בַּעֲלֵי קוֹמָה. וְרַבָּנַן, לְרַבּוֹת כׇּל בַּעֲלֵי קוֹמָה מְנָא לְהוּ? נָפְקָא לְהוּ מֵ״אוֹ הַקָּמָה״.

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems one liable for a concealed article damaged by a fire, why do I need the Torah to state the term: “Standing grain”? The Gemara answers: The term serves to include all items that have stature, i.e., trees and animals, and not only produce. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who derive the halakha of concealed articles from the term “standing grain,” from where do they derive that all items that have stature are included? The Gemara answers: They derive it from the term: “Or standing grain,” since the additional word “or” is an inclusive term.

וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – ״אוֹ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְחַלֵּק. וְרַבָּנַן לְחַלֵּק מְנָא לְהוּ? נָפְקָא לְהוּ מֵ״אוֹ הַשָּׂדֶה״.

The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yehuda derive from the additional word “or”? The Gemara answers: He requires the word “or” to divide the terms, i.e., to teach that one is liable for damage to any one of the items listed, and not only where the fire burned all of them together. The Gemara then asks: And from where do the Rabbis derive the halakha to divide the terms so that one is liable for damage to each one independently? The Gemara answers: They derive it from the second instance of the word “or,” as the verse states: “Or the field.”

וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – אַיְּידֵי דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״אוֹ הַקָּמָה״, כְּתַב ״אוֹ הַשָּׂדֶה״.

The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yehuda derive from the phrase “or the field”? The Gemara answers: Since the Merciful One wrote in the Torah: “Or standing grain,” He also wrote: “Or the field,” for stylistic consistency, but no additional halakha may be derived from this term.

״שָׂדֶה״ לְמָה לִי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי לִחֲכָה נִירוֹ וְסִכְסְכָה אֲבָנָיו. וְלִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״שָׂדֶה״, וְלָא בָּעֵי הָנָךְ! צְרִיכָא; דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״שָׂדֶה״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: מַה שֶּׁבַּשָּׂדֶה – אִין, מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא – לָא; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

Rava continues to elaborate on the different terms in the verse: And why do I need the word “field” in the verse? It serves to include liability for damage in a case when the flames licked a plowed field and charred its stones. The Gemara asks: But let the Merciful One write only the term “field,” and then it would not require all these other terms. If one is liable for damage to a field, which is not totally destroyed by the fire, he is certainly liable for damage to other items that are completely destroyed. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to write the other terms as well, because if the Merciful One had written only “field,” I would say that for what is in the field, yes, one is liable, but for anything else, no, one is not liable. Therefore, it teaches us that one is liable for any damage caused by fire.

אָמַר רַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר נַחְמָנִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן: אֵין פּוּרְעָנוּת בָּאָה לָעוֹלָם אֶלָּא בִּזְמַן שֶׁהָרְשָׁעִים בָּעוֹלָם, וְאֵינָהּ מַתְחֶלֶת אֶלָּא מִן הַצַּדִּיקִים תְּחִלָּה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי תֵצֵא אֵשׁ וּמָצְאָה קֹצִים״ – אֵימָתַי אֵשׁ יוֹצְאָה? בִּזְמַן שֶׁקּוֹצִים מְצוּיִין לָהּ. וְאֵינָהּ מַתְחֶלֶת אֶלָּא מִן הַצַּדִּיקִים תְּחִלָּה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְנֶאֱכַל גָּדִישׁ״; ״וְאָכַל גָּדִישׁ״ לֹא נֶאֱמַר, אֶלָּא ״וְנֶאֱכַל גָּדִישׁ״ – שֶׁנֶּאֱכַל גָּדִישׁ כְּבָר.

§ The Gemara cites an aggadic midrash based on this verse: Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: Calamity befalls the world only when wicked people are in the world, but the calamity begins only with the righteous first, as it is stated in the verse: “If a fire breaks out, and catches in thorns, so that a stack of grain, or standing grain, or the field, is consumed” (Exodus 22:5). When does the fire, i.e., calamity, emerge? At a time when the thorns, i.e., the wicked, are found with it. But calamity begins only from the righteous first, as it is stated in the continuation of the verse: “And a stack of grain is consumed [vene’ekhal].” It is not stated: If a fire breaks out, and catches in thorns, and consumes [ve’akhal] the stack of grain; rather, it states: “A stack of grain is consumed,” meaning that the stack, i.e., the righteous, has already been consumed before the thorns.

תָּאנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף, מַאי דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאַתֶּם לֹא תֵצְאוּ אִישׁ מִפֶּתַח בֵּיתוֹ עַד בֹּקֶר״? כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּיתַּן רְשׁוּת לַמַּשְׁחִית, אֵינוֹ מַבְחִין בֵּין צַדִּיקִים לִרְשָׁעִים. וְלֹא עוֹד, אֶלָּא שֶׁמַּתְחִיל מִן הַצַּדִּיקִים תְּחִלָּה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְהִכְרַתִּי מִמֵּךְ צַדִּיק וְרָשָׁע״.

Rav Yosef taught a baraita: What is the meaning of that which is written with regard to the plague of the firstborn: “And none of you shall go out of the opening of his house until the morning” (Exodus 12:22)? If the plague was not decreed upon the Jewish people, why were they not permitted to leave their homes? Once permission is granted to the destroyer to kill, it does not distinguish between the righteous and the wicked. And not only that, but it begins with the righteous first, as it is stated in the verse: “And will cut off from you the righteous and the wicked” (Ezekiel 21:8), where mention of the righteous precedes the wicked.

בָּכֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: כּוּלֵּי הַאי נָמֵי לְאַיִן דּוֹמִין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: טֵיבוּתָא הוּא לְגַבַּיְיהוּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״כִּי מִפְּנֵי הָרָעָה נֶאֱסַף הַצַּדִּיק״.

Rav Yosef cried and said: Are all these righteous people also compared to nothing when calamity strikes? Abaye said to him: It is goodness for the righteous that they die first, as it is written: “The righteous is taken away because of the evil to come” (Isaiah 57:1), so that he will not have to endure the suffering that will befall the people.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב:

Rav Yehuda says that Rav says:

לְעוֹלָם יִכָּנֵס אָדָם בְּ״כִי טוֹב״ וְיֵצֵא בְּ״כִי טוֹב״, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְאַתֶּם לֹא תֵצְאוּ אִישׁ מִפֶּתַח בֵּיתוֹ עַד בֹּקֶר״.

A person should always enter an unfamiliar city at a time of good, i.e., while it is light, as the Torah uses the expression “It is good” with regard to the creation of light (see Genesis 1:4). This goodness is manifest in the sense of security one feels when it is light. And likewise, when one leaves a city he should leave at a time of good, meaning after sunrise the next morning, as it is stated in the verse: “And none of you shall go out of the opening of his house until the morning” (Exodus 12:22).

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: דֶּבֶר בָּעִיר – כַּנֵּס רַגְלֶיךָ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְאַתֶּם לֹא תֵצְאוּ אִישׁ מִפֶּתַח בֵּיתוֹ עַד בֹּקֶר״. וְאוֹמֵר: ״לֵךְ עַמִּי בֹּא בַחֲדָרֶיךָ, וּסְגוֹר דְּלָתְךָ בַּעֲדֶךָ״. וְאוֹמֵר: ״מִחוּץ תְּשַׁכֶּל חֶרֶב, וּמֵחֲדָרִים אֵימָה״.

§ The Sages taught: If there is plague in the city, gather your feet, i.e., limit the time you spend out of the house, as it is stated in the verse: “And none of you shall go out of the opening of his house until the morning.” And it says in another verse: “Come, my people, enter into your chambers, and shut your doors behind you; hide yourself for a little moment, until the anger has passed by” (Isaiah 26:20). And it says: “Outside the sword will bereave, and in the chambers terror” (Deuteronomy 32:25).

מַאי ״וְאוֹמֵר״? וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּלֵילְיָא, אֲבָל בִּימָמָא לָא; תָּא שְׁמַע: ״לֵךְ עַמִּי בֹּא בַחֲדָרֶיךָ, וּסְגוֹר דְּלָתְךָ״.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for citing the additional verses introduced with the term: And it says? The first verse seems sufficient to teach the principle that one should not emerge from one’s house when there is a plague. The Gemara answers: And if you would say that this matter, the first verse that states that none of you shall go out until morning, applies only at night, but in the day one may think that the principle does not apply, for this reason the Gemara teaches: Come and hear: “Come, my people, enter into your chambers, and shut your doors behind you.”

וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי [הֵיכָא] דְּלֵיכָּא אֵימָה מִגַּוַּאי, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא אֵימָה מִגַּוַּאי – כִּי נָפֵיק יָתֵיב בֵּינֵי אִינָשֵׁי בְּצַוְותָּא בְּעָלְמָא, טְפֵי מְעַלֵּי; תָּא שְׁמַע: ״מִחוּץ תְּשַׁכֶּל חֶרֶב וּמֵחֲדָרִים אֵימָה״ – אַף עַל גַּב דְּמֵחֲדָרִים אֵימָה, מִחוּץ תְּשַׁכֶּל חֶרֶב.

And if you would say that this matter applies only where there is no fear inside, which explains why it is preferable to remain indoors, but where there is fear inside, one might think that when he goes out and sits among people in general company it is better, therefore, the Gemara introduces the third verse and says: Come and hear: “Outside the sword will bereave, and in the chambers terror.” This means that although there is terror in the chambers, outside the sword will bereave, so it is safer to remain indoors.

רָבָא, בְּעִידָּן רִתְחָא הֲוָה סָכַר כַּוֵּי, דִּכְתִיב: ״כִּי עָלָה מָוֶת בְּחַלּוֹנֵינוּ״.

At a time when there was a plague, Rava would close the windows of his house, as it is written: “For death is come up into our windows” (Jeremiah 9:20).

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: רָעָב בָּעִיר – פַּזֵּר רַגְלֶיךָ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיְהִי רָעָב בָּאָרֶץ, וַיֵּרֶד אַבְרָם מִצְרַיְמָה [לָגוּר] (וַיָּגׇר) שָׁם״. וְאוֹמֵר: ״אִם אָמַרְנוּ נָבוֹא הָעִיר וְהָרָעָב בָּעִיר, וָמַתְנוּ שָׁם״.

The Sages taught: If there is famine in the city, spread your feet, i.e., leave the city, as it is stated in the verse: “And there was a famine in the land; and Abram went down into Egypt to sojourn there” (Genesis 12:10). And it says: “If we say: We will enter into the city, then the famine is in the city, and we shall die there; and if we sit here, we die also, now come, and let us fall unto the host of the Arameans; if they save us alive, we shall live; and if they kill us, we shall but die” (II Kings 7:4).

מַאי ״וְאוֹמֵר״? וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּלֵיכָּא סְפֵק נְפָשׁוֹת, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא סְפֵק נְפָשׁוֹת – לָא; תָּא שְׁמַע: ״לְכוּ וְנִפְּלָה אֶל מַחֲנֵה אֲרָם, אִם יְחַיֻּנוּ נִחְיֶה״.

What is the reason for citing the second verse, introduced with the term: And it says? And if you would say that this matter, the principle of leaving the city, applies only where there is no uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation, but where there is uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation this principle does not apply, come and hear: “Come, and let us fall unto the host of the Arameans; if they save us alive, we shall live; and if they kill us, we shall but die.”

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: דֶּבֶר בָּעִיר – אַל יְהַלֵּךְ אָדָם בְּאֶמְצַע הַדֶּרֶךְ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּלְאַךְ הַמָּוֶת מְהַלֵּךְ בְּאֶמְצַע הַדְּרָכִים. דְּכֵיוָן דִּיהִיבָא לֵיהּ רְשׁוּתָא, מְסַגֵּי לְהֶדְיָא. שָׁלוֹם בָּעִיר – אַל יְהַלֵּךְ בְּצִדֵּי דְרָכִים. דְּכֵיוָן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ רְשׁוּתָא, מִחַבֵּי חַבּוֹיֵי וּמְסַגֵּי.

The Sages taught: If there is a plague in the city, a person should not walk in the middle of the road, due to the fact that the Angel of Death walks in the middle of the road, as, since in Heaven they have given him permission to kill within the city, he goes openly in the middle of the road. By contrast, if there is peace and quiet in the city, do not walk on the sides of the road, as, since the Angel of Death does not have permission to kill within the city, he hides himself and walks on the side of the road.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: דֶּבֶר בָּעִיר – אַל יִכָּנֵס אָדָם יָחִיד לְבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת, שֶׁמַּלְאַךְ הַמָּוֶת מַפְקִיד שָׁם כֵּלָיו. וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּלָא קָרוּ בֵּיהּ דַּרְדְּקֵי, וְלָא מְצַלּוּ בֵּיהּ עֲשָׂרָה.

