בבא מציעא מא

בבא מציעא מא

צָרִיךְ דַּעַת בְּעָלִים.

One requires the knowledge of the owner for the item to be considered returned.

אִי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, מַאי אִירְיָא לֹא יִחֲדוּ? אֲפִילּוּ יִחֲדוּ נָמֵי!

The Gemara asks: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, why did the tanna in the first clause of the mishna establish the case specifically where the owner did not designate a specific place for the barrel to be stored in the bailee’s house? Even in a case where the owner designated a place for the barrel, the bailee should be exempt because he replaced the barrel.

לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא יִחֲדוּ דִּמְקוֹמָהּ הוּא, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ לֹא יִחֲדוּ דְּלָאו מְקוֹמָהּ הוּא – לָא בָּעֵינַן דַּעַת בְּעָלִים.

The Gemara answers: The tanna is speaking utilizing the style: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state the halakha in a case where the owners designated a place for the barrel, as after the bailee replaced the barrel, that is its place. But even in a case where the owner did not designate a place for the barrel, and after the bailee replaces the barrel that is not its place, we do not require the knowledge of the owners. In both cases, once he replaces the barrel, he is exempt from payment.

אֵימָא סֵיפָא: יִחֲדוּ לָהּ הַבְּעָלִים מָקוֹם וְטִלְטְלָהּ וְנִשְׁבְּרָה, בֵּין מִתּוֹךְ יָדוֹ, בֵּין מִשֶּׁהִנִּיחָהּ, לְצׇרְכּוֹ – חַיָּיב, לְצׇרְכָּהּ – פָּטוּר. אֲתָאן לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּאָמַר: בָּעֵינַן דַּעַת בְּעָלִים.

The Gemara asks: Say the latter clause of the mishna: If the owners designated a specific place for the barrel, and the bailee moved it and it broke, whether it broke while still in his hand or whether it broke after he replaced the barrel, if he moved it for his purposes he is liable to pay, and if he moved it for its own purposes, he is exempt. We arrive at the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: We require the knowledge of the owners. Since the bailee moved the barrel from its place for his own purposes, he is a robber and is responsible for damages.

אִי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – מַאי אִירְיָא יִחֲדוּ? אֲפִילּוּ לֹא יִחֲדוּ נָמֵי!

The Gemara asks: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, why did the tanna in the latter clause of the mishna establish the case specifically where the owner designated a particular place for the barrel to be stored in the bailee’s house? Even in a case where the owner did not designate a place for the barrel, the bailee should be liable to pay, because the barrel is not considered to have been returned.

לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֹא יִחֲדוּ דְּלָאו מְקוֹמָהּ הוּא, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ יִחֲדוּ נָמֵי, דִּמְקוֹמָהּ הוּא – בָּעֵינַן דַּעַת בְּעָלִים.

The Gemara answers: The tanna is speaking utilizing the style: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state the halakha in a case where the owners did not designate a place for the barrel, as the place that the bailee placed the barrel is not its place. But even in a case where the owner designated a place for the barrel, where the place that the bailee placed the barrel is its place, we require the knowledge of the owners for it to be considered as if the bailee returned the barrel.

רֵישָׁא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל וְסֵיפָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא? אִין, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאן דִּמְתַרְגֵּם לִי חָבִית אַלִּיבָּא דְּחַד תַּנָּא, מוֹבֵלְנָא מָאנֵיהּ בָּתְרֵיהּ לְבֵי מַסּוּתָא.

The Gemara asks: The result of that explanation is that the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara answers: Indeed, it is as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anyone who explains to me both clauses of the mishna with regard to a barrel according to the opinion of one tanna I will honor, and carry his garments after him to the bathhouse, and treat him as a servant treats his master.

תַּרְגְּמַהּ רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אַבָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב: שֶׁנְּטָלָהּ עַל מְנָת לְגוֹזְלָהּ.

The Gemara relates that Rabbi Ya’akov bar Abba interpreted the mishna before Rav: The mishna is referring to a case where the bailee took the barrel in order to rob the owner of it, and that is the meaning of the term: For his purposes. Since he intended to rob the owner of the barrel, he must return it to its place. In the first clause of the mishna, where the owner of the barrel did not designate a place for it, anywhere that he places it constitutes a return to its place. In the latter clause of the mishna, where the owner designated a place for the barrel, since the bailee did not return the barrel to that place, it is not considered to have been returned.

תַּרְגְּמַהּ רַבִּי נָתָן בַּר אַבָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב: שֶׁנְּטָלָהּ עַל מְנָת לִשְׁלוֹחַ בָּהּ יָד.

