בבא מציעא לו

בבא מציעא לו

פְּעָמִים שֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶם בְּאָשָׁם. פְּעָמִים שֶׁהַשּׂוֹכֵר בְּחַטָּאת וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל בְּאָשָׁם, פְּעָמִים שֶׁהַשּׂוֹכֵר בְּאָשָׁם וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל בְּחַטָּאת.

there are times that both are liable to bring a guilt-offering; there are times that the renter is liable to bring a sin-offering and the borrower is liable to bring a guilt-offering; there are times that the renter is liable to bring a guilt-offering and the borrower is liable to bring a sin-offering.

הָא כֵּיצַד? כְּפִירַת מָמוֹן – אָשָׁם. בִּיטּוּי שְׂפָתַיִם – חַטָּאת.

The Gemara elaborates: How so? One who takes a false oath that involves the denial of a monetary matter is liable to bring a guilt-offering. One who takes a false oath on an utterance of the lips that involves no denial of a monetary debt is liable to bring a sin-offering.

פְּעָמִים שֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶם בְּחַטָּאת – כְּגוֹן שֶׁמֵּתָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ, וְאָמְרוּ נֶאֶנְסָה. שׂוֹכֵר דְּבֵין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ מִיפְּטַר פָּטוּר בְּחַטָּאת, שׁוֹאֵל דְּבֵין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ חַיּוֹבֵי מִיחַיַּיב בְּחַטָּאת.

The Gemara elaborates: There are times that both are liable to bring a sin-offering. This is in a case where the cow died in its typical manner and the renter and the borrower both said that it died due to circumstances beyond his control. A renter, who in any case is exempt from paying whether it died of natural causes or due to circumstances beyond his control, is liable to bring a sin-offering if he took a false oath. A borrower, who in any case is liable to pay regardless of the circumstances of its death, is liable to bring a sin-offering if he took a false oath. In both cases, the oath involved no denial of monetary debt.

פְּעָמִים שֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶם בְּאָשָׁם – כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּגְנְבָה, וְאָמְרוּ מֵתָה מֵחֲמַת מְלָאכָה, דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ קָא כָפְרִי מָמוֹנָא, דְּהָא מִיחַיְּיבִי, וְקָא פָטְרִי נַפְשַׁיְיהוּ.

There are times that both are liable to bring a guilt-offering. This is in a case where the cow was stolen from a borrower, and the renter and the borrower both said that it died due to ordinary labor. That is a case where both denied a monetary matter, as they are both liable to pay in a case of theft, and both take an oath on a claim with which they seek to exempt themselves.

שׂוֹכֵר בְּחַטָּאת וְשׁוֹאֵל בְּאָשָׁם – כְּגוֹן שֶׁמֵּתָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ, וְאָמְרוּ מֵתָה מֵחֲמַת מְלָאכָה. שׂוֹכֵר דְּבֵין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ מִיפְּטַר פָּטוּר – חַיָּיב בְּחַטָּאת. שׁוֹאֵל דְּמִיחַיַּיב בְּמֵתָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ, וְקָא פָטַר נַפְשֵׁיהּ בְּמֵתָה מֵחֲמַת מְלָאכָה – בְּאָשָׁם.

There are times when a renter is liable to bring a sin-offering and a borrower is liable to bring a guilt-offering. This is in a case where the cow died in its typical manner and the renter and the borrower both said that it died due to ordinary labor. A renter, who in any case is exempt, as he is exempt from paying in cases where the ox was damaged or died due to circumstances beyond his control, is liable to bring a sin-offering, as the false oath involved no denial of monetary debt. A borrower, who is liable to pay when the cow died in its typical manner and attempted to exempt himself with the claim that it died due to ordinary labor, is liable to bring a guilt-offering.

שׂוֹכֵר בְּאָשָׁם וְשׁוֹאֵל בְּחַטָּאת – כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּגְנְבָה וְאָמְרוּ מֵתָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ. שׂוֹכֵר הוּא דְּמִיחַיַּיב בִּגְנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה, וְקָא פָטַר נַפְשֵׁיהּ בְּמֵתָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ – בְּאָשָׁם. שׁוֹאֵל דְּבֵין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ חַיּוֹבֵי מִיחַיַּיב – בְּחַטָּאת.