The Sages taught: If there is a plague in the city, a person should not enter the synagogue alone, as the Angel of Death leaves his utensils there, and for this reason it is a dangerous place. And this matter, the danger in the synagogue, applies only when there are no children learning in the synagogue, and there are not ten men praying in it. But if there are children learning or ten men praying there, it is not a dangerous place.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כְּלָבִים בּוֹכִים – מַלְאַךְ הַמָּוֶת בָּא לָעִיר. כְּלָבִים מְשַׂחֲקִים – אֵלִיָּהוּ הַנָּבִיא בָּא לָעִיר. וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי דְּלֵית בְּהוּ נְקֵבָה.

The Sages taught: If the dogs in a certain place are crying for no reason, it is a sign that they feel the Angel of Death has come to the city. If the dogs are playing, it is a sign that they feel that Elijah the prophet has come to the city. These matters apply only if there is no female dog among them. If there is a female dog nearby, their crying or playing is likely due to her presence.

יָתֵיב רַב אַמֵּי וְרַב אַסִּי קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק נַפָּחָא. מָר אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לֵימָא מָר שְׁמַעְתְּתָא, וּמָר אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לֵימָא מָר אַגָּדְתָּא. פָּתַח לְמֵימַר אַגָּדְתָּא – וְלָא שָׁבֵיק מָר, פָּתַח לְמֵימַר שְׁמַעְתָּתָא – וְלָא שָׁבֵיק מָר.

§ Rav Ami and Rav Asi sat before Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa. One Sage said to Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa: Let the Master say words of halakha, and the other Sage said to Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa: Let the Master say words of aggada. Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa began to say words of aggada but one Sage did not let him, so he began to say words of halakha but the other Sage did not let him.

אָמַר לָהֶם: אֶמְשׁוֹל לָכֶם מָשָׁל, לְמָה הַדָּבָר דּוֹמֶה? לְאָדָם שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים, אַחַת יַלְדָּה וְאַחַת זְקֵינָה. יַלְדָּה מְלַקֶּטֶת לוֹ לְבָנוֹת, זְקֵינָה מְלַקֶּטֶת לוֹ שְׁחוֹרוֹת. נִמְצָא קֵרֵחַ מִכָּאן וּמִכָּאן.

Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said to them: I will relate a parable. To what can this be compared? It can be compared to a man who has two wives, one young and one old. The young wife pulls out his white hairs, so that her husband will appear younger. The old wife pulls out his black hairs so that he will appear older. And it turns out that he is bald from here and from there, i.e., completely bald, due to the actions of both of his wives.

אָמַר לָהֶן: אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא לְכוּ מִלְּתָא דְּשָׁוְיָא לְתַרְוַיְיכוּ: ״כִּי תֵצֵא אֵשׁ וּמָצְאָה קֹצִים״ – ״תֵּצֵא״ מֵעַצְמָהּ, ״שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם הַמַּבְעִר אֶת הַבְּעֵרָה״. אָמַר הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא: עָלַי לְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַבְּעֵרָה שֶׁהִבְעַרְתִּי –

Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa continued and said to them: If so, I will say to you a matter that is appropriate to both of you, which contains both halakha and aggada. In the verse that states: “If a fire breaks out, and catches in thorns” (Exodus 22:5), the term “breaks out” indicates that it breaks out by itself. Yet, the continuation of the verse states: “The one who kindled the fire shall pay compensation,” which indicates that he must pay only if the fire spread due to his negligence. The verse can be explained allegorically: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said that although the fire broke out in the Temple due to the sins of the Jewish people, it is incumbent upon Me to pay restitution for the fire that I kindled.

אֲנִי הִצַּיתִּי אֵשׁ בְּצִיּוֹן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיַּצֶּת אֵשׁ בְּצִיּוֹן, וַתֹּאכַל יְסוֹדוֹתֶיהָ״; וַאֲנִי עָתִיד לִבְנוֹתָהּ בָּאֵשׁ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַאֲנִי אֶהְיֶה לָהּ חוֹמַת אֵשׁ סָבִיב, וּלְכָבוֹד אֶהְיֶה בְתוֹכָהּ״.