Rabbi Natan bar Abba interpreted the mishna before Rav: The mishna is referring to a case where the bailee took the barrel in order to misappropriate it, as one who misappropriates the property of another is responsible for any subsequent damage to it.

בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? בִּשְׁלִיחוּת יָד צְרִיכָה חֶסְרוֹן. מַאן דְּאָמַר לְגוֹזְלָהּ – קָסָבַר שְׁלִיחוּת יָד צְרִיכָה חֶסְרוֹן, וּמַאן דְּאָמַר לִשְׁלוֹחַ בָּהּ יָד – קָסָבַר שְׁלִיחוּת יָד אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה חֶסְרוֹן.

The Gemara asks: With regard to what do Rabbi Ya’akov and Rabbi Natan disagree? The Gemara answers: It is with regard to whether misappropriation requires loss: Is one liable for misappropriation only if it results in depreciation of the deposit, or is one liable for misappropriation even if he only intended to damage the deposit but there was no depreciation? The one who says that the bailee took the barrel in order to rob the owner of it holds that misappropriation requires loss. And the one who says that the bailee took the barrel in order to misappropriate it holds that misappropriation does not require loss.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מִידֵּי ״נְטָלָהּ״ קָתָנֵי? ״טִלְטְלָהּ״ קָתָנֵי! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁטִּלְטְלָהּ לְהָבִיא עָלֶיהָ גּוֹזָלוֹת, וְקָא סָבַר: שׁוֹאֵל שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת – גַּזְלָן הָוֵי. וְכוּלָּהּ רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל הִיא, וְסֵיפָא: שֶׁהִנִּיחָהּ בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאֵינָהּ מְקוֹמָהּ.

Rav Sheshet objects to that explanation: Does the tanna teach that the bailee took it? It is taught in the mishna: The bailee moved it, indicating that he sought neither to misappropriate it nor to rob the owner of it. Rather, Rav Sheshet said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the bailee moved the barrel to stand upon it and bring fledglings from a nest in a tree. The bailee did not attempt to use its contents. He merely climbed on the barrel. And the tanna of the mishna holds: The legal status of one who borrows without the knowledge of the owners is that of a robber in terms of responsibility. And the entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. And the latter clause is referring to a case where the bailee is responsible because he placed the barrel in a place that is not its designated place.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: ״הִנִּיחָהּ״ בִּמְקוֹמָהּ מַשְׁמַע.

The Gemara asks: And why doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan, who claimed that it is not possible to establish both clauses of the mishna in accordance with the opinion of the same tanna, explain the mishna in that manner? He holds that the term: He placed it, indicates that he replaced it in its designated place. Therefore, the latter clause cannot be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and the contradiction remains.

אִיתְּמַר רַב וְלֵוִי. חַד אָמַר: שְׁלִיחוּת יָד צְרִיכָה חֶסְרוֹן, וְחַד אָמַר: שְׁלִיחוּת יָד אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה חֶסְרוֹן. תִּסְתַּיֵּים דְּרַב הוּא דְּאָמַר שְׁלִיחוּת יָד אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה חֶסְרוֹן, דְּתַנְיָא: רוֹעֶה שֶׁהָיָה רוֹעֶה עֶדְרוֹ, וְהִנִּיחַ עֶדְרוֹ וּבָא לָעִיר, וּבָא זְאֵב וְטָרַף וּבָא אֲרִי וְדָרַס – פָּטוּר. הִנִּיחַ מַקְלוֹ וְתַרְמִילוֹ עָלֶיהָ – חַיָּיב.

§ It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute between Rav and Levi. One says: Misappropriation requires loss. And one says: Misappropriation does not require loss. The Gemara comments: It may be concluded that it is Rav who says: Misappropriation does not require loss, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a shepherd who was herding his flock, which included the animals of others, and he abandoned his flock and went to the city, and a wolf came and devoured an animal, and a lion came and clawed an animal, the shepherd is exempt, as in any case, the attacks occurred through circumstances beyond his control. If he placed his staff and his satchel on the animal that was later attacked, he is liable to pay for the animal. Since he utilized the animal, it is as if he misappropriated it, and therefore he is liable to pay even in a case involving circumstances beyond his control.

וְהָוֵינַן בָּהּ: מִשּׁוּם דְּהִנִּיחַ מַקְלוֹ וְתַרְמִילוֹ עָלֶיהָ חַיָּיב? הָא שַׁקְלִינְהוּ!