There are times when a renter is liable to bring a guilt-offering and a borrower is liable to bring a sin-offering. This is in a case where the cow was stolen from the borrower, and the renter and the borrower both said that it died in its typical manner. The renter, who is liable to pay in cases of theft and loss and attempted to exempt himself with the claim that it died in its typical manner, is liable to bring a guilt-offering. A borrower, who in any case is liable to pay, is liable to bring a sin-offering.

מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַבִּי אַמֵּי, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁהַדַּיָּינִים מַשְׁבִּיעִים אוֹתָהּ – אֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תִשָּׁבַע לְבַטֵּא בִשְׂפָתַיִם״ ״כִּי תִשָּׁבַע״ מֵעַצְמָהּ. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי אַמֵּי.

The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Yirmeya teaching us with this systematic presentation of these cases? They are merely details based on established halakhic principles. The Gemara answers: His statement serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Ami, who says: With regard to any oath that the judges administer, one is not liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath on an utterance, as it is stated in the passage concerning the obligation to bring an offering for taking a false oath: “Or if a soul takes an oath clearly to utter with lips” (Leviticus 5:4). The Gemara infers: The liability to bring an offering for taking a false oath applies only to one who takes an oath on his own initiative, but not when the oath is administered by others. Rabbi Yirmeya teaches us that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami, as one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath on an utterance even if it was administered by another.

אִתְּמַר: שׁוֹמֵר שֶׁמָּסַר לְשׁוֹמֵר, רַב אָמַר: פָּטוּר, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חַיָּיב.

It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to a bailee who conveyed to another bailee the deposit with which he was entrusted. Rav says: He is exempt from payment in the same cases in which he is exempt when the deposit is in his possession. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable to pay even in cases of damage due to circumstances beyond his control.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, לְטַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַב, לָא מִבַּעְיָא שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם שֶׁמָּסַר לְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר דְּעַלּוֹיֵי עַלְּיַיהּ לִשְׁמִירָתוֹ, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר שֶׁמָּסַר לְשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, דְּגָרוֹעֵי גָּרְעַהּ לִשְׁמִירָתוֹ – פָּטוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּהָא מְסָרָהּ לְבֶן דַּעַת.

Abaye says: According to Rav’s line of reasoning, it is not necessary to state his ruling in a case where he was initially an unpaid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to a paid bailee, as in that case the unpaid bailee enhanced the level of his safeguarding, since a paid bailee is liable to pay in instances where an unpaid bailee is exempt. But even in the case of a paid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to an unpaid bailee, where the paid bailee diminished the level of his safeguarding, he is exempt. What is the reason? He is exempt because he conveyed the deposit to a mentally competent person, thereby effectively safeguarded the deposit.

וּלְטַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, לָא מִיבַּעְיָא שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר שֶׁמָּסַר לְשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם דְּגָרוֹעֵי גָּרְעַהּ לִשְׁמִירָתוֹ, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם שֶׁמָּסַר לְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, דְּעַלּוֹיֵי עַלְּיַיהּ לִשְׁמִירָתוֹ – חַיָּיב. דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: ״אֵין רְצוֹנִי שֶׁיְּהֵא פִּקְדוֹנִי בְּיַד אַחֵר״.

According to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s line of reasoning, it is not necessary to state his ruling in a case where he was initially a paid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to an unpaid bailee, as the paid bailee diminished the level of his safeguarding, since an unpaid bailee is exempt in instances where a paid bailee is liable to pay. But even in the case of an unpaid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to a paid bailee, where the unpaid bailee enhanced the level of his safeguarding, he is liable to pay. What is the reason? He is liable because the owner of the deposit said to him: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee.

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: הָא דְּרַב לָאו בְּפֵירוּשׁ אִתְּמַר, אֶלָּא מִכְּלָלָא. דְּהָנְהוּ גִּינָּאֵי, דְּכֹל יוֹמָא הֲווֹ מַפְקְדִי מָרַיְיהוּ גַּבַּהּ דְּהַהִיא סָבְתָּא. יוֹמָא חַד אַפְקְדֻינְהוּ לְגַבֵּי חַד מִינַּיְיהוּ, שְׁמַע קָלָא בֵּי הִלּוּלָא נְפַק אֲזַל. אַפְקְדִינְהוּ לְגַבַּהּ דְּהַהִיא סָבְתָּא, אַדַּאֲזַל וַאֲתָא אִגְּנוּב מָרַיְיהוּ.