I, God, kindled a fire in Zion, as it is stated: “The Lord has accomplished His fury, He has poured out His fierce anger; and He has kindled a fire in Zion, which has devoured its foundations” (Lamentations 4:11). And I will build it with fire in the future, as it is stated: “For I, says the Lord, will be for her a wall of fire round about; and I will be the glory in her midst” (Zechariah 2:9).

שְׁמַעְתְּתָא – פָּתַח הַכָּתוּב בְּנִזְקֵי מָמוֹנוֹ, וְסִיֵּים בְּנִזְקֵי גּוּפוֹ; לוֹמַר לָךְ: אִשּׁוֹ מִשּׁוּם חִצָּיו.

There is a halakha that can be learned from the verse in Exodus, as the verse begins with damage caused through one’s property: “If a fire breaks out,” and concludes with damage caused by one’s body: “The one who kindled the fire.” This indicates that when damage is caused by fire, it is considered as though the person who kindled the fire caused the damage directly with his body. That serves to say to you that the liability for his fire damage is due to its similarity to his arrows. Just as one who shoots an arrow and causes damage is liable because the damage was caused directly through his action, so too, one who kindles a fire that causes damage is liable because it is considered as though the damage were caused directly by his actions.

״וַיִּתְאַוֶּה דָוִד וַיֹּאמַר: מִי יַשְׁקֵנִי מַיִם מִבֹּאר בֵּית לֶחֶם אֲשֶׁר בַּשָּׁעַר. וַיִּבְקְעוּ שְׁלֹשֶׁת הַגִּבּוֹרִים בְּמַחֲנֵה פְלִשְׁתִּים, וַיִּשְׁאֲבוּ מַיִם מִבֹּאר בֵּית לֶחֶם אֲשֶׁר בַּשַּׁעַר [וְגוֹ׳]״.

§ The Gemara continues with another statement of aggada on a related topic: The verse states: “And David longed, and said: Oh, that one would give me water to drink of the well of Bethlehem, which is by the gate! And the three mighty men broke through the host of the Philistines, and drew water out of the well of Bethlehem, that was by the gate, and took it, and brought it to David; but he would not drink it, but poured it out to the Lord” (II Samuel 23:15–16). The Sages understood that David was not simply asking for water, but was using the term as a metaphor referring to Torah, and he was raising a halakhic dilemma.

מַאי קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ? אָמַר רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: טָמוּן בָּאֵשׁ קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ, אִי כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אִי כְּרַבָּנַן, וּפְשַׁטוּ לֵיהּ מַאי דִּפְשַׁטוּ לֵיהּ.

What is the dilemma that David is raising? Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: He was asking about the halakha with regard to a concealed article damaged by a fire. He wanted to know whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one is liable to pay for such damage, or whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that one is exempt from liability for damage by fire to concealed articles. And the Sages in Bethlehem answered him what they answered him.

רַב הוּנָא אָמַר: גְּדִישִׁים דִּשְׂעוֹרִים דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל הֲווֹ, דַּהֲווֹ מִטַּמְּרִי פְּלִשְׁתִּים בְּהוּ, וְקָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: מַהוּ לְהַצִּיל עַצְמוֹ בְּמָמוֹן חֲבֵירוֹ?

Rav Huna stated a different explanation of the verse: There were stacks of barley belonging to Jews in which the Philistines were hiding, and David wanted to burn down the stacks to kill the Philistines and save his own life. He raised the dilemma: What is the halakha? Is it permitted to save oneself by destroying the property of another?

שְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ: אָסוּר לְהַצִּיל עַצְמוֹ בְּמָמוֹן חֲבֵירוֹ; אֲבָל אַתָּה מֶלֶךְ אַתָּה, [וּמֶלֶךְ] פּוֹרֵץ לַעֲשׂוֹת לוֹ דֶּרֶךְ וְאֵין מוֹחִין בְּיָדוֹ.

They sent the following answer to him: It is prohibited to save oneself by destroying the property of another. But you are king, and a king may breach the fence of an individual in order to form a path for himself, and none may protest his action, i.e., the normal halakhot of damage do not apply to you since you are king.

וְרַבָּנַן וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבָּה בַּר מָרִי אָמְרוּ: גְּדִישִׁים דִּשְׂעוֹרִין דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל הֲווֹ, וּגְדִישִׁין דַּעֲדָשִׁים דִּפְלִשְׁתִּים; וְקָא מִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מַהוּ לִיטּוֹל גְּדִישִׁין שֶׁל שְׂעוֹרִין דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל לִיתֵּן לִפְנֵי בְּהֶמְתּוֹ, עַל מְנָת לְשַׁלֵּם גְּדִישִׁין שֶׁל עֲדָשִׁים דִּפְלִשְׁתִּים?