And we discussed this baraita: Due to the fact that he placed his staff and his satchel on the animal, is he liable to pay? Didn’t he already remove them? Even if he improperly used the animal, he already removed his staff and satchel, and it is tantamount to returning it to the owners.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אָמַר רַב: בְּעוֹדָן עָלֶיהָ. וְכִי עוֹדָן עָלֶיהָ מַאי הָוֵי? הָא לָא מַשְׁכַהּ!

And Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: The tanna is referring to a case where the wolf devoured the animal when the staff and satchel were still on the animal. Since the bailee is still using the animal, it is considered his in terms of liability to pay for the damage caused. The Gemara asks: And if the staff and satchel are still on the animal, what of it? But he did not pull the animal and therefore did not acquire it.

וְאָמַר רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק אָמַר רַב: שֶׁהִכִּישָׁהּ בְּמַקֵּל וְרָצְתָה לְפָנָיו. וְהָא לָא חַסְּרַהּ! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ קָסָבַר שְׁלִיחוּת יָד אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה חֶסְרוֹן?

And Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak says that Rav says: The tanna is referring to a case where the shepherd struck the animal with a staff and it ran before him, which is a form of pulling. The Gemara asks: But by causing the animal to run, he did not cause a loss to the animal. Why is he liable to pay? Rather, must one not conclude from it that Rav holds: Misappropriation does not require loss?

אֵימָא שֶׁהִכְחִישָׁהּ בְּמַקֵּל. דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי ״שֶׁהִכִּישָׁהּ בְּמַקֵּל״. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara rejects that proof: Say that he weakened the animal with a staff, and that is the only reason that he is liable to pay. The Gemara comments: Rav’s language is also precise, as he teaches: Where the shepherd struck the animal with a staff. The reason that he explains that he struck the animal with a staff, as opposed to his hand, is to indicate that the animal was weakened. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that Rav holds that misappropriation requires loss.

וּמִדְּרַב סָבַר שְׁלִיחוּת יָד צְרִיכָה חֶסְרוֹן, לֵוִי סָבַר שְׁלִיחוּת יָד אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה חֶסְרוֹן. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּלֵוִי? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן נְהוֹרַאי: מְשׁוּנָּה שְׁלִיחוּת יָד הָאֲמוּרָה בְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר מִשְּׁלִיחוּת יָד הָאֲמוּרָה בְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם.

The Gemara comments: And from the fact that Rav holds that misappropriation requires loss, it may be inferred that Levi holds that misappropriation does not require loss. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Levi? Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yosei ben Nehorai: Misappropriation that is stated with regard to a paid bailee is different from misappropriation that is stated with regard to an unpaid bailee. There is no need for the Torah to state the halakha of misappropriation twice. If an unpaid bailee is liable to pay for misappropriation, all the more so is a paid bailee liable to pay. The reason that the Torah repeated this halakha is to teach that a paid bailee is liable to pay for misappropriation even if there is no loss.

וַאֲנִי אוֹמֵר אֵינָהּ מְשׁוּנָּה.

Rabbi Yoḥanan continues: And I say that misappropriation by a paid bailee is not different.

וּמַאי מְשׁוּנָּה? לֹא תֵּאָמֵר שְׁלִיחוּת יָד בְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, וְתֵיתֵי מִשּׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם: וּמָה שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם שֶׁפָּטוּר בִּגְנֵבָה וַאֲבֵדָה שָׁלַח בָּהּ יָד – חַיָּיב, שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר שֶׁחַיָּיב בִּגְנֵבָה וַאֲבֵידָה לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן. לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא כַּתְבִינְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא? לוֹמַר לָךְ: שְׁלִיחוּת יָד אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה חֶסְרוֹן.

The Gemara elaborates: And what is meant by: Misappropriation that is stated with regard to a paid bailee is different from misappropriation that is stated with regard to an unpaid bailee? As one could claim: Let misappropriation not be stated with regard to a paid bailee, and derive it from misappropriation with regard to an unpaid bailee by means of an a fortiori inference: And if an unpaid bailee, who is exempt in cases where he claims theft and loss, misappropriated the deposit, he is liable to pay, then a paid bailee, who is liable in cases where he claims theft and loss, all the more so is it not clear that he is liable if he misappropriated the deposit? With regard to what halakha did the Merciful One write misappropriation in the case of a paid bailee? It is to say to you: Misappropriation does not require loss; intent to misappropriate is enough to render him liable to pay.

וַאֲנִי אוֹמֵר: אֵינָהּ מְשׁוּנָּה כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, דְּאָמַר: דָּא וְדָא אַחַת הִיא. מַאי דָּא וְדָא אַחַת? מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמִפְרַךְ: מָה לְשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, שֶׁכֵּן מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב.