Rav Ḥisda said: This statement that is attributed to Rav was not stated explicitly. Rather, it was inferred from another statement of his, as it is related: There were these gardeners who each day would deposit their spades with a certain old woman. One day they deposited their spades with one of gardeners. He heard noise from a wedding hall and set out and went there. He deposited the spades with that old woman. In the time that he went and came back from the wedding, their spades were stolen.

אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב וּפַטְרֵיהּ, מַאן דַּחֲזָא סָבַר מִשּׁוּם שׁוֹמֵר שֶׁמָּסַר לְשׁוֹמֵר פָּטוּר. וְלָא הִיא, שָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּכֹל יוֹמָא נָמֵי אִינְהוּ גּוּפַיְיהוּ גַּבַּהּ דְּהַהִיא סָבְתָּא הֲווֹ מַפְקְדִי לְהוּ.

The case came before Rav, and Rav exempted the gardener who deposited the spades with the old woman. One who observed Rav’s ruling thought that Rav issued that ruling due to the fact that a bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is exempt. But that is not so. There, in the case of the spades, it is different, as the gardeners themselves would deposit their spades with that old woman. Since the gardeners cannot claim that it is not their desire for their deposit to be in the possession of this old woman, the gardener who did so is exempt.

יָתֵיב רַבִּי אַמֵּי וְקָאָמַר לַהּ לְהָא שְׁמַעְתָּא. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר מֶמֶל לְרַבִּי אַמֵּי: הַשּׂוֹכֵר פָּרָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וְהִשְׁאִילָהּ לְאַחֵר וּמֵתָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ – יִשָּׁבַע הַשּׂוֹכֵר שֶׁמֵּתָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל מְשַׁלֵּם לַשּׂוֹכֵר. וְאִם אִיתָא, לֵימָא לֵיהּ: אֵין רְצוֹנִי שֶׁיְּהֵא פִּקְדוֹנִי בְּיַד אַחֵר! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? בְּשֶׁנָּתְנוּ לוֹ רְשׁוּת הַבְּעָלִים לְהַשְׁאִיל.

The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ami sat and stated this halakha. Rabbi Abba bar Memel raised an objection to Rabbi Ami from the mishna: In the case of one who rents a cow from another, and this renter lends it to another person, and the cow dies in its typical manner in the possession of the borrower, the halakha is that the renter takes an oath to the owner of the cow that the cow died in its typical manner, and the borrower pays the renter for the cow that he borrowed. And if the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan is so, let the owner say to the renter: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee, and the renter should be liable to pay because he violated the owner’s wishes. Rabbi Ami said to him: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where the owner gave the renter permission to lend the deposit to another.

אִי הָכִי לִבְעָלִים בָּעֵי לְשַׁלּוֹמֵי! דַּאֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: לְדַעְתָּךְ.

The Gemara asks: If so, the borrower should be required to pay the owner, as the owner sanctioned the borrowing. Rabbi Abba bar Memel answers: The case in the mishna is one where the owner said to the renter: Lend this deposit to another at your discretion. Therefore, it is not considered as if the owner lent it to the borrower.

מֵתִיב רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: הַמַּפְקִיד מָעוֹת אֵצֶל חֲבֵירוֹ צְרָרָן וְהִפְשִׁילָן לַאֲחוֹרָיו, מְסָרָן לִבְנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ הַקְּטַנִּים, וְנָעַל בִּפְנֵיהֶם שֶׁלֹּא כָּרָאוּי – חַיָּיב, שֶׁלֹּא שָׁמַר כְּדֶרֶךְ הַשּׁוֹמְרִים.

Rami bar Ḥama raises an objection from a mishna (42a): In the case of one who deposited coins with another, and that bailee bound it in a cloth and slung it behind him, or conveyed them to his minor son or daughter for safeguarding, or locked the door before the coins in an inappropriate, i.e., insufficient, manner to secure them, the bailee is liable to pay for the coins, as he did not safeguard the coins in the manner typical of bailees.