The Rabbis, and some say that it was Rabba bar Mari, give an alternative explanation of the dilemma and said: The stacks of barley belonged to Jews, and there were stacks of lentils belonging to the Philistines. David needed barley to feed his animals. And David raised the following dilemma: What is the halakha? I know that I may take the lentils belonging to a gentile to feed my animals, but is it permitted to take a stack of barley belonging to a Jew, to place before one’s animal for it to consume, with the intent to pay the owner of the barley with the stacks of lentils belonging to the Philistines?

שְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ: ״חֲבֹל יָשִׁיב רָשָׁע, גְּזֵלָה יְשַׁלֵּם״ – אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁגְּזֵילָה מְשַׁלֵּם, רָשָׁע הוּא. אֲבָל אַתָּה מֶלֶךְ אַתָּה, וּמֶלֶךְ פּוֹרֵץ לַעֲשׂוֹת לוֹ דֶּרֶךְ וְאֵין מוֹחִין בְּיָדוֹ.

The Sages of Bethlehem sent the following reply to him: “If the wicked restore the pledge, give back that which he had taken by robbery, walk in the statutes of life, committing no iniquity; he shall surely live, he shall not die” (Ezekiel 33:15). This verse teaches that even though the robber repays the value of the stolen item, he is nevertheless considered to be wicked, and is described as such in the verse, and a commoner would not be allowed to act as you asked. But you are king, and a king may breach the fence of an individual in order to form a path for himself, and none may protest his action.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לְאַחְלוֹפֵי – הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב חַד קְרָא: ״וַתְּהִי שָׁם חֶלְקַת הַשָּׂדֶה מְלֵאָה עֲדָשִׁים״, וּכְתִיב חַד קְרָא: ״וַתְּהִי חֶלְקַת הַשָּׂדֶה מְלֵאָה שְׂעוֹרִים״;

The Gemara discusses the different explanations: Granted, according to the one who says that David was asking whether he could take the stacks of barley and exchange them, i.e., repay the owners of the barley, with stacks of lentils, this is as it is written in one verse: “And the Philistines were gathered together into a troop, where was a plot of ground full of lentils; and the people fled from the Philistines” (II Samuel 23:11), and it is written in one other verse: “He was with David at Pas Dammim, and there the Philistines were gathered together to battle, where was a plot of ground full of barley; and the people fled from before the Philistines” (I Chronicles 11:13). This apparent contradiction can be reconciled by saying that there were two fields, one of barley and one of lentils.

אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לְמִקְלֵי, מַאי אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ לְהָנֵי תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי? אָמַר לָךְ: דַּהֲווֹ נָמֵי גְּדִישִׁים דַּעֲדָשִׁים דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, דַּהֲווֹ מִיטַּמְּרוּ בְּהוּ פְּלִשְׁתִּים.

But according to Rav Huna, the one who says that David’s question was asked because he wanted to burn the stacks of barley, for what purpose does he require these two verses? How does he explain this contradiction? Rav Huna could have said to you that there were also stacks of lentils belonging to Jews, inside which the Philistines were hiding.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לְמִקְלֵי – הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיִּתְיַצֵּב בְּתוֹךְ הַחֶלְקָה וַיַּצִּילֶהָ״; אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לְאַחְלוֹפֵי, מַאי ״וַיַּצִּילֶהָ״?

Granted, according to the one who says that David asked his question because he wanted to burn the stacks, this is as it is written in the following verse with regard to David: “But he stood in the midst of the plot, and saved it, and slew the Philistines; and the Lord performed a great victory” (II Samuel 23:12). But according to the one who says that David’s question was asked with regard to exchanging the lentils for the barley, what is the meaning of the phrase: “And saved it”?

דְּלָא שְׁבַק לְהוּ לְאַחְלוֹפֵי.

The Rabbis answer that David saved it in that he did not permit them to exchange the value of the barley with the lentils.

בִּשְׁלָמָא הָנֵי תַּרְתֵּי, הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי;

Granted, according to both of these two opinions, this is as it is written in two distinct verses, one describing the field of lentils and one describing the field of barley.