Rabbi Yoḥanan stated: And I say that it is not different, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: This case and that case are one. The Gemara elaborates: What is the meaning of: This and that are one? It means that it was necessary to teach misappropriation in both cases due to the fact that it can be refuted by an a fortiori inference: What is notable about an unpaid bailee? He is notable in that he pays the double payment when he falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit. A paid bailee reimburses the owner only for the cost of the deposit in that case. The legal status of the paid bailee is not consistently more stringent than that of an unpaid bailee, and therefore no a fortiori inference is possible.

וּמַאן דְּלָא פָּרֵיךְ סָבַר: קַרְנָא בְּלָא שְׁבוּעָה עֲדִיפָא מִכְּפֵילָא בִּשְׁבוּעָה.

The Gemara comments: And the one who does not refute the a fortiori inference holds: The absolute requirement to pay the principal even without having taken a false oath is more stringent than the requirement to pay the double payment that is effected only with the bailee taking a false oath. In his opinion, the legal status of the paid bailee is consistently more stringent than that of an unpaid bailee, and therefore an a fortiori inference is possible.

רָבָא אָמַר: לֹא תֵּאָמֵר שְׁלִיחוּת יָד לֹא בְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם וְלֹא בְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, וְתֵיתֵי מִשּׁוֹאֵל. וּמַה שׁוֹאֵל דִּלְדַעַת בְּעָלִים קָא עָבֵיד שָׁלַח בָּהּ יָד – חַיָּיב, שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם וְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן.

Rava says: The verse should not state misappropriation, neither with regard to an unpaid bailee nor with regard to a paid bailee, and one can derive it by means of an a fortiori inference from misappropriation with regard to a borrower: And if a borrower, who utilizes the deposit with the knowledge of the owner, misappropriated the deposit, he is liable to pay, then with regard to an unpaid bailee and a paid bailee, who may not utilize the deposit at all, all the more so is it not clear that they are liable to pay if they misappropriate the deposit?

לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? חֲדָא לוֹמַר לָךְ: שְׁלִיחוּת יָד אֵין צְרִיכָה חֶסְרוֹן. וְאִידָּךְ: שֶׁלֹּא תֹּאמַר, דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין לִהְיוֹת כְּנִידּוֹן. מָה שׁוֹאֵל בִּבְעָלִים פָּטוּר – אַף שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם וְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר בִּבְעָלִים פָּטוּר.

Why, then, is the halakha of misappropriation stated in the cases of the unpaid and paid bailees? One mention is to say to you: Misappropriation does not require loss. And the other mention is so that you will not say: With regard to this a fortiori inference, there is a principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion inferred from an a fortiori inference to be like the source of the inference, and thereby conclude: Just as a borrower who is in partnership with the owner is exempt, so too, an unpaid bailee and a paid bailee who are in partnership with the owner are exempt. Consequently, it was necessary for the verse to mention the halakha of misappropriation with regard to both the paid and unpaid bailee.

וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר שְׁלִיחוּת יָד צְרִיכָה חֶסְרוֹן, הָנֵי תַּרְתֵּי שְׁלִיחוּת יָד לְמָה לִי? חֲדָא שֶׁלֹּא תֹּאמַר דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן.

The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says: Misappropriation requires a loss, why do I need these two mentions of misappropriation? The Gemara explains: One mention is so that you will not say with regard to this a fortiori inference the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source.

וְאִידָּךְ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״וְנִקְרַב בַּעַל הַבַּיִת אֶל הָאֱלֹהִים״ לִשְׁבוּעָה. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לִשְׁבוּעָה, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לְדִין? נֶאֶמְרָה שְׁלִיחוּת יָד לְמַטָּה, וְנֶאֶמְרָה שְׁלִיחוּת יָד לְמַעְלָה, מָה לְהַלָּן לִשְׁבוּעָה – אַף כָּאן לִשְׁבוּעָה.

And the other mention is for that which is taught in a baraita. It is written: “And the master of the house shall approach the judges to determine whether he misappropriated his neighbor’s goods” (Exodus 22:7). This is stated with regard to an oath. Do you say that it is stated with regard to an oath, or is it stated only with regard to judgment? Misappropriation is stated below, in a later verse in the chapter: “Whether he misappropriated his neighbor’s goods” (Exodus 22:10), and misappropriation is stated above, in an earlier verse in the chapter: “Whether he misappropriated his neighbor’s goods” (Exodus 22:7). Just as below it is stated explicitly with regard to an oath: “The oath of the Lord shall be between them both to determine whether he misappropriated his neighbor’s goods” (Exodus 22:10), so too here, it is stated with regard to an oath and not merely for judgment.