טַעְמָא דִּקְטַנִּים, הָא גְּדוֹלִים – פָּטוּר. אַמַּאי? נֵימָא לֵיהּ: אֵין רְצוֹנִי שֶׁיְּהֵא פִּקְדוֹנִי בְּיַד אַחֵר!

The Gemara infers: The reason he is liable to pay is that he conveyed the coins to his minor children, but if he conveyed them to his adult son or daughter he is exempt. Why? Let the owner say to him as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee, and therefore even if the children are adults the bailee should be liable to pay.

אָמַר רָבָא: כׇּל הַמַּפְקִיד

Rava said: No proof can be cited, as it is clear that in the case of anyone who deposits an item with another,

עַל דַּעַת אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבָנָיו הוּא מַפְקִיד.

it is with the awareness that at times the bailee’s wife and his children will safeguard the item that he deposits it, as the bailee cannot be with the deposit at all times.

אָמְרִי נְהַרְדָּעֵי, דַּיְקָא נָמֵי דְּקָתָנֵי: אוֹ שֶׁמְּסָרָן לִבְנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ הַקְּטַנִּים – חַיָּיב. הָא לִבְנוֹ וּלְבִתּוֹ הַגְּדוֹלִים – פָּטוּר. מִכְלָל דְּלַאֲחֵרִים, לָא שְׁנָא גְּדוֹלִים וְלָא שְׁנָא קְטַנִּים – חַיָּיב, דְּאִם כֵּן, לִיתְנֵי קְטַנִּים סְתָמָא. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Sages of Neharde’a say: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Or if he conveyed the coins to his minor son or daughter for safeguarding, he is liable to pay. But if he conveyed them to his adult son and daughter, he is exempt. By inference, one can conclude that with regard to others, it is no different if they are adults and it is no different if they are minors. Either way, the bailee is liable to pay, as, if there were a difference, let the tanna teach: If he conveyed the coins to minors, without qualification. The Gemara concludes: Since the tanna specifically addressed the case of one’s minor children, learn from the wording of the mishna that the difference between minors and adults exists only with regard to one’s children.

אָמַר רָבָא, הִלְכְתָא: שׁוֹמֵר שֶׁמָּסַר לְשׁוֹמֵר – חַיָּיב, לָא מִבַּעְיָא שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר שֶׁמָּסַר לְשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם דְּגָרוֹעֵי גָּרְעַהּ לִשְׁמִירָתוֹ, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם שֶׁמָּסַר לְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – חַיָּיב, מַאי טַעְמָא? דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַתְּ מְהֵימְנַתְּ לִי בִּשְׁבוּעָה, הַאיְךְ לָא מְהֵימַן לִי בִּשְׁבוּעָה.

Rava says: The halakha is: A bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is liable to pay. It is not necessary to say that this is the halakha if he was a paid bailee who conveyed the deposit to an unpaid bailee, as in that case the first bailee diminished the level of his safeguarding, as an unpaid bailee is exempt from paying in instances where a paid bailee is obligated to do so. But even if it was initially an unpaid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to a paid bailee, the first bailee is liable to pay. What is the reason that he is liable in that case? He is liable, as the owner of the deposit can say to him: You are trustworthy to me when you take an oath that the item was stolen or lost. That person is not trustworthy to me when he takes an oath.

אִתְּמַר: פָּשַׁע בָּהּ וְיָצָאת לַאֲגַם, וּמֵתָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ. אַבָּיֵי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה אָמַר: חַיָּיב, רָבָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה אָמַר: פָּטוּר.

It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute: In the case of one who was negligent in safeguarding an animal, and it went into a marsh, where it was susceptible to thieves and predatory animals, but it died in its typical manner despite this negligence, i.e., it was neither stolen nor devoured, Abaye says in the name of Rabba: The bailee is liable to pay. Rava says in the name of Rabba: The bailee is exempt from doing so.

אַבָּיֵי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה אָמַר: חַיָּיב, כׇּל דַּיָּינָא דְּלָא דָּאֵין כִּי הַאי דִּינָא לָאו דַּיָּינָא הוּא. לָא מִבַּעְיָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר תְּחִילָּתוֹ בִּפְשִׁיעָה וְסוֹפוֹ בְּאוֹנֶס חַיָּיב, דְּחַיָּיב. אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר פָּטוּר, הָכָא חַיָּיב. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמְרִינַן: הַבְלָא דְאַגְמָא קַטְלַהּ.

The Gemara elaborates. Abaye said in the name of Rabba: He is liable to pay, and any judge who does not rule in accordance with this halakha is not a judge. It is not necessary to say that the bailee is liable in this case, according to the one who says: In a case where the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, one is liable to pay. According to this opinion, it is obvious that the bailee is liable to pay. But even according to the one who says: If the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident one is exempt, here the bailee is still liable to pay. What is the reason that he is liable? It is because we say: The air of the marsh killed the animal. The negligence led to the death of the animal, and it was not due to circumstances beyond his control.

רָבָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה אָמַר: פָּטוּר, כֹּל דַּיָּינָא דְּלָא דָּאֵין כִּי הַאי דִּינָא לָאו דַּיָּינָא הוּא. לָא מִיבַּעְיָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר תְּחִילָּתוֹ בִּפְשִׁיעָה וְסוֹפוֹ בְּאוֹנֶס פָּטוּר, דְּפָטוּר, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חַיָּיב, הָכָא פָּטוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמְרִינַן: מַלְאַךְ הַמָּוֶת מָה לִי הָכָא וּמָה לִי הָתָם.

Rava says in the name of Rabba: He is exempt, and any judge who does not rule in accordance with this halakha is not a judge. It is not necessary to say that the bailee is exempt in this case, according to the one who says: In a case where the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, one is exempt from payment. According to this opinion, it is obvious that the bailee is exempt. But even according to the one who says: In a case where the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, one is liable to pay, here the bailee is still exempt from payment. What is the reason that he is exempt? It is because we say with regard to the Angel of Death, who causes death by natural causes: What difference is there to me if the animal was here, and what difference is there to me if the animal was there? The cause of the animal’s death was natural, and there is no relevance given to the location of the death. Consequently, the bailee is exempt.

וּמוֹדֵי אַבָּיֵי, דְּאִי הֲדַרָא לְבֵי מָרַהּ וּמִתָה – דְּפָטוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּהָא הֲדַרָא לַהּ וְלֵיכָּא לְמֵימַר הַבְלָא דְּאַגְמָא קַטְלַהּ. וּמוֹדֵי רָבָא כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִי גַּנְבַהּ גַּנָּב בַּאֲגַם וּמֵתָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ בֵּי גַנָּב – דְּחַיָּיב. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאִי שַׁבְקַהּ מַלְאַךְ הַמָּוֶת בְּבֵיתֵיהּ דְּגַנָּבָא הֲוָה קָיְימָא.

The Gemara notes: And Abaye concedes that if the animal returned from the marsh to its owner’s house and died there that the bailee is exempt. What is the reason that he is exempt? He is exempt due to the fact that the animal returned, and since it was able to return there is no justification to say that the air of the marsh killed it. And Rava concedes that anytime the animal was stolen from the marsh and then dies in its typical manner in the house of the thief that the bailee is liable to pay. What is the reason that he is liable to pay? He is liable because even if the Angel of Death spared the life of the animal, it would be standing in the house of the thief due to the negligence of the bailee.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרָבָא: לְדִידָךְ, דְּאָמְרַתְּ מַלְאַךְ הַמָּוֶת מָה לִי הָכָא וּמָה לִי הָתָם, הַאי דְּאוֹתְבֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר מֶמֶל לְרַבִּי אַמֵּי וְשַׁנִּי לֵיהּ בְּשֶׁנָּתְנוּ לוֹ בְּעָלִים רְשׁוּת לְהַשְׁאִיל, וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ: מַלְאַךְ הַמָּוֶת מָה לִי הָכָא וּמָה לִי הָתָם!

Abaye said to Rava: According to you, who said with regard to the Angel of Death: What difference is there to me if the animal was here and what difference is there to me if the animal was there? How will you explain the exchange between Rabbi Abba bar Memel and Rabbi Ami? As there is that objection that was raised by Rabbi Abba bar Memel to Rabbi Ami from the mishna with regard to one who rents a cow from another, and then lends it to another person, and Rabbi Ami answered him: It is a case where the owner gave the renter permission to lend the deposit. Abaye states his challenge: But according to your explanation, let Rabbi Ami say to him that the bailee is exempt because with regard to the Angel of Death, what difference is there to me if the animal was here, and what difference is there to me if the animal was there. If the death would have happened regardless of the location of the animal, it makes no difference whether it was in the possession of the first renter or in the possession of the one he lent it to.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְדִידְכוּ דְּמַתְנִיתוּ ״אֵין רְצוֹנִי שֶׁיְּהֵא פִּקְדוֹנִי בְּיַד אַחֵר״ – אִיכָּא לְאוֹתֹבַהּ לְהַהִיא, לְדִידִי דְּאָמֵינָא: אַנְתְּ מְהֵימְנַתְּ לִי בִּשְׁבוּעָה וְהַאיְךְ לָא מְהֵימַן לִי – בִּשְׁבוּעָה לֵיכָּא לְאוֹתֹבַהּ כְּלָל.

Rava said to Abaye: According to you, that you teach that a bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is liable to pay because the owner can claim: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee, there is room to raise that objection. But according to me, as I say that a bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is liable to pay because the owner can claim: You are trustworthy to me when you take an oath that the item was stolen or lost; that person is not trustworthy to me when he takes an oath, there is no room to raise that objection at all.

מֵתִיב רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: הֶעֱלָהּ לְרָאשֵׁי צוּקִין וְנָפְלָה – אֵין זֶה אוֹנֶס, וְחַיָּיב. הָא מֵתָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ – הֲרֵי זֶה אוֹנֶס וּפָטוּר. וְאַמַּאי? לֵימָא לֵיהּ: אַוֵּירָא דְהַר קַטְלַהּ, אִי נָמֵי אוּבְצָנָא דְהַר קַטְלַהּ!

Rami bar Ḥama raises an objection to the opinion of Abaye from a mishna (93b): If one brought the animal to the edge of a cliff and it fell, that is not considered an accident, and he is liable to pay. One may infer that if he brought it to the edge of the cliff and it died in its typical manner, that is considered an accident and he is exempt. But why? Let the owner of the animal say to the bailee: It is the air of the mountain that killed it, or: The exhaustion from climbing the mountain killed it.

הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? שֶׁהֶעֱלָהּ לְמִרְעֶה שָׁמֵן וְטוֹב. אִי הָכִי, נָפְלָה נָמֵי! שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ לְתוֹקְפָּהּ וְלֹא תְּקָפָהּ.

The Gemara rejects this: With what are we dealing here? It is with a case where the bailee took the animal to a bountiful and high-quality pasture. Since shepherds typically herd their flocks there, taking the animal there is not negligent. The Gemara asks: If so, then the bailee should be exempt even if the animal fell. The Gemara answers: He is liable to pay because he should have subdued the animal to prevent it from falling, and he did not subdue it.

אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא רֵישָׁא: עָלְתָה לְרָאשֵׁי צוּקִין וְנָפְלָה – הֲרֵי זֶה אוֹנֶס, אִיבְּעִי לֵיהּ לְמִיתְקְפַהּ! לָא צְרִיכָא שֶׁתְּקָפַתּוּ וְעָלְתָה, תְּקָפַתּוּ וְיָרְדָה.

The Gemara asks: If so, say the first clause of the mishna: If the animal climbed to the top of a cliff and fell, it is a circumstance beyond his control and he is exempt. Shouldn’t he be liable, since he was required to subdue it and prevent it from falling? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the tanna to say that the bailee is exempt only in a case where the animal overpowered him and ascended and the animal overpowered him and descended. Although he attempted to prevent the animal from falling, it overpowered the bailee and fell.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: כֵּיצַד הַלָּה עוֹשֶׂה סְחוֹרָה בְּפָרָתוֹ כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר יְהוּדָה לְרַב יְהוּדָה: אֲמַרְתְּ לַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: חָלוּק הָיָה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei said: How does the other party do business with and profit from another’s cow? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said to Rav Yehuda: You told us in the name of Shmuel that Rabbi Yosei was in disagreement with the first tanna